REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6900-6906 OF 2001

Pinninti Kistamma and Ors. …APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

Duvvada Parsuram Chowdary & Ors …RESPONDENT( s)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6907-6946 OF 2001

Duvvada Parasuram Chowdary & Ors …

APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

Bodasingi Rama Rao & Ors …RESPONDENT( s)

J U D G M E N T

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J..

1.These two batches of appeals are directed against the

judgment and decree dated 27

th

of March, 1997 passed by the

High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Second Appeal

Nos. 361 of 1996 & batch and Second Appeal Nos. 374 of 1996

& batch and also against the judgment and order dated 10

th

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of September, 1997 of the same High Court in Review Petition

Nos. 6980 of 1997 and batch whereby the High Court modified

its earlier order dated 27

th

of March, 1997.

2.The Appellants in CA Nos. 6900-6906 of 2001(hereinafter

called the ‘Tenants’), filed O.S. Nos. 43 of 1980 and batch (7

suits) claiming tenancy rights in respect of 19.80 Acres of land

in Kambirigam Village and also prayed for permanent

injunction restraining the Respondents in

C.A.Nos.6900-6906 of 2001, who are also the appellants in

C.A.Nos.6907-6946 of 2001 (hereinafter called as the

‘Landlords’) from interfering with their possession over the

said land. The Landlords also filed Cross Suits being OS Nos.

75/1980 and batch (13 suits) praying for injunction

restraining the Tenants from interfering with the peaceful

possession of an extent of land measuring 181 Acres which

also included the aforementioned 19.80 Acres.

3.The case of the Tenants in their suits was that the plaint

schedule lands formed a part of the pre-settlement un-

enfranchised Inams in Kambirigam Mokhasa in the erstwhile

Tarla Estate, Tekkali Taluk. They had been cultivating the

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plaint schedule land as tenants from time immemorial under

inamdars, predecessors-in-interest of Landlords by paying

Rajbhagam paddy to them. In 1804, the British Government

granted “Sannad” to the Tarla Estate wherein Kambirigam was

described as a Jagir which was an Estate within the meaning

of Section 3 of the Estate Land Act, 1908. However, no patta

was granted to the Landlords or their predecessors-in-interest.

Therefore, according to the tenants, the rights of the Landlords

in respect of the lands in question vested in the Government

by virtue of Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into

Raiyotwari Act of 1948. (for short ‘Estates Abolition Act’). The

tenants had complained to the Revenue Authorities alleging

that the Revenue records were manipulated by the Landlords.

Pursuant to this, Tehsildar, Palasa conducted an enquiry

wherein it was found that the Tenants and other raiyots were

occupants and cultivators in the Revenue Records for Fasli

1389. Being aggrieved by these orders, Landlords filed a Writ

petition, which came to be registered as W.P.No. 3189 of 1980

before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh claiming that they

were not given an opportunity to be heard in the enquiry

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conducted by the Tehsildar. Allowing the Writ Petition, the

High Court vide its order dated 24

th

of August, 1982 quashed

the order of the Tehsildar. However, the High Court had given

liberty to the Tehsildar to conduct a fresh enquiry after giving

due hearing to the parties. Accordingly, the Tehsildar Palasa,

conducted an enquiry again and passed an order dated 10

th

of

September, 1984, declaring the Tenants and others as

cultivators in Kambirigam village and further observed that

since the time of their ancestors, the Tenants and others had

been cultivating the lands in dispute separately and also

making payment to the Mokhasadars. This order was

confirmed by the Collector and Commissioner of Land

Revenue.

4.In the cross suits filed before the District Munsif, the

Landlords claimed to be the Mokhasadars of Kambirigam

Mokhasa. According to them, the Plaint Schedule Lands are

their absolute property which fell to their respective shares in

the family arrangement among their respective family

members inter se in or about the year 1945. Ever since such

arrangement, they had been in exclusive possession and

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enjoyment of their respective land as described in the schedule

of the plaint. According to the Landlords, Kambirigam village

did not fall within the ambit of Section 2(d) of the Estates

Abolition Act. No patta was granted to the Landlords because

the village was not surveyed.

5.By its judgment and order dated 21

st

of July, 1987, the

District Munsif, Palasa, decreed the suits filed by the Tenants

praying for an order of permanent injunction, restraining the

Landlords from interfering with their plaint schedule lands. By

a separate order, District Munsif dismissed the cross suits

filed by the Landlords praying for an order of injunction

against the Tenants.

6.Being aggrieved by the said judgment of the District

Munsif, Palasa dated 21

st

of July, 1987, the Landlords

preferred two sets of Appeals before the Principal Subordinate

Judge, Srikakulam. From the suits filed by the Tenants, i.e.

O.S. Nos. 75 of 1980 and batch the appeals were numbered as

A.S.No.12 of 1996 and batch (i.e. 13 appeals) and from the

suits filed by the Landlords, i.e. O.S Nos. 43 of 1980 and batch

the appeals were numbered as A.S. No. 11 of 1996 and batch

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(i.e. 7 appeals). The Principal Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam,

by two judgments dated 15

th

of April, 1996 delivered separate

judgments in 13 appeals (A.S No. 12 of 1996 and batch) and 7

appeals (A.S. No. 11 of 1996 and batch).

7.Disposing of the seven appeals in A.S.No.11/1996 and

batch, the Principal Subordinate Judge noted that before the

Trial Court, the plaintiffs and defendants in all seven suits,

had taken similar pleas. After narrating the contentions of

both the parties and examining the materials on record, the

first appellate court came to a finding of facts, inter alia, as

follows :

8.The tenants did not dispute the contentions of the

landlords that their ancestors became the landlords in respect

of the plaint schedule land. According to the tenants, their

ancestors were inducted into possession of separate bits of

plaint schedule lands by the ancestors of the landlords. The

said tenancy was alleged to have been continuing till the date

of filing of the suit. In an enquiry conducted by the Settlement

Officer on an application filed by one of the landlords to

determine whether Kamibirgam village was an Inam Estate or

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not, none of the tenants appeared before the Settlement

Officer. The said landlord had contended that he and his

ancestors owned almost all the land in the village, though they

let out a few bits of lands to some raiyots for seasonal

cultivation temporarily. Thus, by his order dated 29

th

of June,

1950, the Settlement Officer held that Kambirigam village was

not an Inam Estate. It was not the case of the tenants that

they had been inducted in possession of the plaint schedule

land after the order of the Settlement Officer. Admittedly, they

had no documents proving their possession. That the names of

the landlords were recorded in the revenue registers as

personal cultivators was also not denied. The contention that

since the tenants were not residents of Kambirigam village on

the date of the enquiry by the settlement officer, they could

not appear before him, could not be accepted. If numerous

tenants were put in possession of tiny bits of land measuring

300 Acres in respect of which the enquiry was conducted, at

least one of them would have come across the notices put up

announcing the enquiry. In a suit filed by the landlords before

the Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam for a declaration that

7

Kambirigam village was not an estate, a finding was recorded

that there were no tenants in the village. The Government

which was a party to the suit, did not dispute this. An appeal

preferred against the Order of the Subordinate Judge was

dismissed. Until 1976, when the tenants submitted

applications to the Sub Collector, Tekkali stating that they had

been cultivating the lands in Kambirigam Village, paying

‘Ambaram’ to the Mokhasadars, no case was ever made out by

the tenants that they had been tenants in Kambirigam village.

In 1977, one of the landlords filed a suit claiming similar relief

as in the present case against some of the tenants and the

tenants did not even contest the said suit. Admittedly, they

knew of the suit. The specious justification for not contesting

the suit was that they were under the impression that the suit

was compromised. This plea could not be accepted. In the

absence of any indication that there were tenants in the lands

of Kambirigam village till 1977, the mere allegation that the

names of the landlords were wrongly recorded in No.2

Adangal, could not be accepted. The Tehsildar, Palasa by his

order dated 18

th

of June, 1980 held that there were about 30

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tenants in Kambirigam village but such an order was passed

without giving any notice to the landlords. In the fresh enquiry

conducted in accordance with the directions of the High Court

issued on a writ petition filed by the landlords, applications

filed by 60 other tenants were considered. The concerned

Tehsildar by his order dated 10

th

of September, 1984 held that

sizable land of Kambirigam village was under the cultivation of

the tenants. This order was confirmed by the Collector. On

this basis, the tenants disputed the veracity of the findings

recorded by the Settlement officer and by the Subordinate

Judge. The Tehsildar was of the opinion that as there was

enough material to give rise to a doubt that the landlords had

not been cultivating the entire cultivable land in the

Kambirigam village, the benefit of doubt should be given to the

hard pressed poor raiyots, as against the landlords who were

rich and influential. Thus, the order of the Tehsildar was not

based on any reliable and acceptable documentary evidence.

The particulars of land, or rent or tenants were not mentioned

in the findings. The particulars of land mentioned in the

applications filed before Sub-Collector by the tenants, do not

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tally with those in the plaint schedule, based on the order of

the Tehsildar. Hence, it is evident that the Tehsildar did not

conduct the enquiry properly. Padi Narayana, the first

defendant in all except one suit, had denied that he had been

a tenant in the suit lands and had averred that he had been

falsely impleaded in the said proceedings. Yet, he appeared as

a tenant in the findings given by the Tehsildar. Thus, the

order of Tehsildar was found not to be based on proper and

legal evidence. On the other hand, the names of the Landlords

have been recorded in the revenue registers as the personal

cultivators of the plaint schedule lands in the No.2 Adangal till

1979, i.e. for which these batch suits were filed. As against

this, neither the tenants entered the witness box to support

their specific cases, nor did they produce any reliable

documentary evidence to rebut the entries in the record. The

testimonies of witnesses they produced were not reliable.

9.Disposing of A.S.No.12 and batch i.e. the 13 appeals filed

by the landlords from the Original Suits filed by the Tenants,

the Principal Subordinate Judge, inter alia, held that none of

the Tenants disputed the title of the Landlords over the land in

10

Kambirigam village. While the Tenants, who were the plaintiffs

in this batch suits should have established that they had the

possession over the plaint schedule lands by virtue of the

tenancy granted in their favour by the predecessors of the

Landlords, none of them entered the witness box in support of

their case. The particulars of origin of the alleged tenancy were

not given in any of the plaints. The testimony of the only

witness produced by the Tenants was self serving and was not

corroborated by any other evidence, as he was too young to

know the particulars of the alleged tenancy, which had

allegedly been in existence since time immemorial. Again,

reference was made to the discrepancies in the description of

land in plaint schedules and in the applications filed before

the Sub-Collector, Tekkali. It was pointed out that the

Tehsildar’s report on which the Tenants had placed reliance

was not based on legal and relevant evidence. As the burden of

proof was on the Tenants, the mere failure of the Landlords in

establishing that they had been personally cultivating the

plaint schedule lands alone would not enable the Tenants to

get a permanent injunction against them in respect of

11

particular bits of plaint schedule lands.

10Accordingly, the first appellate court allowed the appeals

of the landlords and dismissed the suit of the tenants against

which second appeals were preferred by the tenants before a

learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court which

came to be registered as S.A.Nos.361 of 1996 and batch and

S.A.Nos.374 of 1996 and batch. The second appeals were

directed against both the judgments and decrees dated 15th of

April, 1996 passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge,

Srikakulam in two batches of First Appeals, i.e. A.S.Nos.11

and batch and A.S.Nos.12 and batch. The High Court by the

impugned judgment allowed all the Second Appeals,

numbered as above.

11.It may be noted that the Learned Judge in the impugned

judgment, however, stated that “these second appeals arise

out of a common judgment dated 15

th

of April, 1996 in

A.S.No12 of 1996 and batch on the file of the Principal

Subordinate Judge, Srikakulam, reversing the judgment and

decree in O.S.No.87 of 1980 on the file of the District Munsif,

Palasa.”

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12.Before the High Court in the second appeals and batch,

the following questions were taken into consideration:

1.Whether the Sannad granted in 1804 to Tarla Estate

describing Kambirigam village as Jagir assumed the

character of an “Estate” within the meaning of Estate

Abolition Act to the effect that the Landlords could

dispossess the Tenants on that count?

2.Is the Civil Court empowered to set aside the orders of

the three statutory authorities viz. Tehsildar, District

Collector and the Commissioner of Land Revenue, when

no challenge was made to their orders holding the

Tenants as cultivators of the land in question?

13.After perusing the judgments of the courts below,

however, the High Court was of the opinion that the question

whether the Sannad granted in 1804 assumed the character of

an Estate within the meaning of Estate Abolition Act was of no

consequence at all, because factum of the grant of sannad in

1804 itself was doubtful. The Tenants had not adduced any

evidence to prove that the rights of the Landlords, if any, had

vested in the Government. In the impugned judgment, the

13

High Court came to a conclusion that the issue No.1 should

not be examined in view of the aforesaid conclusion arrived at

by it. For appreciation of the finding arrived at by the High

Court, we may reproduce the same.

“However, on going through the plaint O.S No.

75/80 it appears that no plea was made in that

regard. The only averment made in the plaint is

to the effect that the plaint schedule land was

a portion of the pre-settlement unenfranchised

inam in Kambirigam Mokhasa in the erstwhile

Tarla Estate, and the Tarla Estate was

abolished by the Government under the Act

XXVI of 1948 but Kambirigam Mokhasa village

was not taken over as it was not an “Estate” or

an Inam Village within the meaning of the

Abolition Act and that no patta was granted

either to the defendants or their predecessors

in interest either under the Abolition Act, 1948

or Act XXXVII of 1956. The defendants

therefore lost their right, if any, in the plaint

Schedule land as it vested in the Government as

stated in the concluding part of Para 3 of the

Plaint. The Plaintiffs, who are the appellants

before us do not seem to have produced any

document in respect of these averments made

in paragraph 3 of the plaint. I am, therefore, of

the opinion that no useful purpose would be

served in examining this question whether the

respondents acquired nay right to dispossess

the appellants.”

14.We have carefully examined these findings of the High

Court and after carefully examining the same, we do not find

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any reason to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the

High Court on such question. Accordingly, we agree with the

views expressed by the High Court on the question No.1 as

noted herein above.

15.Let us now consider the question No.2 as noted herein

earlier. The said question is whether the Civil Court was

justified in setting aside the orders of three statutory

authorities, namely the Tehsildar, the District Collector and

the Commissioner of Land Revenue without there being any

challenge to these orders.

16.On this question, the High Court, after considering the

relevant statutes on the subject and after considering the

material evidence on record came to a conclusion that the

decision of the Tehsildar which came subsequent to the filing

of the suit i.e. on 10

th

of September, 1984, which was affirmed

by the District Collector and the Commissioner of Land

Revenue, had achieved the status of finality. The High Court

even came to the conclusion that even independent of that

proposition the evidence, however, thin it may be, has

weighted in favour of the persons who claimed to be the

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cultivators of the disputed lands. In the impugned judgment,

the High Court had accepted the finding of the Tehsildar

which stood in favour of the tenants that they had been

cultivating the lands in question since time immemorial. In

view of the findings arrived at, the Appeals of the Tenant were

allowed by the High Court in S.A.Nos.361, 365, 366, 374, 383,

384, 391, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401,402,

403, 404 of 1996, and the judgment of the First Appellate

Court in A.S.No.12 was set aside.

17.While accepting the order of the Tehsildar dated 10

th

of

September, 1984, the High Court referred to the provisions of

Andhra Pradesh Record of Rights in Land Act, 1971 and after

considering the decisions of Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa, [AIR

1985 SC 577], State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal

Nadam, [AIR 1986 SC 794], Sangubhotla Venkataramaiah

v. Kallu Venkataswamy, [AIR 1976 AP 402], which discussed

the principles relating to exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil

Courts by Statutory Tribunals, came to the conclusion that

the order of the Tehsildar dated 10

th

of September, 1984

having achieved the status of finality cannot be upset by the

16

Civil Court. The High Court further found that the Tenants

were cultivating the land in question and, therefore, they were

entitled to a decree for permanent injunction against the

landlords and accordingly the High Court allowed

S.A.Nos.361, 365, 366, 374, 383, 384, 391, 393, 394, 395,

396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401,402, 403, 404 of 1996, and the

judgment of the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.12 was set

aside.

18.That apart, from the impugned judgment, it is found that

the High Court concluded in the following manner :

“…. the fact remains that the decision of

the Revenue Authorities which came

subsequent to the filing of the Civil Suits

stood unchallenged and not contradicted.

The Tehsildar order dated 10

th

of

September 1984, therefore, achieved the

status of finality. On that account,

therefore, the Landlords lost complete

ground for denying the tenancy rights of

the Tenants-Appellants over the disputed

lands. However, even independent of that

proposition the evidence howsoever thin it

may be, has weighed in favor of the

persons who claim to be cultivators of the

disputed land. The Tehsildar’s second

report speaks volumes about the tenant’s

case that they have been cultivating the

disputed lands since the times of their

17

ancestors and I am loath to disregard the

same.

The Tenants-Appellants’ appeals therefore

deserve to be allowed. Hence the appeals

bearing no. 361, 365, 366, 367,

374,383,384,392, 393, 394, 395, 396,

397, 398, 399, 400, 402, 401,403 and 404

of 1996 are allowed and the impugned

judgement and the order dated 15.04.96 in

A.S. No. 12 of 1996 and batch of lower

appellate court is quashed and set aside.

No costs.”

19.In view of our discussions made herein above and in view

of the fact that the High Court had granted a decree for

permanent injunction in favour of the tenants mainly on the

basis that the tenants were in possession and cultivation of

the disputed lands and after considering the fact the landlords

had failed to prove their possession and cultivation in respect

of the lands in question by producing reliable and material

evidence before the court. Accordingly, as noted herein above,

by the impugned judgment, the High Court had allowed the

second appeal and granted a decree for permanent injunction

in favour of the tenants/appellants who are respondents

before us. Such being the position, we do not find any merit in

18

these appeals so far as the Landlords/appellants are

concerned. However, the Landlords filed a review petition

being Review Petition No.6980 of 1997 and batch against the

group of second appeals, namely, S.A.No.361 of 1996 and

batch under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. Among the many grounds that were

taken, the High Court found merit only in one ground which is

as follows-

1) When there was no defence and no proof emerging from the

documentary or oral evidence, the suits filed by the Landlords

could not be dismissed as the extent claimed by the

Tenants/appellants was only 19.80 Acres.

20.Accordingly, the Court found it proper to insert a

clarification in the operative part of the judgment under

review:

“The Tenants appeal covering a total extent

of Ac 19.80 cents therefore deserved to be

allowed. Hence the Appeals bearing Nos.

361/96, 365/96, 366/96, 367/96, 384/96,

392/96, 393/96, 394/96, 395/96, 396/96,

399/96, 400/96 and 401/96 are allowed,

covering a total extent of Ac. 19.80 cents as

mentioned in the schedules in the respective

plaints filed by the tenants out of the total

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extent of Ac. 181.90 cents of lands claimed

in the respective plaints filed by the

landlords in their respective plaints and the

impugned judgment and order dated 15

th

of

April 1996 in A.S. No. 12 of 1996 and batch

of the Lower Appellate Court is quashed and

set aside. The Landlords’ claim to the

aforesaid extent of A.C No. 19.80 cents, thus,

stands dismissed and to that extent only the

Second Appeals Nos. 374/96, 383/96, 397/96,

398/96, 402/96, 403/96 and 404/96 stand

partly allowed. No costs.”

21.So far as the order of the High Court in the review

petition and batch is concerned, we do not find any ground to

upset the order passed in review petition as we find that the

High Court in the original judgment in the second appeals had

considered not only the second appeal being A.S.No.12 of 1996

and batch but also the second appeal filed against A.S.No.11

of 1996 and batch. That apart, the tenants/respondents filed

their suit for permanent injunction limiting their claim to the

extent of 19.80 Acres of land and, therefore, the High Court

was fully justified in reviewing the said judgment allowing the

second appeal of the tenants only to the extent of 19.80 Acres

of land. Accordingly, we do not find any ground to interfere

20

with the order of the High Court reviewing the second appeals

and batch in the manner indicated above in the exercise of our

discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution.

22.For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in

these appeals filed before this Court and, accordingly, the

appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

…..……………… ..J.

[Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi; ……………………..J.

January 08, 2010. [Harjit Singh Bedi]

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