2026 INSC 521 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6859 OF 2014

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 12822 OF 2013)

PARVATHI NAIRTHI (DEAD)

AND ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

LAXMI NAIRTHY (DEAD)

THROUGH LRS. AND ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

VIJAY BISHNOI, J.

1. The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellants

challenging the Final Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2012

(hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment ”) passed by the

High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as

2

“the High Court”) in Regular Second Appeal No. 1970 of 2012,

by which the High Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the

Appellants herein and thereby affirmed the judgments and

orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate

Court.

FACTUAL MATRIX

2. The brief facts are that one B. Sheena Nairi was a Permanent

Resident of Bombay and was working as a Chartered Accountant

at five big reputed companies. Besides owning a residential flat

in Bombay, he owned substantial other immovable properties

situated at Brahmavar and Chanthar Village, Udupi Taluk,

Karnataka, consisting primarily of agricultural lands and

ancestral properties.

3. B. Sheena Nairi had two sisters and two brothers, namely,

Akkanni Nairi (elder sister), Laxmi Nairthy (younger sister), B.

Jagannatha Nairi (elder brother), and B. Lakshmana Nairi

(younger brother). B. Sheena Nairi had lost his elder sister, and

after her demise, he took care of her two daughters and

performed their marriages.

3

4. B. Sheena Nairi was married to Parvathi Nairthi (Appellant No.

1), and they had five children, namely, Prabhakar Nairi

(Appellant No. 2), Jayanth Nairi (Appellant No. 3), Leela Prabhu

(Respondent No. 2), Sundara Nairi (Respondent No. 3), and Usha

Nairi (Respondent No. 4) herein. For the management of certain

properties, B. Sheena Nairi had executed a Power of Attorney

(hereinafter referred to as “the POA”) in favour of his brother-in-

law Krishnayya Nairi on 30.04.1960 and 08.04.1961.

5. B. Sheena Nairi executed his last Will dated 15.05.1983

(hereinafter referred to as “the Will”) bequeathing all the plaint

schedule properties in the favour of his only sister Laxmi Nairthy,

who is the Plaintiff and Respondent No. 1 herein, and cancelled

the POA executed in favour of his brother-in-law. B. Sheena Nairi

(hereinafter referred to as “the testator”) passed away on

30.11.1983, at the age of 69 years, due to heart attack in Delhi.

6. After the death of the testator, an application was made by his

wife, being Appellant No. 1, before the Tehsildar, Udupi for the

transfer of her husband's properties in her favour. The Tehsildar,

Udupi, vide order dated 01.02.1984, issued notice under the

4

Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 and called for the objections

with respect to the said properties. Subsequently, the Tehsildar,

Udupi, vide order dated 06.04.1984, passed mutation order

transferring the properties in favour of Appellant No. 1.

7. On 22.11.1990, La xmi Nairthy, being the Plaintiff and

Respondent No. 1, instituted a civil suit bearing O.S. No. 186 of

1990 before the Court of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior

Division), Udupi (hereinafter referred to as the “Trial Court”) on

the basis of the Will executed by the testator. The suit was filed

seeking a declaration that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner of

the plaint schedule properties under the Will; a decree of

perpetual injunction restraining the wife and children of the

testator from interfering with her peaceful possession of Item

Nos. 1 to 3 of plaint schedule properties; recovery of possession

of Schedule Item Nos. 4 to 12 of the plaint schedule properties,

which had been given to Krishnayya Nairi under the Power of

Attorney; mesne profits; and compensation till the delivery of

possession.

5

8. The wife and children of the testator, namely Appellant Nos. 1 to

3 and Respondent Nos. 2 to 4, filed a written statement and

contended that the Will is false and fabricated; that the testator

has never executed any such Will; and that the signature affixed

on the said Will does not belong to him. It was further contended

that after the death of the testator, the said Will was created by

his brothers, namely, B. Jagannatha Nairi and Lakshmana Nairi,

in collusion with each other and that the plaint schedule

properties were never in possession of the Plaintiff and the

testator had never revoked the POA executed in favour of

Krishnayya Nairi.

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT

9. The Trial Court, vide Judgment and Decree dated 16.12.2008,

allowed the suit of the Plaintiff and declared that the Plaintiff

is the owner of the plaint schedule property as per the Will and

ordered to handover the possession of Schedule Item Nos. 4 to

12 of the plaint schedule property to the Plaintiff and opened

enquiry under Order XX Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure

6

(hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) for mesne profits. The Trial

Court held that:-

a. The Plaintiff produced her brother B. Jagannatha Nairi-

PW2, who was one of the attesting witnesses to the Will.

PW2 categorically deposed that the testator, being his

brother, had executed the Will in his presence and that the

signature appearing on the Will belonged to the testator.

However, the wife and children of the testator, except filing

the written statement, had not produced any witness and

had not appeared for cross-examination in order to prove

their allegations. On their behalf, only the POA holder

appeared and had given his evidence which was doubtful.

Also, the wife and the children had not specifically cross-

examined the Plaintiff and B. Jagannatha Nairi-PW2 to

prove the Will as fraudulent.

b. With regard to the dispute concerning signature of the

testator on the Will, it was held that the signature in the

POA executed by the testator was accepted by the wife and

children of the testator and when that accepted signature

was compared with the signatures appeared on every page

7

of the Will, it appeared to be the same, observing sufficient

coordination in the writing, the placement of dots in the

signature and the formation of underline, thereb y

concluding that the signatures were made by the same

person.

c. Further, it was also held that the testator, during his

lifetime, executed the POA in respect to Schedule Item Nos.

4 to 12 of the plaint schedule property in favour of

Krishnayya Nairi through licence authority in 1961.

However, the said POA was revoked after the death of the

testator and Krishnayya Nairi had the possession of the

said property as a licensee only. Except accepting the

possession of the schedule property, Krishnayya Nairi had

not denied the ownership of the property of the testator

and had not prayed for any authority or ownership and so,

the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of

Schedule Item Nos. 4 to 12 as per the Will.

d. However, it was observed that due to non-production of

any reliable documents or any complaint lodged by the

Plaintiff before the police regarding the alleged illegal

8

interference of the wife and children of the testator, and in

view of the fact that no eye witnesses were produced to

prove the said incident, no case was made out for grant of

a stay order in favour of the Plaintiff.

10. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 16.12.2008, the

wife and children of the testator preferred an appeal bearing R.A.

No. 4 of 2009 before the District & Sessions Judge at Udupi.

However, the said appeal was transferred to the Fast Track

Court, Udupi (hereinafter referred to as “the First Appellate

Court”) for disposal in accordance with law.

JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT

11. The First Appellate Court, vide Judgment and Decree dated

06.08.2012, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of

the Trial Court. The First Appellate Court observed that the

Plaintiff had already given her representation without any delay

to the Tehsildar, Udupi on 10.02.1984 which disclosed all

relevant facts including execution of the Will in her favour.

Further, the wife and children of the testator, despite being the

best persons to deny the plaint, had not stepped into the witness

9

box to deny the contents of the plaint. Furthermore, the First

Appellate Court relied upon the evidence of B. Jagannatha Nairi

and inferred that the testator and the attesting witness had

signed the Will in the presence of each other. Moreover, it was

held that the Trial Court had rightly compared the disputed

signature of the testator on the Will with the admitted signature

on the POA, and since the Trial Court itself possesses such

power, there was no necessity of a handwriting expert.

Accordingly, the First Appellate Court concluded that no

interference with the findings of the Trial Court was warranted.

12. Aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree dated 06.08.2012, the

wife and children of the testator preferred a second appeal

bearing R.S.A No. 1970 of 201 2 before the High Court of

Karnataka.

IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

13. The High Court, vide Final Judgment and Order dated

15.11.2012, dismissed the second appeal. The High Court held

that it was not the case of the Appellants that the First Appellate

Court had failed to consider any particular ground or point urged

10

by the Appellants. It was further observed that the First Appellate

Court, in order to confirm the judgment of the Trial Court, had

given detailed reasoning on each of the grounds canvassed in the

appeal, though the points for consideration may not have been

properly formulated. Therefore, the High Court held that merely

on the technical grounds that the points formulated by the First

Appellate Court were not in conformity with Order XLI Rule 31 of

CPC, the findings of the First Appellate Court could not be set

aside. With regard to the contention that the wife and the

children of the testator had been excluded from the properties of

the testator without any reason, the High Court held that the Will

itself clearly recited that the testator had already given sufficient

properties to his wife and children. However, for reasons best

known to them, the wife and children of the testator did not enter

the witness box and failed to furnish any particulars regarding

the movable or immovable properties or cash allegedly given to

them by the testator. Even the evidence of B. Jagannatha Nairi

had not been seriously challenged by the Appellants and that it

was not difficult for the Appellants to summon another attestor

to the Will, if he had not attested the Will. Therefore, the High

11

Court held that no substantial question of law arose for

consideration in the appeal and accordingly, the appeal was

dismissed.

14. Being aggrieved by the Impugned Judgment, the Appellants are

before us.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

15. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on

behalf of the Appellants submitted that the suit was filed by the

Plaintiff after 7 years of execution of the Will and 6 years after

mutation and conversion of the land in favour of the Appellants,

for which no explanation was given by the Plaintiff. Even no

explanation was given as to why the testator would make a Will

only for the lands and not for other assets, in favour of the

Plaintiff, to the exclusion of his own wife and children.

16. Further, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the

Respondent No. 1 never objected to the mutation taking place in

favour of the Appellants before the Tehsildar, Udupi in 1984 and

no copy of the Will was produced at that time. No explanation

12

was also given to the document filed by the Plaintiff showing

practice of signatures of the testator.

17. Furthermore, the learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the

testimony of B. Jagannatha Nairi, the attesting witness in the

Will, stated the place of death of the testator to be Bombay and

that he did not know about the contents of the Will.

18. Moreover, it is submitted that the Impugne d Judgment

categorically stated that the points of consideration framed by

the First Appellate Court were “general” in nature and thereafter,

erroneously arrived at the conclusion that all the Courts had

scrutinised the entire evidence and facts on record, treating the

same as “mere technicalities”. Thus, the First Appellate Court

failed to comply with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

19. Mr. Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the Respondents submitted that once specific allegations of

forgery or fraud were made in respect of the Will and the Plaintiff

had duly proved the execution of the Will, the burden shifted on

13

the Appellants to prove their plea of forgery. However, the

Appellants never asked for sending the Will for examination by a

handwriting expert nor chose to examine any expert witness and

thus, the specific plea of forgery was not even attempted to be

proved.

20. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the proceedings

throughout were initiated by Ganesha @ Ganapayya Nairi,

namely Respondent No. 5, whereas the legal heirs of the testator,

namely his wife and children, remained passive throughout the

proceedings. This is evident from the fact that the written

statement was signed, verified and affirmed solely by Respondent

No. 5; only Respondent No. 5 was examined as DW1; and the

application for stay before the First Appellate Court was verified

and affirmed by Respondent No. 5 alone. It is submitted that the

same was for protecting his interest in the property as the

testator had given possession of the property to the father of

Respondent No. 5 as the POA holder and he was enjoying the

possession. But the real beneficiaries of succession, namely the

wife and children of the testator, did not enter the witness box

14

either to prove the plea of forgery or to deny the execution of the

Will.

21. Further, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that Mohammad

Saheb, one of the attestors of the Will, filed an affidavit on

20.12.1990, which was even prior to the filing of the written

statement by the Appellants on 18.02.1991. Therefore, the First

Appellate Court rightly observed that, when the Trial Court had

not issued any notice to him, the question arose as to how he

came to know about the pendency of the suit and for what reason

he had filed the said affidavit.

22. Furthermore, it is also submitted that, sometime after the death

of the testator, the Plaintiff made an application dated

10.02.1984 to the Tehsildar, Udupi requesting him to change the

patta of the plaint schedule properties in her name in the

mutation register. Copies of the said application were also

forwarded to the Secretary, Bramhavara, Udupi Taluk, the

Assistant Commissioner, Kundapura, and the Revenue

Inspector, Bramhavara. However, the Plaintiff came to know that

Krishnayya Nairi had managed to get the names of the wife and

15

children of the testator entered in the records of rights in respect

of the plaint properties without issuing any notice to the Plaintiff

or conducting any enquiry. It is submitted that only in October,

1990, when Krishnayya Nairi along with his son, Ganesha @

Ganapayya Nairi, attempted to threaten the Plaintiff and cut the

standing crops, the Plaintiff was constrained to file the suit.

Therefore, there was no delay in producing the Will before the

Trial Court.

23. Additionally, it is submitted that the testator, in the Will itself,

specifically stated that “I am doing no injustice to my wife and

children or other relatives…I have given enough and more to my

wife and children who are residing at Bombay” and thus, the wife

and children had already been provided with sufficient

properties.

24. Moreover, it is submitted that in the cross-examination of B.

Jagannatha Nairi, being the only living attesting witness to the

Will, he specifically stated that his brother’s daughter came to

his house and took his signature on a paper, the contents of

which were not informed to him and thus, the affidavit of B.

16

Jagannatha Nairi relied upon by the Appellants is a self-created

affidavit by the Appellants and thus, cannot be relied upon.

ANALYSIS

25. We have heard both the learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the parties and have perused the relevant material

placed on record.

26. The issue that arises for our consideration is whether there are

sufficient grounds that warrant interference with the concurrent

findings of the facts of all the Courts upholding validity of the

Will.

Principles for the Validity and Execution of a Will

27. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is pertinent to refer to

the relevant provisions governing the validity and execution of a

Will. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 reads as follow-

“Section 68- Proof of Execution of document required

by law to be attested­- If a document is required by law to

be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one

attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of

proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive,

and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving

evidence: xxx”

17

28. It has been categorically stated in the case of Meena Pradhan

and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another

1

that-

“9. A Will is an instrument of testamentary disposition of

property. It is a legally acknowledged mode of bequeathing

a testator's property during his lifetime to be acted upon on

his/her death and carries with it an element of sanctity. It

speaks from the death of the testator. Since the

testator/testatrix, at the time of testing the document for its

validity, would not be available for deposing as to the

circumstances in which the will came to be executed,

stringent requisites for the proof thereof have been

statutorily enjoined to rule out the possibility of any

manipulation.”

29. With regard to the principles pertaining to the validity and

execution of a Will, reliance is placed on the judgments passed

by 3 Judges Bench and 2 Judges Bench of this Court in H.

Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma And Others

2

,

Bhagwan Kaur v. Kartar Kaur And Others

3

, Janki Narayan

Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam

4

, Yumnam Ongbi Tampha

Ibema Devi v. Yumnam Joykumar Singh And Others

5

, and

Shivakumar And Others v. Sharanabasappa And Others

6

,

1

2023 SCC OnLine SC 1198.

2

1958 SCC OnLine SC 31.

3

(1994) 5 SCC 135.

4

(2003) 2 SCC 91.

5

(2009) 4 SCC 780.

6

(2021) 11 SCC 277.

18

from which the following principles required for proving the

validity and execution of a Will may be deduced:

“10.1. The court has to consider two aspects : firstly, that

the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it

was the last will executed by him;

10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical

accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind

has to be applied.

10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required

under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say:

(a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it

shall be signed by some other person in his presence and

by his direction and the said signature or affixation shall

show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a

will;

(b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more

witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is

necessary;

(c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the

testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some

other person sign the will, in the presence and by the

direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a

personal acknowledgment of such signatures;

(d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the

presence of the testator, however, the presence of all

witnesses at the same time is not required;

10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at

least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to

the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall

be examined;

10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the

testator's signatures but also that each of the witnesses had

signed the will in the presence of the testator;

10.6. If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the

will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be

dispensed with;

19

10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the

will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available

attesting witness has to be called to supplement his

evidence;

10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the

execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the

propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can

be accepted as the testator's last will. In such cases, the

initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier.

10.9. The test of judicial conscience has been evolved for

dealing with those cases where the execution of the will is

surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It requires to

consider factors such as awareness of the testator as to the

content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of

the dispositions in the will; sound, certain and disposing

state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of

execution; testator executed the will while acting on his own

free will;

10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence

et cetera has to prove the same. However, even in the

absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances

giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the

propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by

giving a cogent and convincing explanation.

10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be “real, germane

and valid” and not merely “the fantasy of the doubting mind

[Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277] ”.

Whether a particular feature would qualify as “suspicious”

would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Any circumstance raising suspicion legitimate in nature

would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a

shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust

disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a

leading part in the making of the will under which he

receives a substantial benefit, etc.”

20

30. Coming back to the present factual matrix, after a careful perusal

of the relevant material on record and applying the settled

proposition of law, it is evident that the Will was duly executed

by the testator voluntarily out of his free will in a sound state of

mind and the same stands proved through the testimony of one

of the attesting witnesses, namely B. Jagannatha Nairi, who was

examined as PW2 by the Trial Court. This witness categorically

stated that the testator executed the Will in question in his

presence, and that both he and the testator signed the Will in the

presence of each other.

Claim of Title Based on a Will

31. The contention of the Appellants that there was an unexplained

delay of 7 years in producing the Will after the death of the

testator is liable to be rejected. The said contention has been

considered by all the Courts, which concurrently held that the

Plaintiff had already given a representation before the Tehsildar,

Udupi vide notice dated 10.02.1984 to mutate her name, and the

said notice was received by the concerned authorities as

evidenced by the postal certificate. Although, there was no

material which disclosed that the Plaintiff had produced the copy

21

of the Will before the concerned authority, but the said notice

itself disclosed all relevant facts, including the execution of the

Will in favour of the Plaintiff, without any delay. All the Courts

have duly examined the said issue thoroughly and have recorded

concurrent findings and thus, we are also in conformity with the

same. As regards the contention of the Appellants that they had

obtained mutation entries in the year 1984, it is well settled that

such mutation entries do not confer title and it is effected merely

for fiscal purposes, namely, to enable the State to realize tax from

the person whose name is recorded in the revenue records, as

held in Balwant Singh And Another v. Daulat Singh (Dead)

By LRs. And Others

7

. Also, the contention that the Will is

unregistered has no significant bearing on its validity, as this

Court in the case of Ishwardeo Narain Singh v. Kamta Devi

And Others

8

has clearly held that:-

“6. …There is nothing in law which requires the registration

of a will and wills are in a majority of cases not registered

at all. To draw any inference against the genuineness of the

will on the ground of its non-registration appears to us to be

wholly unwarranted.”

7

(1997) 7 SCC 137.

8

(1953) 1 SCC 295.

22

Scope of Suspicious Circumstances to Vitiate a Will

32. The contention of the Appellants that the Appellants, being the

natural heirs of the testator, have been outrightly excluded

without any reason and that such exclusion constitutes a

suspicious circumstance surrounding the execution of the Will

is legally untenable. It is well-established that mere deprivation

of natural heirs, by itself, may not amount to a suspicious

circumstance because the whole idea behind the execution of a

Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession, as

categorically held in Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Another

v. Panchanan Banerjee (Dead) by LRs and Others

9

. However,

in the case of Ram Piari v. Bhagwant and Ors.

10

, this Court

also held that prudence requires reason for denying the benefit

of inheritance to natural heirs and an absence of it, though not

invalidating the Will in all cases, shrouds the disposition with

suspicious as it does not give inking to the mind of the testator

to enable the Court to judge that disposition was a voluntary act.

9

(1995) 4 SCC 459.

10

(1990) 3 SCC 364.

23

33. This brings us to the next issue i.e., what are the suspicious

circumstances which may vitiate the disposition of a Will. In

Indu Bala Bose & Ors. v. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr.

11

,

this Court held that-

“8. Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not

a “suspicious” circumstance. A circumstance would be

“suspicious” when it is not normal or is not normally

expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal

person.”

34. With regard to the prudence to be drawn while determining the

suspicious circumstances, all the Courts have unambiguously

opined that the Will in question was validly executed. It is trite

to state that when the validity of a Will is to be determined, the

overall terms of a Will, the intention of the testator and the

surrounding circumstances have also to be seen. Mere exclusion

of the natural heirs from the property of the testator, by itself,

cannot be construed as a suspicious circumstance so as to

invalidate a Will outrightly. A testator is legally entitled to dispose

of his property according to his own wishes, and unless the

exclusion is accompanied by suspicious circumstances affecting

11

(1982) 1 SCC 20.

24

the genuineness or due execution of a Will, such exclusion alone

does not render a Will invalid. Thus, we are of the considered

view that the exclusion of the natural heirs cannot be sufficient

to vitiate the Will in question, particularly when the Will clearly

specifies that the testator has not done any injustice to his wife,

children, or other relatives, and that he has given enough to his

wife and children who are residing at Bombay.

Compliance of Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC

35. The contention of the Appellants that the First Appellate Court,

while deciding the first appeal, has not complied with Order XLI

Rule 31 of CPC is hereby rejected. Rule 31 reads thus-

“Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment -

The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and

shall state-

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,

the relief to which the appellant is entitled,

and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and

dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”

25

36. This Court in G. Amalorpavam And Others v. R. C. Diocese of

Madurai and Others

12

also held that:-

“9. The question whether in a particular case there has been

substantial compliance with the provisions of Order 41 Rule

31 CPC has to be determined on the nature of the judgment

delivered in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions

may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void, and

may be ignored if there has been substantial compliance

with it and the second appellate court is in a position to

ascertain the findings of the lower appellate court. It is no

doubt desirable that the appellate court should comply with

all the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC. But if it is

possible to make out from the judgment that there is

substantial compliance with the said requirements and that

justice has not thereby suffered, that would be sufficient.

Where the appellate court has considered the entire

evidence on record and discussed the same in detail, come

to any conclusion and its findings are supported by reasons

even though the point has not been framed by the appellate

court there is substantial compliance with the provisions of

Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the judgment is not in any

manner vitiated by the absence of a point of determination.

Where there is an honest endeavour on the part of the lower

appellate court to consider the controversy between the

parties and there is proper appraisement of the respective

cases and weighing and balancing of the evidence, facts

and the other considerations appearing on both sides is

clearly manifest by the perusal of the judgment of the lower

appellate court, it would be a valid judgment even though it

does not contain the points for determination. The object of

the rule in making it incumbent upon the appellate court to

frame points for determination and to cite reasons for the

decision is to focus attention of the court on the rival

contentions which arise for determination and also to

12

(2006) 3 SCC 224.

26

provide litigant parties opportunity in understanding the

ground upon which the decision is founded with a view to

enable them to know the basis of the decision and if so

considered appropriate and so advised to avail the remedy

of second appeal conferred by Section 100 CPC.”

37. In view of the above position of law, we are of the view that mere

non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of CPC may not vitiate

the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there

has been substantial compliance with it and the rule should not

be interpreted technically to compromise substantial justice. The

findings in the decision passed by the First Appellate Court have

properly scrutinised the evidence on record, even if the points of

consideration are general, and thus, the same does not suffer

from any illegality.

Evidentiary Value of Affidavits

38. The contention of the Appellants that the affidavits of both the

attesting witnesses to the Will, denying that they had signed the

same, render the Will invalid is unsustainable. In this regard,

this Court in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v. State of

27

Maharashtra and Others

13

has categorically held that an

affidavit is not an “evidence” within the meaning of Section 3 of

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and the same can be used as

“evidence” only if, for sufficient reasons, the Court passes an

order under Order XIX of CPC and thus, the filing of an affidavit

cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or

Tribunal, on the basis of which it can come to a conclusion as

regards a particular fact situation. However, in a case where the

deponent is available for cross-examination, and opportunity is

given to the other side to cross-examine him, the same can be

relied upon. In the present case, it is also important to note that

those affidavits were filed even prior to the filing of the written

statement, and the same has been rightly dealt by all the Courts,

which questioned as to how the witnesses came to know about

the enquiry regarding the validity of the Will despite no notice

having been issued by the Court calling upon them to submit

such affidavits. Thus, in view of the same, the affidavits filed by

the attesting witnesses to the Will cannot be relied upon.

13

(2013) 4 SCC 465.

28

CONCLUSION

39. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the concurrent findings of

all the Courts have rightly given a well-reasoned decision

upholding the validity of the Will and the same does not warrant

interference of this Court.

40. For the aforesaid reasons, we affirm the Impugned Judgment and

hence, the present appeal is dismissed.

41. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No order

as to costs.

………………………., J.

(UJJAL BHUYAN)

………………………., J.

(VIJAY BISHNOI)

NEW DELHI;

21

ST

May, 2026