2026 INSC 389 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No(s). 26487 of 2019)

PAWAN GARG & ORS. ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SOUTH DELHI MUNICIPAL

CORPORATION ….RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. This appeal with special leave preferred by the

appellants interdicts the final judgment and order

dated 24

th April, 2019 passed by the Division Bench

of the High Court of Delhi

1 in Letters Patent Appeal

No.369 of 2016, wherein the Division Bench reversed

the judgment and order dated 3

rd March, 2016

passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court

1

Hereinafter, referred to as the “Division Bench”.

2

C.A.@ SLP(Civil) No(s). 26487 of 2019

of Delhi

2 in W.P. (C) No.5382 of 2014, and, inter alia,

upheld the decision of the Layout Scrutiny

Committee

3 dated 19

th May, 2014 and so also of the

Standing Committee dated 17

th July, 2014.

I. BRIEF FACTS

4. The dispute centers around a parcel of land

admeasuring 1600 sq. yards

4, situated in the

erstwhile village Yusuf Sarai Jat, now falling within

the territory of Green Park Extension Colony, New

Delhi.

5 The subject land forms part of a larger tract

of land which was originally under the ownership and

control of a coloniser, namely, Urban Improvement

Company Private Limited.

6 It is stated that the

coloniser surrendered the land to the Municipal

Corporation of Delhi

7 along with a layout plan for the

development of the colony. As per the original layout

plan sanctioned on 3

rd September, 1958, the subject

plot of land was reserved for a High School, whereas

the adjoining areas were earmarked for primary

2

Hereinafter, referred to as the “Learned Single Judge”.

3

For short “LOSC”.

4

Hereinafter, referred to as the “subject land/subject plot”.

5

Hereinafter, referred to as the “colony”.

6

Hereinafter, referred to as the “coloniser”.

7

Predecessor of the present respondent; Hereinafter, referred to as the

“MCD”.

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school and park. Thereafter, the coloniser submitted

a revised layout plan, which was duly sanctioned by

the MCD on 30

th May, 1969, whereby the reservation

of the land for a High School was deleted, while the

lands earmarked for the primary school and the park

were maintained. The principal reason for the

deletion of the High School from the layout plan was

that the area mandatorily required for establishing a

High School was approximately 4000 sq. meters

(roughly 4783.96 sq. yards), whereas the available

land area measured only 1600 sq. yards. The

decision of de-reservation was not questioned before

any forum and has long since attainted finality.

5. The coloniser sold the subject land bearing

Khasra Nos.5, 6 and 14 to five persons

8, namely, Mr.

Govind Ram (700 sq. yards), Mr. Vasudev (250 sq.

yards), Mr. Jagdish Lal Batra (250 sq. yards), Mr.

Prem Nath (150 sq. yards) and Mr. Pearey Ram (250

sq. yards), vide duly registered sale deeds dated 18

th

June, 1975.

6. Alleging that the MCD was trying to interfere

with possession and use of the subject land, the

8

Hereinafter, referred to as the “erstwhile owners”.

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erstwhile owners instituted five separate civil suits

before the competent civil Court, seeking perpetual

injunction against the MCD. All the said suits were

contested by MCD and were decreed vide separate

judgments dated 1

st October, 1988, whereby the civil

Court directed that the MCD shall not interfere with

the possession of the plaintiffs over the subject land,

except in accordance with due process of law. The

relevant extracts from the said judgment

9 are

reproduced below: -

“2. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that he is the

owner of property comprising one room, boundary

wall on a piece of land measuring 14 biswas falling

in Khasra No.6 in village Yusuf Sarai Jat, Green

Park Extension, New Dehi (hereinafter referred to

as the suit property) by virtue of sale deed dated

18.06.1975 which was executed by M/s Urban

Improvement Co. P. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as

the Co.). The sale deed was registered with the Sub

Registrar on 19.6.1975.

3. The plaintiff is in possession of the aforesaid

property for the last 19 years. No Objection

Certificate was also obtained by the plaintiff from

A.D.M. (Revenue) dated 5.6.75 which shows that

the land is free from all encumbrances and

requirements/requisitions of the Government or

any local body.

4. The plaintiff is in use and occupation of the suit

property for more than 19 years and this fact is

duly endorsed in the sale deed of the plaintiff. All

rights, both possessory and ownership vest in the

plaintiff.

9

Suit No.444/78

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[……]

20. The onus to prove this issue was on the

plaintiff. The plaintiff appeared as PW2 and proved

the sale deed Ext.PW2/1. This sale deed was

executed in the presence of PW11 Shri Joginder Pal

Advocate. The site plan Ext.PW2/2 was also proved

by this witness. The sale deed was executed by the

Co. in favour of the plaintiff. Thus, the ownership

of the suit property has been proved in favour of

the plaintiff without any iota of doubt. He has also

constructed a boundary wall as well as a room on

the property. It has come on the record that officials

of the deft. Corpn. came for the purpose of taking

possession, but could not take the same. No

evidence has been led by the deft. MCD on the

record that any notice has ever been served upon

the plaintiff because the ownership of 14 biswas of

land as per plan Ext.PW2/2 and the possession of

Gobind Ram has been undoubtedly proved on the

record. Merely stating that it was an encroachment

upon the municipal land is not sufficient. It has

also been proved on the record through the Local

Commissioner's report appointed by the court that

there is possession of the plaintiff. PW3 Chowkidar

has also proved the possession of the plaintiff. The

statement of PW1 and PW5 who were also plaintiffs

in similar suits and have their property adjacent to

the property of the plaintiff have proved on the

record that plaintiff was the owner of the suit

property and it was in possession of the plaintiff.

Thus, the attempt on the part of deft. MCD to

dispossess the plaintiff without any due process of

law, is illegal and without jurisdiction. This issue Is

decided in favour of the plaintiff as Khasra Nos.

have also not been shown in Ext. DW2/1. The

possession was also not taken in the presence of

DW2. Khasra Nos. have also not been shown in

Ext.DW3/2. He has also admitted that in

Ext.DW3/1, there is a portion on which possession

of MCD has not been shown. Thus, I am satisfied

that plaintiff who is in possession of the suit

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property by virtue of sale deed has a right to use

the same one cannot be dispossessed otherwise

than by compliance of statutory requirement.

21. U/s 477 of DMC Act, no suit can lie against the

MCD. The only limitation is that where the action

of MCD is against the provisions of DMC Act, then

the court has power to entertain the suit. In this

case, the suit was filed by the plaintiff because

there was an attempt on the part of deft. MCD to

take forcible possession of the property from the

plaintiff. Since this act of taking forcible possession

is against the provisions of DMC Act because no

notice has been served upon the plaintiff and he is

the owner and in possession of the suit property

through sale deed Ext.PW2/1 and site plan

Ext.PW2/2, the suit is not barred U/s 477 of DMC

Act.

23. In view of the above discussion, I am satisfied

that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit

property and also is the owner by virtue of sale deed

Ext. PW2/1. Any forcible dispossession without

compliance with the procedural requirements will

be against the law. The suit of the plaintiff is

accordingly decreed. The deft. MCD is hereby

restrained from taking forcible possession of the

property measuring 14 biswas forming part of

Khasra No.6, in Village Yusaf Sarai Jat, New Delhi.”

7. The MCD preferred separate appeals against the

judgments of the civil Court in all the civil suits, albeit

with significant delay. The learned appellate Court

i.e., Additional District Judge, Delhi, refused to

condone the delay and dismissed the aforesaid

appeal/s vide order dated 21

st March, 1992 on the

ground of being time barred. Being aggrieved, the

MCD filed second appeal/s before the High Court of

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Delhi which also came to be dismissed on 4

th

November, 1992.

8. The erstwhile owners executed separate sale

deeds in favour of six persons

10 namely, Dinesh

Kumar (400 sq. yards), Mr. Surinder Kumar (400 sq.

yards), Mrs. Surindra Kundra (150 sq. yards), Mr.

Harish Kundra (250 sq. yards), Mr. Roshan Lal (150

sq. yards) and appellant No. 1- Mr. Pawan Garg (250

sq. yards) on 25

th January, 1994 and 11

th April,

1994.

9. In the meanwhile, the MCD again sought to

interfere with the possession over the subject land,

whereupon the subsequent purchasers preferred

contempt petitions before the Court of learned Civil

Judge, Delhi. In the said contempt proceedings, the

officials of the MCD tendered unconditional apology,

and accordingly, the contempt petition s were

dismissed as withdrawn on 28

th September, 1995.

10. In August, 1996, the subsequent purchasers,

including appellant No.1, filed applications before the

MCD for incorporation of their plots

11 in the layout

plan of “the colony”. The standing committee of the

10

Hereinafter, referred to as the “subsequent purchasers”.

11

The plots referred to herein form part of the subject land.

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MCD, vide Resolution bearing No.210 dated 19

th

August, 1998, rejected the said applications for

incorporation of the plots in the layout plan.

11. In the year 1999, appellant No.1 filed fresh

application seeking reconsideration of prayer for

incorporation of the subject land in the layout plan of

“the colony”. The LOSC of the MCD approved the said

application on 28

th October, 2002 and recommended

incorporation of the plots in the layout plan of the

colony, subject to obtaining proper clearance from

the Delhi Development Authority

12. However, it

appears that for number of years thereafter, no

further action was taken on the said prayer of

appellant No. 1.

12. In the year 2006, the subsequent purchasers

moved an application for sanctioning a building plan

for the construction of a nursery school. The said

application was dismissed on 30

th November, 2006.

In the interregnum, i.e., between the years 2006 and

2008, the subsequent purchasers executed two gift

deeds in favour of appellant Nos.1 & 2 respectively

12

For short “DDA”.

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and registered sale deeds in favour of appellant No.3,

in respect of the subject plots.

13. Upon receiving comments from the DDA and in

view of the report of the Land and Estate Department,

the LOSC gave a negative opinion on the applications

for incorporation of the plots in the layout plan of the

colony vide order dated 19

th May, 2014, observing

that there stood recorded an entry in the immovable

properties register of MCD indicating that the land

was entered in its name. Subsequently, on 17

th July,

2014, the Standing Committee vide its Resolution

No.74 rejected the application of the appellants and

upheld the order dated 19

th May, 2014 passed by the

LOSC.

14. Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred a writ

petition

13 in the High Court of Delhi. The learned

Single Judge, by a detailed well-reasoned order,

allowed the writ petition by setting aside the orders

dated 19

th May, 2014 and 17

th July, 2014 and

directed the respondent-South Delhi Municipal

Corporation

14 to objectively consider the application

for incorporation preferred by the appellants and

13

W.P. (C) No.5382 of 2014.

14

Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent-Corporation”.

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decide the same within a period of 60 days. The

relevant observations made and directions given in

the order dated 3

rd March, 2016 are reproduced

hereinbelow: -

“45. Interestingly, the decision of the Lay Out

Scrutiny Committee dated 19th May, 2014 itself

shows that the ownership was verified in the name

of the applicants by concerned Tehsildar in 1997.

Mere entry in the I.P. Register does not entitle the

Corporation to become the owner of the land in

question. The own documentation of the

respondent Corporation itself frustrates the stand

taken by the MCD that the land is owned by them.

46. In my considered view, in light of the aforesaid

discussion, the decision taken by the Lay Out

Screening Committee can hardly be considered

rational. The result is that the petitioners cannot

utilise their land despite fighting for their rights

since 1975. Thus the decision of the Lay Out

Scrutiny Committee dated 19th May 2014 qua the

petitioners‟ land is set aside. Consequently, the

decision of Standing Committee dated 17.7.2014

qua the petitioner’s land is also set aside. The

respondent, South Delhi Municipal Corporation is

directed to consider the petitioner’s plots in

question in the layout plan within a period of sixty

days from today in accordance with law.”

15. Aggrieved, by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Single Judge, the respondent-

Corporation preferred a Letters Patent Appeal

15,

which stands allowed by the Division Bench vide

judgment dated 24

th April, 2019, which is interdicted

15

Letters Patent Appeal No.369 of 2016.

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at the instance of the appellants in this appeal with

special leave.

II. SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED BY COUNSEL FOR

THE PARTIES

16. Shri Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants,

vehemently and fervently contended that the findings

recorded by the civil Court in the suit for perpetual

injunction, instituted by the predecessors-in-interest

of the appellants, whereby a decree of permanent

injunction was granted, had attained finality. It was

submitted that the Division Bench without the issue

of title being subject matter of the proceedings before

the High Court, unjustly delved into the findings

recorded by the civil Court and proceeded to make

unwarranted observations with respect to the title of

the appellants over the subject plots of land. In this

regard, Shri Bhatnagar referred to the following

excerpts from the impugned judgment of the High

Court: -

“46. On an overall consideration of the findings of

the learned Single Judge, and having regard to the

submissions of the parties, the question which this

court has to decide are:

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(i) firstly, whether the findings of the five previous

suits are conclusive on the issue of title- alive to it

is the RV sale deeds executed by the coloniser in

favour of the writ petitioners’ predecessors in 1994;

(ii) Secondly, whether the communication by the

DDA that the Master Plan- and the consequential

Zonal Development Plan requirements no longer

stipulated that the land was needed for a secondary

school and, therefore, consequently, the SDMC

could change the purpose to residential. Alive to

this is the nature of the MCD’s obligation to carry

out the necessary correction in the layout plan.

(iii) The third would be the interpretation of

Sections 312 and 313 of the Act, having regard to

the decision of the Supreme Court in Pt. Chet Ram

Vashist (supra) etc. and whether the MCD is correct

in asserting that it has the right to manage the

property as its custodian.

(iv) Lastly, whether the issue of title- in the light of

the contentions of the parties has to be decided in

favour of the writ petitioners.”

17. It was urged that there was no occasion for the

High Court to have delved into or adjudicated upon

the issue of title, particularly when the title was never

under dispute and the writ petition had been filed by

the appellants for the limited purpose of seeking a

direction to the respondent-Corporation to

incorporate the plot in the layout plan of the colony.

18. He further submitted that the Division Bench

has recorded self-contradictory findings in the

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impugned judgment on the issue of title. It was, thus,

contended that the finding recorded by the Division

Bench that the appellants’ title over the land in

question was doubtful, is absolutely unjustified. It

was further submitted that the Division Bench

recorded adverse findings regarding the deletion of

the High School from the original layout plan without

taking into account the fact that the deletion took

place in the year 1969 and the very reservation of the

subject land for High School was impermissible

because the total available land area was only 1600

sq. yards, on which the High School could not be

built as the same required minimum land area of

nearly 4000 sq. meters (roughly 4783.96 sq. yards).

Thus, the land was de-reserved in the year 1969 and

reverted back to the original owners.

19. Shri Bhatnagar submitted that all that the

learned Single Judge had directed was that the

prayer of the appellants for incorporation of the

subject land in the colony be considered. Issue of title

was never a subject matter of the dispute before the

High Court. He thus, urged that the impugned

judgment is perverse and illegal on the face of the

record and, therefore, deserves to be set aside and

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the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing

the respondent-Corporation to consider the prayer of

the appellants for incorporation of the subject land in

“the colony” ought to be affirmed.

20. Per contra, Shri Ashwani Kumar, learned

counsel appearing for the respondent-Corporation,

vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on

behalf of the counsel for the appellants. He contended

that the suits instituted by predecessors-in-interest

of the appellants, were confined to seeking perpetual

injunction, and no relief of declaration of title was

sought in respect of the plots in question. Thus, the

civil Court clearly exceeded the scope and ambit of

the suit while making observations on title, without

the same being an issue in the case.

21. It was further submitted that the original

coloniser had surrendered the larger chunk of land

for the development of a colony and, in the approved

layout plan, the land area in question was reserved

for the construction of a High School. However, owing

to insufficiency of area, the school could not be

constructed and consequently, the respondent-

Corporation passed a revised layout plan in which

the land was no longer shown as reserved for a High

15

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School. Notwithstanding the same, it was fervently

contended that even if the specific reservation for a

High School stood deleted, the nature of the de-

reserved land continued to be for public purposes

and thus, it could not have been subjected to any

private ownership.

On these grounds, learned counsel for the

respondent-Corporation implored the Court to

dismiss the appeal and affirm the judgment of the

Division Bench.

III. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

22. We have given our thoughtful consideration to

the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for

the parties and have gone through the impugned

judgment and other material placed on record.

23. The proceedings before the civil Court, seeking

perpetual injunction, were contested by the MCD,

and upon adjudication, a decree of permanent

injunction was passed in favour of the predecessors-

in-interest of the appellants and other landowners,

restraining the MCD from interfering with their

possession, except in accordance with due process of

law.

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24. Aggrieved by the judgments and decrees passed

by the civil Court, the MCD preferred a first appeal

albeit with a significant delay. The learned Additional

District Judge, Delhi, by order dated 21

st March,

1992, dismissed the said appeals on the ground of

delay. The MCD thereafter preferred second appeals

before the High Court of Delhi, which also came to be

dismissed vide judgment dated 4

th November, 1992.

The said decision was never challenged any further

and thus, the findings recorded by the civil Court

attained finality. There is no dispute that the

appellants and their predecessors have always been

in peaceful possession over the plots in question.

Except for a random entry in its property register, the

MCD never asserted title over the plots in question

before any forum. In such circumstances, the

Division Bench was not justified in rendering

observations so as to virtually unsettle the decree of

the civil Court passed way back in 1988 and thereby,

cause the title to be brought under dispute. In this

regard, reference may be made to the observations

contained in paragraph 55 of the impugned

judgment, which reads as below: -

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“55. In the light of the above discussion, it is held

that the impugned judgment to the extent it

assumes that question of ownership and title were

conclusively determined in the previous suit by the

Senior Sub judge and had been endorsed in appeal

and further on second appeal by this Court, is

clearly erroneous. It is also important to notice here

that the appeal preferred before the District Judge

appears to have been time barred. That was the

primary ground for rejection of the application for

condonation. The consequent refusal by this Court

to set aside the findings of the lower courts on the

ground that no substantial question of law arises

was in no manner conclusive on the issue of title

as well. For these reasons, it is held that the Single

Judge fell into error in accepting the writ

petitioners‟ plea that the question of title had been

decided affirmatively in favour of their predecessors

in interest and that issue had the effect of

estopping SDMC from questioning their rights and

interest over the land, as subsequent transferees.”

25. In stark contradistinction to the aforesaid

findings, the Division Bench at Paras Nos. 67 and 72

of the impugned judgment recorded that the title and

interest in the land does not vest in the respondent-

Corporation. Notwithstanding the above finding, it

was observed that the respondent-Corporation acts

as a custodian of public interest of the said land for

the management and interest of the society in

general. The aforesaid paras are quoted hereinbelow:-

“67. It is clear from the above passage that the

title and interest in the land does not vest in

the public corporation (in this case, SDMC):

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however it has “a right as a custodian of public

interest to manage it in the interest of the

society in general. But the right to manage as

a local body is not the same thing as to claim

transfer of the property to itself .” This

enunciation is supported by the earlier observation

that this custodial nature of the right amounts to

“creating an obligation in nature of trust and may

preclude the owner from transferring or selling his

interest in it. It may be true as held by the High Court

that the interest which is left in the owner is a

residuary interest which may be nothing more than

a right to hold this land in trust for the specific

purpose specified by the coloniser in the sanctioned

lay-out plan.” The facts in this case, no doubt are

different: it is that the layout plan continued to be

the same, i.e. the area was earmarked for a school.

The MCD in that case had compelled a transfer to

itself of the public spaces; in this case, it refused to

amend the layout plan.

[……]

72. Here, the land no doubt does not belong to

SDMC; the minimum area required for Sr.

Secondary School is 4000 sq. mts., which is

roughly 4783.96 sq. yds. and the land in

question is 1600 sq. yds. The stand of SDMC with

regard to the land being transferred to MCD in

1969 is correct. The layout plan of the area in

question was originally approved in the year 1958

by Resolution No. 7 dated 03.09.1958 of the SC.

Thereafter, the layout plan was modified in the year

1959. Thereafter, by Resolution No. 183 dated

30.05.1969, the demarcation plan of the area in

question was approved. The land in question,

which is the subject matter of the present petition,

was always shown as earmarked for school.

Possession of the land in question was also handed

over to the Municipal Corporation way back in the

years 1967 and 1968, as reflected from the record.

These facts, ipso facto, in the opinion of this Court,

did not compel the SDMC to permit residential use.

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SDMC undoubtedly cannot – like in Pt. Chet Ram

Vashist’s case compel transfer of the lands unto

itself. However, it has to formally accept the

proposal to convert the use. Here, the petitioners

are not on sound footing.” (Emphasis supplied)

26. Apparently, the discretion of the Division Bench

was heavily clouded by the fact that, in the original

layout plan, the subject land was originally

earmarked for a public purpose, namely, for a High

School, and once the land stood earmarked for a

public purpose, the same could not thereafter be

validly transferred to the appellants.

27. We are of the considered view that the aforesaid

finding was not only out of context but also

unsupported by any cogent or plausible material on

record. A mere entry in the list of properties

maintained by the MCD cannot, by itself, constitute

a valid proof of title over the subject land.

28. The competent authority had admittedly de-

reserved the land admeasuring 1600 sq. yards, which

was originally earmarked for a High School, way back

in the year 1958. There is no material on record to

show that notwithstanding such de-reservation, the

land would continue to retain the character of being

reserved for a public purpose. In this background,

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and having regard to the fact that based on registered

conveyances executed in respect of the land in

question, the land changed multiple hands over a

period of time and as issue of title was never agitated

by the respondent-Corporation before any forum, the

finding recorded by the Division Bench in the

impugned judgment, to the effect that the land was

required to be retained for a public purpose, is

unsustainable on the face of the record.

29. On a perusal of the order passed by the civil

Court dated 1

st October, 1998, it is evident that no

contest was made by the MCD in the said civil suit

disputing the title of the predecessor-in-interest of

the appellants. In such circumstances , the

observations of the High Court that the respondent-

Corporation became the custodian of public interest

to manage the land, which was originally reserved as

a High School in the layout plan, are wholly perverse

and unsupported by tangible evidence. The issue of

title or public purpose having never been raised by

the respondent-Corporation before any forum, the

only issue that required adjudication by the Division

Bench was whether the direction given by the learned

Single Judge to the respondent-Corporation to

21

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consider the prayer of the appellant to incorporate

the land in question in the layout plan of “the colony”

was justified or not. The issue of title neither arose

for consideration before the learned Single Judge, nor

did the facts and circumstances of the case warrant

any such adjudication.

30. At this stage, we may record the submission of

the learned counsel for the appellants that the

possession over the subject land remains with the

appellants who have constructed residential

buildings thereupon. The attempts made by the

Corporation to interfere in the possession over the

plot always met a dead end.

31. The learned Single Judge, while reversing the

decision of the LOSC dated 19

th May, 2014 and that

of the Standing Committee dated 17

th July, 2014,

merely directed the respondent-Corporation to

consider the prayer of the appellants for

incorporating their plots in the layout plan within 60

days. For passing the said direction, the learned

Single Judge referred to the counter affidavit filed by

the MCD in W.P. (Civil) No. 4788 of 2000 wherein a

clear admission is recorded that the subject land is

owned by the other parties who had filed civil suits

22

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against the MCD and the civil Court had declared

them to be the owners. There may be some

incongruity in the language of the affidavit but the

long-standing possession of the appellants and their

predecessors over the plots comprising 1600 sq.

yards area is not in dispute.

32. In this background, there was n either any

occasion for the learned Division Bench to have gone

into the issue of title over the subject land nor was it

justified in non-suiting the appellants on the premise

that the subject land was earmarked for public

purpose. The scope and adjudication of the appeal/s

had to be confined to the direction given by the

learned Single Judge, namely, to consider the prayer

of the appellants for incorporation of the plot in the

layout plan of the colony, and nothing beyond that.

IV. CONCLUSION

33. In wake of the above discussion, we are of the

considered view that the direction issued by the

learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated

3

rd March, 2016, does not suffer from any infirmity

whatsoever. Consequently, the impugned judgment

and order dated 24

th April, 2019 passed by the

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Division Bench upsetting the judgment of the learned

Single Judge is unsustainable in facts as well as in

law and hence, the same is hereby set aside.

34. The judgment rendered by the learned Single

Judge is restored. The respondent-Corporation shall

consider the application of the appellants for

incorporation of the plots in the layout plan of the

colony within 60 days by passing a speaking order.

The disposition, as directed above, shall not be

influenced or prejudiced by any of the observations

made in the order passed by the Division Bench or in

this order.

35. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.

36. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J.

(VIKRAM NATH )

...…………………….J.

(SANDEEP MEHTA)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 20, 2026.