*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VUTUKURU SRINIVAS

+ WRIT APPEAL No. 408 OF 2013

%Dated: 25-08-2022

# Polakala Kuppuswamy (Died) and others.

... Appellants/Respondent Nos.4 to 12

and

$ 1. The District Collector, Chittoor, Chittor District and another

… Respondents/Writ Petitioners

2. The Commissioner of Appeals, O/o.Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration, Hyderabad and others.

... Respondents/Respondent Nos.1 to 3

! Counsel for the Petitioners :Sri D.V.Seetharama Murthy,

learned Senior Counsel

representing Sri Khadar

Mohiddin, learned counsel

^ Counsel for the Respondents : Sri P.Bala Swamy,

Learned Government Pleader

< GIST :

> HEAD NOTE :

? Cases referred :

1. AIR 1964 SC 477

2. AIR 1958 SC 398

3. AIR 1963 SC 1895

4. (2015) 16 SCC 689

5. AIR 1965 SC 338

6. 2005 (3) ALD 113 (FB)

7. 2022 (2) ALD 234 (AP)

2

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VUTUKURU SRINIVAS

WRIT APPEAL NO. 408 OF 2013

Between:

Polakala Kuppuswamy (Died) and others.

... Petitioners

AND

1. The District Collector, Chittoor, Chittor District and another

… Respondents/Writ Petitioners

2. The Commissioner of Appeals, O/o.Chief Commissioner of Land

Administration, Hyderabad and others.

... Respondents/Respondent Nos.1 to 3

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED: 25.08.2022

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VUTUKURU SRINIVAS

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No

Marked to Law Reporters/Journals.

3. Whether Their ladyship/Lordship wishes Yes/No

to see the fair copy of the Judgment?

________________

A.V.SESHA SAI, J

_____________________

VUTUKURU SRINIVAS, J

3

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VUTUKURU SRINIVAS

WRIT APPEAL No. 408 OF 2013

ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice A.V.Sesha Sai)

This Writ Appeal, preferred under Clause 15 of the Letter

Patent, calls in question the order dated 18.12.2012 passed by the

learned Single Judge, allowing W.P.No.4274 of 2009 filed by

respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein.

2. Shorn of inappropriate details, the background, leading to the

filing of the present Letter Patent Appeal is as follows:

2.1).One Sri Polakala Kuppuswamy (deceased appellant No.1)

filed an application before the Settlement Officer, Nellore

(5

th

respondent herein), under Section 11(a) of the Andhra

Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion

into Ryotwari) Act, 1948, claiming ryotwari patta for an

extent of Ac.12.50 cents in Paimash No.394 and R.S.No.33

of Mangalam Village, Tirupati Urban Mandal, Chittor

District. The Settlement Officer, Nellore vide order bearing

S.R.No.6/11(a)/86/CTR, dated 12.06.1986, granted

4

ryotwari patta in favour of Sri P.Kuppuswamy for the above

said land.

2.2).Assailing the validity of the said order dated 12.06.1986,

the District Collector, Chitoor, filed a revision petition

under Section 5(2) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948

before the Commissioner & Director of Settlements,

Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (respondent No.4) and since

the original pattadar died, his legal representatives were

brought on record. The Commissioner & Director of

Settlements, vide order in R.P.No.73/87(BI), dated

20.09.2006, dismissed the said revision, holding that the

Settlement Officer was not wrong in granting patta to

Kuppuswamy.

2.3).Thereafter, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Tirupati Urban,

filed a revision before the Commissioner of Appeals (3

rd

respondent herein) against the order passed by the

Commissioner & Director of Settlements, dated

20.09.2006. The Commissioner of Appeals, vide order

dated 06.12.2008, dismissed the said revision.

5

2.4).Questioning the aforesaid orders of the Settlement Officer,

dated 12.06.1986 as confirmed by the Commissioner &

Director of Settlements and Commissioner of Appeals vide

orders, dated 20.09.2006 and 06.12.2008, respondent

Nos.1 and 2 herein approached this Court by filing

W.P.No.4274 of 2009 under Article 226 of the Constitution

of India. Learned Single Judge of the Composite High Court

of Andhra Pradesh, by way of an order dated 18.12.2012,

allowed the writ petition and remanded the matter to the

Settlement Officer.

3. In the above background, questioning the validity and the legal

sustainability of the said order, passed by the learned Single Judge, the

present Letter Patent Appeal came to be preferred. The Division Bench

of the Composite High Court, admitted the present writ appeal and in

W.A.M.P.No.1003 of 2013, granted an order of status quo.

4. Heard Sri D.V.Seetharama Murthy, learned Senior Counsel

representing Sri Khadar Mohiddin, learned counsel for the appellants

on record and Sri P.Bala Swamy, learned Government Plead er,

appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2 apart from perusing the material

available on record.

6

5. Sri D.V.Seetharama Murthy, learned Senior Counsel, contends

that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is highly erroneous

and contrary to law; that since three authorities concurrently found in

favour of the writ appellants, the learned Single Judge grossly erred in

disturbing the finding of fact recorded in the absence of any

jurisdictional error or patent perversity; that all the authorities

afforded ample opportunity to the department to produce pre -

abolition records; that all the three authorities, on the basis of the

oral and documentary evidence produced by the claimants,

unanimously declared and found the subject land to be a ryothy land;

that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in placing reliance on the

order in W.P.No.17645 of 2005 dated 10.11.2005, as the appellants

herein were not parties to the said writ petition; that the learned

Single Judge erred in placing reliance on the report of the Executive

Officer, Panchayat Raj, Tirupati dated 02.11.2006 in view of the finding

of the Commissioner of Appeals that the said report would not disclose

the survey number in which the tank is located; that the learned Single

Judge ought to have seen that the contention of the writ petitioner

that at present the land is not cultivable and is covered by shrubs and

bushes as such patta cannot be granted is untenable and same is

contrary to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court; that the

7

village map of Mangalam Village clearly shows that there is no tank in

survey No.33 and the same exists in survey No.176; that the master

plan of Tirupati Urban Development Authority Region as affirmed by

State Government, vide G.O.Ms.No.112 M.A. & UD Department, dated

08.03.2019 also shows the same. It is further contended by the learned

Senior Counsel that in the absence of any records produced by the

Department pertaining to pre-abolition period, the learned Single

Judge grossly erred in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by

the quasi-judicial authorities.

6. In support of his submissions and contentions, learned Senior

Counsel places reliance on the following judgments:

i).AIR 1963 SC 1895

ii).AIR 1958 SC 398

iii).AIR 1964 SC 477

iv).2015(16) SCC 689

v).2005 (3) ALD 113 (FB)

vi).AIR 1965 SC 388

vii).2022 (2) ALD 234 (AP).

7. Per contra, learned Government Pleader, while empathetically

and strongly supporting the order of the learned Single Judge,

contends that there is absolutely no infirmity nor there exists any

8

error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge as such the

impugned order warrants no interference of this Court under Clause

15 of Letter Patent. It is further contended that in view of the

absence of proper opportunity given by the quasi-judicial authorities,

the learned Single Judge is justified in remanding the matter to the

primary authority i.e., the Settlement Officer with a direction to

consider the issue afresh after affording opportunity to the

Department as such the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be

faulted. It is also further submitted that the learned Single Judge did

not substitute his opinion for the findings of fact recorded by the

quasi-judicial authorities and only found fault with the jurisdictional

errors committed. It is also submitted further by the learned

Government Pleader that the order passed by the learned Single

Judge would not cause any prejudice to the appellants herein since

the learned Single Judge only remanded the matter for fresh

consideration of the issue and it is open for the appellants to

participate in the enquiry. It is also the further submission of the

learned counsel that there is abnormal delay in filing the application

by the claimants and the same would disentitle the writ appellants

from claiming any right over the property. It is further submitted that

on the ground of abnormal delay in filing application for grant of

9

patta, the Settlement Officer should have rejected the claim. Learned

Government Pleader relies on the judgment of Composite High Court

of A.P. in W.P.No.17645 of 2005 dated 10.11.2005.

8. In the light of the above pleadings and contentions, now the

issues that emerge for consideration and adjudication by this Court

are as follows:

1.Whether the orders, passed by the learned Single Judge,

having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case are

sustainable and tenable ?

2. Whether the learned Single Judge is justified in remanding

the matter to the Primary Authority for fresh consideration ?

3. Whether the Appellants herein are entitled for any relief in

the present writ appeal, filed under Clause 15 of the Letter

Patent ?

9. This Court, having regard to the nature of the controversy,

deems it appropriate to consider all the above three issues together.

10. The information available before this Court shows that one late

Sri Polakala Kuppuswamy, S/o.Bojjaiah @ Narasimhulu, who claimed

the subject land as his ancestral property under Saswatha Patta Takids

dated 09.08.1942 and 11.06.1942 from the land holders, filed an

application under Section 11(a) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1948,

10

claiming Ryothwari Patta. The Tahsildar, Tirupati (Urban) resisted the

said application by filing a counter and the Tahsildar took a stand that

the subject land situated in Survey No.33 of Mangalam Village is

classified as tank poramboke (Chennaiah gunta Cheruvu lokattu) and it

is exclusively used as such and that in view of the provisions of Section

3(16)(b) of the Estates Abolition Act, 1945 and in view of the

prohibition contained therein, no patta can be granted and the

Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to grant ryothwari patta and

that the applicants never cultivated the land as he was away due to

employment. The said counter denied the pattas dated 11.07.1942 and

19.08.1942 as fabricated. During the course of enquiry before the

primary authority i.e., Settlement Officer, the claimant Polakala

Kuppuswamy, apart from examining himself as P.W.1 also examined

Ex.Village Karanam of Settipally, Sri Kalahasti Govindaswamy as P.W.2

and the Inamdar, Sri K.K.Bangaru Buchi Venkatacharyulu as P.W.3 and

the claimant also filed Exs.P.1 and P.2 Pattas dated 11.07.1942 and

19.08.1942 and Ex.P.3, land revenue receipts. The claimant examined

P.Ws.2 and 3 to prove his possession and right over the property. In fact

P.W.2, Ex.Village Karanam, who worked as such for Settipally Village

during the period 1942-1980, categorically deposed about the grant of

pattas by transfer in favour of parents of P.W.1 and about the

11

continuous and uninterrupted possession of the family of P.W.1 and he

also had spoken about the nature of land as Ryothi and he also stated

that the subject land is not a tank poramboku land and is not used for

communal purpose. P.W.3, Inamdhar, also clearly stated about grant of

Exs.P.1 and P.2 pattas and their genuinity and also admitted his

signatures on Exs.P.1 to P.3.

11. It is very much obvious from a reading of the order of the

Settlement Officer that except filing a counter, no documentary

evidence was placed on record by the Mandal Revenue Officer to

substantiate the plea of the Department and despite granting

sufficient time of three years and inspite of a number of reminders,

the Department did not produce any documents and no pre-abolition

records were produced nor produced Revenue Recovery statement.

After extensively and elaborately analyzing and considering the entire

material available on record and while referring to the law laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in AIR 1965 SC 336B, the

Settlement Officer, Primary Authority, passed orders on 12.06.1986,

granting ryotwari patta in favour of Sri P.Kuppuswamy.

12. Coming to the orders passed by the Commissioner & Director of

Settlements dated 02.09.2006, the Department did not choose to

12

place on record any documents to substantiate their plea. On the

other hand, the following documents came to be filed by the

appellants herein before the said revisional authority:

i).Enjoyment certificate issued by the Tahsildhar, Chandragiri

in Roc.No.C2/1274/71, dt.27.12.1971.

ii).Certified copy of Dittam for the years from 1945 to 1958 of

Mangalam Village.

iii).Certified copy of No.2 Adangal for F.1371 to 1379.

iv).Certified copy of fair Adangal for F.1388 to 1389.

v).Two land revenue receipts dt.11.04.1982 and 02.12.1983.

vi).Sec.7 notice issued by the Tahsildhar on 10.05.1980.

13. The Commissioner & Director of Settlements, after meticulously

considering the material available on record including Dittam produced

by the claimants for the period 1945 to 1958, came to the conclusion

against the Department and dismissed the revision.

14. The Commissioner of Appeals also passed an elaborate order,

confirming the view expressed by the Primary and Revisional Authority

and also took into consideration the Dittam produced by the claimants

and though a Topo Sketch was sought to be pressed into service by the

Mandal Revenue Officer, the Commissioner of Appeals found that there

was no survey number indicated therein and also considered the report

13

of the Executive Engineer, Panchayat Raj, Tirupati dated 02.11.2006.

The Commissioner of Appeals also took into consideration the

combined Topo Sketch, wherein the Tank was noted in R.S.No.176 but

not in R.S.No.33.

15. In this context, it may be appropriate to refer to the judgments

cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitoners.

16. In the case of Syed Yakoob v. K.S.Radhakrishnan

1

, the

Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with the jurisdiction of the High

Courts in issuing writs in the nature of writ of certiorari, at Paragraph

No.7 held as under:

The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High

Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has

been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal

position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of

certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction

committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases

where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals

without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of

failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be

issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the

Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for

instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity

1

AIR 1964 SC 477

14

to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the

procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to

principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt

that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a

supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not

entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation

necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the

inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of

evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ

proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face

of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of

tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a

finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari

can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said

finding, the. Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit

admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously

admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the

impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on

no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law

which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing

with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in

mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot

be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the

ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced

before the Tribunal was' insufficient or inadequate to

sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of

evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be

drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive

15

jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be

agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that

the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article

226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately

exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed

Ishaque(1), Nagendra Nath Bora v. The Commissioner of Hills

Division and Appeals, Assam(2), and Kaushalya Devi v.

Bachittar Singh(3).

17. In the case of Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills

Division and Appeals, Assam

2

, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraph

Nos.24 and 25 held thus:

24.It is clear from an examination of the authorities of

this Court as also of the courts in England, that one of the

grounds on which the jurisdiction of the High Court on

certiorari may be invoked, is an error of law apparent on

the face of the record and not every error either of law or

fact, which can be corrected by a superior court, in

exercise of its statutory powers as a court of appeal or

revision.

25. So far as we know, it has never been contended before

this Court that an error of fact, even though apparent on

the face of the record, could be a ground for interference

by the court exercising its writ jurisdiction. No ruling was

brought to our notice in support, of the proposition that

2

AIR 1958 SC 398

16

the court exercising its powers under Art. 226 of the

Constitution, could quash an order of an inferior tribunal,

on the ground of a mistake of fact apparent on the face of

the record.

18. In the case of Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu

(deceased)

3

, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraph Nos.12 and 17 held

thus:

12. Before proceeding further it is necessary to notice

that the matter was brought up before the High Court by

Petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The

jurisdiction conferred by that Article is not by any means

appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the

decisions of Subordinate Courts or Tribunals but is merely

a power of superintendence to be used to keep them

within the bounds of their authority, vide nagendra Nath

Bora v. Commissioner, Hills Division, Asssam (1). It was the

submission of the learned counsel for the respondent

(Appellant in C.A. 105/60) that the High Court exceed-ea

its jurisdiction in interfering what at the worst was a

mere error in the appreciation of evidence and that in

fact there was enough material for the finding which the

Revenue Tribunals had reached, as regards the lease.

17. Even assuming that the Revenue Tribunals erred in

their interpretation of the compromise, it could not be a

3

AIR 1963 SC 1895

17

ground on which their finding could be set aside under

Art. 227, in view of the fact that the compromise was but

one of the several items of evidence on which the finding

was based. If thus there was material, the order could not

be characterised as perverse to permit of interference.

We, therefore, consider that there was no justification to

interfere with this concurrent finding of the revenue

Tribunal.

19. In the case of Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of

Maharashtra

4

, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Paragraph No.14 held thus:

14.In the present case, we find that a disputed question

of fact was raised by the parties with regard to the title

over the land in question. The appellant Corporation on

the one hand based its claim of title on payment of

amount by depositing it in the court and possession of the

land taken pursuant to the agreement reached between

the appellant Corporation and the father of Respondent

2. On the other hand, the case of the second respondent

is that the amount was not deposited by the appellant

Corporation with regard to the land in question. In view

of the fact that there is a disputed question of fact, we

are of the view that it was not a fit case for the High

Court to decide the question of mutation doubting the

title in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

4

(2015) 16 SCC 689

18

and thereby reversing the concurrent findings of fact by

the competent authorities.

20. In the case of Athamanathswami Devasthanam v.

K.Gopalaswamy Ayyangar

5

, the Hon’ble Apex Court at Para No.5

held thus:

5.The lands in suit, according to the plaint, were

uncultivable waste lands covered with shrubs, jungle and the

like. They had not been cultivated for a long time. Waste

lands covered with shrubs, jungle and the like cannot be held

to be uncultivable merely on that account or on account of

their being not cultivated for a long time. Land which can be

brought under cultivation is cultivable land unless some

provision of -law provides for holding it otherwise in certain

circumstances. This is not disputed for the appellant, but

what is urged on its behalf, is that land will not be cultivable

land if it can be brought under cultivation only after

incurring great expenditure. It is said that according to the

respondent, about Rs.3,00,000/- were spent in reclaiming the

land. Except for the statement of the respondent, there is no

evidence worth considering about the actual expenditure

incurred by the respondent in reclaiming the land in suit

which is over 700 acres in area. Reference was also made to

an observation in the judgment of the High Court to the

effect :

5

AIR 1965 SC 338

19

"Of course, there are some lands in an estate which are not

cultivable at all like hill tops, permanently submerged lands,

etc., and they will be incapable of being claimed as ryoti

lands with occupancy rights by lessees for grazing, fishing

etc."

This observation seems to be a general observation and not in

connection with the land in suit. The land in suit was sought

to be brought under cultivation in connection with the Grow

More Food Campaign and this must have been as the land in

suit could be brought under cultivation without any undue

expenditure of money and labour. The expenditure on

reclaiming the land might have been more than the usual

expenses in view of the fact that most of the labour had to

be imported from outside and as tractors had to be used on

account of the large size of the land to be reclaimed within

as short a time as possible. It is not even shown that the

reclamation of land has not been profitable financially. We

are therefore of the opinion that the Courts below have

rightly held the land in suit to be cultivable land.

21. In the case of Sarvepalli Ramaiah v. K.Srinath Reddy

6

, the

Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph No.24 held thus:

24. In this case the same party who filed SLP had approached

in review to the High Court. It was not a case where a party

before the Court was not a party to the earlier proceedings

6

2005 (3) ALD 113 (FB)

20

who was decidedly and definitely affected by the order of

the Court. The judgment of the Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court referred to hereinabove was passed almost in

similar circumstances. Even otherwise the dismissal of the

SLP in limine by the Supreme Court does not preclude

entertaining of a review as has been laid down by the

Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. State of

Bihar, . Similarly in V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. Pvt. Ltd. v.

Commissioner of Income Tax, the Supreme Court held that

the dismissal of SLP was not equivalent to the dismissal of an

appeal. Since the rights of the parties other than the legal

heirs of late K.R. Krishna Reddy were affected by the

judgment of this Court in W.P.No. 21859 of 1996, therefore

we have no doubt in our mind that this judgment cannot

operate against their interests.

22. In the case of L.Ramesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh

7

, this

Court at Paragraph No.57 held thus:

57. The 2nd ground urged by the respondents is that the

subject land is a submergible land (Neeti Mumpu). At

best, the land is subject to ‘inundation’ during rainy

season, but that cannot be said to be a ‘tank bed’ or ‘tank

poramboke’‟. As admitted by the 2008 (6) ALD 788 (DB)

MSM, J wp_8883_2020 respondents, it is only submergible

land and it is a private zeroyati land as per fair adangal.

Therefore, it is a private land. Though it is a submergible

7

2022 (2) ALD 234 (AP)

21

land, it cannot be treated as „government land‟ and it

will not vest on the government consequent upon the

abolition of estates more particularly, when patta was

granted in favour of the original landholders. Even

otherwise, the Principal Secretary to the Government

discussed about this issue in the order dated 25.04.2016 in

paragraph No.6 in detail and recorded that it was only

submergible land. It is recorded as ‘private patta land’ in

the fair adangal, but in the remarks column, it is

mentioned as “submergible land‟ and not part of

karakambadi tank. The Principal Secretary to the

Government dealt with the matter in detail and recorded

a finding that the subject land is a patta land, but not a

river poramboke or tank proamboke by placing reliance on

the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at

Hyderabad "Pydah Chalmaiah v. The Board of Revenue,

Andhra Pradesh" (referred above), wherein it is held that

the payment of cist and acceptance thereof by the

Government was a positive indication that the owner of

the land was determined to reta in his possession

notwithstanding submersion of the land. In the same

judgment, it was clarified that once right or title to the

particular land is established, even in course of time by

flow of water the land gets eroded, the title to the land

does not pass from the private person to the Government

and patta land does not become Government land or river

proamboke.

22

23. It is absolutely not in controversy that three quasi-judicial

authorities concurrently found in favour of the claimant and

confirmed the grant of ryotwari patta. The material available on

record also, in clear and unequivocal terms, demonstrates that by

adducing oral and documentary evidence the claimant could prove his

possession, enjoyment and right over the subject property. On the

other hand, despite sufficient and complete opportunity afforded, the

Department failed in availing the same and failed in producing any

records to substantiate their stand and failed to show the nature of

the property as per their pleadings. A reading of the orders passed by

the quasi judicial authorities impugned in the writ petition

demonstrate the same. The findings of the learned Single Judge that

the respondents quasi judicial authorities, failed to record the nature

of the scheduled property, in the considered opinion of this Court runs

contrary to the material available on record including the orders

impugned in the writ petition. Having failed to adduce any cogent

and convincing evidence despite sufficient opportunity afforded by

the quasi judicial authorities, it is not open for the writ petitioners to

contend that the quasi judicial authorities failed to give opportunity

to them. As per the Constitutional Bench Judgments of the Hon’ble

Apex Court cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and

23

which are referred to above, unless the orders impugned in the writ

petition suffer from jurisdictional error or patent perversity and

unless there is a violation of principles of natural justice, a writ in the

nature of writ of certiorari cannot be issued. In the considered opinion

of this Court, the said contingencies are conspicuously absent in the

orders impugned in the writ petition. In the definite opinion of this

Court, the Department cannot attack the orders impugned in the writ

petition by pressing into service the judgment of the learned Single

Judge of the composite High Court in W.P.No.17645 of 2005 in the

teeth of the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Composite High

Court in Sarvepalli Ramaiah (referred to supra) and fact remains that

the appellants herein are not parties to the said litigation wherein

possession alone was the issue.

24. The aspect of delay in approaching the primary authority by the

claimants, in the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be permitted

to be raised by the Department as the Settlement Officer already

condoned the delay and in the absence of any appeal filed by the

respondent Nos.1 and 2 against the orders of the learned Single Judge.

25. In the facts and circumstances narrated supra, this Court has

absolutely no hesitation nor any traces of doubt to hold that the order

24

passed by the learned Single Judge, which is impugned in the present

appeal cannot stand.

26. For the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Appeal is allowed, setting

aside the order dated 18.12.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge in

W.P.No.4274 of 2009. There shall be no order as to costs.

Miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed.

________________

A.V. SESHA SAI, J

_____________________

VUTUKURU SRINIVAS, J

Date: 25.08.2022

krs/pab

25

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.SESHA SAI

AND

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VUTUKURU SRINIVAS

WRIT APPEAL No.408 of 2013

DATE: 25.08.2022

Krs/Pab