S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 453

PRITAM SINGH

v.

THE STATE

[SAIYID FAZL ALI, PATANJALI SASTRI,

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN, MUKHERJEA and DAS, JJ.]

Constitution of India, Art. 136 (1)-Special leave to appeal­

Granting of leave-Guiding principles-Final hearing-Nature of.

The Supreme Court will not grant special leave to appeal

under Art. 136

(1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that

exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents

features of sufficient gravity to

warrant

a review of the decision

appealed against.

The view

that once an appeal has been admitted by special

leave,

the

entire case is at large and the appellant is free to contest

all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised

in the High Court is wrong. Only those points can be urged at

the final · hearinl( of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the

preliminary stage when leave to appeal is asked for.

Ibrahim v. Rex ([1914] A. C. 615) referred to.

APPEAL from the High Court of Judicature at

East Punjab : Criminal Appeal No. II of 1950.

This was an appeal by special leave from a judg­

ment and order of the High Court of Judicature for

the Province of East Punjab at Simla (Falshaw and

Soni JJ.) dated the 23rd November, 1949, in Criminal

Appeal No. 367 of 1949 upholding the conviction of

the appellant on a charge of murder and confirming

a sentence

of death passed on him by the Sessions

Judge .of Ferozepore.

]ai Gopal Sethi (H.].

Umrigar, with him) for the

appellan.t.

Basant Kishan Khanna, Advocate-General of East

Punjab (S. M. Sikri, with him) for the respondent.

1950. May 5. The judgment of the Court was

delivered

by FAZL Au ].-This is an appeal by one Pritam

Singh against the decision of the High Court of Punjab

at Simla, upholding his conviction on the charge of

1950

May S

Fazl AliJ.

1950

Prit111n Si11gh

v.

T'111 State

. Fazl A?i J.

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]

murder of one Buta Singh and confirming the sentence

of

death passed on him by the

Sessions Judge of

Ferozepore. The prosecution case, which has been

found to

be substantially true by both the trial judge

and

the

High Court may be shortly stated as follows .

On the 28th December, 1948, Pritam Singh had

made indecent overtures to one Punni, wife of Kakarra

Chamar, who had been brought into the village by

Buta Singh, the deceased, about 10 or 12 years ago.

Buta Singh, on learning of this incident, spoke to

Pritam Singh, but finding that his attitude was un­

compromising, he advised Kakarra to go to the police

station to report the matter. On the next day, while

Kakarra was going to the police station, Mal Singh,

the first prosecution witness m the case, brought him

back telling him that Pritam Singh had apologized

and the matter shoulc1 ncit be pursued. On the 30th

December, at about 5 p.m., just when Buta Singh came

out of his house, Pritam Singh came up with a double

barrelled 12-bore

gun an.d shot him in the abdomen,

and Buta

Singh died a short time thereafter.

Shortly after the occurrence, Punjab Singh

and Na! Singh, who had both witnessed the occur­

rence, went

to the police station at Abohar,

which is

at a distance of 13 miles from the place of

occurrence,

and lodged

th~ first information report

regarding the murder. In this report, Punjab Singh

reported the facts as already stated, but he also added

that Pritam Singh was drunk when he fired the gun

and his younger brother, Hakim Singh, who was also

drunk was standing at a short distance from him and

shouting "Kill, don't care." None of the other wit­

nesses however supported Punjab Singh as to the part

attributed by him to Hakim Singh or as to the

drunken condition of the appellant or Hakim Singh,

and the police after due investigation of the case

sent

up a charge sheet against the appellant only. The

appellant was thereafter put on his trial before the Sessions Judge of Ferozepore. The learned Sessions

Judge, after hearing the prosecution witnesses, of whom

five were eye-witnesses,

viz.,

Punjab Singh, his brother

Mitta Singh, Mal Singh, Nikka Singh (brother of Mal

S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 455

Singh), and Mst. Phoolan, mother of the deceased,

came t<t-the conclusion, in agreement with 4 assessors

who were present

at the trial, that the version given by

the prosecution

witn~sses was substantially true. In

support of his conclusion, he referred to the following

facts among

others:-(1) that

the· first information

report

had been lodged at the police station without

any delay, (2) that the names of at least 4 of the

alleged eye-witnesses were mentioned in

the report,

and (3) that no sufficient reason had been shown as to

why the prosecution witnesses

should have conspired -

to falsely implicate the accused in a murder case, if he

had been innocent. The High Court on appeal agreed

with the Sessions Judge, and the learned Judge who

delivered the judgment of the High Court observed as

follows in ,the concluding

part of his judgment

:-"I

have given the case every consideration and I have

come

to the

conclusion that the learned Sessions Judge

was right in holding that the case against the appell­

ant had been proved beyond reasonable doubt."

The appellant thereafter obtained special leave to

appeal to this Court, and Mr. Sethi, the learned counsel

appearing for him, has in support

of the appeal,

addressed to us very elaborate arguments to show

that

the

conclusion arrived at by the Courts below is 'not

correct. He has argued that the alleged eye-witnesses

were intimately connected with each other

and with

the deceased,

that they and the accused belonged to

two mutually hostile factions,

that these witnesses had

made discrepant statements as to the respective

places

from where they claimed to have seen the occurrence,

some of them making discrepant statements about

their own position before the police officer who drew up.

the

plan of the scene of occurrence and before the trial

Court and also making discrepant statements about

the position of the other witnesses, and that they

should not be held to be tru.thful witnes5es inasmuch

as they

had denied certain previous statements made

by them either before the police or before the

Commit­

ting Magistrate. Mr. Sethi also put forward the theory,

which has been discredited

by both the

Courts below

on grounds which

prima Jacie do not appear to be

1950

Pritam Singh

v.

The State

Fllzl AJiJ.

1950

Pritam Singh

~-

The State

F .. lAUJ.

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]

unreasonable, that the occurrence must have taken

place· late at night, that there were probably no

eye-witnesses

to identify the real assailant and that

the appellant had been falsely implicated on ac­

count

of enmity.

The obvious reply to all these arguments ad­

vanced

by the learned counsel for the appellant, is

that this

Court is not an ordinary Court of criminal

appeal and will not, generally speaking, allow facts

to

be reopened, especially when two

Courts agree in their

conclusions in regard to them and when the conclu­

sions of fact which

are challenged are dependent on

the credibility of witnesses who have been believed

by the trial

Court which had the advantage of seeing

them and hearing their evidence. In the present case,

the story for the prosecution, which is neither incredi­

ble nor improbable, is supported

by no less than 5

witnesses including

the mother of the deceased, and

their evidence, in spite of its infirmities, has impressed

4 assessors

and the two

Courts below, who, in apprais­

ing

its reliability, have given due weight to certain

broad features of the case which, according to . them,

negative

the theory of conspiracy or concoction. In

thes{! circumstances, it would be opposed to all prin­

ciple~ and precedents if we were to constitute our­

selves into a

third

Court of fact and, after re-weighing

the evidence, come to a conclusion different from

that

arrived at by the trial Judge and the High

Court.

In arguing the appeal, Mr. Sethi proceeded on the

assumption that once _an appeal had been admitted

by special leave, the entire case was at large and the

appellant was free to contest all the findings of fact

and raise every point which couid be raised in the

High Conrt or the trial Court. This assumption is,

in our opinion, entirely unwarranted. The miscon­

ception involved in

the

argument is not a new one and

had to be dispelled by the Privy Council in England

in Ibrahim v. Rex(') in these words:-" ....... .

the Board has repeatedly treated applications

for leave

to appeal and the hearing of criminal appeals

(!)

[19U] A.C. 615.

S.C.R. _ SUPREME COURT REPORTS 457

1950 as being upon the same footing: Riel's Case; Ex-parte

Deeming.

The Board cannot give leave to appeal

• Pritam Si1rgh

where the grounds suggested could not sustam the

appeal itself; and, conversely, it cannot allow an

appeal on grounds

that would not have sufficed for the

grant of permission to bring

it."

The rule laid down by the Privy Council is based

on sound principle, and, in our opinion, only those

points can be urged

at the final hearing of the appeal

which are fit to be urged

at the preliminary stage when

leave

to appeal is asked for, and it would be illogical

to adopt different standards at two different stages of

the same case.

It seems also necessary to make a few general

observations relating to the powers of

this

Court to

gra1,t special leave to appeal in criminal cases. The

relevant articles of the Constitution dealing with the

appellate jurisdiction

of the

Supreme Court are articles

132 to 136. Article 132 applies both to civil and

criminal cases and under it an appeal shall lie to the

Supreme Court from any judgment, decree ...... or final

order

ofa High

Court, whether in a civil, criminal or ,

other proceeding, if the High Court certifies that the

case involves a substantial question of law as to the

interpretation of the Constitution. Article 133 deals

with the appellate jurisdiction of this Court in civil

matters only, and it has been drafted on

the lines of

sections

109 and 1 IO of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

Article 134 constitutes the Supreme Court as a Court

of criminal appeal_ in a limited class of cases only, and

clearly implies

that no appeal lies to it as a matter of

course or

right except in cases specified therein. Article

135 merely provides that the

;;upreme Court shall have

jurisdiction

and powers with respect to any matter to wl.Jich the provisions of article 133 or article 134 do

not apply, if jurisdiction and powers in relation to that

matter-were exercisable by the Federal Court immedi­

ately before

the commencement of the Constitution

under any existing

law. The last article, with which

we are concerned is article

136 and it runs thus :-" 136. {l) Notwithstanding anything in this

Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion,

v.

The State

Fazl Ali J.

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950J

1950

Prifa11t Singh

grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,

decree, determination, sentence

or order in any cause

or

matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in

the territory of India,

v.

Tile State

Faz! Ali J.

(2) .................. "

The points to be noted in regard to this article

are firstly, that it is very general and is not confined

merely to criminal cases,

as is evident from the words "appeal from any judgment, decree, sentence or order"

which occur therein and which obviously cover a wide·

range of matters; secondly, that the words used in

this article are "in any cause or matter," while those·

used in articles 132 to 134 are "civil, criminal or other

proceeding," and thirdly, that while in articles 132 to

134 reference is made to appeals from

the High

Courts,

under this article, an appeal will lie from any court or

tribunal in the terr1tory of India.

On a careful examination of article 136 along with

the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide

discretionary power with which

this

Court is invested

, under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional

cases only,

and as far as possible a more or less uni­

form

standard should be adopted in granting special

leave

in the wide range of matters which can come up

before it under this article. By virtue

of this article,

we can

grant special leave in civil cases, in criminal c8ses, in income-tax cases, in cases which come up be­

fore different kinds of

tribunals and in a variety of

other cases.

The only uniform standard which in our

opinion

can be laid down in the circumstances is that

Court should grant special leave to appeal only in those

cases where special circumstances are shown

to exist.

The

Privy Council have ttied to lay down from time

to time certain principles for granting special leave in

criminal cases, which were reviewed by the Federal

Court in Kapildeo v. The King. It is sufficient for

our purpose to say that though we are not bound to

follow

them too rigidly since the reasons,

coru;titutional

and administrative, which sometimes weighed with

the Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of

those principles

are useful as furnishing in many cases

~.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 459

a sound basis for invoking the discretion of this Court

in granting special leave. Generally speaking, this

Court will not grant special leave, unless it is shown

that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that

substantial and grave injustice has been done and that

the case in question presents features of sufficient

gravity to warrant a review

of the decision appealed

against.

Since the present case does not in our opinion

fulfil

any of these conditions, we cannot interfere w.ith

the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must be

dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

Agent for the appellant:

S. P. Varma.

Agent for the respondent: P, A. Mehta.

THE BHARAT BANK LTD., DELHI

v.

EMPLOYEES OF THE BHARAT BANK LTD.,

DELHI

and

THE BHARAT BANK EMPLOYEES' UNION,

DELHI

UNION OF INDIA: INTERVENER.

(SHRI liARILAL KANIA C.J., SAIYID FAZL ALI,

PATANJALI SASTR,I, MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN,

and M UKHERJEA J J.]

Conititution of In&ia, A.rt. 136-Siiprc~ Court-Appellate

Jurisdiction-Award of Industri~ Tribw1al-Whether appealable-

l950

Pritam Singh

V;

The Stal<J

Fa:t .UiJ.

1950

May 26.