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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

CWP No.1646 of 2025

Date of Decision: 01.10.2026

_____________________________________________________________________

Puran Chand ……...Petitioner

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh and Others …....Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

For the Petitioner: Mr. B.S. Chauhan, Senior Advocate, with Mr.

Aditi Rana, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Rajan Kahol & Mr. Vishal Panwar,

Additional Advocates General with Mr. Ravi

Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu, Deputy

Advocates General, for the respondent-State.

___________________________________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

Since despite utilization of land of the petitioner for the

construction of road namely Kharapthar–Parsari-Maghawata link road,

no steps are being taken by the respondents for acquisition of the land

of the petitioner and no compensation is paid to him, he is compelled to

approach this Court in the instant proceedings under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, praying therein for the following main reliefs:

“a) Writ of mandamus may kindly be issued to the

respondents to initiate acquisition proceedings qua the land

of the petitioner used for the construction of road i.e.

Kharapthar–Parsari-Maghawata link road denoted by

Khasra No 464, 477 and 932/505 total measuring 00-08-94

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hectares situated at Up-Mahal Thana, Tehsil Jubbal, District

Shimla, H.P, possession of respondent is already recorded in

Jamabandi Annexure P-1.”

2. Pursuant to notices issued in the instant proceedings,

respondents have filed reply under the signatures of

Superintending Engineer, 14

th Circle, Himachal Pradesh Public

Works Department, Rohru, wherein there is no denial to the fact

that land of the petitioner stands utilized for construction of road,

as detailed herein above, but attempt has been made to defeat the

claim of the petitioner on the ground of delay and laches.

3. It has been averred in the reply that road was constructed

during the year 1985-89 and at that time, no objection, if any,

was ever raised by the petitioner and other similarly situate

persons and as such, at this stage, the petitioner is estopped from

claiming compensation. It has been submitted in the reply that

road in question was constructed on the persistent demand of the

residents of the area with clear cut understanding that no

compensation shall be claimed.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material available on record, this Court finds that precisely

the grouse of the petitioner, as has been highlighted in the

petition and further canvassed by Mr. B.S. Chauan, learned

Senior Counsel representing the petitioner, is that at no point of

time, consent, if any, was ever given by the petitioner for

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construction of road on his land without compensation. Mr.

Chauhan, while making this Court peruse pleadings adduced on

record by respective parties vehemently argued that petitioner is

continuously requesting respondents to initiate acquisition

proceedings and pay adequate compensation, but in vain.

5. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General,

while making this Court peruse pleadings adduced on record,

submitted that though there is no written document suggestive of

the fact that the land was ever donated, but definitely there is

implied consent of the petitioner for the construction of road

through his land. He submitted that the very fact that petitioner

remained silent for almost four decades, is sufficient to establish

the factum with regard to implied consent of the petitioner for

construction of road in question.

6. While making this Court peruse judgment passed by this

Court in Shankar Dass Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh in CWP

No.1966 of 2010, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate

General submitted that otherwise also, appropriate remedy for

the petitioner for redressal of his grievance is to approach a Civil

Court by way of civil suit. Mr. Panwar also invited attention of this

Court to judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in State of

Maharashtra Vs. Digambar (1995) 4 SSC (683) to state that claim

being highly stale, deserves outright rejection.

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7. While refuting the aforesaid submission of Mr. Vishal

Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, Mr. B.S. Chauhan,

learned Senior Counsel strenuously argued that Hon'ble Apex

Court in Vidya Devi Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others,

(2020) 2 SCC 569 and Sukh Dutt Ratra Vs. State of Himachal

Pradesh and Others (2022) 7 SCC 508, has already held that plea

of delay and laches cannot be raised in the case of continuous

cause of action, especially in land acquisition matter. He also

invited attention of this Court to judgment dated 27.07.2023

passed in CWP No.5928 of 2022 in Vir Sain Vs. State of

Himachal Pradesh and Others, wherein, admittedly, this Court,

having taken note of the judgments passed in Vidya Devi and

Sukh Dutt Ratra, supra, negated the plea of delay and laches

raised by the respondent-State.

8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

material available on record this Court finds that there is no

dispute qua the fact that land of the petitioner was utilized for

construction of road in question. Plea of delay and laches sought

to be raised by the respondents may not be available on account

of judgment rendered in Vidya Devi and Sukh Dutt Ratra

(supra), wherein it has been categorically held that plea of delay

and laches cannot be raised in case of continuous cause of action

or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court,

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it can always condone the delay to do the substantial justice.

While holding that condonation of delay is a matter of judicial

discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably

in the facts and circumstances of a case, Hon'ble Apex Court has

further held that there is no period of limitation prescribed for the

Courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do

substantial justice. It has been further held that forcible

dispossession of a person from his private property without

following due process of law, is violative of both, human right and

constitutional right, guaranteed under Art. 300-A of the

Constitution of India. It would be apt to take note of following

paras of Vidya Devi, supra:

“10.1. The Appellant was forcibly expropriated of her

property in 1967, when the right to property was a

fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III

of the Constitution.

Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property 1,

which could not be deprived without due process of

law and upon just and fair compensation.

10.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental

right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment)

Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right 2

in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under

Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides

that no person shall be deprived of his property save

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by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a

citizen of his property except in accordance with the

procedure established by law. The obligation to pay

compensation, though not expressly included in Article

300 A, can be inferred in that Article.

To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property,

without following due process of law, would be

violative of a human right, as also the constitutional

right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance

is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai ,

wherein this Court held that:

“6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in

Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in

exercise of its power of "eminent domain" may

interfere with the right of property of a person by

acquiring the same but the same must be for a

public purpose and reasonable compensation

therefor must be paid.” (emphasis supplied)

In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy , this Court

held that:

“21. If the right of property is a human right as also

a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken

away except in accordance with law. Article

300A of the Constitution protects such right.

The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such

right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article

300A of the Constitution of India, must be

strictly construed.” (emphasis supplied)

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In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of

U.P.& Ors., this Court recognized the right to property

as a basic human right in the following words:

“30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by

different political thinkers that some amount of

property right is an indispensable safeguard

against tyranny and economic oppression of the

Government. Jefferson was of the view that

liberty cannot long subsist without the support

of property."Property must be secured, else

liberty cannot subsist" was the opinion of John

Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is

the seed bed which must be conserved if other

constitutional values are to flourish is the

consensus among political thinkers and

jurists.” (emphasis supplied)

In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat this

Court held as follows :

“48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the

powers of the State that no person shall be

deprived of his property save by authority of

law. There has to be no deprivation without any

sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode

is not acquisition or taking possession under

Article 300A. In other words, if there is no law,

there is no deprivation.” (emphasis supplied)

10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not have been

forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal

sanction, and without following due process of law,

and depriving her payment of just compensation, being

a fundamental right on the date of forcible

dispossession in 1967.

10.4. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her

predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition

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is completely baseless. We find complete lack of

authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting

the Appellant of her property by the State.

10.5. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law,

the State could not have deprived a citizen of their

property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed

on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi

& Ors. v. M.I.D.C. & Ors.8 wherein it was held that the

State must comply with the procedure for acquisition,

requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode.

The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of

law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is

provided by the Constitution.

This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that

the right to property is now considered to be not only a

constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right.

Human rights have been considered in the realm of

individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood,

health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a

multifaceted dimension.

10.6. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State

before the High Court, that since it has been in

continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it

would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State

being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the

plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser

i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain

legal title over such property for over 12 years. The

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State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the

land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to

grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done

in the present case.

10.7. The contention advanced by the State of delay and

laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable

to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a

case of a continuing cause of action, or if the

circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the

Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial

discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and

reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It

will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,

and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay

arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the

courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do

substantial justice.

In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a

constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with

a view to promote justice, and not defeat it.

In Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors . v. M.I.D.C. & Ors., this

Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held

as follows :

“There are authorities which state that delay and

laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim.

Most of these authorities pertain to service

jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a

wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of

statutory dues, claim for educational facilities

and other categories of similar cases, etc.

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Though, it is true that there are a few authorities

that lay down that delay and laches debar a

citizen from seeking remedy, even if his

fundamental right has been violated, under 32

or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand

deals with a different scenario altogether.

Functionaries of the State took over possession

of the land belonging to the Appellants without

any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked

repeatedly for grant of the benefit of

compensation. The State must either comply

with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or

requisition, or any other permissible statutory

mode.” (emphasis supplied)”

9. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in Sukhdutt Ratra’s cases (supra).

“23. This Court, in Vidya Devi (supra) facing an almost

identical set of facts and circumstances – rejected the

contention of ‘oral’ consent to be baseless and outlined

the responsibility of the State:

“12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule

of law, the State could not have deprived a

citizen of their property without the sanction of

law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this

Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra

Industrial Development Corpn., wherein it was

held that the State must comply with the

procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any

other permissible statutory mode. The State

being a welfare State governed by the rule of

law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond

what is provided by the Constitution.

12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v.

Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property

is now considered to be not only a constitutional

or statutory right, but also a human right.

Human rights have been considered in the

realm of individual rights such as right to

shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc.

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Human rights have gained a multifaceted

dimension.”

24. And with regards to the contention of delay and

laches, this court went on to hold:

“12.12. The contention advanced by the State of

delay and laches of the appellant in moving the

Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and

laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing

cause of action, or if the circumstances shock

the judicial conscience of the Court.

Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial

discretion, which must be exercised judiciously

and reasonably in the facts and circumstances

of a case. It will depend upon the breach of

fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed,

and when and how the delay arose. There is no

period of limitation prescribed for the courts to

exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do

substantial justice.

12.13 In a case where the demand for justice is

so compelling, a constitutional court would

exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote

justice, and not defeat it.

25. Concluding that the forcible dispossession of a person

of their private property without following due process

of law, was violative of both their human right, and

constitutional right under Article 300-A, this court

allowed the appeal. We find that the approach taken

by this court in Vidya Devi (supra) is squarely

applicable to the nearly identical facts before us in the

present case.

26. In view of the above discussion, in view of this court’s

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 and 142 of

the Constitution, the State is hereby directed to treat

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the subject lands as a deemed acquisition and

appropriately disburse compensation to the appellants

in the same terms as the order of the reference court

dated 04.10.2005 in Land Ref. Petition No. 10-LAC/4

of 2004 (and consolidated matters). The Respondent-

State is directed, consequently to ensure that the

appropriate Land Acquisition Collector computes the

compensation, and disburses it to the appellants,

within four months from today. The appellants would

also be entitled to consequential benefits of solatium,

and interest on all sums payable under law w.e.f

16.10.2001 (i.e. date of issuance of notification under

Section 4 of the Act), till the date of the impugned

judgment, i.e. 12.09.2013.”

10. In the aforesaid judgments, Hon’ble Apex Court has

categorically held that contention advanced by the State of delay

and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is liable to be

rejected, especially when it is not in dispute that petitioners are

suffering continuous loss, coupled with the fact that they

repeatedly requested the authorities to initiate acquisition

proceedings.

11. If the aforesaid judgments are read in their entirety,

it clearly emerges that landowners cannot be deprived of their

land, without following due process of law. If it so, ground raised

by the respondents that petitioner has made his land available

with consent, is of no consequence, rather, this Court, having

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taken note of the fact that land of the petitioner stands utilized

for the construction of road in question, is compelled to agree with

the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that his client

is entitled for compensation qua the land utilized by the

respondents for the construction of road in question.

12. Though at this stage, Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned

Additional Advocate General, while making this court peruse

judgment dated 24.2.2023 passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Civil

Appeal No. 1278 of 2023, titled State of Himachal Pradesh and

Ors v. Rajiv and others, attempted to argue that the relief as

sought in the instant petition, cannot be allowed on the ground of

delay and laches, but having perused judgment supra, in its

entirety, this Court finds that it never came to be held in the

aforesaid judgment that the claim of the land owner after an

inordinate delay, cannot be considered, rather, in the aforesaid

case, claimants were not held entitled to the interest under the

Land Acquisition Act from the date of Notification under S.4 till

the filing of the writ petition. Since, no Notification under S.4 of

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ever came to be issued in the case of

the petitioner, ruling, if any, given in the aforesaid judgment, is

of no relevance.

13. Admittedly, land of the petitioner stands utilized for

construction of road almost four decades back, but till date,

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petitioner has not been paid any amount, which action of the

respondent-State certainly amounts to forcible dispossession of

the petitioner from his land, which is violative of provision

contained under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

14. In case titled, State of Himachal Pradesh v. Umed

Ram Sharma (1986) 2 SCC 68, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that

entire State of Himachal Pradesh is a hilly area and without

workable roads, no communication is possible; every person is

entitled to life as enjoined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India;

every person has right under Article 19 (1) (b) of the Constitution

of India to move freely, throughout the territory of India; for the

residents of hilly areas, access to road is access to life itself. Stand

taken by the respondents that there was a policy for providing

roads on demand of residents as a favour to them on conditions

that they would not claim compensation, cannot be sustained

because such stand is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution

of India.

15. In case titled Hari Krishna Mandir Trust v. State of

Maharashtra and others, 2020 9 SCC 356, Hon’ble Apex Court

has held that though right to property is not a fundamental right,

but it is still a constitutional right under Article 300A of the

Constitution of India and also a human right; in view of the

mandate of Article 300A, no person can be deprived of his

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property save by the authority of law. No doubt, State possesses

the power to take or control the property of the owner of the land

for the benefit of public, but at the same time, it is obliged to

compensate the injury by making just compensation.

16. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion

made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this

Court finds merit in the present petition and accordingly, the

same is allowed with a direction to the respondents to initiate

acquisition proceedings within four weeks under the relevant

statute vis-à-vis land of the petitioner and thereafter, just and fair

compensation qua the same be awarded to the petitioner. Since

petitioner has been fighting for his rightful claim for so long, this

Court hopes and trusts that authority concerned would do the

needful expeditiously, preferably, within four months. In the

aforesaid terms, present petition is disposed of along with pending

applications, if any.

October 01, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),

(sunil) Judge