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Patel Babubhai Manohardas & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat

  Supreme Court Of India Criminal Appeal /1388/2014
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Case Background

This appeal by special leave is directed againstthe judgment and order dated 17.12.2013 passed by the HighCourt of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (briefly ‘the High Court’hereinafter) in Criminal Appeal No. 626 ...

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Document Text Version

2025 INSC 322

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1388 OF 2014

PATEL BABUBHAI MANOHARDAS & ORS. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

UJJAL BHUYAN, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against

the judgment and order dated 17.12.2013 passed by the High

Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad (briefly ‘the High Court’

hereinafter) in Criminal Appeal No. 626 of 2011.

2. It may be mentioned that the four appellants are

accused Nos. 1 to 4. They were convicted by the Court of

Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana vide the judgment and

order dated 12.05.2011 in Special Atrocity Case No. 53/2009

2

under Sections 306 and 114 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC’

for short) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment (RI) for 5

years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000.00 each with a default

stipulation.

3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and

sentence, appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No. 626 of 2011

before the High Court. State of Gujarat also filed Criminal

Appeal No. 796 of 2011 for enhancement of sentence. By the

common judgment and order dated 17.12.2013, the High Court

dismissed the appeal of the appellants and affirmed the

conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana (‘trial court’ for

short). The appeal filed by the State was also dismissed.

4. It is against the aforesaid judgment and order

dated 17.12.2013 passed by the High Court that the appellants

preferred the related SLP (Crl.) No. 2809/2014. However, State

did not challenge before this Court dismissal of its appeal by

the High Court.

5. This Court by order dated 07.04.2014 had issued

notice both on the special leave petition as well as on the prayer

for bail. By order dated 04.07.2014, leave was granted.

3

Thereafter, vide the order dated 17.10.2014, this Court granted

bail to appellant No. 4. Vide the order dated 11.05.2015,

appellant No. 1 was also granted bail. Thereafter, by the order

dated 14.09.2015, appellant Nos. 2 and 3 were granted bail.

6. Prosecution case in brief is that one Jaybalaben

lodged first information before the Mehsana Taluka police

station on 14.05.2009 stating that at 08:00 AM on 25.04.2009,

she and her daughter Priyanka had gone to the Amipura water

park dispensary as she was working there. At around 01:00

PM, one Jayantibhai Kalidas, a neighbour, came to her

dispensary and told her that her mother-in-law was ill. On

hearing this, she and her daughter came back home

immediately in a rickshaw. When she reached her house, she

saw many people had gathered there. She went inside the

house and saw her husband Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai lying

on a cot with his younger and elder brothers standing nearby.

Though she tried to revive him, he did not respond; he had

already died. As she started weeping, the ladies who were

present there told her that her husband had consumed poison.

Foul smell of poison was coming from his mouth. First

informant stated that her husband was taken to the village

dispensary where he was declared dead. Thereafter police

4

came. After completion of necessary paper works, body of her

husband was taken to Mehsana Civil Hospital for postmortem

examination on completion of which the body was handed over

to the family.

6.1. Jaybalaben continued with her narration. She

stated that about a year ago, a case of misappropriation was

registered against her husband Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai in

his office. She and her elder brother-in-law Jayantibhai had

asked her husband as to why he needed so much of money to

which the reply of her husband was that one cleaning worker

in his office by the name Geetaben had trapped him in a love

scandal and thereafter started blackmailing him for money. It

was for this reason that he had to withdraw money from the

office to give her.

6.2. When her elder brother-in-law Jayantibhai called

Geetaben, her mother Jasiben, her husband Dahyabhai and

relative Babubhai Patel to return the money, they initially

agreed to do so but did not return. They also took away

ornaments (jewellery).

6.3. Jaybalaben also stated that at the time of death of

her husband, they found one note of two pages from the pocket

5

of her husband’s trouser which was shown to her by

Jayantibhai, her elder brother-in-law. She stated that from that

note, it was apparent that Geetaben and her family members

were blackmailing her husband after taking various

photographs and videos of him with her in compromising

position. She stated that her husband ha d also stolen

ornaments (jewellery) of her daughter and gave those to

Geetaben and her family members. It was for this reason that

her husband Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai had consumed poison.

7. The aforesaid complaint was registered as I.C.R.

No. 107/2009 by the Mehsana Taluka police station under

Sections 306/114 of IPC read with Section 3(2)(5) of The

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘the Prevention of Atrocities Act’

hereinafter). The investigating officer on conclusion of

investigation filed chargesheet against the appellants before the

Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mehsana. As the case was

triable by the Court of Sessions, it was committed to the Court

of Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana (trial court) where the

case was numbered as Special Atrocities Case No. 53/2009.

Prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited

a number of documents to prove its case. On completion of

6

prosecution evidence, statements of the appellant s were

recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 (Cr.P.C.). Appellants denied the prosecution case and

alleged false implication.

8. On consideration of the oral as well as

documentary evidence and after hearing the parties, trial court

vide the judgment and order dated 12.05.2011 convicted the

appellants under Sections 306/114 of IPC but acquitted them

of the charge under Section 3(2)(5) of the Prevention of

Atrocities Act. Upon such conviction, the trial court sentenced

the appellants to undergo RI for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs.

10,000.00 each with a default stipulation for the offence

punishable under Sections 306/114 IPC.

9. Appellants assailed the aforesaid conviction and

sentence of the trial court before the High Court in Criminal

Appeal No. 626 of 2011. As pointed out above, State also filed

Criminal Appeal No. 796/2011 for enhancement of sentence.

10. High Court vide the judgment and order dated

17.12.2013 upheld the conviction and sentence of the

appellants and dismissed their appeal. High Court also did not

7

find any good ground to enhance the sentence. Consequently,

the criminal appeal filed by the State was dismissed.

11. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that

both the trial court and the High Court failed to appreciate that

the prosecution case was not supported by any material

evidence, such as, video cassette and objectionable

photographs of the deceased with the accused persons etc.

Therefore, the story of blackmailing by the accused persons

compelling the deceased to commit suicide is not at all

believable.

11.1. From the evidence tendered by the prosecution

witnesses, no intention on the part of the accused persons to

aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide is

discernible. Appellants were neither present at the time and

place of recovery of the dead body nor at any proximate point

of time. Therefore, no case for abetment to commit suicide can

be said to have been made out against the appellants.

11.2. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits

that the so-called suicide note was produced before the police

20 days after the death of the deceased. As such, no reliance

can be placed on such suicide note.

8

11.3. Learned counsel further submits that both the

courts below failed to appreciate that PW -7 Jayantibhai

Karshanbhai Parmar, elder brother of the deceased, did not

support the case of the prosecution. As such the charge under

Section 306 IPC cannot be said to have been proved by the

prosecution against the appellants beyond all reasonable

doubt.

11.4. He also points out that according to the

prosecution case, the deceased had given money and

ornaments to the appellants on their blackmailing him. But

there was neither recovery of any money nor ornaments from

the accused persons (appellants). Learned counsel for the

appellants submits that there could be various other reasons

which compelled the deceased to take the extreme step, such

as, disciplinary proceeding initiated in his office against him for

misappropriation of money leading to his suspens ion but

certainly no case of abetment to commit suicide can be said to

have been made out against the appellants.

11.5. That being the position, learned counsel contends

that appellants have been wrongly convicted under Sections

9

306/114 IPC and, therefore, are entitled to a clear acquittal.

Appeal should accordingly be allowed.

12. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent

submits that death of Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar had

taken place due to consumption of poison. This has been

proved by the postmortem report. He submits that the suicide

note (Ex. 33) was written in the own handwritin g of the

deceased and this has been proved as per the opinion of the

handwriting expert. From the suicide note, it is apparent that

appellants had extracted money from the deceased by

blackmailing him with compromising photographs of the

deceased with appellant No. 3. As the deceased became unable

to withstand the same, he took the drastic step.

12.1. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that

on a conjoint reading of all the oral and documentary evidence,

it is evident that prosecution had proved the charge against the

appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. Therefore, the trial

court rightly convicted the appellants under the aforesaid

provisions of law which conviction has been affirmed by the

High Court. He, therefore, submits that there is no merit in this

appeal and consequently the appeal should be dismissed.

10

13. Submissions made by learned counsel for the

parties have received the due consideration of the Court.

14. Before we proceed to advert to the evidence of the

material prosecution witnesses and to analyse the same, it

would be apposite to refer to the legal provisions and the

judicial precedents relevant for adjudication of the present

criminal appeal.

15. Attempt to commit suicide is an offence in India.

Section 309 IPC says that whoever attempts to commit suicide

and does any act towards such act, shall be punished with

simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year

or with fine or with both. However, once suicide is carried out,

the offence is complete. Considering the nature of the offence,

obviously such a person would be beyond the reach of the law.

Therefore, question of penalising him would not arise but

whoever abets the commission of such suicide would be

penalised under Section 306 IPC. Punishment prescribed

under Section 306 IPC is imprisonment of either description for

a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to

fine. What Section 306 IPC says is that if any person commits

11

suicide, then whoever abets the commission of such suicide

shall be punished as above.

16. Therefore, the crucial word in Section 306 IPC is

‘abets’. ‘Abetment’ is defined in Section 107 of IPC. As per

Section 107 IPC, a person would be abetting the doing of a thing

if he instigates any person to do that thing or if he encourages

with one or more person or persons in any conspiracy for doing

that thing or if he intentionally aids by any act or illegal

omission doing of that thing. There are two explanations to

Section 107. As per Explanation 1, even if a person by way of

wilful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact

which he is otherwise bound to disclose voluntarily causes or

procures or attempts to cause or procure a thing to be done, is

said to instigate the doing of that thing. Explanation 2 clarifies

that whoever does anything in order to facilitate the

commission of an act, either prior to or at the time of

commission of the act, is said to aid the doing of that act.

17. Section 114 IPC is an explanation or clarification

of Section 107 IPC. What Section 114 IPC says is that whenever

any person is absent but was present when the act or offence

for which he would be punishable in consequence of the

12

abetment is committed, he shall be deemed to have committed

such an act or offence and would be liable to be punished as

an abettor.

18. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh

1, this

Court held that to ‘instigate’ means to goad, urge, provoke,

incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of

‘instigation’, it is not necessary that actual words must be used

to that effect or that the words or act should necessarily and

specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Where the

accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of

conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no

other option except to commit suicide, then ‘instigation’ may be

inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without

intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to

be ‘instigation’.

19. Elaborating further, this Court in Chitresh Kumar

Chopra versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

2 observed that to

constitute ‘instigation’, a person who instigates another has to

provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the

1

(2001) 9 SCC 618

2

(2009) 16 SCC 605

13

other by ‘goading’ or ‘urging forward’. This Court summed up

the constituents of ‘abetment’ as under:

(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the

deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or

conduct which may even be a wilful silence until

the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the

deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or

conduct to make the deceased move forward more

quickly in a forward direction; and

(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke,

urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide

while acting in the manner noted above.

Undoubtedly, presence of mens rea is the necessary

concomitant of instigation.

20. Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu versus State of West

Bengal

3 is a case where this Court held that in a case of alleged

abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect

act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the

allegation of harassment without there being any positive

action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the

accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit

suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be

3

(2010) 1 SCC 707

14

sustainable. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in

case of Ude Singh versus State of Haryana

4.

21. After considering the provisions of Sections 306

and 107 of IPC, this Court in Rajesh versus State of Haryana

5

held that conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable

on the allegation of harassment without there being any

positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part

of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit

suicide.

22. Abetment to commit suicide involves a mental

process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person

in the doing of a thing. Without a positive proximate act on the

part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide,

conviction cannot be sustained. Besides, in order to convict a

person under Section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea

to commit the offence.

23. This Court in Amudha versus State

6 held that

there has to be an act of incitement on the part of the accused

proximate to the date on which the deceased committed

4

(2019) 17 SCC 301

5

(2020) 15 SCC 359

6

2024 INSC 244

15

suicide. The act attributed should not only be proximate to the

time of suicide but should also be of such a nature that the

deceased was left with no alternative but to take the drastic

step of committing suicide.

24. Again, in the case of Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi

versus State of Karnataka

7, this Court observed that discord

and differences in domestic life are quite common in society.

Commission of suicide largely depends upon the mental state

of the victim. Until and unless some guilty intention on the part

of the accused is established, it is ordinarily not possible to

convict the accused for an offence under Section 306 IPC.

25. Prakash versus State of Maharashtra

8 is a case

where this Court after analysing various decisions on the point

summed up the legal position in the following manner:

14. Section 306 read with Section 107 of IPC, has

been interpreted, time and again, and its principles

are well established. To attract the offence of

abetment to suicide, it is important to establish

proof of direct or indirect acts of instigation or

incitement of suicide by the accused, which must

be in close proximity to the commission of suicide

by the deceased. Such instigation or incitement

should reveal a clear mens rea to abet the

7

(2024) SCC Online SC 3541

8

2024 INSC 1020

16

commission of suicide and should put the victim in

such a position that he/she would have no other

option but to commit suicide.

25.1. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court referred to

its earlier decision in Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar versus State

of M.P.

9 and held that in a given case, even a time gap of 48

hours between using of abusive language by the accused and

the commission of suicide would not amount to a proximate

act.

26. Having surveyed the relevant legal provisions and

the case laws on the subject, let us now deal with the material

prosecution witnesses.

27. PW-2 is Jayabalaben Dashrathbhai Parmar, the

informant. In her evidence in chief, she stated that the incident

had occurred on the 25

th of the fourth month (April). She

deposed that she worked as a clean worker in the water park,

having studied up to 10

th standard. Her husband

Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar was serving in the postal

department. Her husband’s last posting was at Linch. They had

5 children, 3 girls and 2 boys. She stated that she came to know

9

(2002) 5 SCC 371

17

later that there was a misappropriation case against her

husband in his office.

27.1. Geetaben of Linch (appellant/accused No. 3)

befriended and became close to them. That way she started

coming home. PW-2 alleged that by performing some ‘black art’

and giving her husband some liquid substance, she made him

her own. Geetaben left her husband after taking away his

money.

27.2. On 25.04.2009, PW-2 had gone to the water park

in connection with her service. During noon, one Jayantibhai

Kalabhai Parmar came to her office and told her that her

mother-in-law was ill. On hearing this, she came back home.

In front of her residence, she saw a huge crowd. As she entered

her house, she saw the dead body of her husband. She tried to

wake him up by shaking him but there was no response.

27.3. PW-2 stated that she had some ornaments but

those had been taken away by the accused persons. She stated

that she did not notice anything at the time of the death of her

husband but later on she found one slip (note). She read that

note wherefrom she could gather that lot many things were

written in that letter. In the note, it was written that the

18

appellants had trapped him and after making video cassette,

they used to blackmail him. Fed up with such harassment, he

committed suicide by consuming poison.

27.4. She, therefore, lodged a complaint before the

police on 14.05.2009 (Ex. 22/1).

27.5. PW-2 was cross-examined. She stated in her

cross-examination that the incident had occurred on

25.04.2009. Police had taken her two statements on

14.05.2009 and 15.05.2009. In so far the misappropriation

case of her husband is concerned, PW-2 stated that she and

her husband had paid back Rs. 1,20,000.00 to the postal

department, receipt of which was given. She also admitted that

there was a case against her husband for which he was

arrested by the police though released on bail subsequently.

She however admitted that the chit (note) was found by her

elder brother-in-law (PW-7) and not by her. Before she reached

her home on 25.04.2004, relatives had taken her husband to

the hospital.

27.6. Jayantibhai, the elder brother-in-law (PW-7), told

PW-2 about the note on the next day and that is how she came

to know that her husband had written the note. When

19

panchnama was drawn on 25.04.2009, no note was found.

From the time of death till the lodging of complaint, the note

was with PW-7. PW-2 did not go to the police station to say

about the note. She described the relationship between the

accused as follows: Geetaben (appellant/accused No. 3) who

used to work in the office of her husband; appellant/accused

No. 4 is the mother of Geetaben; appellant/accused No. 2 is the

husband of Geetaben; and appellant/accused No. 1 is a relative

of the other accused persons. PW-2 stated that neither

Geetaben nor the accused persons had ever come to her

residence.

27.7. PW-2 stated that her husband was suspended

from service about 2 years back. He was worried about the

misappropriation case. PW-2 denied the suggestion that the

note was not written by her husband and that the accused

persons had not taken away money from him.

28. Amrutbhai Karshanbhai Parmar is PW -6.

Deceased was his brother. On that fateful day, while he was

having lunch at home, his niece came to him and told him that

something had happened to her father. Then he went to the

house of his brother Dashrathbhai and found him lying

20

motionless. He believed that he had consumed poison. When

he took his brother to the hospital, he was declared dead. At

that time, his other brother Jayantibhai (PW-7) was also there.

On searching the body of his brother, PW-6 stated that they

found one note from his pocket. In that note, the deceased had

mentioned 3-4 names further stating that they were

blackmailing him; so he had committed suicide. It was in the

own handwriting of Dashrathbhai. However, he stated that he

did not know the persons whose name were mentioned in the

note.

29. PW-7 is the elder brother of the deceased,

Jayantibhai Karshanbhai Parmar. Narrating about the

incident, he stated that while he was at home during noon, his

brother Amrutbhai came and told him that Dashrathbhai was

lying unconscious. They rushed to Dashrathbhai’s house and

found him in an unconscious condition. They dialled 108 and

also informed the police. They took Dashrathbhai to the

hospital where he was declared dead. PW-7 stated that though

he searched the body of his brother Dashrathbhai, he did not

find anything. Contradicting the above statement, he stated

that though one note was found, who found that note and what

21

was written in it, he did not know. He stated that he did not

know for what reason, his brother died.

29.1. This witness was declared hostile.

29.2. In his cross-examination, he stated that he had no

idea that in his statement before the police he had stated that

one note was found in his brother’s pocket wherein it was

written that he had an affair with Geetaben (appellant No. 3)

and for that reason he had committed suicide. He denied

making any statement before the police on 15.05.2009 that his

brother Dashrathbhai had given the misappropriated money to

Geetaben and that the accused persons were blackmailing his

brother by showing him compromising photos and videos of

him and Geetaben. He also denied making any statement

before the police that his deceased brother had given

ornaments meant for his daughter’s marriage to the appellants.

30. PW-11 is Champaben Nathalal, women head

constable. In her evidence, she stated that while she was on

duty in the afternoon on 14.05.2009, the complaint came to be

registered. In her cross-examination, she stated that as per

Diary No. 17/09 dated 24.04.2009 (sic), she was on duty when

inquest was carried out. She stated that no note was found at

22

the time of the inquest and no such note was presented at the

police station.

31. On a careful analysis of the evidence tendered by

the above prosecution witnesses, it would reveal that though

the incident had occurred on 25.04.2009, the complaint was

lodged by PW-2 on 14.05.2009, thus there being a delay of 20

days. Though there is a GD entry on 25.04.2009, it appears

that barring postmortem and inquest, no FIR was registered

and no other investigation was carried out by the police. It was

only after lodging of the complaint that police recorded the

statement of PW-2 on 14.05.2009 and 15.05.2009 and of the

other witnesses thereafter. Though delay in lodging of first

information is not always fatal but considering the fact that in

this case, the delay is of 20 days which has remained

unexplained, it would have a material bearing on the

prosecution case.

32. PW-11 who served as the head constable in the

concerned police station, deposed that she was on duty in the

afternoon of 14.05.2009 when the complaint came to be

registered. In her cross-examination, she stated that she was

also on duty when Diary Entry No. 17/09 dated 24.04.2009

23

was made. She was categorical in her statement that no suicide

note was found at the time of the inquest; no such note was

presented at the police station either.

33. There are significant inconsistencies in the

evidence of the prosecution witnesses regarding the

occurrence. PW-2 stated in her substantive evidence that on

being informed about her mother-in-law's illness, she had

come home from her office. On reaching home, she saw a huge

crowd in front of her residence. As she entered her house, she

saw the dead body of her husband . However, in her cross-

examination, she stated that when she reached home on that

fateful afternoon, the relatives had already taken her husband

to the hospital. Such inconsistent testimony cast serious

doubts about the veracity of the evidence of the said

prosecution witness.

34. In so far the suicide note is concerned, PW-2

stated that PW-7 had told her on the next day about the same.

It was only then that she came to know that her husband had

written a suicide note. In fact, when the panchnama was drawn

on 25.04.2009, no note was found on the body of the deceased.

She stated that from the time of death till the lodging of

24

complaint, the suicide note was with PW-7. This again cast

serious aspersions about the credibility of the suicide note.

35. There is another significant inconsistency. PW-6

stated that while he was at home having lunch, his niece came

and told him that something had happened to her father

(Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar) . So he went to the

residence of his brother and found him lying motionless. At

that time, PW-7 was also present. On the other hand, PW-7

stated that while he was at home, his brother PW-6 came and

told him that brother Dashrathbhai was lying unconscious. It

was thereafter that he rushed to Dashrathbhai’s house. Such

inconsistencies clearly impeach the credibility of the above two

prosecution witnesses.

36. That apart, there is nothing on record to show

recovery of any jewellery (ornaments) by the police from the

accused persons. No signed cheques of the deceased or cheque

book or passbook of the deceased were recovered and exhibited

in court. In such circumstances, the very sub-stratum of the

prosecution case that the accused persons were making illegal

gain by blackmailing the deceased falls flat.

25

37. Before we move on to the alleged suicide note, it

would be appropriate to advert to the postmortem report. As

per the said report, cause of death was due to consumption of

Dichlorvos Organophosphorus Non-thio poison. The doctor who

carried out the postmortem examination, Dr. Prakash

Laxmandas, deposed as PW-1. He stated that in the course of

postmortem examination, 400 cc of coffee coloured foul

smelling liquid was found in the small intestine and as per

postmortem note, the same was Dichlorvos Organophosphorus

Non-thio poison. He stated that if anybody drinks such

poisonous substance then this type of death can happen.

38. However, there is no recovery of any trace of the

poison consumed by the deceased at the place of occurrence.

No bottle/container of such poison was recovered from the

residence of the deceased. Moreover, the prosecution could not

place before the court any material as to wherefrom the

deceased had procured the poison.

39. In Kumar @ Shiva Kumar versus State of

Karnataka

10, this Court opined that in a case of death due to

consumption or administering of poison, be it homicidal or

10

2024 INSC 156

26

suicidal, recovery of the trace of such poison is crucial. This

Court held thus:

46. …….As a general principle, it can be said that in

a case of death by poisoning, be it homicidal or

suicidal and which is based on circumstantial

evidence, recovery of the trace of poison consumed by

or administered to the deceased is of critical

importance. It forms a part of the chain; rather it

would complete the chain to prove homicide or

suicide.

40. This takes us to the suicide note (Ex. 33). We have

already noted the delayed and controversial circumstances

under which the suicide note surfaced which makes it highly

suspect. Nonetheless, since it was exhibited, let us deal with

the same. Sum and substance of the suicide note allegedly

written by Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar (the deceased)

with the date given as 24.04.2009 is that appellant No. 3 had

joined his office following the illness of the existing cleaner. She

used to come to the office daily for cleaning purposes. Slowly

they developed intimacy. It is alleged that appellant No. 3 had

performed ‘black art’ on the deceased so much so that, he fell

in love with her. Taking advantage of the situation, she took

photographs and video of them in compromising position. All

the accused persons were shameless persons. As they started

27

blackmailing him, he initially paid Rs. 80,000.00 to them and

thereafter started giving them ornaments. He also gave them

his passbook and cheque books after signing on the cheques.

Because of such blackmailing, he had to misappropriate money

from his office for which he was suspended. It is stated that he

was totally ruined and, therefore, he had committed suicide as

he had no other alternative.

41. The suicide note was sent to the Forensic Science

Laboratory (FSL) for examination. The Deputy Chief

Handwriting Expert of FSL, Gandhinagar opined that the

handwriting was of the deceased. However, the prosecution did

not examine the Deputy Chief Handwriting Expert as an expert

witness. The records also do not indicate that the accused had

admitted genuineness of the report of the handwriting expert.

42. In Shashi Kumar Banerjee versus Subodh Kumar

Banerjee (since deceased)

11, this Court observed that expert’s

evidence as to handwriting is opinion evidence. It can rarely, if

ever, take the place of substantive evidence. Before acting on

such opinion evidence, it is necessary to see if it is corroborated

either by clear direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.

11

AIR 1964 SC 529

28

43. In the case of Murari Lal versus State of M.P.

12, this

Court opined that having due regard to the imperfect nature of

the science of identification of hand-writing, the approach of the

court should be one of caution. Reasons for the opinion must

be carefully probed and examined. In an appropriate case,

corroboration may be sought. Where the reasons for the opinion

are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a

doubt, uncorroborated testimony of a handwriting expert may

be accepted.

44. This Court dealt with the effect of placing reliance

on the opinion of handwriting expert without examining him in

court in Keshav Dutt versus State of Haryana

13. One of the

questions which fell for consideration in that case was whether

the opinion of a handwriting expert can be admitted in evidence

without examination of the handwriting expert. In this

connection, this Court took the view that when the trial court

chose to rely on the report of the handwriting expert, it ought to

have examined the handwriting expert in order to give an

opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the said expert. In

that case, it was found that there was nothing on record to show

12

(1980) 1 SCC 704

13

(2010) 9 SCC 286

29

that the accused persons had admitted to the report of the

handwriting expert.

45. Finally, even if we take the suicide note as correct

and genuine, we do not find any act of incitement on the part

of the appellants proximate to the date on which the deceased

committed suicide. No act is attributed to the appellants

proximate to the time of suicide which was of such a nature

that the deceased was left with no alternative but to commit

suicide. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that any

offence of abetment to commit suicide is made out against the

appellants.

46. Accordingly and in the light of the above, we allow

this appeal. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order

of the High Court dated 17.12.2013 and of the trial court dated

12.05.2011 are hereby set aside. Since the appellants are

already on bail, their bail bonds stand discharged.

……………………………J .

[ABHAY S. OKA]

……………………………J .

[UJJAL BHUYAN]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 05, 2025.

Reference cases

Description

Supreme Court Overturns Abetment of Suicide Conviction in Patel Babubhai Manohardas Case

In a significant development concerning **Abetment of Suicide IPC**, the Supreme Court of India in the case of *Patel Babubhai Manohardas & Ors. v. State of Gujarat* (2025 INSC 322) delivered a pivotal **Supreme Court Ruling on Section 306**, overturning convictions previously affirmed by the High Court. This detailed analysis, now readily accessible on CaseOn, delves into the nuances of establishing culpability in cases involving suicide and the critical role of evidence and legal interpretation.

Background of the Case

The case originated from the alleged suicide of Dashrathbhai Karsanbhai Parmar on April 25, 2009, due to consuming poison. His wife, Jaybalaben (PW-2), lodged an FIR on May 14, 2009, alleging that the four appellants (accused Nos. 1-4) had blackmailed her husband using compromising photographs and videos involving appellant No. 3 (Geetaben), leading him to misappropriate funds from his office and eventually commit suicide. A two-page suicide note, purportedly written by the deceased, was central to the prosecution's case.

Trial Court and High Court Decisions

The Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana, convicted the appellants under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide) and 114 (abettor present when the offence is committed) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), sentencing them to 5 years rigorous imprisonment and a fine. They were, however, acquitted of charges under the Prevention of Atrocities Act. The High Court of Gujarat subsequently upheld this conviction and sentence, dismissing appeals from both the appellants and the State (which had sought enhancement of sentence).

Issue Before the Supreme Court

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the prosecution had presented sufficient and credible evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellants had abetted the deceased's suicide, particularly whether there was a proximate act of incitement and the necessary criminal intent (*mens rea*) on their part.

The Legal Framework for Abetment of Suicide

To understand the Supreme Court's decision, it's crucial to revisit the legal principles governing abetment of suicide:

Defining Abetment (Section 107 IPC)

Section 107 of the IPC defines 'abetment' in three ways: instigating a person to do a thing, engaging in a conspiracy for doing that thing, or intentionally aiding by any act or illegal omission. Explanation 1 clarifies that wilful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, which a person is bound to disclose, can amount to instigation. Explanation 2 states that doing anything to facilitate the commission of an act, either prior to or at the time of its commission, is aiding.

Abettor Present (Section 114 IPC)

Section 114 IPC clarifies that if a person who would have been punishable as an abettor for an offence is present when that offence is committed, they are deemed to have committed such act or offence themselves.

Punishment for Abetment of Suicide (Section 306 IPC)

Section 306 IPC mandates punishment for anyone who abets the commission of suicide, with imprisonment extending up to 10 years and a fine.

Judicial Precedents on 'Instigation' and 'Mens Rea'

The Supreme Court has consistently held that for a conviction under Section 306 IPC, a clear *mens rea* (guilty intention) on the part of the accused to instigate or aid the suicide is essential. Mere harassment or a word uttered in a fit of anger, without intending the consequences, is not sufficient. Landmark judgments like *Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh*, *Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)*, and *Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu v. State of West Bengal* underscore the requirement of a 'direct or indirect act of incitement' or a 'positive proximate act' that leaves the deceased with 'no other option' but to commit suicide. More recent rulings, such as *Prakash v. State of Maharashtra* (2024), reiterate the need for the instigation to be in 'close proximity' to the suicide.

Evidence of Poisoning and Handwriting Experts

In cases involving death by poisoning, the recovery of poison traces or containers is often crucial, as highlighted in *Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka* (2024). Regarding expert handwriting evidence, while reports can be indicative, as per *Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee* (1964) and *Murari Lal v. State of M.P.* (1980), they are opinion evidence and require corroboration. Critically, *Keshav Dutt v. State of Haryana* (2010) established that if a trial court relies on an expert report, the expert must be examined in court to allow for cross-examination by the accused.

Supreme Court's Analysis: Scrutiny of Evidence

The Supreme Court meticulously re-evaluated the prosecution's evidence and found several significant weaknesses:

Unexplained Delay in FIR

The incident occurred on April 25, 2009, but the FIR was lodged on May 14, 2009, a delay of 20 days. The Court noted that this substantial and unexplained delay had a material bearing on the prosecution's case, suggesting potential afterthoughts or concoction.

Inconsistencies in Witness Testimonies

* **PW-2 (Jaybalaben):** The informant's testimony was inconsistent. While she initially stated she found her husband's dead body upon reaching home, in cross-examination, she admitted that relatives had already taken him to the hospital by the time she arrived. Such contradictions cast serious doubts on her veracity. * **PW-6 and PW-7 (Brothers of Deceased):** There were discrepancies between the two brothers regarding the discovery of the suicide note. PW-7, initially a key witness, was declared hostile and denied making previous statements about finding the note or the alleged blackmail.

The Dubious Suicide Note (Ex. 33)

* **Delayed Production:** The suicide note, supposedly found in the deceased's pocket, was not discovered during the initial panchnama on April 25, 2009. PW-2 stated she only learned about it the next day from PW-7. Its belated appearance raised significant suspicions. * **Lack of Expert Examination:** Although an FSL report opined that the note was in the deceased's handwriting, the Deputy Chief Handwriting Expert who prepared the report was *not examined* as a prosecution witness. This denied the appellants the opportunity for cross-examination, rendering the expert opinion less reliable in the absence of corroboration or admission by the accused.

Absence of Blackmail Evidence

The prosecution's core allegation of blackmail, involving demands for money and ornaments, lacked material support. No jewellery, signed cheques, cheque books, or passbooks allegedly taken by the accused were recovered by the police, undermining the very 'sub-stratum' of the blackmail theory.

No Proximate Act or Mens Rea for Abetment

Even if the suicide note were considered genuine, the Supreme Court found no evidence of a specific, proximate act of incitement by the appellants that directly led the deceased to commit suicide. The prosecution failed to establish that the appellants' actions created a situation leaving Dashrathbhai with 'no other alternative' but to take his own life. The essential *mens rea* required for abetment was therefore not proven.

Lack of Poison Recovery

Despite the post-mortem report confirming death by poison, no bottle or container of the poison was recovered from the deceased's residence, nor could the prosecution establish how the deceased procured it. This further weakened the circumstantial chain of evidence. Throughout this intricate legal analysis, CaseOn.in's 2-minute audio briefs proved invaluable, assisting legal professionals in quickly grasping the core arguments and the Supreme Court's reasoning behind these specific rulings.

Supreme Court's Conclusion

Given the significant lacunae in the prosecution's case—including the unexplained delay in the FIR, the inconsistent witness testimonies, the questionable circumstances surrounding the suicide note, the unproven allegations of blackmail, and critically, the absence of a proximate act of incitement or *mens rea* for abetment—the Supreme Court concluded that the charge under Sections 306/114 IPC was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned judgments of both the High Court and the trial court. The appellants, who were already on bail, had their bail bonds discharged.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This Supreme Court judgment serves as a vital precedent, particularly for those involved in criminal law practice and study: * **Emphasis on Proximate Cause and Mens Rea:** It strongly reiterates that mere allegations of harassment or distant actions are insufficient for abetment of suicide. A direct, proximate act that leaves the victim with no alternative but to end their life, coupled with clear *mens rea* on the part of the accused, is indispensable. * **Credibility of Evidence:** The judgment highlights the critical importance of timely FIRs, consistent witness testimonies, and the proper handling and examination of crucial evidence like suicide notes and expert reports. Delays and inconsistencies can fatally undermine the prosecution's case. * **Handling of Expert Evidence:** It provides a crucial reminder that expert opinions, especially from handwriting experts, are not conclusive and must be corroborated. The right of the accused to cross-examine expert witnesses is fundamental. * **Burden of Proof:** The case reinforces the high standard of 'beyond reasonable doubt' required in criminal convictions, particularly when the elements of *mens rea* and proximate cause are at play in complex abetment charges. This ruling underscores the judiciary's commitment to ensuring that convictions are based on robust evidence and strict adherence to legal principles, safeguarding individual liberties against charges that lack substantial proof.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances. CaseOn bears no responsibility for any actions taken based on the information presented herein.

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