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CASE NO.:

Writ Petition (civil) 389 of 2002

PETITIONER:

People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr.

RESPONDENT:

Union of India

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/12/2003

BENCH:

S. RAJENDRA BABU & G.P. MATHUR

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

[With

W.P.(Crl.) 89/2002, W.P.(Crl.)

129/2002, W.P.(Crl.) 28/2003 &

W.P.(Crl.) 48/2003]

RAJENDRA BABU, J. :

W.P.(C) No. 389/2002 & W.P.(Crl) No.

89/2002 :

In this batch of Writ Petitions before us the

Constitutional validity of various provisions of the

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (hereinafter

POTA) is in challenge.

The Petitioners' contended before us that

since the provisions of POTA, in pith and

substance, fall under the Entry 1 (Public Order) of

List II Parliament lacks legislative competence. To

authenticate this contention, the decision in

Rehman Shagoo & others V. State of Jammu

Kashmir, 1960 (1) SCR 680, is relied upon.

According to them, the menace of terrorism is

covered by the Entry "Public Order" and to explain

the meaning thereof, our attention is invited to

decisions in Romesh Thaper V. State of

Madras, 1950 SCR 594, Dr. Ram Manohar

Lohia V. State of Bihar, 1966 (1) SCR 709, and

Madhu Limaye V. SDM, Monghyr, (1970) 3 SCC

746. The Petitioners thus submitted that terrorist

activity is confined only to State(s) and therefore

State(s) only have the competence to enact a

legislation.

The learned Attorney General refuting this

contention submitted that acts of terrorism, which

are aimed at weakening the sovereignty and

integrity of the country cannot be equated with

mere breaches of law and order and disturbances

of public order or public safety. He argued that the

concept of "sovereignty and integrity of India" is

distinct and separate from the concepts of "public

order" or "security of State" which fall under List

II enabling States to enact legislation relating to

public order or safety affecting or relating to a

particular State. Therefore, the legislative

competence of a State to enact laws for its

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security cannot denude Parliament of its

competence under List I to enact laws to

safeguard national security and sovereignty of

India by preventing and punishing acts of

terrorism. Learned Attorney General distinguished

the decision in Rehman Shagoo and submitted

that the legislation dealt with therein is

fundamentally and qualitatively different from

POTA. He also argued before us that Rehman

Shagoo cannot mitigate the binding ratio and

unanimous conclusion reached by this Court on

the point of legislative competence in Kartar

Singh V. State of Punjab, 1994 (3) SCC 569 =

1994 (2) SCR 375, that Parliament can enact such

law.

In deciding the point of legislative

competence, it is necessary to understand the

contextual backdrop that led to the enactment of

POTA, which aims to combat terrorism. Terrorism

has become the most worrying feature of the

contemporary life. Though violent behavior is not

new, the present day 'terrorism' in its full

incarnation has obtained a different character and

poses extraordinary challenges to the civilized

world. The basic edifices of a modern State, like -

democracy, state security, rule of law, sovereignty

and integrity, basic human rights etc are under

the attack of terrorism. Though the phenomenon

of terrorism is complex, a 'terrorist act' is easily

identifiable when it does occur. The core meaning

of the term is clear even if its exact frontiers are

not. That is why the anti-terrorist statutes - the

earlier Terrorism and Disruptive Activities

(Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) and now POTA do

not define 'terrorism' but only 'terrorist acts.' (See

: Hitendra Vishnu Thakur V. State of

Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602).

Paul Wilkinson, an authority on terrorism

related works, culled out five major characteristics

of terrorism. They are:

1. It is premeditated and aims to create a climate

of extreme fear or terror.

2. It is directed at a wider audience or target than

the immediate victims of violence.

3. It inherently involves attacks on random and

symbolic targets, including civilians.

4. The acts of violence committed are seen by the

society in which they occur as extra-normal, in

literal sense that they breach the social norms,

thus causing a sense of outrage; and

5. Terrorism is used to influence political behavior

in some way - for example to force opponents into

conceding some or all of the perpetrators

demands, to provoke an over-reaction, to serve as

a catalysis for more general conflict, or to

publicize a political cause.

In all acts of terrorism, it is mainly the

psychological element that distinguishes it from

other political offences, which are invariably

accompanied with violence and disorder. Fear is

induced not merely by making civilians the direct

target of violence but also by exposing them to a

sense of insecurity. It is in this context that this

Court held in Mohd. Iqbal M. Shaikh V. State

of Maharashtra, (1998) 4 SCC 494, that:

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"...it is not possible to give a precise definition

of terrorism or to lay down what constitutes

terrorism. But... it may be possible to describe

it as a use of violence when its most important

result is not merely the physical and mental

damage of the victim but the prolonged

psychological effect it produces or has the

potential of producing on the society as a

whole. ... if the object of the activity is to

disturb harmony of the society or to terrorize

people and the society, with a view to disturb

even tempo, tranquility of the society, and a

sense of fear and insecurity is created in the

minds of a section of society at large, then it

will, undoubtedly be held to be terrorist act..."

Our country has been the victim of an

undeclared war by the epicenters of terrorism with

the aid of well-knit and resourceful terrorist

organizations engaged in terrorist activities in

different States such as Jammu & Kashmir, North-

East States, Delhi, West Bengal, Maharashtra,

Gujarat, Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh. The learned

Attorney General placed material to point out that

the year 2002 witnessed 4038 terrorist related

violent incidents in J&K in which 1008 civilians and

453 security personnel were killed. The number of

terrorist killed in 2002 was 1707 out of which 508

were foreigners. In the year 2001 there were as

many as 28 suicide attacks while there were over

10 suicide attacks in 2002 in which innocent

persons and a large number of women and

children were killed. The major terrorist incidents

in the recent past includes attack on Indian

Parliament on 13th December 2001, attack on

Jammu & Kashmir Assembly on 1st October, 2001,

attack on Akshardham temple on 24th September

2002, attack on US Information Center at Kolkatta

on 22nd January 2002, Srinagar CRPF Camp attack

on 22nd November 2002, IED blast near Jawahar

Tunnel on 23rd November 2002, attack on

Raghunath Mandir on 24th November 2002, bus

bomb blast at Ghatkopar in Mumbai on 2nd

December 2002, attack on villagers in Nadimarg in

Pulwama District in Jammu Kashmir on the night

of 23rd-24th March 2003 etc. There were attacks

in Red Fort and on several Government

Installations, security forces' camps and in public

places. Gujarat witnessed gruesome carnage of

innocent people by unleashing unprecedented

orgy of terror. People in Bihar, Andhra Pradesh,

and Maharashtra etc have also experienced the

terror trauma. The latest addition to this long list

of terror is the recent twin blast at Mumbai that

claimed about 50 lives. It is not necessary to swell

this opinion by narrating all the sad episodes of

terrorist activities that the country has witnessed.

All these terrorist strikes have certain

common features. It could be very broadly

grouped into three.

1. Attack on the institution of democracy,

which is the very basis of our country. (By

attacking Parliament, Legislative Assembly etc).

And the attack on economic system by targeting

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economic nerve centers.

2. Attack on symbols of national pride and

on security / strategic installations. (eg. Red Fort,

Military installations and camps, Radio stations

etc.)

3. Attack on civilians to generate terror

and fear psychosis among the general populace.

The attack at worshipping places to injure

sentiments and to whip communal passions. These

are designed to position the people against the

government by creating a feeling of insecurity.

Terrorist acts are meant to destabilize the

nation by challenging its sovereignty and integrity,

to raze the constitutional principles that we hold

dear, to create a psyche of fear and anarchism

among common people, to tear apart the secular

fabric, to overthrow democratically elected

government, to promote prejudice and bigotry, to

demoralize the security forces, to thwart the

economic progress and development and so on.

This cannot be equated with a usual law and order

problem within a State. On the other hand, it is

inter-state, inter-national or cross-border in

character. Fight against the overt and covert acts

of terrorism is not a regular criminal justice

endeavor. Rather it is defence of our nation and

its citizens. It is a challenge to the whole nation

and invisible force of Indianness that binds this

great nation together. Therefore, terrorism is a

new challenge for law enforcement. By indulging

in terrorist activities organized groups or

individuals, trained, inspired and supported by

fundamentalists and anti-Indian elements were

trying to destabilize the country. This new breed

of menace was hitherto unheard of. Terrorism is

definitely a criminal act, but it is much more than

mere criminality. Today, the government is

charged with the duty of protecting the unity,

integrity, secularism and sovereignty of India from

terrorists, both from outside and within borders.

To face terrorism we need new approaches,

techniques, weapons, expertise and of course new

laws. In the above said circumstances Parliament

felt that a new anti-terrorism law is necessary for

a better future. This parliamentary resolve is

epitomized in POTA.

The terrorist threat that we are facing is now

on an unprecedented global scale. Terrorism has

become a global threat with global effects. It has

become a challenge to the whole community of

civilized nations. Terrorist activities in one country

may take on a transnational character, carrying

out attacks across one border, receiving funding

from private parties or a government across

another, and procuring arms from multiple

sources. Terrorism in a single country can readily

become a threat to regional peace and security

owing to its spillover effects. It is therefore

difficult in the present context to draw sharp

distinctions between domestic and international

terrorism. Many happenings in the recent past

caused the international community to focus on

the issue of terrorism with renewed intensity. The

Security Council unanimously passed resolutions

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1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001); the General

Assembly adopted resolution 56/1 by consensus,

and convened a special session. All these

resolutions and declarations inter alia call upon

Member States to take necessary steps to 'prevent

and suppress terrorist acts' and also to 'prevent

and suppress the financing of terrorist acts.' India

is a party to all these resolves. Anti-terrorism

activities in the global level are mainly carried out

through bilateral and multilateral cooperation

among nations. It has thus become our

international obligation also to pass necessary

laws to fight terrorism.

The attempts by the State to prevent

terrorism should be based on well-established

legal principles. The 'Report of the Policy Working

Group of the United Nations and Terrorism' urged

the global community to concentrate on a triple

strategy to fight against terrorism. They are:

a). Dissuade disaffected groups from

embracing terrorism;

b). Deny groups or individuals the means to

carry out acts of terrorism; and

c). Sustain broad-based international

cooperation in the struggle against terrorism.

Therefore, the anti-terrorism laws should be

capable of dissuading individuals or groups from

resorting to terrorism, denying the opportunities

for the commission of acts of terrorism by creating

inhospitable environments for terrorism and also

leading the struggle against terrorism. Anti -

terrorism law is not only a penal statue but also

focuses on pre-emptive rather than defensive

State action. At the same time in the light of

global terrorist threats, collective global action is

necessary. Lord Woolf CJ in A, X and Y, and

another V. Secretary of the State for the

Home Department (Neutral Citation Number:

[2002] EWCA Civ. 1502) has pointed out that

"...Where international terrorists are operating

globally and committing acts designed to terrorize

the population in one country, that can have

implications which threaten the life of another.

This is why a collective approach to terrorism is

important."

Parliament has passed POTA by taking all

these aspects into account. The terrorism is not

confined to the borders of the country. Cross-

border terrorism is also threatening the country.

To meet such a situation, a law can be enacted

only by Parliament and not by a State Legislature.

Piloting the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in the joint

session of Parliament on March 26, 2002 Hon'ble

Home Minister said:

"...The Government of India has been

convinced for the last four years that we have

been here and I am sure even the earlier

Governments held that terrorism and more

particularly, State-sponsored cross border

terrorism is a kind of war. It is not just a law

and order problem. This is the first factor,

which has been responsible for Government

thinking in terms of an extraordinary law like

POTO.

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...So, first of all, the question that I would like

to pose to all of you and which we have posed

to the nation is: 'Is it just in Jammu and

Kashmir an aggravated law and order situation

that we are facing or is it really when we say it

a proxy war, do we really believe that it is a

proxy war?'...But when you have terrorist

organizations being trained, financed by a

State and it becomes State-sponsored

terrorism and all of them are enabled to

infiltrate into our country, it becomes a

challenge of a qualitatively different nature..."

(Emphasis supplied)

From this it could be gathered that

Parliament has explored the possibility of

employing the existing laws to tackle terrorism

and arrived at the conclusion that the existing

laws are not capable. It is also clear to Parliament

that terrorism is not a usual law and order

problem.

The protection and promotion of human

rights under the rule of law is essential in the

prevention of terrorism. Here comes the role of

law and Court's responsibility. If human rights are

violated in the process of combating terrorism, it

will be self-defeating. Terrorism often thrives

where human rights are violated, which adds to

the need to strengthen action to combat violations

of human rights. The lack of hope for justice

provides breeding grounds for terrorism.

Terrorism itself should also be understood as an

assault on basic rights. In all cases, the fight

against terrorism must be respectful to the human

rights. Our Constitution laid down clear limitations

on the State actions within the context of the fight

against terrorism. To maintain this delicate

balance by protecting 'core' Human Rights is the

responsibility of Court in a matter like this.

Constitutional soundness of POTA needs to be

judged by keeping these aspects in mind.

Now, we will revert to the issue of legislative

competence. Relying on Rehman Shagoo

Petitioners argued that Parliament lacks

competence since the 'terrorism' in pith and

substance covered under the Entry 1 (Public

Order) of List II. Conclusion of this contention

depends upon the true meaning of the Entry -

'Public Order'.

A constitution Bench of this Court in Rehman

Shagoo examined the constitutionality of the

Enemy Agents (Ordinance), No. VIII of S. 2005

promulgated by His Highness the Maharaja under

Section 5 of Jammu Kashmir Constitution Act, S.

1996. For a proper understanding of the ratio in

Rehman Shagoo, it is necessary to understand the

background in which the impugned Ordinance was

promulgated. (See : Prem Nath Kaul V. The

State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1959 Supp. (2)

SCR 270, to understand the background that

prevailed in the then Kashmir). Because any

interpretation divorced from the context and

purpose will lead to bad conclusions. It is a well-

established canon of interpretation that the

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meaning of a word should be understood and

applied in accordance with the context of time,

social and conditional needs. Rehman Shagoo

was concerned with the interpretation of

Instrument of Accession and the power of

Maharaja to issue the impugned Ordinance

therein. The same was promulgated to protect the

state of Kashmir from external raiders and to

punish them and those who assist them. The

situation that prevailed during the latter half of

1940s is fundamentally different form today. The

circumstances of independence, partition, state

re-organization, and the peculiar situation

prevailing in the then Kashmir etc. need to be

taken into account. It is only in that context this

Court said in Rehman Shagoo that the impugned

Ordinance:

" ...In pith and substance deals with public

order and criminal law procedure; the mere

fact that there is an indirect impact on armed

forces in s. 3 of the Ordinance will not make it

in pith and substance a law covered by item

(1) under the head 'Defence' in the Schedule."

Therefore, Rehman Shagoo is

distinguishable and cannot be used as an authority

to challenge the competence of Parliament to pass

POTA. The problems that prevailed in India

immediately after independence cannot be

compared with the menace of terrorism that we

are facing in the twenty first century. As we have

already discussed above, the present day problem

of terrorism is affecting the security and

sovereignty of the nation. It is not State specific

but trans-national. Only Parliament can make a

legislation to meet its challenge. Moreover, the

entry 'Public Order' in the State List only

empowers the States to enact a legislation relating

to public order or security in so far as it affects or

relates to a particular State. How so ever wide a

meaning is assigned to the Entry 'Public Order',

the present day problem of terrorism cannot be

brought under the same by any stretch of

imagination. Thus, Romesh Thaper, Dr. Ram

Manohar Lohia and Madhu Limaye (all cited

earlier) cannot be resorted to read 'terrorism' into

'Public Order'. Since the Entry Public Order or any

other Entries in List II do not cover the situation

dealt with in POTA, the legislative competence of

Parliament cannot be challenged.

Earlier a Constitution Bench of this Court,

while dealing with the very same argument, held

in Kartar Singh's case (supra) as follows:

"Having regard to the limitation placed by

Article 245 (1) on the legislative power of the

Legislature of the State in the matter of

enactment of laws having application within

the territorial limits of the State only, the

ambit of the field of legislation with respect to

'public order' under Entry 1 in the State List

has to be confined to disorders of lesser

gravity having an impact within the boundaries

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of the State. Activities of a more serious nature

which threaten the security and integrity of the

country as a whole would not be within the

legislative field assigned to the States under

Entry 1 of the State List but would fall within

the ambit of Entry 1 of the Union List relating

to defence of India and in any event under the

residuary power conferred on Parliament under

Article 248 read with Entry 97 of the Union

List.

...

The terrorism, the Act (TADA) contemplates,

cannot be classified as mere disturbances of

'public order' disturbing the 'even tempo of the

life of community of any specified locality' - in

the words of Hidayathulla, C J in Arun Ghosh v.

State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 98 but it is

much more, rather a grave emergent situation

created either by external forces particularly at

the frontiers of this country or by anti-

nationals throwing a challenge to the very

existence and sovereignty of the country in its

democratic polity.

...

In our view, the impugned legislation does not

fall under Entry 1 of List II, namely, Public

Order. No other Entry in List II has been

invoked. The impugned Act, therefore, falls

within the legislative competence of Parliament

in view of Article 248 read with Entry 97 of List

I and it is not necessary to consider whether it

falls under any of the entries in List I or List

III. We are, however, of the opinion that the

impugned Act could fall within the ambit of

Entry 1 of List I, namely, 'Defence of India'."

[pp. 633, 634, 635]

While this is the view of the majority of

Judges in Kartar Singh's case (supra), K.

Ramaswamy,J. held that Parliament does possess

power under Article 248 and Entry 97 of List I of

the Seventh Schedule and could also come within

the ambit of Entry 1 of List III. Sahai,J. held

that the legislation could be upheld under Entry 1

of List III. Thus, all the Judges are of the

unanimous opinion that Parliament had legislative

competence though for different reasons.

Considering all the above said aspects, the

challenge advanced by Petitioners of want of

legislative competence of Parliament to enact

POTA is not tenable.

Another issue that the Petitioner has raised

at the threshold is the alleged misuse of TADA and

the large number of acquittals of the accused

charged under TADA. Here we would like to point

out that this Court cannot go into and examine the

'need' of POTA. It is a matter of policy. Once

legislation is passed the Government has an

obligation to exercise all available options to

prevent terrorism within the bounds of the

Constitution. Moreover, we would like to point out

that this Court has repeatedly held that mere

possibility of abuse cannot be counted as a ground

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for denying the vesting of powers or for declaring

a statute unconstitutional. (See: State of

Rajasthan V. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCR 1,

Collector of Customs V. Nathella Sampathu

Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316, Keshavananda

Bharati V. State of Kerala, 1973 (4) SCC 225;

Mafatlal Industries V. Union of India, (1997) 5

SCC 536 etc).

Meaning of the word 'abets' in the context of

POTA:

Pertaining to the validity of individual

sections, petitioners primarily contended that

Section 3(3) of POTA provides that whoever

'abets' a terrorist act or any preparatory act to a

terrorist act shall be punishable and this provision,

fails to address the requirement of 'mens rea'

element. They added that this provision has been

incorporated in POTA in spite of the contrary

observation of this Court in Kartar Singh,

wherein it was held that the word 'abets' need to

have the requisites of intention or knowledge.

Consequently, they want us to strike down Section

3(3) as the same is prone to misuse.

In Kartar Singh, this Court was concerned

with the expression "abet" as defined under

Section 2(1)(a) of TADA and hence considered the

effect of different provisions of the TADA to

ascertain true meaning thereof. As the meaning

of the word "abet" as defined therein is vague and

in precise, actual knowledge or reason to believe

on the part of the person to be brought within the

definition should be brought into that provision

instead of reading down that provision. That kind

of exercise is not necessary in POTA.

Under POTA the word "abets" is not defined

at all. Section 2(1)(i) of POTA says "words and

expressions used but not defined in this Act and

defined in the Code shall have the meaning

respectively assigned to them in the Code."

According to Section 2(1)(a) of POTA "Code"

means 'Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of

1974).' Whereas, Section 2(y) Cr.P.C. refers to

Indian Penal Code for meaning of the word 'abets'.

Therefore, the definition of 'abets' as appears in

the IPC will apply in a case under POTA. In order

to bring a person abetting the commission of an

offence, under the provisions of IPC it is necessary

to prove that such person has been connected

with those steps of the transactions that are

criminal. 'Mens rea' element is sine qua non for

offences under IPC. Learned Attorney General

does not dispute this position. Therefore, the

argument advanced pertaining to the validity of

Section 3(3) citing the reason of the absence of

mens rea element stands rejected.

Section 4:

Section 4 provides for punishing a person

who is in 'unauthorised possession' of arms or

other weapons. The petitioners argued that

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since the knowledge element is absent the

provision is bad in law. A similar issue was raised

before a Constitution Bench of this Court in

Sanjay Dutt V. State (II), (1994) 5 SCC 410.

Here this Court in Para 19 observed that:

"... Even though the word 'possession' is not

preceded by any adjective like 'knowingly', yet

it is common ground that in the context the

word 'possession' must mean possession with

the requisite mental element, that is, conscious

possession and not mere custody without the

awareness of the nature of such possession.

There is a mental element in the concept of

possession. Accordingly, the ingredient of

'possession' in Section 5 of the TADA Act

means conscious possession. This is how the

ingredient of possession in similar context of

statutory offence importing strict liability on

account of mere possession of an unauthorised

substance has been understood."

The finding of this Court squarely to the

effect that there exists a mental element in the

word possession itself answers the Petitioners

argument. The learned Attorney General also

maintains the stand that Section 4 presupposes

conscious possession. Another aspect pointed out

by the petitioners is about the 'unauthorized'

possession of arms and argued that unauthorized

possession could even happen; for example, by

non-renewal of license etc. In the light of Sanjay

Dutt's case (supra) this Section presupposes

knowledge of terrorist act for possession. There is

no question of innocent persons getting punished.

Therefore, we hold that there is no infirmity in

Section 4.

Sections 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16 and 17:

Contentions have been raised in regard to

provisions relating to seizure, attachment and

forfeiture of proceeds of terrorism.

Provisions relating to seizure, attachment

and forfeiture have to be read together. Section

2(c) of POTA sets out the meaning of 'proceeds of

terrorism' and reads as follows:

" 'proceeds of terrorism' shall mean all

kinds of properties which have been

derived or obtained from commission of

any terrorist act or have been acquired

through funds traceable to a terrorist act,

and shall include cash irrespective of

person in whose name such proceeds are

standing or in whose possession they are

found."

Explanation to Section 3 gives the meaning

of 'a terrorist act' in the context of sub-section (1)

of Section 3 so as to include the act of raising

funds intended for the purpose of terrorism.

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Section 6 debars a person from holding or

possessing any proceeds of terrorism and also

makes it clear that it is liable to be forfeited.

Section 7 authorises an investigating officer, not

below the rank of Superintendent of Police with

the prior approval in writing of the Director

General of Police of the State, to seize such

property or attach the same and serve a copy of

such an order on the person concerned, if he has

reason to believe that any property in relation to

which an investigation is being conducted

represents proceeds of terrorism. Section 8

provides for forfeiture of the proceeds of terrorism

by a court irrespective of the fact whether or not

the person from whose possession it is seized or

attached is prosecuted in a Special Court for an

offence under POTA. Section 9 provides for issue

of show cause notice before forfeiture of proceeds

of terrorism and an order for forfeiture cannot be

made if such person establishes that he is a bona

fide transferee of such proceeds for value without

knowing that they represent proceeds of

terrorism. Under Section 10, an appeal lies

against an order made under Section 8 of POTA.

Sub-section (2) thereof states that where an order

made under Section 8 is modified or annulled by

the High Court, the person against whom an order

of forfeiture has been made under Section 8 is

acquitted, such property shall be returned to him

and in either case if it is not possible for any

reason to return the forfeited property, adequate

compensation should be paid to him, which will be

equivalent to the price and interest from the date

of seizure of the property. Although the

petitioners have challenged the various provisions

of POTA relating to seizure, forfeiture and

attachment of the property, ultimately they did

not pursue with that argument and submitted that

the various facets of challenge to the aforesaid

provisions can only be examined in the context of

an actual fact situation and for the present they

wanted an interpretation of the expressions used

in Section 10(2) to apply even to a case of

forfeiture of the proceeds of terrorism against a

person who is prosecuted under POTA. Even that

aspect can only be considered when an actual

situation arises and not in the abstract.

Therefore, we need not examine in detail these

provisions except to notice the background in

which these provisions have been enacted.

The order of forfeiture, by reason of Section

11, has been made independent of imposition of

other punishments to which a person may be

liable. Under Section 12, Designated Authority

has been permitted to investigate the claims made

by a third party. These provisions have to be seen

as against Section 16, which provides for

forfeiture of property of any person prosecuted

and ultimately convicted. Here only on conviction,

forfeiture of property can take place. In this

connection, it is relevant to take note of the

provisions of Sections 15, 16 and 17. Section 15

renders certain transfers to be null and void in

cases where after the issue of an order under

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Section 7 or notice under Section 9 any property

is transferred by any mode whatsoever, such

transfer shall for the purpose of the Act be ignored

and if such property is subsequently forfeited, the

transfer of such property shall be deemed to be

null and void. Section 16 enables a special court

trying a person for an offence under the Act to

pass an order that all or any of the properties,

movable or immovable or both belonging to him,

during the period of such trial, be attached, if not

already attached under the Act. On conviction of

such person, the special court may, by an order,

declare that any property, movable or immovable

or both belonging to the accused and specified in

the order, shall stand forfeited to the Central

Government or the State Government, as the case

may be. Section 17 provides that in cases where

any share of a company shall stand forfeited,

then, the company shall, on receipt of the order of

the special court, notwithstanding anything

contained in the Companies Act, 1956 or the

articles of association of the company, forthwith

register the Central Government or the State

Government, as the case may be, as the

transferee of such shares.

Funding and financing play a vital role in

fostering and promoting terrorism and it is only

with such funds terrorists are able to recruit

persons for their activities and make payments to

them and their family to obtain arms and

ammunition for furthering terrorist activities and

to sustain the campaign of terrorism. Therefore,

seizure, forfeiture and attachment of properties

are essential in order to contain terrorism and is

not unrelated to the same. Indeed, it is relevant

to notice a resolution passed by the United

Nations Security Council [Resolution No.1373

dated 28.9.2001] which emphasized the need to

curb terrorist activities by freezing and forfeiture

of funds and financial assets employed to further

terrorist activities. It will also be interesting to

notice the United Nations International Convention

for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism

but at the same time it is not necessary to go into

those details in the present context. The scheme

of the provisions indicate that the principles of

natural justice are duly observed and they do not

confer any arbitrary power and forfeiture can only

be made by an order of the court against which an

appeal is also provided to the High Court and the

rights of bona fide transferee are not affected.

Therefore, for the present, it is not necessary to

pronounce the constitutional validity of these

provisions and we proceed on the basis that they

are valid.

Number of changes have been made in the

provisions which existed in TADA and which exist

in POTA. The relevant discussion in the challenge

to Section 8 of TADA by majority in Kartar Singh

is contained in paras 149-157 and para 452 by

Justice Sahai who has concurred with the

majority. The validity of Section 8 of TADA was

upheld, only if it was applied in the manner

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indicated in Para 156 of the judgment which is as

under :-

"The discretionary power given to the

Designated Court under Section 8(1) and (2)

is to be exercised under strict contingencies,

namely, that (1) there must be an order of

forfeiture and that order must be in writing;

(2) the property either movable or immovable

or both must belong to the accused convicted

of any offence of TADA Act or rule thereunder;

(3) the property should be specified in the

order; (4) even though attachment can be

made under Section 8(2) during the trial of the

case, the forfeiture can be ordered only in

case of conviction and not otherwise."

However, ultimately, they do not press these

contentions to be considered in these proceedings

by stating that the various facets as set above can

really be seen in actual fact situation and for the

present, they call upon the Court to clarify that

the expression "modified" or "annulled" used in

Section 10(2) shall apply even in a case of

forfeiture of the proceeds of terrorism against a

person who is not prosecuted under POTA.

It is not necessary to interpret these

expressions and as and when an appropriate case

arises, appropriate interpretation can be given on

the said expressions. There is a scheme for

forfeiture of the proceeds of terrorism followed by

a show cause notice to be issued and thereafter

on a decision being made, an appeal lies thereto

and the order of forfeiture, by itself, will not

prevent the court from inflicting any other

punishment for which the person may be liable

under the Act. The effect of modification and

annulment of an order made by court under

Section 8 of the Act is set out in sub-section (2) of

Section 10. Therefore, as rightly submitted on

behalf of the petitioners, these aspects can

appropriately be dealt with depending upon the

fact situation arising in a given case. Therefore,

it is not necessary to express any opinion on these

aspects of the matter.

Section 14:

The constitutional validity of Section 14 is

challenged by advancing the argument that it

gives unbridled powers to the investigating officer

to compel any person to furnish information if the

investigating officer has reason to believe that

such information will be useful or relevant to the

purpose of the Act. It is pointed out that the

provision is without any checks and is amenable to

misuse by the investigating officers. It is also

argued that it does not exclude lawyers or

journalists who are bound by their professional

ethics to keep the information rendered by their

clients as privileged communication. Therefore,

the Petitioners submitted that Section 14 is

violative of Articles 14, 19, 20(3) and 21 of the

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Constitution. Learned Attorney General maintained

that the Act does not confer any arbitrary or

unguided powers; that such power is restricted to

furnish information in one's possession in relation

to terrorist offence 'on points or matters where

the investigating officer has reason to believe (not

suspect) that such information would be useful for

or relevant to the purposes of the Act'; that this

provision is essential for the detection and

prosecution of terrorist offences; and that the

underlying rationale of the obligation to furnish

information is the salutary duty of every citizen.

Section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 casts a duty upon every person to furnish

information regarding offences. Criminal justice

system cannot function without the cooperation of

people. Rather it is the duty of every body to

assist the State in detection of the crime and

bringing criminal to justice. Withholding such

information cannot be traced to right to privacy,

which itself is not an absolute right (See : Sharda

V. Dharmpal, 2003 (4) SCC 493). Right to

privacy is subservient to that of security of State.

Highlighting the necessity of people's assistance in

detection of crime this Court observed in State of

Gujarat V. Anirudhsing, 1997 (6) SCC 514,

that:

"...It is the salutary duty of every witness who

has the knowledge of the commission of the

crime, to assist the State in giving evidence..."

Section 14 confers power to the investigating

officer to ask for furnishing information that will be

useful for or relevant to the purpose of the Act.

Further more such information could be asked

only after obtaining a written approval from an

officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of

Police. Such power to the investigating officers is

quiet necessary in the detection of terrorist

activities or terrorist.

It is settled position of law that a journalist or

lawyer does not have a sacrosanct right to

withhold information regarding crime under the

guise of professional ethics. A lawyer cannot claim

a right over professional communication beyond

what is permitted under Section 126 of the

Evidence Act. There is also no law that permits a

newspaper or journalist to withhold relevant

information from Courts though they have been

given such power by virtue of Section 15(2) of the

Press Council Act, 1978 as against Press Council.

(See also : Pandit M.S.M Sharma V. Shri Sri

Krishan Sinha, 1959 Supp (1) SCR 806, and

Sewakram Sobhani V. R.K Karanjia, 1981 (3)

SCC 208, which quoted Arnold V. King Emperor

1913-14 (41) IA 149, with approval and also

B.S.C V. Granada Television, 1981 (1) All E.R

417 (HL) and Branzburg V. Hayes, 1972 (408)

US 665). Of course the investigating officers will

be circumspect and cautious in requiring them to

disclose information. In the process of obtaining

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information, if any right of citizen is violated,

nothing prevents him from resorting to other legal

remedies.

In as much as the main purpose of Section14

of POTA is only to allow the investigating officers

to procure certain information that is necessary to

proceed with the further investigation we find

there is no merit in the argument of the

petitioners and we uphold the validity of Section

14.

Sections 18 & 19:

Sections 18 and 19 deals with the notification

and de-notification of terrorist organizations.

Petitioners submitted that under Section 18(1) of

POTA a schedule has been provided giving the

names of terrorist organization without any

legislative declaration; that there is nothing

provided in the Act for declaring organizations as

terrorist organization; that this provision is

therefore, unconstitutional as it takes away the

fundamental rights of an organization under

Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of the

Constitution; that under Section 18(2) of the Act,

the Central Government has been given

unchecked and arbitrary powers to 'add' or

'remove' or 'amend' the Schedule pertaining to

terrorist organizations; that under the Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 an organization

could have been declared unlawful only after the

Central Government has sufficient material to

form an opinion and such declaration has to be

made by a Notification wherein grounds have to

be specified for making such declaration: that

therefore such arbitrary power is violative of

Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.

Pertaining to Section 19 the main allegation is that

it excessively delegates power to Central

Government in the appointment of members to

the Review Committee and they also pointed out

that the inadequate representation of judicial

members will affect the decision-making and

consequently it may affect the fair judicial

scrutiny; that therefore Section 19 is not

constitutionally valid.

The Learned Attorney General contended that

there is no requirement of natural justice which

mandates that before a statutory declaration is

made in respect of an organization which is listed

in the schedule a prior opportunity of hearing or

representation should be given to the affected

organization or its members: that the rule of audi

alteram partem is not absolute and is subject to

modification; that in light of post-decisional

hearing remedy provided under Section 19 and

since the aggrieved persons could approach the

Review Committee there is nothing illegal in the

Section; that furthermore the constitutional

remedy under Articles 226 and 227 is also

available; that therefore, having regard to the

nature of the legislation and the magnitude and

prevalence of the evil of terrorism cannot be said

to impose unreasonable restrictions on the

Fundamental Rights under Article 19(1)(c) of the

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Constitution.

The right of citizens to form association or

union that is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the

Constitution is subject to the restriction provided

under Article 19(4) of the Constitution. Under

Article 19(4) of the Constitution the State can

impose reasonable restrictions, inter alia, in the

interest of sovereignty and integrity of the

country. POTA is enacted to protect sovereignty

and integrity of India from the menace of

terrorism. Imposing restriction under Article 19(4)

of the Constitution also includes declaring an

organization as a terrorist organization as

provided under POTA. Hence Section 18 is not

unconstitutional.

It is contended that before making the

notification whereby an organization is declared as

a terrorist organization there is no provision for

pre-decisional hearing. But this cannot be

considered as a violation of audi alteram partem

principle, which itself is not absolute. Because in

the peculiar background of terrorism it may be

necessary for the Central Government to declare

an organization as terrorist organization even

without hearing that organization. At the same

time under Section 19 of POTA the aggrieved

persons can approach the Central Government

itself for reviewing its decision. If they are not

satisfied by the decision of the Central

Government they can subsequently approach

Review Committee and they are also free to

exercise their Constitutional remedies. The post-

decisional remedy provided under POTA satisfies

the audi alteram partem requirement in the

matter of declaring an organization as a terrorist

organization. (See: Mohinder Singh Gill V. Chief

Election Commissioner, 1978 (1) SCC 405;

Swadeshi Cotton Mills V. Union of India, 1981

(1) SCC 664; Olga Tellis V. Bombay Municipal

Corporation, 1985 (3) SCC 545; Union of India

V. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 (3) SCC 398).

Therefore, the absence of pre-decisional hearing

cannot be treated as a ground for declaring

Section 18 as invalid.

It is urged that Section 18 or 19 is invalid

based on the inadequacy of judicial members, in

the Review Committee. As per Section 60,

Chairperson of the Review Committee will be a

person who is or has been a Judge of High Court.

The mere presence of non-judicial members by

itself cannot be treated as a ground to invalidate

Section 19. (See: Kartar Singh' case (supra) at

page 683, para 265 of SCC).

As regards the reasonableness of the

restriction provided under Section 18, it has to be

noted that the factum of declaration of an

organization as a terrorist organization depends

upon the 'belief' of Central Government. The

reasonableness of the Central Government's

action has to be justified based on material facts

upon which it formed the opinion. Moreover the

Central Government is bound by the order of the

Review Committee. Considering the nature of

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legislation and magnitude or presence of

terrorism, it cannot be said that Section 18 of

POTA imposes unreasonable restrictions on

fundamental right guaranteed under Article

19(1)(c) of the Constitution. We uphold the

validity of Sections 18 and 19.

Sections 20, 21 & 22:

Petitioners assailed Sections 20, 21 and 22

mainly on the ground that no requirement of mens

rea for offences is provided in these Sections and

the same is liable to misuse therefore it has to be

declared unconstitutional. The Learned Attorney

General argued that Section 21 and its various

sub-sections are penal provisions and should be

strictly construed both in their interpretation and

application; that on a true interpretation of the Act

having regard to the well settled principles of

interpretation Section 21 would not cover any

expression or activity which does not have the

element or consequence of furthering or

encouraging terrorist activity or facilitating its

commission; that support per se or mere

expression of sympathy or arrangement of a

meeting which is not intended or designed and

which does not have the effect to further the

activities of any terrorist organization or the

commission of terrorist acts are not within the

mischief of Section 21 and hence is valid.

Here the only point to be considered is

whether these Sections exclude mens rea element

for constituting offences or not. At the outset it

has to be noted that Sections 20, 21 and 22 of

POTA is similar to that of Sections 11, 12 and 15

of the Terrorism Act, 2000 of United Kingdom.

Such provisions are found to be quite necessary

all over the world in anti-terrorism efforts.

Sections 20, 21 and 22 are penal in nature that

demand strict construction. These provisions are a

departure from the ordinary law since the said law

was found to be inadequate and not sufficiently

effective to deal with the threat of terrorism.

Moreover, the crime referred to herein under

POTA is aggravated in nature. Hence special

provisions are contemplated to combat the new

threat of terrorism. Support either verbal or

monetary, with a view to nurture terrorism and

terrorist activities is causing new challenges.

Therefore Parliament finds that such support to

terrorist organizations or terrorist activities need

to be made punishable. Viewing the legislation in

its totality it cannot be said that these provisions

are obnoxious.

But the Petitioners apprehension regarding

the absence of mens rea in these Sections and the

possibility of consequent misuse needs our

elucidation. It is the cardinal principle of criminal

jurisprudence that mens rea element is necessary

to constitute a crime. It is the general rule that a

penal statute presupposes mens rea element. It

will be excluded only if the legislature expressly

postulate otherwise. It is in this context that this

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Court said in Kartar Singh's case (supra) (at

page 645 para 115 of SCC) that:

"Unless a statue either expressly or by

necessary implication rules out 'mens rea' in

case of this kind, the element of mens rea

must be read into the provision of the statute."

Mens rea by necessary implication could be

excluded from a statue only where it is absolutely

clear that the implementation of the object of the

Statue would otherwise be defeated. Here we

need to find out whether there are sufficient

grounds for inferring that Parliament intended to

exclude the general rule regarding mens rea

element. (See: State of Maharashtra V. M H

George, AIR 1965 SC 722, Nathulal V. State of

MP, AIR 1966 SC 43, Inder Sain V. State of

Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 372, for the general

principles concerning the exclusion or inclusion of

mens rea element vis-`-vis a given statute). The

prominent method of understanding the legislative

intention, in a matter of this nature, is to see

whether the substantive provisions of the Act

requires mens rea element as a constituent

ingredient for an offence. Offence under Section

3(1) of POTA will be constituted only if it is done

with an -'intent'. If Parliament stipulates that the

'terrorist act' itself has to be committed with the

criminal intention, can it be said that a person who

'profess' (as under Section 20) or 'invites support'

or 'arranges, manages, or assist in arranging or

managing a meeting' or 'addresses a meeting' (as

under Section 21) has committed the offence if he

does not have an intention or design to further the

activities of any terrorist organization or the

commission of terrorist acts? We are clear that it

is not. Therefore, it is obvious that the offence

under Section 20 or 21 or 22 needs positive

inference that a person has acted with intent of

furthering or encouraging terrorist activity or

facilitating its commission. In other words, these

Sections are limited only to those activities that

have the intent of encouraging or furthering or

promoting or facilitating the commission of

terrorist activities. If these Sections are

understood in this way, there cannot be any

misuse. With this clarification we uphold the

constitutional validity of Sections 20, 21 and 22.

Section 27:

Under Section 27, a police officer

investigating a case can seek a direction through

the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Court

of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for obtaining

samples of handwriting, finger prints, foot-prints,

photographs, blood, saliva, semen, hair, voice of

any accused person reasonably suspected to be

involved in the commission of an offence under

the Act. The Court can also draw adverse

inference if an accused refuses to do so.

Petitioners argued that this Section falls foul

of Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution for

the reason: that no power has been left with the

Court to decide whether the request for samples

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from a suspect person sought for by investigating

office is reasonable or not; that no power has

been given to the Court to refuse the request of

the investigating officer; that it is not obligatory

for the Court to record any reason while allowing

the request; and that the Section is a gross

violation of Article 20(3) because it amounts to

compel a person to give evidence against himself.

Relying mainly on State of Bombay V. Kathi

Kalu Oghad, 1962 (3) SCR 10, learned Attorney

General submitted that the argument pertaining to

the violation of Article 20(3) is not sustainable.

We do not think, as feared by the Petitioner,

that this Section fixes a blanket responsibility

upon the Court to grant permission immediately

upon the receipt of a request. Upon a close

reading of the Section it will become clear that

upon a 'request' by an investigating police officer

it shall only 'be lawful' for the Court to grant

permission. Nowhere it is stated that the Court will

have to positively grant permission upon a

request. It is very well within the ambit of Court's

discretion. If the request is based on wrong

premise, the Court is free to refuse the request.

This discretionary power granted to the Court

presupposes that the Court will have to record its

reasoning for allowing or refusing a request.

Pertaining to the argument that the Section per se

violates Article 20(3), it has to be noted that a

bench consisting of 11 judges in Kathi Kalu

Oghad's case (supra) have looked into a similar

situation and it is ruled therein (at pages 30 -32)

that:

"...The giving of finger impression or of

specimen signature or of handwriting, strictly

speaking, is not 'to be a witness'...when an

accused person is called upon by the Court or

any other authority holding an investigation to

give his finger impression or signature or any

specimen of his handwriting, he is not giving

any testimony to the nature of a personal

testimony. The giving of a personal testimony

must depend upon his volition. He can make

any kind of statement or may refuse to make

any statement. But his finger impressions or

his handwriting, in spite of efforts at concealing

the true nature of it by dissimulation cannot

change their intrinsic character. Thus the

giving of finger impression or of specimen

writing or of signatures by an accused person,

though it may amount to furnishing evidence in

the larger sense, is not included within the

expression 'to be a witness'...

...They are only materials for comparison in

order to lend assurance to the Court that its

inference based on other pieces of evidence is

reliable..."

(Emphasis Supplied)

This being the position in law, the argument

of the Petitioners pertaining to the violation of

Article 20(3) is not sustainable. It is meaningful to

look into Section 91 of Cr. PC that empowers a

criminal court as also a police officer to order any

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person to produce a document or other thing in

his possession for the purpose of any inquiry or

trial. (See: Shyamlal Mohanlal V. State of

Gujarat, AIR 1961 SC 1808, in this regard).

Moreover, this Section is only a step in aid for

further investigation and the samples so obtained

can never be considered as conclusive proof for

conviction. Consequently we uphold the

constitutional validity of Section 27.

Section 30:

Section 30 contains provision for the

protection of witness. It gives powers to the

Special Court to hold proceedings in camera and

to taking measures for keeping the identity of

witness secret.

Petitioners challenged the constitutional

validity of this Section by leveling the argument;

that the right to cross-examine is an important

part of fair trial and principles of natural justice

which is guaranteed under Article 21; that even

during emergency fundamental rights under

Article 20 and 21 cannot be taken away; that

Section 30 is in violation of the dictum in Kartar

Singh's case (supra) because it does not contain

the provision of disclosure of names and identities

of the witness before commencement of trial; that

fair trial includes the right for the defence to

ascertain the true identity of an accuser; that

therefore the same has to be declared

unconstitutional. Learned Attorney General

submitted that such provisions or exercise of such

powers are enacted to protect the life and liberty

of a person who is able and willing to give

evidence in prosecution of grave criminal offences;

that the Section is not only in the interest of

witness whose life is in danger but also in the

interest of community which lies in ensuring that

heinous offences like terrorist acts are effectively

prosecuted and punished; that if the witnesses are

not given immunity they would not come forward

to give evidence and there would be no effective

prosecution of terrorist offences and the entire

object of the Act would be frustrated; that cross-

examination is not a universal or indispensable

requirement of natural justice and fair trial; that

under compelling circumstances it can be

dispensed with natural justice and fair trial can be

evolved; that the Section requires the Court to be

satisfied that the life of witness is in danger and

the reasons for keeping the identity of the witness

secret are required to be recorded in writing; that,

therefore, it is reasonable to hold that the Section

is necessary for the operation of the Act.

Section 30 of POTA is similar to Section 16 of

TADA, the constitutional validity of which was

upheld by this Court in Kartar Singh's case

(supra) (see pages 683 - 689 of SCC). In order to

decide the constitutional validity of Section 30 we

don't think it is necessary to go into the larger

debate, which learned Counsel for both sides have

argued, that whether right to cross-examine is

central to fair trial or not. Because right to cross-

examination per se is not taken away by Section

30. This Section only confers discretion to the

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concerned Court to keep the identity of witness

secret if the life of such witness is in danger. We

cannot shy away from the unpleasant reality that

often witnesses do not come forward to depose

before Court even in serious cases. This

precarious situation creates challenges to our

criminal justice administration in general and

terrorism related cases in particular. Witnesses do

not volunteer to give evidence mainly due to the

fear of their life. Ultimately, the non-conviction

affects the larger interest of community, which lies

in ensuring that the executors of heinous offences

like terrorist acts are effectively prosecuted and

punished. Legislature drafted Section 30 by taking

all these factors into account. In our view a fair

balance between the rights and interest of

witness, rights of accused and larger public

interest has been maintained under Section 30. It

is also aimed to assist the State in justice

administration and encourage others to do the

same under the given circumstances. Anonymity

of witness is not general rule under Section 30.

Identity will be withheld only in exceptional

circumstance when the Special Court is satisfied

that the life of witness is in jeopardy. Earlier this

Court has endorsed similar procedure. (See:

Gurbachan Singh V. State of Bombay, 1952

SCR 737, Hira Nath Mishra V. Principal,

Rajendra Medical College, 1973 (1) SCC 805,

A. K. Roy V. Union of India, 1982 (1) SCC 271).

While deciding the validity of Section 16 of TADA,

this Court quoted all these cases with approval.

(See also the subsequent decision in Jamaat-e-

Islami Hind V. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC

428.

The need for the existence and exercise of

power to grant protection to a witness and

preserve his or her anonymity in a criminal trial

has been universally recognised. Provisions of

such nature have been enacted to protect the life

and liberty of the person who is able and willing to

give evidence in support of the prosecution in

grave criminal cases. A provision of this nature

should not be looked at merely from the angle of

protection of the witness whose life may be in

danger if his or her identity is disclosed but also in

the interest of the community to ensure that

heinous offences like terrorist acts are effectively

prosecuted and punished. It is a notorious fact

that a witness who gives evidence which is

unfavourable to an accused in a trial for terrorist

offence would expose himself to severe reprisals

which could result in death or severe bodily injury

or that of his family members. If such witnesses

are not given appropriate protection, they would

not come forward to give evidence and there

would be no effective prosecution of terrorist

offences and the entire object of the enactment

may possibly be frustrated. Under compelling

circumstances this can be dispensed with by

evolving such other mechanism, which complies

with natural justice and thus ensures a fair trial.

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The observations made in this regard by this

Court in the decisions to which we have adverted

to earlier have been noticed by this Court in

Kartar Singh's case (supra) and has upheld the

validity of a similar provision subject, of course, to

certain conditions which form part of Section 30

now. The present position is that Section 30(2)

requires the court to be satisfied that the life of a

witness is in danger to invoke a provision of this

nature. Furthermore, reasons for keeping the

identity and address of a witness secret are

required to be recorded in writing and such

reasons should be weighty. In order to safeguard

the right of an accused to a fair trial and basic

requirements of the due process a mechanism can

be evolved whereby the special court is obligated

to satisfy itself about the truthfulness and

reliability of the statement or disposition of the

witness whose identity is sought to be protected.

Our attention has been drawn to legal

position in USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia

and UK as well as the view expressed in the

European Court of Human Rights in various

decisions. However, it is not necessary to refer

any of them because the legal position has been

fully set out and explained in Kartar Singh and

provision of POTA in Section 30 clause (2) has

been modelled on the guidelines set out therein.

We may further notice that the effort of the court

has been to balance the right of the witness as to

his life and liberty and the right of community in

effective prosecution of heinous criminal offences

with the right of the accused to a fair trial. This is

done by devising a mechanism or arrangement to

preserve anonymity of the witness when there is

an identifiable threat to the life or physical safety

of the witness or others whereby the court

satisfies itself about the weight to be attached to

the evidence of the witness. In some jurisdictions

an independent counsel has been appointed for

the purpose to act as amicus curie and after going

through the deposition evidence assist the court in

forming an opinion about the weight of the

evidence in a given case or in appropriate cases to

be cross-examined on the basis of the questions

formulated and given to him by either of the

parties. Useful reference may be made in this

context to the recommendations of the Law

Commission of New Zealand.

The necessity to protect the identity of the

witness is not a factor that can be determined by

a general principle. It is dependent on several

factors and circumstances arising in a case and,

therefore, the Act has left the determination of

such question to an appropriate case.

Keeping secret the identity of witness,

though in the larger interest of public, is a

deviation from the usual mode of trial. In

extraordinary circumstances we are bound to take

this path, which is less travelled. Here the Special

Courts will have to exercise utmost care and

caution to ensure fair trial. The reason for keeping

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identity of the witness has to be well

substantiated. It is not feasible for us to suggest

the procedure that has to be adopted by the

Special Courts for keeping the identity of witness

secret. It shall be appropriate for the concerned

Courts to take into account all the factual

circumstances of individual cases and to forge

appropriate methods to ensure the safety of

individual witness. With these observations we

uphold the validity of Section 30.

Section 32:

This Section made it lawful of certain

confessions made to police officers to be taken

into consideration.

Concerning the validity and procedural

difficulties that could arise during the process of

recording confessions the Petitioners submitted

that there is no need to empower the police to

record confession since the accused has to be

produced before the Magistrate within forty-eight

hours, in that case magistrate himself could record

the confession; that there is no justification for

extended time limit of forty eight hours for

producing the person before Magistrate; that it is

not clear in the Section whether the confession

recorded by the police officer will have the validity

after Magistrate has recorded the fact of torture

and has sent the accused for medical

examination; that it is not clear as to whether

both the confession before the police officer as

well as confession statement before the Magistrate

shall be used in evidence; that the Magistrates

cannot be used for mechanically putting seal of

approval on the confessional statements by the

police; that, therefore, the Section has to be

nullified. Validity of this Section was defended by

the learned Attorney General by forwarding the

arguments that the provisions relating to the

admissibility of confessional statements, which is

similar to that of Section 32 in POTA was upheld in

Kartar Singh's case (supra); that the provisions

of POTA are an improvement of TADA by virtue of

enactment of Section 32(3) to 32(5); that the

general principles of law regarding the

admissibility of a confessional statement is

applicable under POTA; that the provision which

entails the Magistrate to test and examine the

voluntariness of a confession and complaint of

torture is an additional safeguard and does not in

any manner inject any constitutional infirmity;

that there cannot be perennial distrust of the

police; that Parliament has taken into account all

the relevant factors in its totality and same is not

unjust or unreasonable.

At the outset it has to be noted that the

Section 15 of TADA that was similar to this Section

was upheld in Kartar Singh's case (supra) (pages

664-683 of SCC). While enacting this Section

Parliament has taken into account of all the

guidelines, which were suggested by this Court in

Kartar Singh's case (supra). Main allegation of

the Petitioners is that there is no need to empower

the police to record confession since the accused

has to be produced before the Magistrate within

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forty-eight hours in which case the Magistrate

himself could record the statement or confession.

In the context of terrorism the need for making

such a provision so as to enable Police officers to

record the confession was explained and upheld

by this Court in Kartar Singh's case (supra)

(page 680 para 253 of SCC). We need not go into

that question at this stage. If the recording of

confession by police is found to be necessary by

Parliament and if it is in tune with the scheme of

law, then an additional safeguard under Section

32 (4) and (5) is a fortiori legal. In our considered

opinion the provision that requires producing such

a person before the Magistrate is an additional

safeguard. It gives that person an opportunity to

rethink over his confession. Moreover, the

Magistrate's responsibility to record the statement

and the enquiry about the torture and provision

for subsequent medical treatment makes the

provision safer. It will deter the police officers

from obtaining a confession from an accused by

subjecting him to torture. It is also worthwhile to

note that an officer who is below the rank of a

Superintendent of Police cannot record the

confession statement. It is a settled position that

if a confession was forcibly extracted, it is a nullity

in law. Non-inclusion of this obvious and settled

principle does not make the Section invalid. (See :

Kartar Singh's case (supra) page 678, para 248

- 249 of SCC). Ultimately, it is for the concerned

Court to decide the admissibility of the confession

statement. (See : Kartar Singh's case (supra)

page 683, para 264 of SCC). Judicial wisdom will

surely prevail over irregularity, if any in the

process of recording confessional statement.

Therefore we are satisfied that the safeguards

provided by the Act and under the law is adequate

in the given circumstances and we don't think it is

necessary to look more into this matter.

Consequently we uphold the validity of Section 32.

Section 49:

Section 49 mainly deals with procedure for

obtaining bail for an accused under POTA.

Petitioners' main grievance about this Section

is that under Section 49(7) a Court could grant

bail only if it is satisfied that there are grounds for

believing that an accused 'is not guilty of

committing such offence', since such a satisfaction

could be attained only after recording of evidence

there is every chance that the accused will be

granted bail only after minimum one year of

detention; that the proviso to Section 49(7),

which is not there under TADA, makes it clear that

for one year from the date of detention no bail

could be granted; that this Section has not

incorporated the principles laid down by this Court

in Sanjay Dutt's case (supra) (at page 439 para

43-48 of SCC) wherein it is held that if a challan is

not filed after expiry of 180 days or extended

period, the indefeasible right of an accused to be

released on bail is ensured, provided that the

same is exercised before filing of challan; that the

prosecution is curtailing even this right under

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POTA. Therefore, the petitioners want us to make

the Section less stringent according to the settled

principles of law. Learned Attorney General

submitted that the provisions regarding bail are

not onerous nor do they impose any excessive

burden or restriction on the right of the accused;

that similar provisions are found in Section 37 of

the NDPS Act 1985 and in Section 10 of the UP

Dacoity Affected Areas Act; that on a true

construction of Section 49(6) and (7) it is not

correct to conclude that the accused cannot apply

for bail at all for a period of one year; that the

right of the accused to apply for bail during the

period of one year is not completely taken away;

that the stringent provision of bail under Section

49(7) would apply only for the first one year of

detention and after its expiry the normal bail

provisions under Cr.P.C. would apply; that there is

no dispute that the principle laid down by this

Court in D.K Basu V. State of West Bengal,

1997 (1) SCC 416, will apply; that in the light of

effective safeguards provided in the Act and

effective remedies against adverse orders there is

no frailty in Section 49.

Section 49 of the Act is similar to that of

Section 20 of TADA, constitutional validity of

which has been upheld by this Court in Kartar

Singh's case (supra) (pages 691-710 of SCC).

Challenge before us is limited to the interpretation

of Section 49(6) and (7). By virtue of Section

49(8), the powers under Section 49 (6) and (7)

pertaining to bail is in addition to and not in

derogation to the powers under the Code or any

other law for the time being in force on granting of

bail. The offences under POTA are more complex

than that of ordinary offences. Usually the overt

and covert acts of terrorism are executed in a

chillingly efficient manner as a result of high

conspiracy, which is invariably linked with anti-

national elements both inside and outside the

country. So an expanded period of detention is

required to complete the investigation. Such a

comparatively long period for solving the case is

quite justifiable. Therefore, the investigating

agencies may need the custody of accused for a

longer period. Consequently, Section 49 (6) and

(7) are not unreasonable. In spite of this, bail

could be obtained for an accused booked under

POTA if the 'court is satisfied that there are

grounds for believing that he is not guilty of

committing such offence' after hearing the Public

Prosecutor. It is the general law that before

granting the bail the conduct of accused seeking

bail has to be taken into account and evaluated in

the background of nature of crime said to have

committed by him. That evaluation shall be based

on the possibility of his likelihood of either

tampering with the evidence or committing the

offence again or creating threat to the society.

Since the satisfaction of the Court under Section

49(7) has to be arrived based on the particular

facts and after considering the abovementioned

aspects, we don not think the unreasonableness

attributed to Section 49(7) is fair. (See: Kartar

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 26 of 31

Singh's case (supra) page 707, para 349-352 of

SCC).

Proviso to Section 49(7) reads as under:

"Provided that after the expiry of a period of

one year from the date of detention of the

accused for an offence under this Act, the

provisions of sub-section (6) of this Section

shall apply."

It is contended that this proviso to Section

49(7) of POTA is read by some of the courts as a

restriction on exercise of power for grant of bail

under Section 49(6) of POTA and such power

could be exercised only after the expiry of the

period of one year from the date of detention of

the accused for offences under POTA. If the

intention of the legislature is that an application

for bail cannot be made prior to expiry of one year

after detention for offences under POTA, it would

have been clearly spelt out in that manner in

Section 49(6) itself. Sections 49(6) and 49(7) of

POTA have to be read together and the combined

reading of these two sections is to the effect that

Public Prosecutor has to be given an opportunity

of being heard before releasing the accused on

bail and if he opposes the application, the court

will have to be satisfied that there are grounds for

believing that he is not guilty of having committed

such offence. It is by way of exception to Section

49(7) that proviso is added which means that

after the expiry of one year after the detention of

the accused for offences under POTA, the accused

can be released on bail after hearing the Public

Prosecutor under ordinary law without applying

the rigour of Section 49(7) of POTA. It also

means that the accused can approach the court

for bail subject to conditions of Section 49(7) of

POTA within a period of one year after the

detention for offences under POTA.

Proviso to Section 49(7) provides that the

condition enumerated in sub-section (6) will apply

after the expiry of one-year. There appears to be

an accidental omission or mistake of not including

the word 'not' after the word 'shall' and before the

word 'apply'. Unless such a word is included, the

provision will lead to an absurdity or become

meaningless. Even otherwise, read appropriately,

the meaning of the proviso to Section 49(7) is that

an accused can resort to ordinary bail procedure

under the Code after that period of one year. At

the same time, proviso does not prevent such an

accused to approach the Court for bail in

accordance with the provisions of POTA under

Section 49(6) and (7) thereof. This interpretation

is not disputed by the learned Attorney General.

Taking into account of the complexities of the

terrorism related offences and intention of

Parliament in enacting a special law for its

prevention, we do not think that the additional

conditions regarding bail under POTA are

unreasonable. We uphold the validity of Section

49.

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There is no challenge to any other provisions

of the Act.

In the result, these petitions stand dismissed

subject, however, to the clarifications that we

have set out above on the interpretation of the

provisions of the enactment while dealing with the

constitutionality thereof.

W.P.(Crl.) 129/2002 :

A case was registered against the petitioner

under Section 13(1)(a) of the Unlawful Activities

Prevention Act, 1967, Section 21(2) and (3) of the

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) read

with Sections 109 and 120B of the Indian Penal

Code on 4.7.2002. When the petitioner returned

to Chennai from Chicago on 11.7.2002, he was

arrested at the Chennai Airport and was produced

before a Judicial Magistrate, Madurai on

12.7.2002. He had been remanded. He has been

detained in jail since then pursuant to the remand

order of the Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. A

notification was issued constituting Special Court,

Chennai at Poonamallee for trial of the offences

under POTA. The petitioner was produced before

the Special Court on 7.8.2002 and he has been

continued to be remanded to jail from time to

time. On 9.10.2002, his remand has been

extended beyond the period of 90 days.

In this case, though several questions have

been raised, two questions have been specifically

urged, namely :

(1) Whether Section 21(1) and (3) of the

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 are

offending Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of the

Constitution of India and therefore

unconstitutional?

(2) Does the mere expression of sympathy for

Tamils in Sri Lanka for whom the Liberation

of Tigers of Tamil Eelam has become the

sole-representative recognised by the

International Community amount to support

to a terrorist organisation under the

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 thereby

empower the State to curtail the personal

liberty?

We have upheld the constitutional validity of

Section 21 of POTA in the decision pronounced by

us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 above and,

therefore, the first question does not survive for

consideration.

So far as the second question is concerned,

we have heard Shri F.S. Nariman and Shri Anil B.

Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the

petitioner, apart from Shri Rajinder Sachhar and

Shri B.S. Malik, the learned senior counsel

appearing for the petitioner in connected matters,

on the interpretation of Section 21 of POTA. Shri

P.P. Rao, appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu,

has made elaborate submissions and adverted to

various affidavits filed by the Union of India.

However, it is not necessary for us to examine any

of these aspects in these proceedings. We have

carefully considered the arguments advanced by

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the learned counsel and that of the learned

Attorney General for India on this aspect of the

matter. We think, the proper course that has to

be adopted in a case of this nature where a

criminal case has already been lodged and the

same is pending consideration before the Special

Court, it would not be appropriate for us to

express our views on the question of facts arising

in this case. We are sure that the Special Court

will decide the matter in the light of decision

pronounced by us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of

2002 above.

The writ petition is disposed of with aforesaid

observations.

W.P.(Crl.) 28/2003 :

The petitioner in this writ petition seeks for

declaration that Section 21(2) and the proviso to

Section 49(6) and 49(7) of POTA are illegal and

ultra vires the Constitution of India.

Inasmuch as we have upheld the

constitutional validity of Section 21(2) and proviso

to Section 49(6) and 49(7) of POTA in the

judgment pronounced by us in Writ Petition (C)

No. 389 of 2002 above, this writ petition is

dismissed.

W.P.(Crl.) 48/2003 :

In this writ petition, apart from challenging

the constitutional validity of Sections 1(4), 3 to 9,

14, 18 to 24, 26, 27, 29 to 33, 36 to 53 which has

been upheld by us in the judgment pronounced by

us in Writ Petition (C) No. 389 of 2002 above, the

constitutional validity of Entry 21 of the Schedule

to POTA is also challenged.

On that aspect no specific arguments have

been addressed by any of the parties. This matter

will have to be heard separately and hence, this

writ petition is de-linked from other matters.

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 4051 of 1996#1996#M/s Pepsi Foods Limited

#Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh

#2003-11-25#25622# 4051#P. VENKATARAMA REDDI # Dr. AR. LAKSHMANAN.

###

Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 104-106 of 2003#2003#Bikau Pandey and Ors.

#State of Bihar

#2003-11-25#25623# 104-106#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 10906 of 1996#1996#Shanti Kumar Panda

#Shakutala Devi

#2003-11-03#25624# 10906#R.C. LAHOTI # ASHOK BHAN.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 11483 of 1996#1996#Amrendra Pratap Singh

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#Tej Bahadur Prajapati & Ors.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 9130 of 2003#2003#Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd.

#Shapoorji Data Processing Ltd.

#2003-11-18#25626# 9130#CJI# S.B. Sinha # AR. Lakshmanan.

##

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 14178-14184 of 1996#1996#Brij Behari Sahai (Dead) through L.R

s., etc. etc.

#State of Uttar Pradesh #2003-11-28#25627# 14178-14184#Do

raiswamy Raju # Arijit Pasayat.

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 1968 of 1996#1996#Goa Plast (P) Ltd.

#Chico Ursula D'Souza

#2003-11-20#25628# 1968#B.P. Singh # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan

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Writ Petition (crl.)#Writ Petition (crl.) 199 of 2003#2003#Ashok Kumar Pandey

#The State of West Bengal

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 20 of 2003#2003#Surendra Paswan

#State of Jharkhand

#2003-11-28#25630# 20#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 278 of 1997#1997#Vidyadharan

#State of Kerala

#2003-11-14#25631# 278#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 292 of 1997#1997#State of Madhya Pradesh.

#Awadh Kishore Gupta and Ors.

#2003-11-18#25632# 292#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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###State of Punjab & Anr.

#M/s Devans Modern Brewaries Ltd. & Anr.

#2003-11-20#25633##CJI.# R.C. Lahoti # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan.

##

Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 331 of 1997#1997#Shriram

#State of Madhya Pradesh

#2003-11-24#25634# 331#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 3630-3631 of 2003#2003#The Prohibition & Excise Supdt., A.P.

& Ors.

#Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally & Ors. #2003-11-17#25635# 3630-3631#CJI.

#Dr. AR. Lakshmanan

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 371-372 of 2003#2003#Ram Dular Rai & Ors.

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#2003-11-27#25636# 371-372#S.B. Sinha.

####

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 4075-4081 of 1998#1998#Nair Service Society

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 4698-4700 of 1994#1994#State of U.P. & Ors.

#Lalji Tandon (Dead)

#2003-11-03#25638# 4698-4700#R.C. LAHOTI # ASHOK BHAN

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 506 of 1997#1997#State of Karnataka

#Puttaraja

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 519-521 of 2003#2003#Goura Venkata Reddy

Vs.

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 530-531 of 2003#2003#Bhargavan & Ors.

#State of Kerala

#2003-11-17#25641# 530-531#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 7371 of 2002#2002#N.D. Thandani (Dead) By Lrs.

#Arnavaz Rustom Printer & Anr.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 9205-07 of 2003#2003#The Land Acquisition Officer, Nizamabad,

District, Andhra Pradesh

#Nookala Rajamallu and Ors.

#2003-11-21#25643# 9205-07#DORAISWAMY RAJU # ARIJIT PASAYAT.

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Transfer Petition (crl.)#Transfer Petition (crl.) 77-78 of 2003#2003#K. Anbazhagan

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 7868 of 1995#1995#ITW Signode India Ltd.

#Collector of Central Excise

#2003-11-19#25645# 7868#CJI# S.B. Sinha # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan.

##

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 857 of 1998#1998#Shyam Singh

#Daryao Singh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors

#2003-11-19#25646# 857#Shivaraj V. Patil # D.M. Dharmadhikari.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 3630-3631 of 2003#2003#Prohibition & Excise Supdt. A.P. & Ors

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#Toddy Tappers Coop. Society, Marredpally & Ors.

#2003-11-17#25647# 3630-3631#S.B. Sinha

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 62-65 of 1999#1999#Pramod K. Pankaj

#State of Bihar and Ors.

#2003-11-20#25648# 62-65#CJI# # S.B. Sinha.

##

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 8232 of 1996#1996#Hindustan Lever & Anr.

#State of Maharashtra & Anr.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 5337-5339 of 1999#1999#Manager, Nirmala Senior, Secondary Sch

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ool, Port Blair

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 9131 of 2003#2003#Rekha Mukherjee

#Ashish Kumar Das & Anr.

#2003-11-18#25651# 9131#CJI# S.B. Sinha # Dr. AR. Lakshmanan.

##

Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 3130 of 2002#2002#Ashan Devi & Anr.

#Phulwasi Devi & Ors.

#2003-11-19#25652# 3130#Shivaraj V. Patil # D.M. Dharmadhikari.

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 7096 of 2000#2000#Smt. Lila Ghosh (Dead) through LR, Shri Tap

as Chandra Roy

#The State of West Bengal

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###Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd.

#State of Bihar & Ors.

#2003-11-19#25654##Brijesh Kumar # Arun Kumar.

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Appeal (crl.)#Appeal (crl.) 115-120 of 2002#2002#R. Sai Bharathi

#J. Jayalalitha & Ors.

#2003-11-24#25655# 115-120#S. RAJENDRA BABU # P. VENKATARAMA REDDI

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Appeal (civil)#Appeal (civil) 9136-9137 of 2003#2003#M/s.Sathyanarayana Brothers (P) Ltd.

#Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board

#2003-11-18#25656# 9136-9137#Brijesh Kumar # (Arun Kumar.

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