No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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Crl. M.C. No. 09 of 2021
Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM: GANGTOK
(Criminal Jurisdiction)
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SINGLE BENCH: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BHASKAR RAJ PRADHAN, JUDGE
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Crl. M.C. No. 09 of 2021
1. Pema Chultim Bhutia,
S/o Shri Thendup Bhutia,
R/o Kewzing Road, Ravangla,
P.O. & P.S. Ravangla,
South Sikkim.
2. Abdul Hussain Ahmed,
S/o Late Sadik Hussain Ahmed,
Permanent R/o Kaliabhomora,
Gotlong Gaon, Sonitpur, Assam,
At present Ravangla,
P.O. & P.S. Ravangla, South Sikkim.
3. Ajay Kumar,
S/o Ranu Mahto,
Permanent R/o Kabia, Begusarai,
P.O. Kabia, Bihar,
At present Ravangla,
P.O. & P.S. Ravangla, South Sikkim.
4. Suvratanu Halder,
S/o Tushar Kanti Halder,
Permanent R/o Nawpara, Borthe,
24 PGS, Barasat, Kolkata,
Presently at Ravangla, South Sikkim.
….. Petitioners
Versus
State of Sikkim .... Respondent
Application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
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Appearance:
Mr. Dewen Sharma Luitel, Advocate for the Petitioners.
Mr. Yadev Sharma, Additional Public Prosecutor and Mr.
Sujan Sunwar, Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-
respondent.
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Date of hearing : 16.02.2022
Date of Order : 22.02.2022
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Crl. M.C. No. 09 of 2021
Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
O R D E R
Bhaskar Raj Pradhan, J.
1. This judgment shall consider the application under
section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Cr.P.C.) filed by the petitioners jointly to quash the First
Information Report (FIR) as well as the criminal
proceedings pursuant thereto against the petitioner no.1 on
a complaint by the petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4.
2. Heard Mr. Dewen Sharma Luitel, learned counsel for
the Petitioners as well as Mr. Yadev Sharma, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent. The
learned counsel for the petitioners submits that this is a fit
case to exercise powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. and
quash the criminal proceedings including the FIR in view of
the amicable settlement arrived at between the petitioners
relying upon various judgments discussed herein below.
The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that all
differences between the petitioner no.1 on the one hand
and the petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4 on the other have been
resolved and they have agreed to maintain a harmonious
relationship and live peacefully. The petitioner nos. 2, 3
and 4 do not want to contest the case and has no
grievances against the petitioner no.1 anymore. They have
agreed to abide by the compromise deed and move on with
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
their lives. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor
submits that in view of the compromise deed entered
between the petitioners the State-respondent has no
objection if the criminal proceedings are quashed.
3. The FIR was registered on 05.11.2019 at Rabong
Police Station. It alleged that petitioner no.1 assaulted the
petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4 while they were on duty due to
which they sustained severe injuries. The FIR also alleged
that they had been threatened with dire consequences. It
further alleged that petitioner no.1 had forcefully stopped
the company vehicles of M/s S & P Infrastructure
Development (P) Limited and snatched the keys.
4. The investigation led to the filing of final report under
section 173 of the Cr.P.C. alleging commission of offences
under section 341, 323, 326 and 506 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC). On 02.08.2021 the learned Judicial
Magistrate, Yangang Sub-Division, South Sikkim framed
charges against the petitioner no.1 under section 341, 323,
326 and 506 of the IPC. The orders of the learned Trial
Court reflect that the witnesses are yet to be examined.
On 10.08.2021 the learned counsel for the petitioner
no.1 submitted before the learned Trial Court that the
petitioners were on the verge of settlement of their
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
disputes and would approach this court for quashing the
FIR.
5. A compromise deed dated 07.08.2021 has been filed
along with this petition entered between the petitioners in
which it is stated that after the intervention of family
members, friends and well wishers of all the parties who
are well known to each other , they have reached an
amicable settlement. It is stated that since they have
compromised the matter the petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4 does
not desire to press the charges against the petitioner no.1
and they do not have any objection if this court annuls the
FIR and the criminal proceeding pursuant thereto.
6. Section 341, 323 and 506 of the IPC are
compoundable offences. Section 341 IPC is compoundable
by the person restrained or confined. Section 323 IPC is
compoundable by the person to whom the hurt is caused.
Section 506 IPC is compoundable by the person
intimidated. In the present case the petitioner nos. 2, 3 and
4 who are the complainant are personally present in court
and state that they have compromised the case with the
petitioner no.1 which is recorded in the compromise deed
as well.
7. Section 326 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. The
charge against the petitioner no.1 is that he had voluntarily
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
caused grievous hurt to petitioner no.2 by slapping and
punching him. Although the trial is yet to begin, the
medical report of the petitioner no.2 filed along with the
final report suggests that he was bleeding from the nose
and had diminished hearing from the left ear. The report
suggests that the petitioner no.2 had suffered moderate
hearing loss (sensorineural hearing loss) of the left ear
because of which the report suggested that the injury was
grievous in nature.
8. Mr. Dewen Sharma Luitel, learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
in Yogendra Yadav vs. State of Jharkhand
1
to urge before this
court that in view of the compromise deed FIR could be
quashed. In Yogendra Yadav (supra) there were two cross
FIRs. The first FIR alleged commission of offences under
section 341, 323, 324, 504 and 307 read with section 34 of
the IPC. The second FIR alleged commission of offences
under section 147, 148, 149, 448, 341, 323 and 380 of the
IPC. In both cases charge-sheets were submitted after
investigation and while the cases were going on the parties
agreed to compromise. A panchayat was held with the
intervention of well wishers and compromise petition
signed. Pursuant thereto an application was filed under
1
(2014) 9 SCC 653
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Crl. M.C. No. 09 of 2021
Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
section 231 (2) read with section 311 of the Cr.P.C. As
section 324, 341 and 323 of the IPC were compoundable
offences and section 326, 307 read with section 34 IPC
were non-compoundable the application for compounding
was accepted but the prayer for compounding the non -
compoundable offences was rejected by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court had dismissed
the challenge to the order of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge. The matter then reached the Supreme
Court which held:
“4. Now, the question before this Court
is whether this Court can compound the
offences under Sections 326 and 307 IPC
which are non-compoundable? Needless to
say that offences which are non -
compoundable cannot be compounded by the
court. Courts draw the power of compounding
offences from Section 320 of the Code. The
said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab [Gian Singh v. State
of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2
SCC (L&S) 988] ). However, in a given case,
the High Court can quash a criminal
proceeding in exercise of its power under
Section 482 of the Code having regard to the
fact that the parties have amicably settled
their disputes and the victim has no objection,
even though the offences are non -
compoundable. In which cases the High Court
can exercise its discretion to quash the
proceedings will depend on facts and
circumstances of each case. Offences which
involve moral turpitude, grave offences like
rape, murder, etc. cannot be effaced by
quashing the proceedings because that will
have harmful effect on the society. Such
offences cannot be said to be restricted to two
individuals or two groups. If such offences are
quashed, it may send wrong signal to the
society. However, when the High Court is
convinced that the offences are e ntirely
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
personal in nature and, therefore, do not
affect public peace or tranquillity and where it
feels that quashing of such proceedings on
account of compromise would bring about
peace and would secure ends of justice, it
should not hesitate to quash them. In such
cases, the prosecution becomes a lame
prosecution. Pursuing such a lame
prosecution would be waste of time and
energy. That will also unsettle the
compromise and obstruct restoration of peace.
5. In Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2
SCC (L&S) 988] this Court has observed that:
(SCC p. 340, para 58)
“58. Where the High Court
quashes a criminal proceeding having
regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim
has been settled although the offences
are not compoundable, it does so as in
its opinion, continuation of criminal
proceedings will be an exercise in
futility and justice in the case demands
that the dispute between the parties is
put to an end and peace is restored;
securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor.”
Needless to say that the above observations
are applicable to this Court also.
6. The learned counsel for the parties
have requested this Court that the impugned
order [Yogendra Yadav v. State of Jharkhand,
Criminal MP No. 1915 of 2011, order dated 4-
7-2012 (Jhar)] be set aside as the High Court
has not noticed the correct position in law in
regard to quashing of criminal proceedings
when there is a compromise. Affidavit has
been filed in this Court by complainant Anil
Mandal, who is Respondent 2 herein. In the
affidavit he has stated that a compromise
petition has been filed in the lower court. It is
further stated that he and the appellants are
neighbours, that there is harmonious
relationship between the two sides and that
they are living peacefully. He has further
stated that he does not want to contest the
present appeal and he has no grievance
against the appellants. The learned counsel
for the parties have confirmed that the
disputes between the parties are settled; that
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
parties are abiding by the compromise deed
and living peacefully. They have urged that in
the circumstances pending proceedings be
quashed. The State of Jharkhand has further
filed an affidavit opposing the compromise.
The affidavit does not persuade us to reject
the prayer made by the appellant and the
second respondent for quashing of the
proceedings.”
9. The law regarding the power of the High Court in
quashing FIRs on settlement arrived at between the parties
under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is well settled by a catena
of decisions of the Supreme Court. In Gian Singh vs. State of
Punjab
2 the Supreme Court summarized the position thus:
“61. The position that emerges from the
above discussion can be summarised thus :
the power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct
and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences
under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent
power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord
with the guideline engrafted in such power
viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In
what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be
exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case and
no category can be prescribed. However,
before exercise of such power, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly
quashed even though the victim or victim's
family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim
and the offender in relation to the offences
under special statutes like the Prevention of
2
(2012) 10 SCC 303
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
Corruption Act or the offences committed by
public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the
offences arising from commercial, financial,
mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the parties
have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash
the criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the
offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would put
the accused to great oppression and prejudice
and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal case despite full
and complete settlement and compromise
with the victim. In other words, the High Court
must consider whether it would be unfair or
contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of
the criminal proceeding would tantamount to
abuse of process of law despite settlement
and compromise between the victim and the
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of
justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case
is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the
High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction
to quash the criminal proceeding.”
10. In Narendra Singh vs. State of Punjab
3
the Supreme
Court laid down the following principles by which the High
Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
3
(2014) 6 SCC 466
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
“29.1. Power conferred under Section
482 of the Code is to be distinguished from
the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power to
quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where
the parties have settled the matter between
themselves. However, this power is to be
exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached
the settlement and on that basis petition for
quashing the criminal proceedings is filed,
the guiding factor in such cases would be to
secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court.
While exercising the power the High
Court is to form an opinion on either of the
aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be
exercised in those prosecutions which involve
heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, for the offences alleged to have
been committed under special statute like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working
in that capacity are not to be quashed merely
on the basis of compromise between the
victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominantly civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the
parties have resolved their entire disputes
among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the
High Court is to examine as to whether the
possibility of conviction is remote and bleak
and continuation of criminal cases would put
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the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal
cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC
would fall in the category of heinous and
serious offences and therefore are to be
generally treated as crime against the society
and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of
Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open
to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which if proved, would
lead to proving the charge under Section 307
IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the
High Court to go by the nature of injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect
of injuries suffered by the victim can generally
be the guiding factor. On the basis of this
prima facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong
possibility of conviction or the chances of
conviction are remote and bleak. In the former
case it can refuse to accept the settlement and
quash the criminal proceedings whereas in
the latter case it would be permissible for the
High Court to accept the plea compounding
the offence based on complete settlement
between the parties. At this stage, the Court
can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to
result in harmony between them which may
improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to
exercise its power under Section 482 of the
Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the settlement
is arrived at immediately after the alleged
commission of offence and the matter is still
under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash
the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is
because of the reason that at this stage the
investigation is still on and even the charge-
sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those
cases where the charge is framed but the
evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still
at infancy stage, the High Court can show
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benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably, but after prima facie assessment
of the circumstances/material mentioned
above. On the other hand, where the
prosecution evidence is almost complete or
after the conclusion of the evidence the matter
is at the stage of argument, normally the High
Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such
cases the trial court would be in a position to
decide the case finally on merits and to come
to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.
Similarly, in those cases where the conviction
is already recorded by the trial court and the
matter is at the appellate stage before the
High Court, mere compromise between the
parties would not be a ground to accept the
same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial
court. Here charge is proved under Section
307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of
a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no
question of sparing a convict found guilty of
such a crime.”
11. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan
4 the
Supreme Court while examining all the previous relevant
judgments on the point held:
“15.1. That the power conferred under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings for the non -compoundable
offences under Section 320 of the Code can be
exercised having overwhelmingly a nd
predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions
or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes and when the parties have
resolved the entire dispute amongst
themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised
in those prosecutions which involved heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society;
4
(2019) 5 SCC 688
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be
exercised for the offences under the special
statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC
and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against
the society and not against the individual
alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings
for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or
the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious
impact on the society cannot be quashed in
exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Code, on the ground that the parties have
resolved their entire dis pute amongst
themselves. However, the High Court would
not rest its decision merely because there is a
mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It
would be open to the High Court to examine
as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC
is there for the sake of it or the prosecution
has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge
under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it
would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of
the body, nature of weapons used, etc.
However, such an exercise by the High Court
would be permissible only after the evidence
is collected after investigation and the charge-
sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during
the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras
29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court
in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri)
54] should be read harmoniously and to be
read as a whole and in the circumstances
stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
offences, which are private in nature and do
not have a serious impact on society, on the
ground that there is a settlement/compromise
between the victim and the offender, the High
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Court is required to consider the antecedents
of the accused; the conduct of the accused,
namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding,
how he had managed with the complainant to
enter into a compromise, etc.”
12. In Ramgopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
5 the Supreme
Court dealt with a case in which the accused had been
convicted for various offences under section 294, 323 and
326 read with section 34 IPC. The appellant No.1 therein
was alleged to have struck the complainant with a pharsa,
which resultantly cut off the little finger of his left hand.
During the pendency of the appeal a compromise had been
entered between the parties. The Supreme Court held:
“11. True it is that offences which are
„non-compoundable‟ cannot be compounded
by a criminal court in purported exercise of its
powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such
attempt by the court would amount to
alteration, addition and modification of
Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive
domain of Legislature. There is no patent or
latent ambiguity in the language of Section
320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its wider
interpretation and include such offences in the
docket of „compoundable‟ offences which have
been consciously kept out as non -
compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited
jurisdiction to compound an offence within the
framework of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an
embargo against invoking inherent powers by
the High Court vested in it under Section 482
Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the
peculiar facts and circumstances of a case
and for justifiable reasons can press Section
482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court and/or to secure the
ends of justice.
5
2021 SCC OnLine SC 834
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12. The High Court, therefore, having
regard to the nature of the offence and the
fact that parties have amicably settled their
dispute and th e victim has willingly
consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings, can quash such proceedings in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-
compoundable. The High Court can
indubitably evaluate the consequential effects
of the offence beyond the body of an
individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic
approach, to ensure that the felony, even if
goes unpunished, does not tinker with or
paralyze the very object of the administration
of criminal justice system.
13. It appears to us that criminal
proceedings involving non-heinous offences or
where the offences are pre-dominantly of a
private nature, can be annulled irrespective of
the fact that trial has already been concluded
or appeal stands dismissed aga inst
conviction. Handing out punishment is not the
sole form of delivering justice. Societal method
of applying laws evenly is always subject to
lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that
the cases where compromise is struck post-
conviction, the High Court ought to exercise
such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view
the circumstances surrounding the incident,
the fashion in which the compromise has been
arrived at, and with due regard to the nature
and seriousness of the offence, besides the
conduct of the accused, before and after the
incidence. The touchstone for exercising the
extra-ordinary power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends of justice.
There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do
substantial justice. A restrictive construction
of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in
the given facts and circumstances of a case,
may rather lead to grave injustice. On the
other hand, in cases where heinous offences
have been proved against perpetrators, no
such benefit ought to be extended, as
cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder
Singh v. State of Punjab
3
and Laxmi
Narayan (Supra).
14. In other words, grave or serious
offences or offences which involve moral
turpitude or have a harmful effect on the
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social and moral fabric of the society or
involve matters concerning public policy,
cannot be construed betwixt two individuals
or groups only, for such offences have the
potential to impact the society at large.
Effacing abominable offences through
quashing process would not only send a
wrong signal to the community but may also
accord an undue benefit to unscrupulous
habitual or professional offenders, who can
secure a „settlement‟ through duress, threats,
social boycotts, bribes or other dubious
means. It is well said that “let no guilty man
escape, if it can be avoided.”
13. During the hearing the petitioner no.2 who was
personally present stated that all differences between the
petitioner no.1 and him have been amicably resolved and
that after being treated he does not have a hearing
problem anymore.
14. In these circumstances, this court is called upon to
consider if the FIR and the criminal proceeding against the
petitioner no.1 be quashed in exercise of its power under
section 482 Cr.P.C. having regard to the fact that the
parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victims
(petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4) have no objection to it. The
offence under section 326 IPC is non-compoundable but
not a heinous offence. The records prima facie reveal that
the incident occurred when the petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4,
as officers of the company engaged in the construction of
the highway, sought to remove the construction outside the
residence of the petitioner no.1’s father-in-law (with his
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Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
permission) which fell outside his private area and where
the highway was to be constructed. It transpires that the
petitioner no.1 however, got agitated by the fact that the
petitioner nos. 2, 3 and 4 broke and cleared the part of the
cemented construction which was constructed by his
father-in-law but under the road construction area. This
led to the petitioner no.1 allegedly attacking the petitioner
nos. 2, 3 and 4.
15. There is nothing to suggest or doubt that the
compromise entered between the petitioners is not bona
fide. Besides the offence under section 326 IPC all other
offences being compoundable have been compromis ed
between the petitioners. Having resolved their dispute and
differences compounding the other related offences and not
allowing the compromise to go through with regard to the
offence under section 326 IPC may lead to a situat ion
which may not secure the ends of justice and prevent
abuse of the process of court. Possibility of conviction in
such cases may be bleak. As stated earlier the trial is yet to
begin. The Supreme Court is clear that the High Court can
show benevolence in exercising its power favorably after
prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material even
in cases where the charge is framed but evidence is yet to
start or is still at infancy stage. As held by the Supreme
18
Crl. M.C. No. 09 of 2021
Pema Chultim Bhutia & Ors. vs. State of Sikkim
Court in Ramgopal (supra) criminal proceedings involving
non-heinous offences or where the offences are pre -
dominantly of a private nature, can be annulled irrespective
of the fact that trial has already been concluded or appeal
stands dismissed against conviction. Handing out
punishment is not the sole form of delivering justice.
Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to
lawful exceptions.
16. In view of the aforesaid, the petition under section 482
Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioners is allowed. FIR No.29/2019
dated 05.11.2019 as well as the Criminal Proceeding i.e.
G.R. Case No.21 of 2020 pending in the Court of the
learned Judicial Magistrate, Yangang, Sub-Division, South
Sikkim are hereby quashed.
17. It is hoped that the petitioner no.1 who is a graduate
does not in the future take law into his own hands to
resolve disputes which can be effectively settled by
approaching the relevant authorities as well as the courts
of law.
( Bhaskar Raj Pradhan )
Judge
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