A

B

c

.

F

G

'456

'PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC

RIGHTS AND OTHERS

v.

UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

September 18, 1982

[P.N. BHAGWATI AND BAHARUL ISLAM, JJ.]

•

Public Interest Litigation, scope and need for-Violation of various labour 4

laws in relation to workmen employed in the construction work connected with the \T_

Asian Games like Constitution of India, 1950 Arts. 24, Minimum wages Act, 1948,

Equal Remuneration Act. The employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970, Inter-

state Migrant workman (Regulation of Employment and conditions of Service) Act,

1970 and contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970-Locus~standi- •

Maintainability of the writ and remedial relief that could be granted-Duties of

Court regarding sentencing in cases of violation of Labour Laws-Constitution of ·

India Articles 14, 23, 24 and 32--Scope of Article 23 Meaning of''begar" Duty of

State when violation of Arts. 11, 23 and 24 is complained.

Petitioner No. 1,, is an organisation formed for the purpose of protecting

democratic rights. It c'ommissioned three social scientists for the purpose of

investigating. and inquiring into the conditions under which"the workmen engaged

in the various Asiad Projects were working. Based on the report made by these

three social scientists after personal investigati~n and study the 1st petitioner add­

ressed a letter to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bhagwati complaining

of

viola#on of

.... various labourlaws by the reSpondents' and/or their agents and seeking interfe-­

rence by the Supreme Court to render social justice by means of appropriate

directions to thC affected workmen. The' Supreme Court 'treated the letter as a

writ petition on the judicial side and issued notice; to· the Union of India, Delhi

Administration and the Delhi Development Authority.

The allegations

in

the petition were :

(i) The various authorities to whom the execution of the different

projects

was entrusted engaged contractors for

the purpo~e of car­

rying out the construction work of the projects and they were

registered as principal emploYers under section 7 of the Contract

Labour (Regulation and~AboJition) Act; 1970. These contractors

engaged workers through "Jamadars" who brought them from

different parts of India particularly the States of Rajasthan, Uttar

Pradesh and Orissa and paid to these Jamadars the minimum wage

of Rs. 9.25 per day pe·r worker and not to the workmen direct. The

Jamadars deducted Rupee one p~r day per worker as t~eir commis-

-

••

'

.(ii)

PEOPLE'~ UNION v. UNION OJ! INDIA: . 457

sion with the result that there was a violation of the provisions Or

... the Minimum Wages Act; .

Th~.,provisions of Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated as'

the women w~>rkcrs wei:e being paid RS. 7/-per day, the balance of

the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by . the

Jamadars:

(iii) There was violation of Article

24 of the Constitution and of the

prov.isions of the Employment of Children Acts, 1938 and 1970 in

asmuch 3.s children below 'the age of 14 years were employed by the

contractors in the construction work of the various projects;

(iv) There was viOlation of the· provisions of the Contract Labour

(Regulations. and Abolition) Act, 1970 which resulted in depriva·

tion and exploitation ~f the Workers ~nd denial of their right to

proper living condition and medical and other facilities un'der the

Act; and

(v) The provisions

of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of

Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979, though brought

into force as far back as 2nd

Octobe~ 1980 in the Union Territory

of Delhi were not implemented by t~e Contractors.

AlloWing the petition, the Court.,

HBLD: 1:1. Public.interest litig'ation which is strategic arm of the legal

aid movement and which is int~nded to bring justice within the reach of the poor

masses: who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally different

-kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is essentially of an

adversary character where there is a dispute between two li1igating parties, one

making claim

or seeking relief against the other and that other opposing

such claim

or resisting such relief.

Public interest litigation-is brought before

the .court .not for the purpose

of

enfo~ing the right of one individual '

against another as happens in the case of ordinary litigation. but it is inten­

ded to promote and indicate public intCrest which demands that violations of

constitutional or legal rights of Jarge number of people who are poor, ignorant or

'\.,.in a socially or ecoiiomically disadv3.ntaged Position should ~ot go unnoticed and

unredressed. That would be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one

of the , essential elements of pubJiC interest i~ any democratic form of Govern­

ment. [467 C-F)

l :2. The Rule of Law does not mean that the protection of the law must

,be available only to a fortunate ~few or that the law should be alJowed to be pro­

stituted by the vested interests for protecting and upholding the status quo under

the guise

of enforcement of their civil and political rights. The poor too have

civil

~nd political rights and the Rule of law is meant for them also, though today

· it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and the alcohol

kings have the Fundamental rights to carry

on their

busin~ss and to fatten their

purses by exploiting the consuming public, ~rtainly the "chamaras" to belonging

A

B

,

c

D

E

F

G

H

B

c

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1

[1983] i S.C.R.

I '

to the lowes strata of society have Fundamental Right to earn on honest living

through their sweat and toil. ·Large oUfubers of men, women and children who

constitute the bulk

of an population are today living a sub human existence in

conditions

of object poverty; utter grinding poverty has broken their back and.

sapped their moral fibre. They have no faith in the existing

social and economic

system. ·Nor can these poor aitd deprived sections of humanity afford to enfotce

theifcivil and political rights. [467 F-H;

468 A-DJ

1 :3, The

only solutiOn of t;naking civil .i~d politica_l rights meaningful to

these large sections of society would be to remake the material conditions and

restructure the social and economic order so that they may

be able to realise

the·

economic, social and cultural rights. Of course, the task of restructuring the

social and economic order so that the social and economic right.becOme a

meaningful reality for the poor and lo.;ly sections of the community is one which

legitimately be!Ongs to the legislature and the executive but mere initiation of.

social and economic rescue prograffimes by the executive arid the legislature would

, not"be eno~gh and.it is only through muiti~dimensional strategies including public

D

E

F G'

' '

H'

interes't litigation that these social and economic rescue programmes can be made

effective. [468 G-Hi 469 B-D]

1:4. Public interest liii~ation, is essentia!Jy a cooperative or collaborative

e'ffort on the part .of the petitioner, the State or public authority and the Court to

secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights, benefits and privilegea

conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to reach social

justice

-to them. The

State or public authority against whom public interest litiga·

tion is brought should be as much interested·in ensurirtg basic human rights, cons·

titutional as well as legal, to those who are iq. a socially and econo~ically disad­

vantaged position, as the petitioner who brings the public interest litigation before

the court. The State or public authority which is arrayed as a respondent in

public interest litigation shculd, in fact, welcome

it, as it would gjve it an

oppor·

tunity to right a wrong or to redress an .injustice done to th~ p0or and weaker sec­

tions

of the community whose welfare is and must be tlie prime

coOcem of the

State or the public authority. [469 D-F]

1 :5. The legal ~id movement and public interest -litigation s~ek to bring

justice to these .forgotten specimens of humanity who constitute the bulk of the

citizens

of India: and who are really and truly the

"People of India wQo gave to _ ·'

theffiselves this magnificient Constitution. Pendency of large afrears in the courts

cannot be any reason for i;Ienying access of justice to the poor and weaker sections

of the community. [470 E-F] '

1 :6. The time has now come when tbe courts must become the courts for

the poor

and struggling masses of this country.

_,.They must shed their character

as upholders of the established order and the stritus quo. They must be sensitised

to the need-of doing justice to the large masses of people to whom justice bas

, been denied by a cruel and heartless society for, generations. Th~ realisation must

come to them that social justice

is the signature tune of our Constitution and

. it

i~ their sole'mn duty under the C~nstinition to enforce the baSic human rights

of the poor and vulnerable sections of the community and actively help in the

'.>

..

I '

•

. PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 459

realisation.of the constitutional goals. This new change has to come if the

judicial system

is to

become·an effective instrument of social justice for without'

it, it cannot survive for long. FortunatE~ly thi~ change is gradually taking place and

public interest litigation is playing a large part in bringin.g about this change. It

is through public interest litigation that the problems of_ the poor ar~ now

coming to the forefront and the ~ntire theatre of the law is changing. It holds out

great possibilities for the futQ.re. This writ peiition is on~ su~h ins ta nee of public'

in~rest liti~otion .. [470 G-H; 471 A-CJ

2. It is true that construction industry does not find a· plai;e on the sche­

dule to the Employment of Childfen Act, 1938 and the Prohibition enacted in

section 3 sub~section ( 3) 'Of that Act against the emploYment of a child who bas

not completed his fourteenth year cannot apply ·to em.ploymCnt in construction

industry. But, apart hltogether frOm the requirement of Convention No. S9'of

the International Labour Organisation and ·ratified byrlndia, Article ~4 of the

Constitution provides that no child below the age of 14 shall bC employed to work

in any factory or mine

or engaged in any other hazardous employment. This

is

a coristitutional prohibition which, even if not followed up by appropriate lcgis-

. lation, must ~p·erate prOpiro vi"gore and cori.struction work Deing ·plainly a:D.d.

indlibitably a hazardous employment, it is cle8r that by reason of tbi~ Constitu­

tional pfohibition, no child beJOw the age of 14 years can be allowed tO be cnga ..

ged in construction ·work. Therefore, notwithstanding the absence of specifica­

tion of constructio.~ industfy in the Schedµle to the Employffient of Children ~Act

1938, no child below the age of 14 years. cap be employed in construction work

and the Union of lndia as also every state Governme11l must ensure that this

const!tutional mandate is ll~t violated in any part of the CoUntry. [474 A-Fl, .

A

B

c

D

3. Magistrates and Judges in the country must view violaVons of labour .I;

laws with strictness and wheneVer any violations of labour laws lire established

before them, they should punish the errant employers by , imposing· adequate

pu~ishment'. The labour laws are en:1;cted for improving the conditions of workers

and the emploYers cannot be allOwed tO buy off immunity against violations of

labour laws by paying a paltry fine which they' would not mind paying, because

ࡹ violating the labour laws they would be making profit which would far exceed

the amount of. the fin~. If violations of labour laws _are to be~ puni~hed with If'

meagre fines, it .. would be impossible {o enSure observance of the labour IawS and

the·labdur l:iws would be reduced. to nullity. They would remain merely paper

tigers without any .teeth or claws. [476 E-H] •

4:1 ~ It is true that the complaint of the petitioners in the writ petition

is in regard to the violations of the provisions of ·various labOur laws designed

for the wdfare of workmen, and therefore from a strictly traditional point of view G

it wollld be only the workmen whose legal rights are· violated who would be . ..­

entitled to approach the court for judicial redress .• But the traditional rule of

standing which confines access to the,judiCial process only to those to whom legal

iQ.Jury is caused or legal wrong is done has now been jeitisoned by the Supreme

Court and the narrow ·confines within which the rule of standing was imprisoned

for long years

as a result

af inheritance ·.bf the Anglo-sax on system of jurispru-H

dence. have been broken a~~ : new ~imensi9n has beCn _given to the doctrine ?f (

460

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963) I s.c.R.

A locus standi which has revoJutionised the whole concept of access to justice in a

way not known before

to

~he Western System of jurisprudence. [477 F-H]

B

c

0

E

F

G

H

4:2. Having regard to the peculiar socio-economic conditions prevailing

in .the country where there is considerable poverty, illiteracy and ignorance

obstructing and impeding accessibility to the judicial process, it would ~esult

in closing the doors of justice to the poor and deprived sections oft.he communi­

ty if the traditional rule of standing evolved by Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that

only a perSon wronged can sue for judicial redress were to be blindly adhered to

and followed, and it is therefore necessary to evolve a new strategy by relaxing

this tr!tditional rule of standing in order that justice may become easily available

to the lowly and the lost. [478 A-C] ·

4:3. Where a person or class Of persons to whom legal injury is caused or

le8:al wrong is done is by reason of pov!']'ty, disability or socially or economically

disadvantaged position Dot able to approach the Court for judicial redress, any

member

of the public acting bonafide and not out of any extraneous motivation

may move the Court for judicial redress

of the

legal injury or wrong sufferred by

such person or class of persons and the judicial process may be set in motion by

any public spirited individual

or institution even by addressing a

letter to the

cOurt. Where judicial redress is sought of a legal injury or legal wrong

suffered

by a person or class of

Qersons who by reason of poverty, disability or

socially o.r economically disadvantaged position are unable to approach the court

and the court is moved for this purpose by a member of a public by addressing a

letter drawing the attention of the court to such legal injury or legal Wrong, court

would ca.st aside all technical rules of procedure and entertain the Jetter as a

wfit petition on the judicial side and take ~ction upon it .. [478 C-F]

. '

Here, the workm'en whose rights are said to have been violated and to

whom a Jife of basic human dignity has been denied are poor, ign~rant, illiterate

humans who,

by reason of their poverty and social and economic

disability, arc

unable· to approach tbe courts for judicial redress and hence the petitiOI]ers have,

under the liberalised rule

of standing, locus standi to maintain the

pr~sent writ

petition espousing the cause

of the workmen. The petitioners are not acting ma/afidt or out of e1'traneous motives since the first petitioner is admittedly an

organisation dedicated to the protecting and cnfOrcement Or Fundamenta.J Rights

and making Directive Pi::inciples of State Policy enforceable and jus-ticiable.

There can be no doubt that it is out

of a sense of public service that the present litigation has been brought by the petitiOners and it is clearly maintainable.

{478 G-H; 479 A-BJ

4:4. The UniOn,..of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Dcve-.

Jopment Authority cannot escape their obligation to the workmen to ensure

observance

of the provisions of various labour law by its contractors and

for non-compliance

wit!! the laws by the contractors, the workmen would clearly

have a cause

of actions against them as

pri~cipal employers. So far as to Con­

tract Labour (Regulation and Abolit_ion) Act, 1970 is conce[ned, section 20 is cJear

that

if any amenity required to be provided u.nder sections 16 to-18 or

1!1 for the

•

•

>

•

_,

'-

•

••

PEOPLE'S UNION V. UNION OF INDIA 461

benefit of-the workmeri employed in an establishment is not Provided by the con- A

tractor, the· obligation to provide such amenity rests on the priticipal emplo-

yer. [479 C-D]

Sections 17'and 18 of the Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulation of

Employment and Conditions of _Service) Act 1979 also make ·principal employer

_liable to make payment of_the wages

to the wages to the migrant workmen emplo-

. yed

bY, the contractor as also to pay the allowances provided) .under sectiOns 14 ~

and 15 and _to provide the facilities specified in section 16 of such migrant work-

men. [479

F-G]

'

Article 24 of the Constitution embodies a Fundamental Right which is

plainly and indubitably enforceable against every one and by reason of its compul­

sive mandate, no ·one can employ a child below the age of 14 years in a

hazardous . employment. Since, construction . work is a hazardous· employ­

ment, no child below the· age of 14 years can be employed in constructions work

and therefore, not only are the contractors under a constilutional mandate

not to

em

Ploy any child . below the. age of 14 years, but it is also the duty of the

Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority

to ensure that this constitutional obligation is obeyed by the contractors to whom

they have entrusted the construction work

of the

v3rioUs Asiad Projects. Similar­

ly the respondents must ensuie compliance with by the contractors of the Provi­

sions of the 'equal Remuneration Act, 1946 as they express.the principle of

equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution. [479 G-H; 480 A-DJ

No doubt, the contractors are liable to pay the minimum wage to the

workmen employed by them under the Minimum Wage Act 1948 but the Union of

India. the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority who havo

entrusted the construction work to the con~ractors .would equaHy·be resPonsiblc

to ensure that the minimum wage is paid to the workmen by their contractors.

[480 G-H]

5:1. It is true thatlthe present writ petition cannot be maintained by the

petitioners unless they can sh'ow some violation of a Fundamental Right, for it

is only for enforcement right that a writ petition can be maintain~d in this Cou'rt

under Article

32. But, certainly the following

comPlaints do legitimately form thC

subject matter of a writ petition under Article 32; namely, (i) the complaint of

.. violation of Article 24 based on the averm'ent that children below the age of 14

years are employed in the construction work of the Asiad Projects, (ii) allegation

of non-observance

of the provisions of the Equal Remuneration

)\.ct ~946, is in

effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle of equality before the

law enshrined in Article 14; and (iii) the complaint of non-observance of the provi­

sions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 ancJ, the Inter­

state Migrant Workmen (Regulations of Employment and Conditions of Service),

Act

1979 as it is a

complain't'relating to violation of Article 21. !'iow the rigbts'and

benefits conferred on the workmen employed

by a contractor under the provisions

of the

Contract· Labour (Regulation and Ab~lltion Act 1970 and the Inter-St.ate

Migrant Workmen Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act ·

1979 which became enforceable w.e.f. 4-6-1982 are clearly intended to ensure basic

c

D

E

F

G

H

,

462 .· SUPREME CoUilT REPORTS [!983] I s.c.a.

A human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are deprived of any of these

. rights and benefits to which they, are entitled under the provisions of these two pie­

ces of social welfare legislation, that would clearly be a violation of Articl~ 21 by

the Union of India, the.Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Autho­

rity which, as principal employers, are n1ade statutorily responsibl~ for securing

suCh rights and benefits to tbe workmenj and' (iv) the complaint in regard to non­

payment'"ar minimum wage to the workmen under the Minimum Wages Act 1948,

8 is also one relating to breach of a Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 23

which

is violated by non-payment of minimum wage to the workmen.

c

D

E

F

G

H

[481 D -H; 482 A-Fl

Maneka G,andhi v. Union_ of lndiq, [1978] 2 SCR 663; Francis Coralie Mullin

v. The Administrator of Union Territory of Delhi & Others, [1981] 2 SCR 516,

applied.

5:2. Many

of the

fu!-ldatnental rights enacted in Part III opei:ate as limita­

tion~· on the power of the State and impose negative obligations on the State not

to encroach on individual liberty aod they are enforceable only against the State.

But there are Certain fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution which are

enforceable against the whole w~rld and they are to be found inter alia in Articles

17,

23 and

24. [483 C-D] . .

,5:3. Article 23 is clearly designed to protect the individual not only

against

the

State but also against other private citizens. Article 23 is nbt limited

in its application against the State but it prohibits ''traffic in human beings and

·begar and other similar forms of fofced Jabour" ptactised by anyone else. -:rbe

prohibition against "traffic in human being and begar and other similar forms of

forced labour" is clearly intended to be a general prohibition, total in its effect

a~d'an pervasive in its range and it is enforceable not only against the State but

also against any other person indulging in any such practice .. [ 484 G-H; 485 A]

. . . .

5:4. The word ''begar" in Article 23 is not~ word of common~Use in

English language, bllt a word of Indian origin which like many other words has

found its way·. in English vocabulary. It is a form of forced labour under which

3: person is compelled, to work without receiving any re?1uneration. Begar is thus

clearly a film of forced labour.· [ 485 E-G]

.,,

S. Vasudevan v. s.b. Mil/al AIR 1962 Born. 53 applied.

5:5.

It is not merely

'begar• which is constitutionally prohibited by

A'rticle 23 but also all other similar forms, of forced labour.· Article 23 strikes

at forced labour in whatever form it may manifest itsClf, becatse it is violative of ·

human dignity and is contrary to basic human values. To contend tbat exacting

le.hour by passing some remuneration,

though it be inadequate will not attract

the provisions of Article

~3 is to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition

against forced Jabour

enacted in Article 23. The contention is not only

ill;:

founded, but does not accord with the principle enunciated by this Court in

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India that when interpreting the P{OVisions of the

Constiiution conferring·fundamental rights, the.

attempt of the Court should be. · to expand the reach and ambit of the fundamental 'rights rather than to attenuate

• . .,..

•

•

..

,

•

•

i

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 463

-theit meaning and content. The Constitutio~ makers did not intend to strike

only at certain

for.ms of

(orced labour leaving it~ open to the socially or econo­

nlically powerful sections of the commuri.ity to explpit the poor and weaker

Sections by resorting to other forms of forced labour. There could be no logic or

reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or service to another

Without receiving any remunercition at an', . it should be regarded 1,\5. a pernicious

practice sufficient to attract the-con.demnation of Artiele 23, but if some remune­

ration is paid for .it, then it should be outside the i,nhibition· of~tbat Article. To

intCrpret Article 23 as contended would be reducing Article 23 to a m~re rope of

sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society for a .person

.belonging to a socially

or economically dominant class to exact labour or service

frOm a person belongillg to the deprived and vulnerable sectioQ_.of the community

by paYing a negligible amount of remuneration and thus escape the rigour of Art ..

23. It would not be right to place on·the language of ·Article 23 an interpreta­

tion which would emasculate its beneficient provisions aiid defeat the very pur­

pose of.enacting them. Article

23

is'' intended to ·abolish every fofm o( forced

lobour. [486 E·H; 487 A.DJ

5:6. ' The words ''other similar forms of forced labour" are' used in

Article 23 riot with a view to importing the particular characteristic of 'beg·ar'

that labour or service should be exacted without payment of any rembneration

but with a view

to bringing

withii;l the scope and ambit o~ that Article alt other

forms

of forced labour and since

'begar' is· one form of forced Jabour, the ConSti-

tution makers 'used tbe words '"other similar forn1s of forced labour". If the

i-equire":'ent that labour or work should be exacted without any reo:i.un~ration ·

were imported in other foqns of force.:i labour. they would straight~away coine

·within the meaning of the word 'begar' ~nd in that event there would be no need

to have the additional words "otbe. similar forms of forced labour." These

words woUJd be rendered futile~and n1~:1ningiess and it is a well recognised rule of

intefpretation' that the court should :ivoid. ·a construction which has the effect of

rendering any words used

by the

leg;s a'ture superfluous redundant. [487 E~G]

. '

The object of adding these words was clearly to expand the· reach and

content

of Article 23 by including, in addition to

'begaf', other forms of forced

labour within the prohibition

of that Article. Every form 'of forced

labou; -

' '

'begar', or o~herwise, is within ·the inhibition of Article 23 and it makes no

diffeience whether the person who is f'orced to give his labour or servic~ to

another

is remunerated or not. Even if remuneration is

paiCL labour supplied

by a persOn \

1.:ould be hit by Article 2~ if it is forced labour, that is; labour supplied

hot willingly but as a result o·f force or' compuJsion. For example, where a

· person has entered into a contract of ser,vice with another for a period

J of thre¥ years and he wishes to discontinue serving such other person before the

· expifation of the-period of three years, if a IaW were to 'provide that in such a

case the cOntract s,hat'I be specifically enforc~d and he. shall be co~pelled to

serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to forced labour

and sU.ch a law would be void as offending. Article 23. That _is why specific

perfon;naace of a contr~ct of service 'cannot bC: enforced against an employee

'

A

B

c

D

E.

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

t

464

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] I s.c.R

and the employee cannot be forced by compulsion of law to continue to serve

the employer. Of course, if there is a breach of the contract of service, the

employee would be liable to pay damages to the employer but he cannot be

forced to continue_ to serve the employer without breaching the injunction of

Article 23. (487 H; 488 A·D]

Baily v. A_alabama, 219 US 219:55 Law Ed. 191; quoted with approval,

5:7. Even if a person has contracted with another to perform strvice and

there is consideration for such service in the shape of liquidation of debt or even

remuneration, he cannot

be forced by compulsion of law or

·otherwise, to continue

to perform such service, as that would be forced labour within the inhibition of

A_rticle 23, .which strikes at every form of forced lab~ur even if it has its origin in

a contract voluntarily entered into

by tbe person obligated to provide labour ,or

service, for tbe reasons, namely;

(i) it offends against human dignity to compel a

pc:rson to provide labour or service to another if he does not wish to do so, even

though it be breach of the contract entered into by him; (ii) there should be no

serfdom or involuntary setvitude in a free democratic India which respects the

dignity of the individual and the worth of the human per..son; (iii) in a country

like India w~ere there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no

equality

of bargaining power, a contract of service

m3y appear on its face 'Volun~

tary but it.may, in reality, be involuntary, because while entering into the contract

the employee by reason

of his economically helpless condition, may have been

faced with Hobson's choice, either to starve

or to submit to the exploitative terms

dictated

by the powerful employer. It

would be a traVesty of justice to hold

the employee in suCh a case to the terms of the contract and to compel him to

serve the employCr even though he may not wish to do so. That would aggra~ ·

vate the inequality and injustice from which the employee even otherwise suffers

on account

of his

ecoliomically disadvantaged position and lend the authority of

law to the exploitation of the poor helpless employee by the econoibically power~

fol employer. Article 23 therefore, provides ..... that no one shall be forced to provide

labour or service against his will, even though it be under a contractor of

service. [490 C-H]

Pollock v. Williams, 322 US 4:88_ Lawyers Edn. 1095; referred to.

-5:8. Where a person provides labour or services to another for remunera­

tion which is Jess tha~ ihe minimu~ wage, the labour or service provided bY him

clearly

faJJs within the scooe and ambit. of the words

"forced labour" under

Article 23. Such a person would be entitled to come to the court for enforcement

of his fundamental right under Article 23 by asking the court to direct payment

of t,!le minimum wage to him so that the labour or service providel,1 by him ceases

to

be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied. [492 F-G]

5:9. Ordinar1ly no one would willingly supply labour

or service to ano­

ther for less than the minimu~ wage, when he knows that under the law he is

entitled to get minimum wage for the labour or service provided by him. .There­

fore when a person provides labour or service to another against receipt of remu~

neration which i~ lc::ss ·tb(\.n the ~inimu~ ·wa~e, b<i is acting under the force of

•

. '

>

•

•

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA 465

some compulsion whi~h drives him to work though he is paid less than what he is A

entitled under Jaw to receive. What Article 23 prohibits is 'forced labour' that

is labour or service which a· person is forced to provide." [491 B-D]

5:10. 'Force' which would inake such labour Or service cforced labow'

may arise in seve;a.1 ways. It may be physical force which may-compel a Person

to-provide labour br service to another or it may be force exerted through a legill

provision such as ~ provisio~ for imprisonmeOt Or fine in case the empioyee fails

to provide Jabour

or service or it may even be compulsion arising from hunger

and poverty, want and destitution. Any

· factof which deprives a person of a

choice of alternative and compels him to adopt one particular course Of actioD

may properly be regarded as 'force' and if labour or servic~ is compelled as a

result of such 'force', it would be 'forced labour'. Where a person is suffering

from hunger or starvation, when he has no resources at all to fight disease or to

feed his wife and children

or even to hide their nakedness, where utter grinding

poverty has broken his back and reduced him

to.a state

Of htlpl<5~Dt:~5 and des­

pair and where no other employment is available to alleviate the rigour of his

poverty,

he would. have no choice but to

·accept aD.y work that comes his, way,

even if the remuneration offered to

hirr1 is

Jess than the minimum wage. He

would be in no Position to bargain with the employer; he would have to accept

what

is offered to him. And in doing so he would be acting not as a

free agent -

with a choice between alternatives but under the compulsion of economic circum­

stances and the labour or ser'(ice provided by him would be clearly 'forced labour'.

The word 'forced' should not be read in a ~arrow and restricted manner so as to

be confined only. to physical .or legal 'force' particularly when the national

eharaCter, its fundamental document has promised to build a new soci~list repub­

lic where there will be -socio-economic justice for all and e'\'ery one shall have the

right tO work, to education and to adequate meariS of livelihood. The constitu­

.tion makers have given u.s one cf the most remarkable documents in ltistory for

ushering in a new socio-economic order and the ConstitutiOn which they have

forged for us has a·sociaJ purpose and an economic mission and, .therefore, every

word or phrase in the Constitution

n1ust be interpreted

in

1a manner which would

3dvancc thi.;. socio-economic Objective of the ConstitutioD. It is a fact that in a

capitalist society economic circumstances

e.xert much greater pressure on an

indi­

vidual in driging him to a particular .. course of action than phYsical comprilsio.n

or force of legislative provi.sion. The word 'force' must therefore be construed

to include not only physical or legal force but force arising from the compulsion

of economic circumstances which leaves no choice of alternatives to a person in

•want and compels him to provide labour or service even though.the remuneration

received for

it is

lesS than the minimum wage. Of course, if a person provides

labour or service

to another agains't receipt of the minimum wage, it would not

be possible 'ro say that the labour or service provided by him is 'forced labour'

because

he gets what he is entitled under

Haw to receive. No inference can reason­

ably be drawn in sue:h a case that h.e iS forced to provide labour or serVice for the

simple reason that would be providing labour

or

sefvice against receipt of what

is lawfully payable to him just likC any ,other person who is not under. the force

of any compulsion.· [491 D-H; 492 A-El

6. Wherever any fundamentl\1 right which i~ ~nforceable against pri~ate

individual~ !JUCh a~~ for example, 4 fupd4mental ri~ht enacted in Articl.e l7 or :?:3

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

E

·F

G

H

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' (1983] l S.C.R.

or 24 is being vio1ated. it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take

necessary steps for the putpose of interdicting such violatiOn and ensuring obser­

vance of th.e fundamental right b:Y the private individual who is transgreSsing the·

same. The fact that the. person whose fundamental right is violated can always

approach the court for the purp~se of Cnforcem'ent of bis fundamental ·right. can­

not absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to see ih-at there is no

violation

of the fundamental right of such person, particularly when he belongs to

the weaker

sectio.n of humanity and.is unable to wage a legal battle against a

strong.and powerful opponent who

1

is exploitin'g him. [493 A-DJ

ORIGINAL JurusmcTION: Writ Petition No. 8143 or'1981.

(Unde~ article 32 of the Constitution of India)

Govind Mukhoty in person and A.K. Ganguli for the

petitioner.

Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent

No. I.

N.C. Talukdar and R.N. Poddar for Respondents Nos. 5

and

6.

Sardar Bahadur Saharya and Vishnu Bahadur Saharya for Res­

pondent No.

7.

The Judgment of the Court was' delivered by

BHAGWATI, J. This is a writ petition brought by way of public'

interest litigation in order to ensure. observance

of the provisions of

various

Jabour· laws in relation to workmen. employed in the cons­

truction work

of various projects connected with the Asian Games.

The

111atter was . brought to the attention of the Court by the !st

petitioner which is an organisation formed for the purpose of pro•

tecting democratic rights by ;.,eans of a letter addressed to one of us

(Bhagwati, J .). The letter was based on a report made by a team of

three social scientists who were commissioned by the Jst petitioner

for the 'purpose of investigating and inquiring into the conditions

under which the workmen engaged

in the

various Asiad Projects

were working. Since the Jetter, ·addressed by the. I st petitioner was

based on the report made

by three social scientists after personal

investigation and study, it was treated as a writ petition on the

judic

cial side and. notice was· issued upon it inter alia to the Union of

India, Delhi Development Authorityand Delhi Administration which

•

•

•

•

->

•

...

..

•

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)' 467

were arrayed as respondents to the writ petition. These respondents

filed their respective· affidavits in reply to the allegatio~s contained -~

in the writ petition and_ an affidavit was filed on behalf of the peti·

tioner in rejoinder to the affidavits in reyly and the writ petiti~n was

argued before

us on the basis of these pleadings.

•

. Before we proceed to deal with the facts giving rise to this writ , . .

petition, we may repeat what we have said earlier in various orders

made

by us from time to time dealing with public interest litigation .

We wish to point out with all tlie emphasis at our command tllat

public interest

litigatfon which is a strategic arm of the legal aid

movement and which is intended to bring justice within the reach or

. the poor ~asses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity,

.is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional __

litigation which is essentially of an adversary character where there

.

is a dispute between two litigating parties, one making claim or

.seek·

ing reljef against the other. and that other opposing such claim or

resisting such relief. Public interest litigation is brought before the

court not for the purpose

of enforcing .the right of one individual

against another as happens in

ti,e case of ordi;,ary litigation, but it

is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which demands_

that violations of constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of

people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically dis­

advantaged position should not go unnoticed and unredressed. That

would

be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one of the

essential elements

of public interest in any democratic form of

government. The

Rule of Law doe_s not mean that the protection

of the law must be available only to a fortunate few or that the law

should be allowed to be prostituted

by the vested interests for.

pro­

tecting and upholding the status quo under the guise of enforcement

of their civil and political· rights. The p9or too have civil and politi.

cal rights and the Rule

of

-Law is meant for them also, though today

it exists only on paper and not in reality. If the sugar barons and

the alcohol kings have the Fundamental Right to carry on their busi­

ness and to.fatten their purses by exploiting the consuming public,

have the 'chamars' belonging to the lowest strata

of society nd

Fundamental Right to earn an honest liv.ing through their sweat

·and

toil ? The former can approach the courts ~with a formidable .army

of distinguished lawyers paid in four or five figures per day and if

t\leir right to exploit is upheld against the government under the

label

of Fundamental

Ri(lht, the courts are praised for their boldness

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

B

c

D

E

F

G

468 .

SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1983) I s.c.ll.

and courage and their independence and fearlessness are applauded

and acclaimed. But,

if the. Fundamental Right of the. poor and

helpless victims

of injustice is sought to be enforced by public

interest

litigat~on, the so called champions of human rights frown

upon it as waste of time of the highest court in the land, which,

according to them; should not engage itself in such small and trifling

matters. Moreover, these self-styled hum.an fights activists rorget

that civil anil political rights, priceless and invaluable as they are for

freedom and democracy, simply do not exist for the vast masses

of

our people. Large numbers of men, women and children who

cons­

titute the bulk of our population are today living a sub-human

existence in conditions

of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has

broken their back' and sapped tbeir

·moral fibre. They have no faith

in. the existing social and economic system. What civil and political

·rights are these poor and· deprived sections of humanity going to

enforce 1 This was ·brought out forcibly by W. Paul Gormseley at

the Silver. Jubilee ·Celebrations of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights at the Banaras Hindu University : ·

"Since India is one of those countries which has given a

pride

of place to the basic

human rights and freedoms in its

Constitution in its chapter on Fundamental Rights and, on

. the Directive Principles of State Policy and has already com­

.Pleted twenty-five years of independence, the question may

be raised whether or not the Fundamental Rights enshrined

in our Constitution have any

meanin.g to the millions of our

people to

whom·food, drinking water, timely medical facili;

ties and relief from disease and disaster, education and job

opportunities still remain unavoidable.

We, in India, should

on this occasion study

. the Human· Rights declared and

defined

by the

United Nations· and compare them with the

. rights available In practice and secured by the law of our

country."

'-.

The only solution for making civil and political rights _meaningful to

these large sections

of

society ·would be to remake the material con­

ditions and restructure the social and economic order so that they

may

be able

· to realise the economic,· social and cultural rights. ·

H There is indeed close relationship between civll and political rights

on the one hand and economic, social and cultural rights on the

other and this r\lllitionsbip is so obvious ihat the Internatio.nal

•

•

•

•"-. ..

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION'OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)' 469

Human Rights Conference in Tehran called by the General Assembly

in 1968 declared in a final proclamation :

"Sin~e human ~ights and fundamenfal freedoms are

indivisible, the

full realisation of civil and

political· rights

without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural ·

rights. is impossible .. "

Of course, the task of·restructuring the social and economic order

so that the so~ial and economic rights become a meaningful reality

for the poor and lowly sections

of the community is one which

legi­

timately belongs to th.e legislature and the executive, but mere initia­

tion of social and economic rescue programmes 'hy the executive and

the legislature would not he enough and it

is only through multi-

,

dimensional strategies including public interestlitigation that these

social and economic rescue programmes can be made effective. ·

Public interest litigation, as we conceiye it, is essentially· a .co·oper~­

tive or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State or

public authority and the court to secure ob_servance of the constitu­

tional or legal rights, benefits and privileges conferred upon the

vulnerabi°e sections of the community and to reach social justice to

them. The State or public au!hority against wh.om public interest

litigation

is brought should be as

much interested in ensuring basic

. -· -

human rights, constitutional as well as legal, to those who are in a

socially and economically disadvantaged position, as the petitioner

w~~ brings the public interest ,litigation before· the Court. The state·

or public authority which is arrayed as a respondenl'in public inte­

rest litigation should, in fact, welcome it, as it would give it an oppor •.

'.(unity to tight a wrong or to redress an injustice done to the poor

and weaker sections of the community whose welfareis and must be

h the prime concern of the State or the public authority.

' '

A

B

c

D

E

F

, There is a misconception in the. minds of some lawyers, journa-: ·

lists and men 'in public life that public interest ·litigation is unneces::""-'G

·sarily cluttering up the files of the court and adding to the already· ·

staggering arrears of cases which are pending for.Jong years and)t.

shoul.d not iherefore be encouraged by the court. This is, to our

mind; a 'totally perv,erse view smacking of elitist and status quoist

approach. Those who are decryfog publiC interest litigation do not H

seem ·to realise that courts ire not meant only for the rich and the

well-to-do, for the landlord 11nd the gentry, for the business magnat~

A

B

·c

D

F

G

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983]. J s.c.R

and the industrial tycoon, but they exist also for the poor and the

down-trodden the have-nots and the handicapped and the half­

hungry millions of our countrymen. So far the courts have been

used only for the purpose of vindicating the rights

of the wealthy

and the affluent.

It is

only these privileged classes which have been

able to approach the courts for protecting their vested interests.

It

is only the moneyed who have so far had the golden key to unlock

the

doors of justice. But, now for the first time the portals of the

court are being thrown open to. the poor and the down-trodden, tl~e

ignorant and the illiterate, and their ·cases are coming before the

courts through public interest litigation which has been made possible

by the recent judgment delivered by this

Cc,urt in Judges Appoint­

ment and Transfer cases. Millions of persons belonging to the

deprived and vulnerable sections

of humanity are

looking· to the

courts for improving their life conditions ani:J ma.king b;isic human

rights meaningful for them. They have been crying for justice but

their cries have

so far been in the wilderness. They have been

suffer­

ing injustice. silently with the patience of a rock, without the strength

. even to shed any tears. Mahatma· Gandhi once said to Gurudev

Tagore, "I have had the pain of watching birds, who for want of

strength could not be coaxed even into a flutter of their wings. The

human bird under the Indian sky gets up weaker than when he pre­

tended to retire. For millions it is an eternal trance." This.is true

of the 'human bird' in India even today after -more than 30 years of

independence. The legal aid movement and public interest litigation

seek to bring justice to these forgotten specimens

of humanity who

constitute the bulk

of the citizens of India and who are really and

truly the

"People of India" , who gave to themselves this magnificent

Constitution. it is true that there are large arrears pendfog in the .

•

..

courts but, that cannot be any reason for denying access to justice to )

the poor and weaker sections of the community. No State has a · .· ·

right to tell its citizens that because a large number of cases of the _ _,

rich and the well-to-do are pending in our courts, we will not help

the poor to come to the courts for seeking justice until the staggering

load

of cases of people who can afford, is disposed of. The time

has now come when the courts must become the courts for the poor

and struggling masses

of

_this country They must shed their charac-

ter

as upholders of the established

order and the status quo. They,

must be sensitised to the need

of doing justice to the large masses of

people to whom justice

·has been de?ied by a cruel and heartless

~ociety for generatjoµs, The realisation must c?me to them that

•

•

~·

I

,

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, i.) 471

social justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and it is their

solemn duty under the Constitution to enforce the basic human

rights

of the poor and vulnerable sections of the community and acti­

vely help in the realisation of the constitutional goals. This

ne_:v

change has to come if the judicial system is to become an effective

instrument

of social justice, for without it, it cannot survive for

long. Fortunately, this change

is gradually taking place and public

· interest litigation is playing a large part in bringing about this

change.

It is through public interest litigation that the problems of'

the poor are now coming to the fore front and the entire theatre of

the law is

~banging. It holds out great possibilities for the future .

This writ petition is one such instance of public interest litigation.

The Asian Games take place periodically in different parts

of

Asia and this

tim~ India is hosting the Asian Games. It is a highly

prestigious undertaking

and in order to accomplish it successfully

according to international standards, the Government

of India had

to embark upon various

construction projects which included build­

ing of fly-overs, stadia, . swimming pool, ·hotels and Asian Games

village complex. This construction work

was framed

·out by the

Government of India amongst various Authorities such as the Delhi

Administration, the Delhi Development Authority and the

'New Delhi

Municipal Commiitee. It

is not necessary for the purpose of the

present writ petition to set out what particular project

was entrusted to

·which authority because it is not the purpose

of this writ petition to firld ·fault with any particular authority for

'not observing the labour laws in relation to ·the workmen employed

in the projects which are being executed

by it, but to

·ensure that in

future the labour laws are implemented and the rights

of the workers

under the

·labour laws are riot violated. These various authorities to

' whom the execution of the different projects was entrusted engaged

\.._ contractors for the purpose of carrying out the construction work of

l.-... the projects and they were registered as principal employers under

section 7 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,

1970. The contractors started the construction work of the projects

and for the purpose

of carrying

out . the construction work, they

engaged workers through jamadars. The jamadars brought the

workers from different parts

of India and particularly the

States of

Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and got them employed by the

contractors. The workers were entitled to a minimum wage

of Rs.

'

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

·A

B

c

D

E

F

•

G

B

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19831 i s.c.il.

9.25 per day, that being the minimum wage fixed for workers emplo­

yed on the construction of roads and in building operations but the

case of the petitioners

was that the workers were not paid this

mini­

mum wage and they were exploited "1Jy the contractors and the jama­

dars. The Union of India in the affidavit reply filed on its behalf by

Madan Mohan; Under Secretary, Ministry o( Labour· asserted that

the contractors did pay the minimum

wage of Rs. 9.25 per day but

frankly admitted that this minimum wage

was paid to the jamadars

thrdugh

whom the workers were recruited and the jamadars deducted

rupee one

per day per ·worker as their commission and paid only·

Rs. 8.25 by way of wage to the workers. The result was that in fact

the workers dld not get the minimum wage of Rs. 9.i5 per day. The

. petitioners also alleged· in the writ petition that the provisions

of the ·Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 were violated and

women workers w~re being paid only Rs. 7 /-per day and the balance

of the amount of the wage was being misappropriated by the jamadars.

It

was also pointed out by the petitioners that there was violation of

Article 24 of the Constitution and of the provisions of the

Employ­

ment of Children Act, 1938 in as much as children belo·w the age of

14 years were employed by the contractors in the construction ·work

of the various projects. The petitioners also alleged violation of the

provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act

1970 and pointed out various breaches o.f those provisions by the

contractors which resulted

in deprivation and exploitation of the

workers employed

in the. construction work of most

oJ the projects.

II was also the case of the petitioners thaflhe workers were denied

proper living conditions and medical and other facilities

io which ·they were entitled under the provisions of the Contract Labour

. (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970'. The petitioners also complain­

ed that the contractors were not implementing the provisions of thl.l­

Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Con­

ditions of Service) Act 1979 though that Act was brought in force in

the Union Territory of Delhi as far back as 2nd Octdber 1980. The

report or' the team of three social scientists on which the ~rit petition

was based set out various instances of viOlations of the provisions of

the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Equal RemuneratiOn Act 1976,

A.rticle 24 of the Constitution, The Employment of Children Actl970,

and the.Jnter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment

and c;onditions

of Service) Act 1979.

.....

•

i

•

These averments made on behalf of the petitioners were denied ·,.

in the affidavits in reply filed on behalf of the Union of India, the

-

'

•

~EOPLB

1

s UNION V. UNION OF INDIA ,(Bhagwati, J.) 473

Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development Authority. It was

asserted by these authorities that so far as the Equal . Remuneration

Act

1976 and the Contract Labour (Regulation

and Abolition) Act ·

1970 were concerned, the provisions of these labour laws lVere 'being ·

complied with by the contractors and . whenever any violations of

these labour laws were btought lo the attention of the. authorities as

a result

of periodical inspections carried

O\lt by them, a;tion by way

of pro'secution was being taken against the contractors. The provi­

sions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 were, according to the Delhi

Development Authority, being observed by the contractors and it

was pointed out by the Delhi Development

Authority·.ln its affidavit

in reply that the construction .work of _the projects entrust'd to it

was being carried out by the contractors under a written cqntract

entered into with them and this written contract incorporated

'"Model Rules for the Proteciion, of Health and sa;itary .(range-·

merits for Workers employed by Delhi Development Authority or its

Contractors" which provided for various facilities to be given to the

· workers employed in the construction work and. also ensured to them

payment

of minimum wage The Delhi Administration was not so

categorical as the Delhi

Development Authority in regard to the

observance

of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Aci 1948 and

in its affidavit in

reply it conceded that the jamadars through whom

the workers were recruited might be deducting rupee one per day per

worker from the minimum

wage payable to the

''workers. The Union

of India was however mere frank and it clearly admitted in its affi·

davit in reply that the jamadars were di:ducting rupee one per day

per worker from the

wage payable to the workers with the result

that the workers did

pol get the minimum wage of Rs. 9.25 per,day

and there was violation of the·provisions of the Minimum Wages

r' Act, J 9 48~

~ . ,·

, .

'- So far as the Employment of Children A.ct 1938 is concerned

the case

of the

Union or India, the Delhi Administration and the

·Delhi Developmeni Authority was that 'no complaint in regard to

the violation

of the provisions of

.that Act was at any time received.

by them and they disputed that there Wa< any violation ot these

provisions by the contractors. It was also contended · on behalf of

these Authorities that the Employment of Children Act 1938 was

not applicable in case of employment in the construction work of .

'

these projects, since construction industry is not a process specified

· in the Schedule and is therefore not within the provisions of sub~

A

B

c

D

I

)

E

F

G

El

B

0

E'

G

H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983l 1s.c.R.

section (3) of section 3 of that Act. Now unfortunately this con­

tention urged on behalf of the respondents is well founded, because

construction industry does not find a place in the Schedule to the

.Employment of Children Act

1938

~nd the, prohibition enacted in

section 3 su"b-section (3) of that Act agafost the employment of a

child

who has not completed his fourteenth year cannot.

·apply to

employment

in construction industry. This is a sad and deplora_ble

omission

which,,we think, must· be immediately set right by every

State Government by amending the Schedule so as to include cons­

truction industry in it in e;ercise of the power conferred under

section 3A of the Employment

of Children Act,

1938,. We hope and

trust that every State Government will take the necessary steps in this

behalf without any undue delay, because construction work is clearly

a hazardous occupation and it

is absolutely essential that the

employ­

ment of children under the age of 14 years must be prohibited in

every type of _construction work. That would ·be in consonance

with Convention No .. 59 adopted by the .International Labour Organi­

sation and ratified by India. But apart altogether from the require-

. ment of Convention No. 59, we have Article 24 of the Constitution

which provides that no chlld below-the age of 14 shall be employed

to work

in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous

employment.

This is a constitutional prohibition which, even if not

followed up

by appropriate legislation,

must operate proprio vigore

and construction work being plainly and indubitably a hazardous

em_ployment, it is clear that by reason of this constitutional prohibi-

/ tiO"D, ·no child below the age of .14 years can be allowed to be engaged

i11 construction work. There can therefore be no doubt that not­

. withstanding the absence of specification o( construction industry in

the Schedule to the Employment of Children Act 1938, no child

below the age of 14 years can he employed in construction. work and

the Union of fodia as also every State Government must ensure that

this constitutional mandate

is not violated

·in any part of the country.

Here, of course, ihe plea

of the

Union of India, the Delhi Adminis-

. tration and the Delhi Development Authority was that no child below

the·age of 14 years was at any time employed in the construction

work of these projects and

in

any event DO complaint in that behalf

was received by any of these Authorities and hence there. was no

violation of the constitutional prohibition enacted in Article 24. So

far as the complaint in reg_ard to non-observance of the provisions

of the Inter State M.igrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment

and Conditions

of

Service) Act 1979 was concerned, the defence of

the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and' the Delhi Develop­

ment Authority that though this Act had come into force in the

--'

.• ~

I

•

•.

)

r.

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati. i.) 475

Union Territory of Delhi w_ith effect from 2nd October 1980, the

power to enforce the provisions of the Act was delegated to the

Administrator'of the Union Territory of Delhi only on 14th July

1981 and thereafter also the provisions of the Act could· not been

enforced because the Rules to be made un~er -the Act had not been

finalised until 4th June

1982. It is difficult to understand as to why

in the case of beneficient

•legislation._ like_ the Inter State Migrant

Workmen (Regulation

of Employment and Conditions of

Service)

Act 1979 it should have taken more than 18 months for the Govern­

ment

of

India to delegate the power to enforce the provisions of the

Act to the

-. Administrator of the

Union Territory of Delhi and

another almost l i months to make the Rules under the Act. It was -­

well kriown that a large number of migrant workmen coming from

different States were employed in the construction work of various

Asiad projects and

if the provisions of a social welfare legislation

like the Inter

State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment

and Conditions of Service) Act

1979 were applied and

the benefit'~f

-such provisions made available to these migrant workmen, it would

have gone a long

way towards ameliorating their

-conditions of work

-_and ensuring them a decent living with basic human-dignity, We

very much wished that the provisions of this Act had been made

applicable earlier to the migrant workmen employed in the construc­

iion work of these projects though we must oonfess that we do not

see why the enforcement of the provisions of the Act should have

been held up until the making

of the

Rul~s. It is no don bt true that

there are certain provisions in the Act which cannot be enforced

unless there are rules made under the Act but equally there are other

provisions which do not need

any prescription by the Rules for their

enforcement

ond these latter provisions could certainly have been

enforced by the Aministrator

of the

Union Territory -of nClhi

in _so far as migrant workmen employed in these projects were con­

cerned. There can be no doubt that in any event from and after

4th June,

1982 the provisions of this beneficient

-legislation have

-become enforceable and the migrant workmen employed in the cons­

tructi<;>n work of these projects are entitled to the dghts and bCnefits

conferred upon them under those provisions. We need not -point

out that

so far as

the rights_ and benefits conferrec;I upon migrant

workmen under the provisions

of section_-

13 to I 6 of the Act are

concerned, the responsibility for ensuring such rights and benefits

rests not only on the contractors-but.also on the Union ·or India the

Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development Au tborlty who is

A.

B

c

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

·E

F

G

H

s\JP1UJMB COURT RBPOR'l'S fl 983) I s.c.k.

the principal employer in relation to the construction work entrusted

by it to the contractors. We must confe;s that we have serious

doubts whether the provisions

of this Act are being implemented in

relation to the migrant workmen employed

in the construction work

of

th~se projects and we have therefore by our Order dated I Ith

· May 1982 appointed three Ombudsmen for the pqrJJ.ose of m'aking

periodic inspeytion and reporting to us whether the provisions of

this Act are being implemented at least from 4th June 1982.

. · We must in fairness point out that the Union of India has .

stilted in its affidavii in reply that a number of prosecution have ·

been launched against the contractors for violations of the provision

.

of various labour laws and in Annexure I to its affidavit in reply

it·

has given detailed particulars of such prosecutions. It is apparent

from the particulars given in this Annexure that the prosecutions

launched against the cantractors were_primarily for offences such as

non-maintenance of relevant registers non-provision of welfare and

health facilities such as first aid box, latrines, urinals etc. and non­

issue of wage slips. We do not propose to go into the details of

tliese prosecutions launched against the contractors but we are shocked ·

to find that in cases of violations of labour laws enacted for the

benefit

of workmen, the Magistrates have been imposing only small

fines

of Rs.

200/-there abouts. The Magistrates seem to view the.

violatfons of labour laws .with great indifference and unconcern as ·if

they are trifling offences undeserving of judicial severity. They seem

to over-look the fact labour laws are enacted for improving the con­

ditions of workers and the employers cannot be allowed to buy off

immunity against violations

of labour laws by paying a paltry fine

which they would not mind paying, because by violations the labour

laws they would be making profit which would far exceed the amount

of the fine. If violations of labour laws are going to b.e punished

only

by meagre. fines, it would be impossible to ensure observance of

the labour laws and the labour laws would be reduced to nullity.

They would remain merely paper tigers without any teeth

-or claws.

We would like to impress upon the Magistrates and Judges

in the

country

that violations of labour laws must be viewed with strictness

and;whenever any violations

of labour laws are established before

them,'they should punish ihe errant employers

by imposing adequate

punishment.·

We may· c~nveniently at this stage, before proceeding to

examine the factual aspects of the case, deal with two prelhninary

..

..

. ,

..

PEOPLE'S UNION Ii. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.)

I objections raised on behalf of the respondents aga~nst the maintain­

ability of the writ petition. 'The first preliminary objection was

that the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain the writ, petition

since, even on the averments made

in the writ petition, the rights

said

to·· have been violated were t]lose of the workers einployed iii

the con~tru.ction w'ork of the various-Asiad projects and not of the

petitioners and the petitioners

cou.ld not therefore have any cause of

action. The second preliminary objection urged on behalf of the

res­

pondents was that in any event no writ petition cquld lie against tho

respondents, because the workmen whose rights were said to have

been violated were employees of the contractors and not oftthe respon­

dents and the cause of action of the workmen, if any, ·was therefore

against the contractors and not against the respondents.

It was

also·_

contended as part of this preliminary objection that no writ petitfon

under article 32 of the Constitution could lie against the respondents for

the alleged violations

of the rights of the workmen under the various

labour laws, and the remedy,

if any, was only under the provisions

of those laws. These two preliminary objections were pressed before

us

on behalf of the

Union of Imlia, the Delhi Administration and the

Delhi Development Authority with a

view to shutting out an inquiry by this Court into the violations of various labour laws alleged in 'the

writ petition, but we do not think·there is any substan'ce in them

and they must

be rejected.

Our reasons for saying so are as

follows:

-The first preliminary objection raises the question of locus

· standi of the petitioners to maintain the writ petition._ It .is true,

' that the complaint

of the petitioners in the writ petition

is in regard

to the violations of the provisions of various labour laws designed

for the welfare of workmen and therefore from a strictly traditional

point

of view, it would be only the workmen whose legal rights

are

vio_lated who would be entitled to approach the -court for

-judicial redress. But the traditional rule of

st~nding which confines

access to the judicial process only to those to whom legal inj~ry is .

caused or legal wrong is done has now -been jetisoned by this Court

and the narrow confines within which the rule of staillliilg was

imprisoned for long years as a result of inheritance of the Anglo­

Saxon System"6f jurisprudence have been' broken and a new dimen-·

sion has been given to-the doctrine of locus standi which has·

revoluiionised the whole concept of access to justice in a way not

known before to the Western System

of jurisprudence. This Court

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983] 1 s.c.k.

has taken the view that, having regard to the peculiar socio-.

economic conditions prevailing in the country where there is,

considerable poverty, illiteracy and ignorance obstructing and

impeding accessibility to the judicial process, it would result in clos­

ing the doors of justice to the poor and deprived sections of the

community if the traditional 'rule

of standing

evolved by Anglo­

Saxon jurisprudence that only a person wronged can sue for judicial

redress

were to be blindly adhered to and followed,

and it is there­

fore necessary to evolve a new strategy by. relaxing this traditional

rule

of standing ir! order that justice may became easily available to

the lowly and the lost.

It has been held by this Court in its recent

judgment

in the Judges Appointment and Transfer case, in a major

break-through which in the years to come

is likely to impart new

significance and relevance to the judicial system .and

to transform it

into as instrument

of socio-economic change, that where a person or

class of persons to whom legal injury. is caused

or, legal wrong is

done is by reason of poverty, disability or socially or econoinically

disadvantaged position not able to approach the Court for judicial

redress, any member

of the public acting bona fide and not out of

any extraneous motivation may move the Court for judicial redress.

of the legal injury or wrong suffered by such person or class of

persons

and· the judicial process may be set in motion by any public

spirited individual or institution. even

by addressing a letter to the

court. Where judicial

redress· is sought of a legal injury or legal

wrong suffered

by

a person or 'class of persons who by reason

of poverty, disability or socially or economically disaqvantaged

position are unable to approach the court and the court is moved

for this purpose' by a member

of a public by addressing a letter

drawing the attention

·of the court to such legal injury or legal

wrong, court would cast aside all technical rules· of procedure and

entertain the letter as a

Writ petition

OD the judicial sidO and take

action upon it. That

is what

has happened in the present case.

Here the workmen whose rights are said to have been violated and·

to whom a life of basic human dignity has been denied are poor,

ignorant, illiterate humans who,

by reason of their poverty and social

and economic disability, are unable to approach the courts for

judicial redress and

hence the petitioners, have under the liberalised

rule

of standing, locus standi to maintain the present writ. petition ·espousing the cause of the workmen. It is not the case of the ,

respondents that tlie petitioners are acting mala fide or out of extra­

neous motives and in fact the respondents cannot so allege, since

'

-r

•

..

1'

. I

•

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 479

the first p~titioner is admittedly an .organisation ·dedicated to the

protection and enforcement

of Fundamental Rights and' making

Directive Principles

of State Policy

enforc~able and justiciable.

'There can be no doubt that

it is out of a sense of public

·service

.that the present litigation has been brought by the petitioners and it

is clearly maintainable. '

We must then proceed to consider the first limb of the second

preliminary objection.

It is true that the workmen whose cause has been championed by the petitioners are employees of the contractors

but the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi

Development Authority which have entrusted the' construction··work

of Asiad projects to the contractors cannot escape th.eir obligation

for opservance of the various labour laws by.the contractors. So far

as the

Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act

1970 is

concerned, it is clear that under section 20, if any ·amenity required

to be provided under·sections 16, 17, 18 or 19 for the benefit of the

workmen employed in an establishment is not provided by the

contractor, the obligation to provide such amenity rests on the

principal employer and therefore if in the construction work

of the

Asiad projects, the contractors do

not carry out the obligations.

impcsed upon them by any of these sections, the Union of India,

the Delhi Admlnistration and the Delhi Development Authority as

principal employers would be liable and these obligation~ would be

enforceable against them. The same position obtains .in regard to

the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation 'of Employment and

Conditions

of Service) Act 1979. In the case of this Act

also,

sections 17 and 18 make the principal employer liable to make pay­

ment of the wages to the ·migrant workmen employed by the

contractor as also to pay the allowances provided under. sections f4

and

15 and to provide the facilities specified in section 16 to

sue!)

migrant workmen, in case the contractor fails to do so and these

obligations are also therefore clearly enforceable against the Union

'of India, the Delhi . Administration and the Delhi Development

Authority as principal ,employers. So far as Article 24 of the

Constitution 'is concerned, it embodies a fundamental right wbich.'is

plainly and indubitably enforceable against every one and.by reason

of its compulsiv_e mandate, no one can employ a child below the age

of 14 years in a hazardous employment and since, as pointed out .

/ above, construction work is a hazardous employment, no child below

(he a~e of 14 years can be employed in construction wor!< and there

A

c

0

E

F

G

H

A

8

c

D

E

F

G

480'

SUPREME COUR1 REPORTS . [19831 1 s.c.a.

f-0re, not only are the contractors under a 'constitutional mandate

riot to employ any

chHd below the age of 14 years, but it is also .the

duty

of the

Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi

Development Authority to ensure that this constitutional.obligation

is obeyed by the contractors to whom they

have

1 entrusted the

construction work

of the

vari.ous Asiad projects. The Union of

India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Development

Authority cannot. fold their hands in despair and become silent

spectators

of the breach of a constitutional prohibition being

com­

mittee by their own contractors. So also with regard to the

observance

of the provisions of the Equal

R~muneration Act 1946,

the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develo-

. ment Authority cannot avoid iheir obligation to ensure that these

provisions are COJ!lplied with by the contractors. It is the principle

1

of equality em bodied in Article 14 of the Constitution which finds

expression in the provisions

of.

the Equal Remuneration Act 1946

ana if the Union of India, the Delhi Administration or the Delhi

Development Authority at any \ime finds that the provisions

of the

Equal Remuneration

Act' 1946 are not observed and the principles

of equality before the law enshrined in Article 14 is violated. by its

own contractors, it cannot ignore such violation and sit quiet by

adopting a non-interfering ·attitude and taking shelter under the

executive that the violation is being committed by the contractors

and not

by it. If any particular contractor is committing a breach

of the provisions of

tl\_e Equal Remuneration Act 1946 and tl;ius

denying equality before the Jaw· to the workmen, the Union of

India, the Delhi Administration or the Delhi Development

Authority as the case may

be, would be under an obligation to

ensure that the contractor observes the provisions

of the Equal

Remuneration Act

1946 and

does· not breach the equality clanse

.'enacted in Article 14 .. The Union qf India, the Delhi. Administration

and the

.. Delhi Development Authority must

al$o ensure that the

minimum

wage is paid to the workmen as provided under the

Minimum Wages Act 1948. The contractors are,

of course,

liable'

to pay the minimum wage· to the workmen employed by them but

the Union of India the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develop­

ment Authority who have entrusted the · eonstruction work to the

contractors would equally be responsible to ensure that the minimum

wage js paid to the workmen by their contractors. This obligation

which even otherwise rests on

rhe:

Union of India, the Delhi

,Administration and the Delhi Development Authority is adc!itionally

-'

•

•

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwatl, J.) 481

re-inforced by section 17 of the. Inter State Migrant Workmen

(Regulation

of Employment and Conditions .of

Service) Act 1979 in

so far as migrant workme_n are concerned. It is obvious, therefore,

that the Union Of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi

Development Aut~ority cannot escape their obligation to the w~rk­

men to ensure observance of these labotlr laws by the contractors

and if these labour laws are not complied with by the contractors,

the workmen would clearly have a cause of action against the

Union of India, the Delhi Administration a.nd tlie Delhi Development

Au tbority. 1

That takes us to.a consideration of the· other limb -0f the

second preliminary objection. The argument of the respondents

under this bead

of preliminary objection was that a writ petition

·

under Article 32 cannot be maintained unless it complains of a breach

of some fundamental right cir the other and since what were alleged in

. the present writ petition were merely violations of the labour laws

enacted for the benefit

of

,the workin~n and n9t. breaches of any

fund.amental rights, the present writ petition w~s not maintainable

and was liable to M dismissed. Now it is: true that, the present writ

petitiop ·cannot be maintained by the ·petitioners unless they can

show some violation of a fundamental right, for . it ·is only for

enforcement

of a fundamental right that a writ petition can be

·

maintained in this Court under Article 32. So far we agree with

the contention

of the respondents but there our agreement ends. We

cannot accept the plea of the respondents that the

present writ peti­

tion does not complain of any breach o.f a fundamenta1'right. The

complaint of violation of Article 24 based on the averment that

children below the age

of 14 year_s are employed in the construction ·work of the Asiad projects is clearly a complaint of violation of a

fundamental right. So also when, the petitioners allege non­

observ~nce of the·provisions of the·· Equal. Remuneration Act 1946,

it is in 'effect and substance a complaint of breach of the principle

/"of equality before the law enshrined in Article 14 ·and it can hardly

be disputed that such a complaint can legitimately form the s~bject

matter of a writ petition under Article 32. Then there is the

complaint

of

non-observanc; of the provisions of the Contract

Labour (Regulation

& Abolition) Act

1970 ·and the Inter State

Migrant Workmen (Regulation of· Employment and Conditions,

of Service) Act I 979 and this is also in our opinion a com-

plaiut relating to viol11tion of_ Article 21. This· Article has

. '-

A

B

-c

D

E

'.

F

G

-H

A

B

c

D

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1983] I s.c.R.

acquired a new dim~osioo as· a result of the decision of this

Court in

Maneka Gandhi v.

Union of India(') and it bas received

its most expansive interpretation. in

Francis Coralie Mullin v. The

Administrator,

Union Territory of Delhi & Ors,(') where it has been

held by this Court that the right to life guaranteed under this Article

is not confined merely to physical existence or to the use of any

faculty or limb through which life

is enjoyed or the

soul communi­

cates with outside world but it also includes within jts scope and

. ambit the right to live with basic human . dignity and ,the State

cannot deprive any one of this precious and invaluable right because

DO J)rocedure by which ~uch deprivation may be effected can ever be

regarded as reasonable, fair and just. Now the rights and benefits

conferred on the workmen employed

by a contractor under the

provisions

of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act .

1970 and the Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employ­

.men! and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 are clearly intended to

ensure basic human dignity to the workmen and if the workmen are ~

deprived of any of these rights . and benefits to which they are .

entitled. under the provisions

of these two .Pieces of social welfare

legislation, that would clearly be a violation

of Article 21 by the

Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develop­

ment Authority which, as principal employers, are made statutorily

responsible for securing such rights and benefits to the workmen ..

That leaves for consideration the complaint in rega.rd to non-pay­

ment or"minimum wage to the workmen under the Minimum Wages

Act

1948. We are of the view that this complaint is also one

relating

to breach of a 'fundamental right and for reasons which we

shall presently state, it is the fundamental right enshrined in Article

'2:> which. is violated by no~-payment of minimum wage to the

F workmen.

H

Article 23 enacts a very important fundamental right in the.

following terms :

"Art. 23 : Prohibition of traffic in human beings and~forced

labour--

(I) Traffic in human beings and begar and other

similar forms

of forced labour are prohibited and

(I) [1978] 2

S.C.R. 663.

(2) (1981) 2 S.C.R. SIC$,

..

•

-~-

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 48

any contravention of this provision shall be an

offence punishable in accordance with law.

(2) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the

State

from imposing compulsory service for public.

purposes, and in imposing such service the State

shall not make any discrimination on grounds

only of religion, race, caste or class or any of

them.

Now many

of the fundamental rights enacted in

Part III operate as

limitations on the power of the State and impose negative obligations .

un the State not to encroach on individual liberty and they are

enforceable only against the State. But there are certain funda­

mental rights conferred by the Constitution which are enforceable

against the whole world and they are to be found inter alia in _

Articles

17, 23 and 24. We have already di,scussed

th'\' true scope

and ambit

of Article 24 in an-earlier portioe of this judgment and

hence we.do not propose to say anything more about

it._ So also_

we need not expatiate on the proper meaning and effect of the

fundamental right enshrined in Article

17 since we are

not concerned

with that Article in the present. writ petition.

It is Article 23

with

' which we are concerned and that Article is clearly designed to

protect the individual not only against ·the State but also against

other private citizens. Article

23 is not

limfted in its application

against the State but it prohibits "traffic in human beings and begar

and other-similar forms

of forced

labour" practised by anyone else.

The sweep

of Article 23 is

. wide. and unlimited and it strikes at

traffic in human beings and begar and other -similar forms of forced

· labour" wherever they ar-e -found. The reason for enacting this

provision in the chapter

on fundamental

fights is to be found in the

socio-economic condition

of the people.at the time when the

Consti­

tution came to 'be. enact~d. The C~hstitution makers, when they set

out to frame the Constitution, found that they had the enormous

task before theni

of changing the

socio-economic structure of the

country and bringing about socio-economic regeneration with a

view

to reaching social and

economic· justice to the common man. Large

masses

of people, bled white by well nigh two centuries of foreign

rule; were

Jiving in abject poverty and destitution with ignorance

and

illite~acy accentuating their helplessness and despair. The

society had degenerated into a· status-orient~<! _,hier~rchical society -

I

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

•

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

n·

..

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I 1983] I S.C.R •.

with little respect for the dignity of individual who was in the lower

rungs of the social ladder or in an economically impoverished.

condition.

The. political revolution was completed and it had

succeeded in bringing freedom to the counrty but freedom was not an end· in itself, it was .only a means to an end, the end being the raising

or'the peopl~ to higher levels of achievement and.bringing about'

their total ,,dvancement and welfare. Political freedom had no

meaning unless it was accompanied by social and economic freedom '

and it was therefore necessary to carry forward the social and

economic revolution with a

view to creating 'social economic

condi­

tions in which every one would be able to enjoy basic human rights

and participate in the fruits

of freedom and liberty in an egalitarian

social and economic framework.

It was with this end in view that

the constitution makers .enacted

the Directive Principles of State

Policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting out the constitutional

goal

of a new socio-economic order. Now

there was one feature of

our natio~l life which was ugly and shameful and which cried for

urgent attelition and that

was the existence of bonded or forced

labour

in large parts of the country. This evil was the relic of feudal

. exploitative society and it was totally incompatible

with the new

·egalitarian socio-ec-:momic order which, "We the people of India"

were determined to build and constituted a gross and most revolting

'denial

of basic human dignity. It

~as therefore' 11ecessary to eradi­

cate this pernicious practice and wipe it out altogether from the

; n~tional scene and this had to be done immediately because with

the advent

of freedom, such practice could not be allowed to

continue to blight the national life any longer. Obviously, it would

not have been. enough merely. to include abolition

of forced labour

i"o

the Directive Principles of State Policy, because then the outlaying

'of this practice would not have been legally enforceable and it would

_have continued to plague ·our national life in violation of the basic

constitutional norms and values untill some appropriate legislation

-could

be brought by the legislature forbidding' such practice. The

Constitution

·makers therefore decided to give teeth to their resolve

to obliterate and wipe out this 'evil practice by enacting consti­

tutional prohibition against it in the chapter on fundamental rights,

so that the abolition-

of such practice may beco me enforceable

and

effective as soon as the Constitution came into force. This is the

reason

why the provision enacted in Article 23 was included in the

chapter on fundamentar rights. The prohibition againsi

"traffic in (

)lµman beings and begar and other similar forll\s of forced labour"

•

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION op' INDIA' (Bhagwati. J.) 485

is clearly intended to be a general prohibition, tot.al in 'it~ effect and.

all pervasive in jts range and it is 'enforceable not . only . against the

State bnt also $inst any other person indulging in ,any. such ·

practiee.

' -

The question then is as to· what is the true scope and meaning

of the expression "traffic in human beings. and begar and other

similar forms

of forced

labour" in Article 237 What are the forms

of 'forced labour' prohibited by that Article and what kind of labour •

provided by a person can be regarded as 'f"rced labour' so as to

fall within this prohibition ? · '

When the Constitution makers · enacted Article 23 they had

before them Article

of the

Universal. Declaration of Huinan Rights

oui .they deliberately departed from its language and employed words

'which would make the reach and content of Article

23 much wider.

than

that of Article 4 of the Universal Declaraticin of Human Rights.

They banned 'traffic

in human

b~ings which. is an· expression of

much clarger amplitude than "slave trade" and they also interdicted

"begar and other similar forms of forced labour". The question is ·

what is the scope and ambit of the expression 'begar and other

similar forms

of forced

labour?" In this ·expression wide enough to

include every conceivable form of forced labour and what is-the true

scope and meaning

of the words

"forced labour·?" The ~ord 'begar'

in this Article is not a word of common use in English language.' It

is a_ word of Indian origin which like many other words has.found

its way in the English vocabulary. It is very difficult to fo.rmulate

a precise defi~ition of the_ word begar' but there . can be no

doubt that it• is a form· of 'forced labour under which a person is

compelled to work without receiving any remuneration. Moles-·

;,...._ ~orth describes 'begar' as "labour or ,service. exacted by a govern­

ment or person in 'power without giving remuneration for it."

Wils'on's glossary of Judicial and. -Revenue Terms-. gives~ the

following meaning of the

wotd 'begar' :

"a forced lab0iirer, ·one

pressed to carry burthens for individuals or the public. Under. the

old system,

when

pressedJor public service, no pay was given. The

Begari, though still liable to

be pressed for public objects, now

recei­

ves pay : For~ed labour for private service is prohibited.", "Begar"

may ,therefore be loosely described as labour or service whieh a per-

-

s'on is forced to give without receiving any remuneration

for· it. That

was th~ meaning of the word '!>e~'!r"accepted by a l)iyi~io!l Bench

A·

B

c

D

E

FI

G

A

c

D

E

G

486 SUPRJlME COURT RJlPORTS [1983] l s.c.R ..

of the Bombay High Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.~. Mital.(') ~Begar'

is thus clearly a film of forced labour. Now it is not merely 'begar'

which

is unconstitutionally prohibited by Article 23 but also all other

· -~

similar forms of forced labour. This Article strikes at forced labour

in whatever form it niay manifest itself, because it is violative

of

human dignity and is contrary to basic human .values. The practice

of forced labour is condemned in almost every international instru-

ment dealing with human rights.

It is ·interesting to find that as far

, back as 1930 long before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

came into being, International Labour Organisation adopted Conven-

tion No. 29 laying down that every member of the International

tabour Organisation which ratifies this convention shall "suppress

the use of forced or compulsory labour in ·all its forms" and this

prohibition

was elaborated in

Convention No. 105 adopted by the

lnternation~l Labour Organisation in 1957 ... The words "forced or

compulsory labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course a limited

meaning but that

was so on account of the restricted definition of

these words given

in Article 2 of the Convention. Article 4 of the

European

Convention of Human Rights and Article 8 of the Inter­

national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also prohibit forced

or compulsory labour. Article

23 is in the same strain and

it enacts

a prohibition against forced labour

in whatever form it may be

found.

· The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent ,

· laid some empba:sis on the word 'similar' and contended that it is

not every form of forced

0

• labour which is prohibited by Article 23

but only such form of forced labour as is similar to 'begar' and since

'begar' means labour or service which a person

is forced to give

with­

out receiv_ing any remuneration for it, the interdict of Article 23 is

limited .only'to thosef~rms of forced labour where labour or service

is exacted from a person without paying any remunerat'ion at all an<j r

if some. remuneration is paid, though it be inadequate, it would· not _,./

fall within the words 'other similar forms of forced lab.our: This

contention seeks to unduly restrict the amplitude of the prohibition

against forced labour enacted

in Article 23

and· is in our opinion not

well founded. It does not accord with the principle enunciated by

this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(') that when

interpreting the provisions

of the Constitution conferring

funda­

mental rights, the. attempt qfthe court spould be to expand the reach

and ambit of the fundamental rights rather than to attenuate their

(!) AIR 1962 Born. 53.

(2) [1978) 2jSCR 621.

•

~

I

'

•

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (llhagwati, J,) 48'7

meaning and content. It is difficult to imagine that the Constitution

makers should have intended to strike

.only at certain forms of forced

labour leaving it open to the socially

or economically powerful

sections

of the community to expioit the poor and weaker sectionsby

resorting

to other forms of forced labour. Could there be any logic

o·r reason in enacting that if a person is forced to give labour or

service to another without receiving any remuneration at all it should,

be 'regarded as a pernicious practice sufficient to attract the condem·

nation of Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid for it, then it

should be outside the inhibition

of that Article ? If this were the . true interpretation, Article 23 would be reduced to a mere rope of

sand, for it would then be the easiest thing in an exploitative society '

for a person belonging to a socially ·Or economically dominant class

to exact.labour

or serivce from a person belonging to the deprived and vulnerable section pf the community by paying a negligible

amount of remuneration ·and thus escape the rigour of Article 23.

We do not think it would be right to place on the language of Article

23 an interpretation which would emasculate. its beneficent provi­

'sions and defeat the very purpose of enacting them. We are clear

of the view that Article 23 is intended to abolish every form of

forced" labour. The words "other similar forms of forced labour are

used

in Article 23 not with a view to importing the particular

charac­

teristic of 'begar' that labour or service should be exacted without

payment

of any remuneration but with a view to bringing within the

scope and ambit

of that Article all other forms of forced labour and

since 'begar'

is

o_ne form of forced labour, the Constitution makers

used the words "other similar ·forms of forced labour," If the

requirement that labour or work should be exacted Without any

_remuneration were imported in other forms of forced labour, they

would straightaway come

w.ithin !he meaning

of the word 'begar'

-~ and in that event there would be no need to have the additional

;....._

' '

'

, words "other similar forms of forced labour." These words would

-.. be rendered futile and meaningless and it is a well° recognised rule of

interpretation that the court should avoid a ·construction which as·

the effect of rendering any words used by.the legislature· superfluous

or redun.dent. The object of adding these words was clearly to expand

the reach and content

of Article 23 by including, in addition to

'begar', other forms

of forced labour within the prohibition of that

Article. Every form of forced labour 'begar' or otherwise, is within the

inhibition

of Article 23 and it

makes no difference whether the per-

A

c

D

F

•

G

H

B

O'

D

E

G

H

48~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1983) 1 S.C.R.

son who is forced to give his labour or service to another is remune­

rated or not. Even if remuneration is paid, labour supplied by a

person would

be hit by this Article if it is forced labour, that is,

labour supplied not willingly but as a result of force or compulsion.

Take for example a case where a person has entered into a contract

of service with another for a period of three years and he wishes

·to

discontinue serving such other person before the expiration of the

period of three years.

If a law

were to provide that in such· a case

' the contract shall be specifically enforced and he shall be compelled

to serve for the full period of three years, it would clearly amount to

forced labour and such a

law would be void as offending Article 23.

That

is why specific perfotmance of a contract of service cannot be.

enforced against an employee and the employee

ca1;1not be forced by

compulsion of law to continue to serve the employer. Of course, if

there is a breach of the contract of service, the employee would be

· liable to pay damages to the ·employer but he cannot be forced to

continue to serve the empioyer without breaching the injunction ·of

Article 23. This was precisely the. view taken by the Supreme Court

of United States

in Baily v. Alabama(') while dealing

witb•a similar

provision in the Thirteenth Amendment. There, a legislation enact­

ed by the Alabama State providing that when a person with intent

to injure or defraud his employer enters into a contract in writing

for the purpose of any service and obtains money or other property

from the employer and without refunding the money or the

p_roperty

refuses or fails to perform such service, he will be punished with

of fine. The constitutional validity of this legislation was

challenged on the gronnd that it violated

the Thirteenth Amendment

-which

inter a/ia provides :

"Neither slavery nor involuntar/servitude

shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their juris-

diction···. This challenge was upheld by.a majority of the Court and

Mr. Justice Hughes d~livering the majority opinion said :

"We cannot escape the conclusion that although the

statute in terms

is to punish fraud, still

iti; natural and

inevitable effect

is to expose to conviction for crime those

who simply fail or refuse to perform contracts for personal

service

in liquidation of

a debt, and judging its purpose by

its effect that it seeks in this way to provide the means of

compulsion tl~~ough which performance of such service may

(I) 219 U.S. 219 : 55 L. Ed. 191.

+

I

•

•

'

..

PllOPLB;S UNION v. UNION OF INl>IA (Bhagwati, J.). 489

be secured. The question is whether such a statute is

constitution_al".

The learned J:idge proceeded to explain the scope and ambit ,of the

expression 'involuntary servitude'

in

the following words :

"The. plain intention was to abolish slavery of whatever

name and form and all its badges arid incidents, to render

impossible any st~te of bondage ; to make labour free by

prohibiting that control by which the personal serviye of c-­

one men is disposed of or . coerced for another's benefit,

which is the essence of involuntary servitude." .

Then, dealing with the contention that the employee in that case had.

voluntarily contracted tO' perform the service wpich was sought to be/

compelled and there was therefore no violation· of the provisions of

the Thirteenth Amendment, the .learned Judge observed :

"The fact that . the debtor contracted to perform the

. labour which is sought to be compelied does not withdraw

the attempted enforcement from the condemnation of the

statute. The full intent

of ihe constitutional provision'Could

be defeated with obvious facility if through the

guise 'of

. contracts under· which advances had been made, debtors.

could

be held to compulsory service. It

i~ the compulsion

of the service that the statute inhibits; for when that occurs,

the condition

of servitute is created which

would: be not less

involuntary because of the original agreement to ·work out

the indebtedness. The . contract exposes the debtor to

liability for the loss due to the breach, but not to enforced

18.bour."·

'-· and proceeded to ehiborate ibis thesis by pointing out :

' "Peonage is sometimes classified as voluntary or 'invo-·

luntary, but this implies simply a difference in~ the mode of

origin, but-none in the character of the servitude. The one

"exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the

- ,

service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the

debtor by

some. provision of 'law. But peonage however

created,

is compulsory service, involuntary servitude.

·The

· peon can release himself therefrom, it is true, by 'the pay-

A

B

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

0

E

G

490 StJPltEMI! COUllt Rl!POlltS [1983] 1 s.c.R.

ment of the debt, but otherwise the service is enforced. A

clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary

performance of Jabour or rendering of services

in payment

of a debt. In the latter case the debtor though contracting

to· pay his indebtedness by labour of service, and subject·

like any other contractor to an action for damages for.

breach of that contract, can elect at any time to·break it,

and

no law or force compels performance or a continuance

of the

service." ·

It is therefore clear that even if a person has contracted with another

to perform service and there

is consideration for such service in the

shape

of liquidation of debt or even remuneration, he cannot be

forced

by compulsion of law or otherwise to continue to perform such

service,

as that would be forced labour within the

inhil;>itian of.

Article 23c -·This Article strikes at every form of forced labour. even

if it has its origin in a contract voluntarily entered into by the person

obligated to provide Jabour or service Vide Pollock v. Williams.(')

The reason is that it offends against human dignity to compel a

person to provide labour or service to another if

he does. not ,wish to

do so,

e~n, though it be in breach of the contract en_tered into by

him. There should

be

·DO serfdom or involuntary servitude in a free

democratic India which respects the dignity

of tbe individual and the

worth of the human person. Moreover,

in a country like India

·where there is so much poverty and unemployment and there is no·

equality of bargaining power, a contract of service may appear on

its face voluntary but it may,

in reality, be involuntary, because

while entering into the contract, the employee,

by reason of his

economically helpless condition, may have been faced-with Robson's

choice, either to starve or to submit to the exploitative terms dictated

by the powerful employer.

It would be a travesty of justice to hold

. th~ employee in_ such a case to·the terms of the contract and to

compel

him to serve ihe employer even though he may not wish to

do so. That would aggravate the inequality and injustice from which

the employee

eve_n otherwise suffers on account of his economically

disadvantaged position and leild the authority of

law to the

exploi­

tation of the poor helpless employee by the economically powerful

employer. Article 23 therefore says that no one shall be ·forced to

ff (I) 322 U.S. 4:88 Lawyers Edition 1095.

..

•

. PEOPLE'S UNION v._ UNION «:F INDIA (Bhagwatl, J.) 491

provide labour or service against his will, even though it be :under _a

=ontract of service.

Now the next question that arises for consideration is whether

there

is any breach of Article 23 when a person .provides labour or

service to the

State or to any other person and is paid less than the

minimum

wage for it.

· It is' obvious that ordinarily no one would

willingly supply labour or service to another for

less than the

mini·

mum ·wage, when he knows that under the law he is entitled to get

-minimum wage for the ·Jabour or service provided by him. It may

therefore

be

-legitimately presumed· that when a person provides

labour or service to another against receipt

of remuneration which is

less than the minimum wage, he is acting under the force of some

compuision which

drives him to work though he is paid Jess than

what

he is entitled

ui\der law to receive. What Article 23 prohibits

is 'forced labour' that is labour or service which a person-is forced

to provide and 'force' which would make such labour or service

'forced labour' may arise

in several .ways. It may he physical

force which may compel.a person to provide

labour-or service to

another or it may pe force exerted through '! legal provision such

as a· provision for imprisonment or fine in case the employee fails

.to provide labour or service or it may even be_ compulsion arising

from hunger and poverty, want and destitution. Any factor which

deprives a person

of a choice

of alternatives and compels him .to

adopt one particular course of action may properiy be regarded as

'force' and

if labour or service is compelled as a result of such

'force', it would

we 'forced labour'. Where a person is suffering

from hunger

or starvation, when he bas no resources at

ail to fight

disease or

fe_ed bis wife and children or even to hide their nakedness,

where utter grinding poverty bas broken his

·back and reduced him

to a state of helplessness and ·deSPair and where no· other employ­

ment is available to alleviate the rigour of his poverty, he would

have no choice but to acceept .any work that comes hims way, even

if the remuneration offered to

him is less than the !Ilinimum

wage.·

He would be in no position to bargain with the employer; he would

have

to accept what is offered to him. And in doing so he would be

acting not

_;is a free agent with a choice between alternatives but

J!Dder the cpmpulsion of economic circumstances and the Jabour or

service provided

by him would be clearly 'forced Jabour.' There is

no reason why the word 'forced' should be read in a narrow and

A

I

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

492 SUPREM~ COURT lti!PORl'S (1983) 1 s.c.ll.

.restricted manner so. as to be confined only to physical or legal

'force' particularly when the national charter, its fundamental

document has promised to build a

new soc.ialist republic where there

will be socio-economic justice for all and every one shall have the

right to work, to education and to adequate means of livelihood.

The constitution makers have

given us one of the

most remarkable

,documents in history for ushering in a new socio-economic order

and the .Constitution w bich they have forged for

us has a social

purpose and an economic mission and therefore every word or

phrase

in the Constitl!tion must be interpreted in a manner which

would advance the socio-economic objective

of the Constituti0 n. It

is ncit unoften that

in· capitalist society economic circumstance exert

'

much greater pressure on an individual in driving him to a particular

course

of action than physical compulsion or force of legislative

provision. The word 'force'. must

therefore-be construted to i!Jclude

not only physical or legal force but also force arising from the

compulsion

of economic circumstance which leaves no choice

of

alternatives to a person in want and compels him to provide Jabour

or service

even though the remuneration received for it is less than . the minimuni wage of course, if.a P.,rson provides labour or service

to another against receipt

of the minimum wage, 'it would

not be

possible to say that the labour or service provided by ])im is 'forced

. Jabour' because he gets what he is entitled under law to receive.

No inference can reasonably

be drawn in

. such a case that ·he is

forced to. provide labour or service for the simple ~eason that he

would be providing labour or service against receipt of what is

lawfully payable to

him just like any other person who is

not under

the force

of any compulsion. We are therefore of the v,iew that

where

a·person provides labour or ser:vice to another for remunera­

tion which is less than the minimum wage, the labour or service

provided

by him cleariy fafls within the

;scope and ambit of the

words 'forced labour' under Article 23. Such a person would be

entitled to come to the court for enforcement of his fundamental

right tinder Article 23 by asking the· court io direct payment of the

minimum

wage to him so that the labour or service provided by him ceases to be 'forced labour' and the breach of Article 23 is remedied.

It is' therefote clear that when the petitioners alleged that minimum

wage was not paid

t.o the workmen employed by the contractors, the

complaint

was really in effect and substance a

compl!lint against

violation of the fundamental

r.ight of the workmen under

Article

23.

.•

\.

•

..

•

PEOPLE'S UNION V, UNION OF.INntA (8hagwati, !.) 493

Before leaving this subject, We may point out with all the

emphasis tit our command. that whenever any fundamental right,

which is enforceable against private individuals such as, for example·

a fundamental right enacted in Article 17 or 23 or -24 is being

violated; it is the constitutional obligation of the State to take the

· necessary steps for the purpose ·of' ,interdicting such violatioQ and

ensuring observance of tbe·fundameotal ·right by the private .iodivi·

dual who is transgressing the. same. Of course, the person whose

fundamental right

is violated can always approach the

court-for the

purpose

of

~nforcemeot of his fundamental right, but that cannot

absolve the State from its constitutional obligation to

see that there

.

is

no violation of the fundamental righL,.of such person,· particularly·

ivheo he belongs to the weaker section humanity 'and is unable to

, wage a legal 'battle against a strong .and powerful opponent who. is

. exploiting him. The Union of India, the Delhi AdmioistratiOn and

the Delhi Development Authority must therefore

be held to be under

an

obligatioo'fo ensure <;>bservance of these various labour laws·by

the contractors and if the provisions ·Of any of these labour laws are

violated

by the contractors, the petitioners indicating the cause of

the workmen are entitled to enforce this obligation against the Union of India, the Delhi Administration and the Delhi Develop­

ment Authority by· filing the present writ petition. The preliminary

objections urged on behalf

of the respondents must. accordingly be

rejected.

Having disposed

of these preliminary objections, we may

tnm· •

to consider whether there was any violation of the provisions of the

Minimum Wages Act

1948, Article 24 of the Constitution, the

Equal Remuneration Act

1976, the Contract labour (Regulation

and Abolition) Act

1970 and 'the Inter State Migrant, Workmen

(Regulation

of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act

·1979

by the contractors. The Union !Jf India in its affidavit in reply

·admitted that there were. certain.violations, committed by the contra·

ctors but hastened to add that for these violations prosecutions were

initiated against the errant contractors and no •violation of any of

the labour

.laws was allowed

togo unpunished. The Union of India

'also conceeded

in its affidavit in reply that Re.

I/· per worker per ·day

was deducted by the jamadars from the wa:ge payable to the workers

with the result that the workers did not -get the minimum wage of

Rs.

9.25 per day, but stated that proceedings had been taken for

the purpose

of recovering the amount of the

snort fall in minimum

wage from the contractors. No particular~ were however S;ven of

1

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

•

494

'

SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1983) I !.C.R.

such . proceedings adopted by/ the Union of India or the Delhi

Administration

or the Delhi

DevClopment Authority. It was for this

reason

that we

directed by our order dated 11th ·May 1982 that

whatever is the minimum . wage for the time being or if the wage

payable is higher than· such wage, shall be paid by the contractors

to the workmen directly without the intervention of the jamadars and

that the jamadars shall not be entitied to· deduct or recover any amount ·

from the minimum wage payable to the workmen as and by way of

commission or otherwise. He would als.o direct in additio.n that if the

.. Union of India or the Delhi Administration or the Delhi Develop·

ment Authority finds and for !his purpose it may hold such i.nquiry

as is possible in

the circumstances that any

·of the workmen has not

received the minimum wage payable to him, it •.hall take the .J

necessary legal action against the contractrs. whether by way of__,

proesC1,1tion or by way of recovery of the amount of the short-fall. , ·

We would also suggest. that ,hereafter whenever any contracts are

given . by. the. government' or any other. governmental authority

including a public sector corporation, it should be ·ensured by intro·

. D ... · ducing a suitable provision in the contracts that wage shall be.paid ·

by the contractors to the workmen directly without the intervention

of any jamadars or, thekadars and th.at the contractors shall ensure

.that no· amount by ·way of commission or otherwise is deducted or

. , recovered by the Jamadars from the wage of the workmen. So far as

E

F

G

•

H

· observallce of the other labour laws by the contractors is concerned,

· the Union of India, the' Del hf Administration and the Delhi Develop·

meut Authority disputed the claim of the. petitioners that the provi·

sions of these labour laws wel'ci not being implemented . by the

contractOrs save in _a -few instances where prosecutions bad _been

launched agai11st the contractors. Since it would not be possible

for this Court . to take evidence for ·the purpose of deciding this

factual dispute between_ the parties

and

·we also wanted to ensure

.

that in any event the provisions of these various laws enacted for the ·benefit of the workmen were strictly observed and implemented by

the contractors, we by ciur

order

dated 11th· May 1982 appointed ,

· three Ombudsmen and requested them to make periodical inspectio~s

· of the .sites of the construction work: for the purpose of ascertaining

whether

the provisions of these labour laws were being carried

out.

and the. workers were receiving the benefits and amenities provided

for them ·under these beneficient statutes or . whether the"re were ariy

. violations of. these provisions being committed by tile contractors ·so

· that on the basis of the reports of. the three, Ombudsmen, this Court

could give further direction in the matter if fo~nd necessary. We may

J

•

•

T

..

PEOPLE'S UNION v. UNION OF INDIA (Bhagwati, J.) 495

add that,whenever any construction work is being carried out either

departmentally or through contractors, the government or any other

-governmental authority including a public sector corporation which

is carrying out such work must take great care to see that the

provisions

of the labour laws are being strictly observed and they

should not wait for any

c,;mplaint to be received from the work~en

in regard to nonobservance of any such provision before proceeding

~.to• take action against the erring olllcers or contractor, but they ·

should institute an effective,system of periodic inspections .coupled

with occasional surprise inspe~tions by the higher officers in order

·to ensure that there are no violations of the, provisions of· labour

laws and the workmen are not denied the rights _and benefits to

which

they are entitled under such provisions ahd if any such

violations are found, immediate action should

be taken against

defaulting officers or contractors. That

is the .least which a

govern­

ment or a governmental authority or a public sector corpo~ation

·is expected to do in a social welfare state .

These are the reasons for which . we made our Order dated

1 Ith

May 1982.

S.R. Petition allowed.

'-..

B

c

D