*HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
+CRIMINAL PETITION NO.3775 OF 2024
%26.06.2024
#Between:
Pinnelli Ramakrishna Reddy,
S/o P. Venkateswara Reddy,
Aged about 54 years,
Occ: Member of Legislative Assembly,
Resident of Macherla, Palnadu District - 522426.
…… Petitioner / Accused No.1
$And:
State of Andhra Pradesh, rep., by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court at Hyderabad.
….Respondent/Complainant
!Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel
: Sri Rama Lakshmana Reddy Sanepalli, learned Counsel
^Counsel for the Respondent : Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned Special Counsel
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. (2011) 1 SCC 694
2. 2015 SAR (Criminal) 156
3. (2020) 5 S.C.C. 1
4. (2014) 8 SCC 273
5. (2023) 8 SCC 632
6. (2021) 10 SCC 773
7. 2012(3) MPLJ
8. 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 82
9. 2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 274
This Court made the following:
2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
***
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.3775 OF 2024
Between:
Pinnelli Ramakrishna Reddy,
S/o P. Venkateswara Reddy,
Aged about 54 years,
Occ: Member of Legislative Assembly,
Resident of Macherla, Palnadu District - 522426.
…… Petitioner / Accused No.1
$And:
State of Andhra Pradesh, rep., by its Public
Prosecutor, High Court at Hyderabad.
….Respondent/Complainant
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 26.06.2024
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may
be allowed to see the Judgments? Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of order may be marked
to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair
copy of the order? Yes/No
_____________________________
JUSTICE T.MALLIKARJUNA RAO
APHC010243192024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF JUNE
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3775/2024
Between:
Pinnelli Ramakrishna Reddy,
The State Of Andhra Pradesh
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
1. RAMALAKSHMANA REDDY SANEPALLI
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
1. N ASHWANI KUMAR
2. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)
The Court made the following ORDER:
1. The petitioner/A. 1 has filed the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seek
No.48 of 2024, registered at the
District.
2. A case has been registered against the Petitioner and others for the
offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 448, 427, 353, 452, 120
Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC) read with Section 149 of IPC and Section 3 of
3
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF JUNE
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 3775/2024
Pinnelli Ramakrishna Reddy, ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
AND
The State Of Andhra Pradesh ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:
RAMALAKSHMANA REDDY SANEPALLI
Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)
The Court made the following ORDER:
The petitioner/A. 1 has filed the Criminal Petition, as per Section 438 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking anticipatory bail concerning Crime
, registered at the Rentachinthala Police Station
A case has been registered against the Petitioner and others for the
offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 448, 427, 353, 452, 120
Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC) read with Section 149 of IPC and Section 3 of
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
[3369]
WEDNESDAY, THE TWENTY SIXTH DAY OF JUNE
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
...PETITIONER/ACCUSED
...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT
Criminal Petition, as per Section 438 of the
anticipatory bail concerning Crime
Police Station of Palnadu
A case has been registered against the Petitioner and others for the
offences punishable under Section 143, 147, 448, 427, 353, 452, 120-B of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC) read with Section 149 of IPC and Section 3 of
4
Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ("PDPP Act") and Section
131 and 135 of The Representation of the People Act, 1951 ("R.P. Act").
3. In brief, the prosecution case is that on 13.05.2024, around 12:30 PM, at
Paluvaigate Village, Rentachintala Mandal, Palnadu District, unidentified
individuals entered Polling Booth Station No. 202 and vandalized an EVM
(Electronic Voting Machine) and VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail)
machine before fleeing the scene. Following this incident, on 22.05.2024, a
Memo was submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Police, Rentachintala Police
Station, to the Junior Civil Judge's Court, Gurazala. The Memo alleged that on
13.05.2024, A.1, A.2 and A.3 unlawfully entered Polling Station No. 202. They
damaged the VVPAT machine, considered election equipment and government
property. Before damaging the equipment, the accused engaged in a physical
altercation with their adversaries at the polling station.
4. The learned counsel representing the Petitioner/A.1, argues that the
Station House Officer, Rentachintala Police Station, filed a Memo nine days after
the alleged incident, in which the Petitioner and two others were named as
accused under several sections of the law. The learned counsel contends that
opposition leaders orchestrated this delay to tarnish the Petitioner's reputation
and implicate him in an electoral offence. It is alleged that the Investigation
Officer was influenced to implicate the Petitioner unfairly. Furthermore, the
learned counsel asserts that the Petitioner has filed a complaint against the
Police Official involved, claiming that the allegations against him were concocted
through deliberations and discussions. The filing of the Memo before the Court
was characterized as belated and part of a design to keep the Petitioner away
from the counting process and hinder his ability to appoint election agents. The
learned counsel further contends that since the offences in question carry
punishments below seven years, the procedures outlined in Section 41-A of the
Cr.P.C., which deal with arrest procedures, should have been strictly followed.
5
Learned counsel emphasizes that the actions of the opposition party and the
police indicate a clear intent to arrest the Petitioner, which would result in
irreparable harm and injury to him.
5. The Respondent-State has submitted a counter, refuting all the allegations
presented in the Petition. The contentions outlined in the Counter need not be
reiterated, as they essentially mirror the report's content dated 13.05.2024.
Additionally, the Counter asserts that the Petitioner holds the position of a
Member of the Legislative Assembly and is currently contesting as an MLA
candidate for the Macherla Assembly Constituency. It alleges that the Petitioner
has been involved in violent activities and is the primary accused in the present
case. Additionally, the Petitioner is claimed to command a group of ruthless
associates. If he remains free to move publicly under these circumstances, it
could jeopardize the lives of innocent people and create widespread panic in the
villages. Moreover, the Counter asserts that the Petitioner is involved in 12
cases, indicating a pattern of alleged criminal behaviour.
6. Heard Sri T. Niranjan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel representing Sri
Rama Lakshmana Reddy Sanepalli, learned counsel, for the Petitioner/A.1, and
Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, learned Special counsel, representing the Respondent-
State (vide G.O.Rt.No.577, dt.12.06.2024). Both sides reiterated their
submissions on par with the contentions presented in the petition and Counter.
Consequently, the contentions raised by learned counsel need not be
reproduced.
7. In the common order of I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.Nos.3788, 3789, 3790 of
2024 and I.A.No.1 of 2024 in Crl.P.No.3775 of 2024, this Court granted interim
protection to the Petitioner, ensuring no coercive steps and no arrest until
06.06.2024 under specified conditions. Dissatisfied with the Court’s order in
Crl.P.Nos.3775 and 3788 of 2024, a Special Leave Petition (criminal) Diary
No(s).25204 of 2024 and 25512 of 2024 were filed before the Hon’ble Apex
6
Court. After hearing arguments from the learned counsel representing both
parties, the Hon’ble Apex Court passed an order prohibiting the Petitioner from
entering the counting station at Macherla Assembly Constituency on 04.04.2024.
Additionally, the Hon’ble Apex Court requested this Court to expeditiously
dispose of the pending petitions based solely on their merits, without being
uninfluenced by the Apex Court’s order.
8. The parameters for granting anticipatory bail have been succinctly laid
down in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre V. State of Maharashtra
1
, wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as follows:
“112. The following factors and parameters can be taken into consideration
while dealing with anticipatory bail:
“(i) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the accused
must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;
(ii) The antecedents of the applicant, including the fact as to whether the
accused has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court
in respect of any cognizable offence;
(iii) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;
(iv) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or other
offences;
(v) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of injuring or
humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;
(vi) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail, particularly in cases of large
magnitude affecting a very large number of people;
(vii) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the
accused very carefully. The Court must also clearly comprehend the exact
role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the accused is
implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the Penal Code, 1860,
the Court should consider with even more excellent care and caution
because over-implication in the cases is a matter of common knowledge
and concern;
(viii) While considering the prayer for the grant of anticipatory bail, a balance
has to be struck between two factors, namely, no prejudice should be
caused to the free, fair and full investigation, and there should be
1
(2011) 1 SCC 694
7
prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the
accused;
(ix) The Court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the
witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;
(x) Frivolity in Prosecution should always be considered; it is only the element
of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of
bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of
the Prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to
an order of bail."
9. In Rakesh Baban Borhade V. State of Maharashtra and another
2
, the
Hon’ble Apex Court observed that;
“Anticipatory bail not to be granted as a matter of rule but should be granted
only when a case is made out and the Court is convinced that the accused
would not misuse his liberty”.
10. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Sushila Aggarwal V. State (N.C.T. of Delhi)
3
, wherein it held that:
91.1. ………….. it should enure in favour of the accused without any
restriction on time. Normal conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section
438(2) should be imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to
any offence, it is open for the court to impose any appropriate condition
(including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event), etc.
91.2. ………….. it is held that the life or duration of an anticipatory bail order
does not end normally at the time and stage when the accused is summoned
by the court, or when charges are framed, but can continue till the end of the
trial. Again, if there are any special or peculiar features necessitating the court
to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is open for it to do so.
11. As stated in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre (supra), the nature and gravity
of the accusation and the exact role of the accused are the prime factors that
must be considered while granting or refusing to grant anticipatory bail to the
accused. The Prosecution has submitted a pen drive containing pertinent
2
2015 SAR (Criminal) 156
3
(2020) 5 S.C.C. 1
8
evidence related to the alleged offence and statements from witnesses gathered
during the investigative process. In response, the learned counsel representing
the Petitioner has raised objections regarding the authenticity and admissibility of
the video clippings, citing the Prosecution's failure to clarify its source. Notably, it
appears that the Election Commission of India has not disputed the authenticity
of the visuals depicted in the video footage. At present, the matter remains in the
investigative phase. Upon review of the CCTV footage, which spans 24 hours,
this Court initially finds it unlikely that such videos could have been fabricated.
Even otherwise, the statements recorded during the investigation also show that
the alleged conduct of the Petitioner, an MLA, during the polling process is
unacceptable. Prima facie the act of entering into a polling booth with others and
trying to the electronic voting machine is a blatant assault on the democratic
process. Such attributed behaviour, especially from a public representative,
undermines public trust in electoral system. The Petitioner has served as a MLA,
since 2009. He contested as an MLA, Macherla Assembly Constituency from
YSR Congress party during the General Elections 2024. There is a prima facie
indication that the Petitioner and others entered a polling station and that
Petitioner specifically damaged a VVPAT (Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail)
machine, crucial election equipment. When the polling agent attempted to resist
such actions, the Petitioner appeared to make threatening gestures. This Court
views that those entrusted with public office are expected to uphold exemplary
standards of conduct. Regrettably, the actions attributed to the Petitioner are
perceived to have fallen short of these expectations. When these accusations
are made against the Petitioner, and if the Court grants anticipatory bail, there is
a significant possibility of recurrence of such events. It could also send a wrong
signal to the public, suggesting that the Court is overly liberal in granting
anticipatory bail, even in the face of a blatant attack against the electoral system.
It is crucial to ensure that the judicial process does not appear
9
to condone or tolerate such grave alleged misconduct, as it would erode public
confidence in the justice system and the democratic process.
12. The Petitioner contends that as a contestant for MLA in the Macherla
Constituency, he has raised objections regarding the biased conduct of police
officers. He asserts that the allegations against him have been fabricated with
malicious intent.
13. As per the records, the crime was initially registered on 15.05.2024, at 2:30
PM, while the incident occurred at 12:30 PM on 13.05.2024. A memo was filed
identifying the Petitioner as the accused in this crime. The alleged offence
occurred within a polling booth, where it is claimed that the Petitioner entered
and committed the act. It is noted that polling officers, agents representing
various parties, and police personnel stationed at the booth were expected to
recognize the Petitioner upon entry. It is implied that without such recognition, his
entry would have been challenged. Despite this awareness of the Petitioner's
identity among polling staff, the report lodged on 15.03.2024, did not initially
name the Petitioner as an accused MLA, despite the incident occurring on
13.05.2024. A prudent person might assess the rationale behind withholding the
Petitioner's name as an accused in the initial report.
14. In this case, this Court does not find it appropriate to give significant weight
to the delay in naming the Petitioner as an accused in the report nor to the timing
of the report itself. These factors do not provide any advantage to the Petitioner's
case. Moreover, the Petition does not extend to assessing the Election
Commissioner of India's authority to issue directives for the Petitioner's arrest in
the specific circumstances presented. If the Petitioner intends to contest the
validity of such a directive, he should have pursued legal remedies according to
the established procedures. Under no circumstances can the Election
Commissioner's directive be considered a favourable basis for granting
anticipatory bail to the Petitioner.
10
15. The learned counsel representing the Petitioner argues that all the
offences for which the FIR was initially registered and subsequently added under
a memo filed on 22.05.2024, carry punishments below seven years,
necessitating strict adherence to the procedures outlined in Section 41A of
Cr.P.C. According to the learned counsel, the Station House Officer has
disregarded the guidelines set forth by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
Arnesh Kumar V. The State of Bihar
4
by actively pursuing the Petitioner's
arrest.
16. The learned counsel for the Petitioner relied on the decision of the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Mohd. Asfak Alam V. State of Jharkhand
5
, wherein a reference
was made to Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar (supra) and observed as follows:
“11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not
arrest the accused unnecessarily and Magistrates do not authorise detention
casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above,
we give the following directions:
11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to
automatically arrest when a case under Section 498-AIPC is registered but to
satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid
down above flowing from Section 41CrPC;
11.2. All police officers be provided with a checklist containing specified sub-
clauses under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
11.3. The police officer shall forward the checklist duly filled and furnish the
reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while
forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
11.4. The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse
the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after
recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate
within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the
Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the
district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
4
(2014) 8 SCC 273
5
(2023) 8 SCC 632
11
11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-ACrPC be served on the
accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may
be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district for the reasons to
be recorded in writing;
11.7. Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering
the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be
liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before the High
Court having territorial jurisdiction.
11.8. Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the
Judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the
appropriate High Court.
12. We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the
cases under Section 498-AIPC or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the
case in hand, but also such cases where offence is punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may
extend to seven years, whether with or without fine.”
17. The learned counsel for the Petitioner further relied on the decision in
Arnesh kumar V. State of Bihar (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Court observed
that:
5. Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts scars forever.
Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle between the
lawmakers and the police and it seems that the police has not learnt its
lesson : the lesson implicit and embodied in CrPC. It has not come out of its
colonial image despite six decades of Independence, it is largely considered
as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of
public. The need for caution in exercising the drastic power of arrest has been
emphasised time and again by the courts but has not yielded desired result.
Power to arrest greatly contributes to its arrogance so also the failure of the
Magistracy to check it. Not only this, the power of arrest is one of the lucrative
sources of police corruption. The attitude to arrest first and then proceed with
the rest is despicable. It has become a handy tool to the police officers who
lack sensitivity or act with oblique motive.
6………………no arrest should be made only because the offence is non-
bailable and cognizable and therefore, lawful for the police officers to do so.
The existence of the power to arrest is one thing, the justification for the
exercise of it is quite another. Apart from the power to arrest, the police
officers must be able to justify the reasons thereof. No arrest can be made in
a routine manner on a mere allegation of commission of an offence made
12
against a person. It would be prudent and wise for a police officer that no
arrest is made without a reasonable satisfaction reached after some
investigation as to the genuineness of the allegation………………….
7.1. …………..it is evident that a person accused of an offence punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which
may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the
police officer only on his satisfaction that such person had committed the
offence punishable as aforesaid. A police officer before arrest, in such cases
has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such
person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the
case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to
disappear; or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such
person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to
dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the court or the police officer; or
unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever
required cannot be ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach
based on facts.
7.3. In pith and core, the police officer before arrest must put a question to
himself, why arrest? Is it really required? What purpose it will serve? What
object it will achieve? It is only after these questions are addressed and one
or the other conditions as enumerated above is satisfied, the power of arrest
needs to be exercised. In fine, before arrest first the police officers should
have reason to believe on the basis of information and material that the
accused has committed the offence. Apart from this, the police officer has to
be satisfied further that the arrest is necessary for one or the more purposes
envisaged by sub-clauses (a) to (e) of clause (1) of Section 41 CrPC.
9. Another provision i.e. Section 41-A CrPC aimed to avoid unnecessary
arrest or threat of arrest looming large on the accused requires to be vitalised.
Section 41-A as inserted by Section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Amendment) Act, 2008 (5 of 2009), which is relevant in the context reads as
follows:
“41-A. Notice of appearance before police officer.—(1) The police officer
shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 41, issue a notice directing the person
against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information
has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a
cognizable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be
specified in the notice.
(2) Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that
person to comply with the terms of the notice.
13
(3) Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he
shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless,
for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to
be arrested.
(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the
notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such
orders as may have been passed by a competent court in this behalf, arrest
him for the offence mentioned in the notice.”
The aforesaid provision makes it clear that in all cases where the arrest of a
person is not required under Section 41(1) CrPC, the police officer is required
to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified place
and time. Law obliges such an accused to appear before the police officer
and it further mandates that if such an accused complies with the terms of
notice he shall not be arrested, unless for reasons to be recorded, the police
officer is of the opinion that the arrest is necessary. At this stage also, the
condition precedent for arrest as envisaged under Section 41 CrPC has to be
complied and shall be subject to the same scrutiny by the Magistrate as
aforesaid.
18. In Satender Kumar Antil V. CBI
6
, while giving certain guidelines to
consider the bail applications, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that:
5. ….........The caveat which has been put by the learned ASG is that where the
accused have not cooperated in the investigation nor appeared before the
investigating officers, nor answered summons when the court feels that judicial
custody of the accused is necessary for the completion of the trial, where
further investigation including a possible recovery is needed, the aforesaid
approach cannot give them benefit, something we agree with.
19. The learned Public Prosecutor, representing Respondent-State asserts
that the procedural guidelines outlined in Section 41A of Cr.P.C., cannot be
mandated as compulsory. He argues that it is within the discretion of police
authorities to determine whether to adhere to Section 41A of Cr.P.C., or proceed
under Section 41(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. Furthermore, he contends that issuing
directives to enforce specific procedural steps would infringe upon the autonomy
6
(2021) 10 SCC 773
14
of police officers in conducting their investigations. According to him, such
directives would amount to undue interference in the investigative process. He
emphasizes that the Court should exercise restraint and refrain from dictating
operational procedures to law enforcement agencies.
20. While considering the similar submissions in W.P. No.3848 of 2020, this
Court passed an order dated 28.04.2020, observing that even in the case of
Arnesh Kumar (3 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has spelt out how
the Power under Section 41 (1) (b) and 41-A of Cr.P.C. are to be exercised. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, after considering Section 41 (1) Cr.P.C., noted
that in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required, the Police Officer
should issue a notice directing the accused to appear before him at a specified
place and time. This Court concurs with the submission of the learned
Government Pleader that the discretion to arrest or not to arrest a person and,
after that, to follow Section 41-A of Cr.P.C. is solely vested in the Investigating
Officer. This Court cannot compel the police to act based on 41-A Cr.P.C. as a
matter of right. In this Court's opinion, the discretion should be left to the officer
concerned to arrest or not to arrest.
21. In consideration of the preceding arguments and established case law, the
fact that the offences prima facie alleged against the Petitioner carry
punishments of seven years or less under the law does not automatically entitle
the Petitioner to a notice under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. The decision whether to
follow the procedure outlined in Section 41A or to proceed with immediate arrest
under Section 41(1)(b) of Cr.P.C., rests solely within the discretion of the
investigating officer. It is well-settled that the authority to arrest or refrain from
arresting an accused person lies with the investigating officer, however, he must
exercise this discretion judiciously. Therefore, the decision to issue a notice
under Section 41A of Cr.P.C., is a matter for the investigating officer to determine
based on the circumstances of the case.
15
22. A perusal of the parameters for granting anticipatory bail laid down by the
Hon'ble Apex Court shows that the Court must consider the seriousness of the
offence, the likelihood of the Petitioner's absconding from justice, the
antecedents of the accused and chances of the Petitioner tampering with
evidence or threatening the witnesses.
23. The learned counsel representing the Respondent-State asserts that the
Petitioner is a habitual offender involved in 11 cases, including two similar
offences. The Prosecution has provided details of these cases, which are
outlined below:
Sl.
No.
Crime Number Offences Police Station
1. Cr. No.64 of 2009 341, 324, 506 r/w 34 of IPC Rentachintala
2. Cr. No.78 of 2014 147, 148, 324, 506 r/w 149 of IPC Veldurthy
3. Cr. No.34 of 2017
147, 148, 324, 302 r/w 149, 120B of
IPC
Veldurthy
4. Cr.No.97 of 2014 188, 341, 283 of IPC Karempudi
5. Cr. No.75 of 2014
147, 148, 307, 324, 354, 427 r/w
149 of IPC, Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST
(POA) Act & Section 3 of E.S. Act
Machavaram
6. Cr. No.252 of 2015 143, 341, 188 r/w 149 of IPC Macherla Town
7. Cr. No.125 of 2018
147, 148, 427, 307 r/w 149, 188 of
IPC, section 32 of P.A. Act, 1861,
section 132(1) of R.P.Act
Macherla Town
8. Cr. No.92 of 2019
143, 188 of IPC, Section 32 of P.A.
Act, 1861, section 131(1)(A) of
R.P.Act
Macherla Town
9. Cr.No.331 of 2018 143, 341, 188 r/w 149 of IPC Gurazala Town
10.
Cr. No.52 of 2024
506, 509 of IPC & Section 131 (2) of
R.P.Act
Rentachintala
11. Cr. No.53 of 2024
143, 147, 148, 307, 324 r/w 149 of
IPC and section 131(2) of R.P.Act
Rentachintala
24. As per the G.O.Rt.No.577 Home (Courts.A) Department, dt.12.06.2024,
the Andhra Pradesh State Government has appointed Sri N. Ashwani Kumar,
learned counsel as Special Counsel to appear before the High Court in certain
16
cases of Macherla Assembly Constituency incidents involving the serious and
grave violation of Model Code of Conduct. The learned Senior Counsel
representing the Petitioner made submissions regarding the appointment of
Special Counsel in this case. It is not the Petitioner’s case that the Government is
not empowered to appoint Special Counsel on behalf Defacto Complainant/State.
25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on a decision reported in
Paras Kumar Jain and another vs. State of M.P. and others
7
, wherein the
Madhya Pradesh High Court, observed in Para 16, which reads as under:
“16. Thus the position in law is settled that while appointing a Special
Public Prosecutor the State is required to apply its mind on the relevant
aspects of the matter and see that only a fair and impartial advocate is
appointed as Special Public Prosecutor. If an advocate has appeared on
behalf of the complainant in earlier proceedings, then this aspect needs
consideration by the State while appointing him as Special Public
Prosecutor. The appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor cannot be
made in a mechanical manner on mere asking by the complainant. It is
the responsibility of the State to ensure the fair trial and see that the
advocate appointed as Special Public Prosecutor, acts in non prejudicial
manner.”
26. The learned Special Counsel for the Respondent, relied on a decision
reported in Sri Omprakash Baheti and others vs. The State of Maharashtra
8
,
wherein the High Court of Bombay held that:
“18. xxx The records disclose that there has been application of mind by
respondent no. 1 before appointing Advocate Gupta as Special Public
Prosecutor and therefore, it cannot be said that respondent no. 1 has
appointed Advocate Gupta as Special Public Prosecutor mechanically at
the request of the complainant.”
27. The petitioner does not argue that the State Government failed to follow
proper procedures when appointing Sri N. Ashwani Kumar, as Special Counsel,
nor has the petitioner challenged these proceedings. Furthermore, the petitioner
7
2012(3) MPLJ
8
2006 SCC OnLine Bom 82
17
does not claim that the appointment of Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel
has caused any prejudice to him.
28. In light of these facts, this Court finds that the petitioner's submission
regarding the appointment of Sri N. Ashwani Kumar as Special Counsel is not
significantly relevant to the disposal of the current application.
29. The learned counsel for the Petitioner argues that custodial interrogation is
unnecessary, citing the Prosecution's assertion that it has gathered all pertinent
evidence demonstrating the Petitioner's involvement in the offence. Furthermore,
the Prosecution has not argued for the necessity of the Petitioner's custodial
interrogation.
30. In Ashok Kumar V. State of Union Territory Chandigarh
9
, the Hon’ble
Apex Court held that:
12. There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of the
effective modes of investigating the alleged crime. It is equally true that
just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also
not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences
are of a severe nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State
while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is
required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate
more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is
required for investigation.
31. This Court views that the investigating officer deserves a free hand to take
the investigation to its logical conclusion in a case containing severe allegations.
32. With regard to the Prosecution's case, the investigation remains
incomplete. Granting anticipatory bail to the Petitioner could potentially hinder the
ongoing investigation. There is a concern regarding threats to witnesses, and a
prima facie case implicating the Petitioner in a serious offence exists. The
9
2024 S.C.C. OnLine SC 274
18
allegations are severe, and the investigating agency has not yet been able to
interrogate the Accused/Petitioner.
33. The established legal principle is that anticipatory bail is not granted as a
matter of routine; it should only be provided when the Court is convinced that
exceptional circumstances warrant such an extraordinary remedy.
34. The Prosecution is concerned that the Petitioner, having cultivated a
strong grassroots following across every village and town over his four
consecutive terms as MLA, poses a risk if released on bail as there is a severe
apprehension that he may influence his followers and associates to seek
retribution against the witnesses or the victim. Additionally, the Prosecution has
presented matters that the Petitioner allegedly assaulted Namburi Seshagiri Rao,
an agent of the TDP, in continuation of the incident in question, prompting the
filing of a criminal case against him.
35. The Petitioner is shown to be involved in multiple cases, making his
antecedents a crucial factor to consider when deciding on an application for
anticipatory bail. The investigation concerning the Petitioner is ongoing. Before
the Order was issued on 23.05.2024 in this Petition, the Petitioner evaded arrest,
raising concerns about his potential to threaten the complainant or tamper with
evidence.
36. Considering all the attending facts and circumstances of the case as well
as the gravity of the offence, as also the settled principle of law that power of
grant of bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C., is to be sparingly exercised in
extraordinary circumstances and thus, no such circumstances being having been
made out in this case, this Court does not find it a proper case for granting the
relief of anticipatory bail to the Petitioners/Accused.
37. As a result, the Petition is dismissed.
19
38. It is explicitly clarified that the observations made in this Order are
preliminary and pertain solely to the decision on the present application without
indicating a stance on the case's merits.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________
JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Date: 26.06.2024
MS / SAK
20
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO
Criminal Petition No.3775 of 2024
Date: 26.06.2024
MS
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