R. KUPPAYEE AND ANR.

v.

RAJA GOUNDER

DECEMBER l 0, 2003

[R.C. LAHOTI AND ASHOK BHAN, JJ.J

Hindu Law-Gift of ancestral property by the father in favour of his

daughters through registered settlement

deed-Father later claiming that

A

B

the settlement deed got executed by misrepresentation and fraud-Plea by

father that his signature was obtained

as a witness to a sale deed and not C

for execution of settlement deed and that he has no capacity to gift to his

daughters the Joint family

property-Suit by daughters for permanent

injunction for restraining the father from interfering with peaceful

possession-Trial Court

dismissed the suit-Confirmed by First Appellate

Court and High Court

Held, on facts and evidence, the gift was not vitiated D

by fraud

and misrepresentation-Further, father has capacity to gift

ancestral property

to daughters to a reasonable extent.

The respondent, by a registered settlement deed, settled the suit

property to his appellant-daughters out of natural love and affection

for them. After 5 years, the respondent asked the appellants to vacate

E

the property and tried to trespass into the property. The appellants

filed a suit for permanent injunction before trial court for restraining

the respondent and his associates from interfering with the appellant's

peaceful possessi~n and enjoyment of the suit property. The respond­

ent resisted the suit contending that the suit property was an ancestral F

property; that settlement deed was not executed in favour of the

respondents;

that the appellants misrepresented the respondent taking

advantage

of his addiction to liquor for signing the sale deed of the

property purchased by

the appellants as an attesting witness and

instead got the settlement deed signed. The trial court dismissed the

suit of the appellants holding that the settlement deed was got executed G

by misrepresentation and that the respondent had no power to make

a gift of a part of his ancestral properties in favour of his daughters.

This was confirmed

by the first appellate court and the High Court.

In appeal, the appellants contended that the finding of fact by the H

605

606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A lower courts regarding execution of settlement deed is vitiated due to

misreading

of the statement of one of the attesting witnesses: that the

respondent, being the

karta of the Joint Hindu family had the authority

to make a gift of ancestral immoveable property to a reasonable extent

to his daughters.

B

c

The

respundent contended that he had no authority to gift the

only ancestral

property possessed by

the family in favour of his

daughters.

Allowing the appeal, the

Court

HELD : 1.1. Finding recorded by the trial court clearly shows that

the court misread and misconstrued the testimony of the attesting

witness

PW 2. In his deposition, PW 2 has clearly stated that he ·was

invited by the respondent to be a witness. He has nowhere .stated that

D the respondent was taken for affixing signatures as witness. If respond~

ent was to be a witness, then there was no need to ask PW2 and other

witness to accompany the respondent or for them to sign the document.

PW 2 also deposed that the respondent affixed his signatures on the

settlement deed (Ex

Al) after reading the same, that he has signed

Exhibit

Al as a witness and that he knew the respondent.

Suggestion

E put to him that signatures of the respondent on Exhibit Al wer~

obtained by threat was denied. The trial court did not refer to this par~

of testimony of PW 2 at all. In the cross-examination, PW 2 has stated

. "' ' . . ... '

that the fact that the respondent had invited him for signing as a witness

has been read to him as if PW 2 had stated t~at th~ respondent was

F taken for affixing signature~ as a witness to some_ documents on the date

when the deed of settlement Exhibi_t Al was executed.,.This i§ a c~ear

misreading of the testimony of PW 2. The trial court also failed to ~ote

that the evidence of respondent lacked total credibility e~pecially in th<;

light of his conduct i_n denying his signature on the settl_ement deed,

G vakalatnama as well as on the summons ser.ved on him. Projection made

~ ' . . .. . .

by the respondent in his testim~ny that the appellants taking advantage

of the fact that he was a drunkard got the settlement deed signed

fraudulently cannot be accepted. Respondent took no steps to g~t the

settlemen_t deed cancell~d though, the appellants had been living in the

H house for tive years after the execution of the. settlement deed. In his

R. KUPPA YEE v. RAJA GOUNDER 607

·· · statement he does not say that he did not know about the execution of A

the settlement deed. Plea taken by him that he was taken to the Sub­

Registrar's office to be a witness to a sale deed by his son-in-law cannot

be accepted as it has not been proved on record

that the respondent's

son-in-law had in fact purchased any house site. Findings recorded by

the

trial court and upheld by the First

appellate court and the High B

Court based on misreading of evidence are liable to be set aside. The

findings recorded on misreading

of evidence being perverse cannot be

sustained by

law. [612-E-H; 613-A-D)

2.1. A father can make a gift

of ancestral immoveable property

within reasonable limits, keeping in view, the total extent of the C

property

held by the family in favour of his, daughter at the time of

her marriage or even long after her marriage. [617-E-F)

2.2. Question as to whether a

particular gift is within reasonable

limits

or not has to be judged according to the status of the family at D

the time

of making a gift, the extent of the immoveable property owned

by the family

and the extent of property gifted. No hard and fast

rule

prescribing quantitative limits of such a gift can be laid down. The

answer to such a question would

vary from family to family. The

question

of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift made has to be E

assessed vis-a-vis the total value of the

proper~' held by the family.

Simply because the gifted property is a house, it cannot be held that

the gift made was not within the reasonable limits. It is basicah; a

question

of fact. If on facts, it is found that the gift was not within

reasonable limits, such a gift would not be upheld.

It was for the F

respondent to plead and prove that the gift made by the father was

excessive

and unreasonable keeping in view the total holding of the

family.

In the absence of any pleadings or proof on these points, it

cannot be held that the gift made in this case was not within the

reasonable limits

of the property held by the

family. The respon~ent

has failed to plead and prove that the gift made was to unreasonable G

extent keeping in view, the total holding of the family. The first

appellate court and the High Court thus erred in non-suiting the

appellants on this account. [617-G-H; 618-A-E]

2.3.

The respondent had the capacity to make a gift to a reasonable H

.l

608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A extent of ancestral immoveable property in favour of his daughters. The

gift was not vitiated by fraud of misrepresentation. The appellants are

held to be the absolute owners or the suit property and the respondent is

injuncted from interfering with the peaceful possession

and enjoyment

of the suit property by the appellant perpetually. (618-F-G)

B

c

Kamala Devi v. Bachulal Gupta, (1957]

SCR 452; Guramma

Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh

& Anr. v. Malappa, (1964) 4

SCR 497

and Ammathayee Ammal & Anr. v. Kumaresan & Ors., [1967] l SCR

353, referred to.

Anivillah Sundararamaya v. Cher/a Seethamma & Ors., (1911) 21

MLJ 695; Pugalila Vettorammal & Anr. v. Vettor Goundan, (1912)' MLJ

321; Devalaktuni Sithamahalakshmamma & Ors. v. Pamulpaii Kotayya

& Ors., AIR (1936) Madras 825; Karuppa Gounder & Ors. v •. Palaniammal

& Ors., (1963) 1 MLJ 86; The Commissioner of Gift Tax 'V. Tej Nath,

D (1972) PLR (74) land Tara Sabzlani v. Raghunath, AIR (1963) Orissa

59, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. ·16757 of

1996.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 28.6.91 of the Madras High

Court

in S.A. No.

970 of 1991.

Gaurav Aggarwal and Prashant Kumar for the Appellants.

R. Soundravardan, K.K. Mani, Ms. Manika Pandey for the Respond•

F ent.

The Judgment

of the Court was delivered by

BHAN,

J. : Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the

courts below

in dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiff-appellants

G (hereinafter referred to as the

"appellants"), the appellants have come up

in this appeal.

Shortly stated the facts are:

The appellants are the daughters

of the defendant-respondent (here­

H inafter referred to as the

"respondent"). By a registered settlement deed,

R. KUPPA YEE v. RAJA GOUNDER [BHAN, J.] 609

Exhibit A-l dated 29th of August, 1985, the respondent hereinabove settled A

an extent of 12 cents of land comprised in S.No. 113/2, Thathagapatti

Village, Salem District in favour of the appellants. As per recitals in the

settlement deed, the settlement was made by the respondent out

of natural

love and affection for the appellants and the possession

of the property was

handed over to them on the day the settlement deed was executed. The

B

schedule of settlement deed shows that the total

exterit of the property

owned by the family was 3 .16 acres. The gift was made

of 12 cents along

with Mangalore tiled house standing on the gifted land. It was also stated

in the settlement deed that

in future neither the respondent nor any other

male or female heirs would have a right over the settled property.

After nearly 5 years, on 22nd April,

1990, respondent and his

associates asked the appellants to vacate the property and tried to trespass

into the property. Because

of the attempt made by the respondent to

trespass into the property, the appellants filed the Original

Suit No. 451

c

of 1990 in the Court of District Muns if, Salem seeking relief of restraining D

the respondent and his associates from interfering with the appellant's

peaceful possession and enjoyment

of the suit prorerty in any way by way

of a permanent injunction, or, for grant of

relief deemed fit in the

circumstances

of the case. Respondent resisted the suit and in the written

statement filed by him, he took the stand that he had not executed any

E

settlement deed. That his son-in-law i.e., husband of appellant No. I had

purchased a house site and the respondent was taken to the Registrar's

office to witness the sale deed. That he was used to taking liquor

and taking

advantage

of his addiction to

liquor the appellants and their respective

husbands fraudulently by misrepresentation instead got the sale deed

F

executed from him. The property in dispute being Joint Hindu Family

property consisting

of himself and his son could not be gifted under any

circumstances.

In support

of their respective pleas, the parties led their evidences.

The appellant No.I

steppd into the witness box as PW-I. She admitted G

that the property was ancestral. That her father had settled the property

on her and her sister

of his own will out of nature love and affection for

them.

PW-2, the attesting witness to Exhibit A-1 stated that he knew the

respondent. While he was standing on the road and talking to some

persons,

he was called by the respondent to witness the document. He went H

610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A to Sub-Registrar's office along with the respondent. Respondent put his

signatures on Exhibit A-I after reading the same. That he (himself) and

Govindawamy signed Exhibit A-I as witnesses. Govindawamy has died.

In the cross-examination he stated that he did not know the contents of the

document, Exhibit A-1.

He showed his ignorance as to when, where or

B in whose name the stamp papers were purchased. He denied having

knowledge

of the fact as to whether the respondent was in the habit of

drinking liquor. Respondent in order to prove his case stepped in the

witness box as

DW-1. He stated that the property was a Joint Hindu Family

property as the same had been purchased with the sale proceeds

of the

C ancestral property. That his son-in-law who was working in

TVS had

purchased some property and he was taken by his son-in-law to sign as

a witness. He denied having executed the settlement deed

in favour of the

appellants. He denied that he knew

PW-2. It was stated that the possession

of the appellants was permissive as they were allowed to reside in the house

to enable them to send their children to the school. He denied his signatures

D on the settlement deed, on the 'v.akalatnama' given by him to his counsel

as well as on the summons sent to him by the

':')Urt. It was denied that

he knew English.

It was also stated by him that his signatures

were obtained

fraudulently on the pretext

of signing as a witness on the document by

which his son-in-law had

purch~ed a house site. That the total extent of

E the family holding was 3.16 acres of land. He admitted that his son was

residing separately for the last 3 to 4 years but denied that he was retracting

from the settlement deed on the advise

of his son. That he was in the habit

of drinking.

F

No other evidence was led by any of the parties.

The trial court believed the evidence

of the respondent. It was held

that the respondent was taken to the Sub-Registrar's office to witness a

document whereas a deed

of settlement was got executed from him.

Testimony

of

PW-2, the attesting witness was discarded. It was held that

G the deposition of PW-2 in fact supported the case put forth by the

respondent to the effect that the respondent was taken to the Sub­

Registrar' s office to sign as a witness. The trial court further held that since

the property

in dispute was ancestral in nature, the respondent had no

power/authority to make a gift

of a part of the ancestral property in favour

H of his daughters. The suit was dismissed. The order of the trial court was

R. KUPPAYEE v. RAJA GOUNDER [BHAN, J.] 611

affirmed by the First Appellate Court

as well as by the High Court, A

aggrieved against which the present appeal has been filed.

It is submitted by the counsel for the appellant that the findings

recorded by the courts below are wrong on facts as well as in law. Finding

of fact regarding due execution of Exhibit A-1 is vitiated due to misreading B

of the statement of the attesting witness, PW-2.

Thal th~ father being the

Karta had the authority to make a gift

of ancestral immovable property to

a reasonable extent out

of the Joint Hindu Family property in favour of

his daughters. That such authority of the father is recognised in old Hindu

Text Books as well as

by the courts in recent times. Counsel appearing

for the respondent has controve1ted the submissions made by the counsel

C

for the appellants. It was argued that there was no misreading of evidence

and that the finding recorded by the courts below on facts could not be

interfered with

by this Court at this stage of the proceedings. The

respondent had no authority to make a gift

of part of the _ancestral

immovable property and in any case he could not have gifted the only D

residential house possessed by the family.

The two points which arise for consideration in this appeal are:

(i) whether the judgment

of the courts below are vitiated

because

of the misreading of the evidence of PW-2, the E

attesting witness to the settlement deed;

(ii) whether the gift/settlement made by the father in favour

of

his married daughters of a reasonable extent of immovable

property out

of the Joint Hindu Family property is valid. F

The trial court believed the evidence of the respondent and dismissed

the suit. For arriving at this conclusion the trial court held that

if the

respondent had the intention

of executing a deed of settlement in respect

of the suit property in favour of the appellants, then at least he would have

taken his son Ramasamy for affixing his signatures as a witness to the deed.

G

Since it was not done the document Exhibit A-1 could not be relied on.

The statement

of PW-2 was construed to mean as if he had stated that the

respondent was taken for affixing his signatures as a witness on the date

when the settlement deed, Exhibit

A-1 was

execu~ed. We have carefully

perused the statements made by PW-2

as well as DW-1 and in our view H

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A the trial court misread and misconstrued the testimony of PW-2. In the

course

of cross-examination

PW-2 had stated as follows:-

B

"Only the defendant invited me for signing as witness. On the

way Govindasamy was also invited while he was found standing

there..... While going towards the Sub-Registrar's office, the

Defendant saw and invited

me to sign as

witness."

The trial court in his judgment has misconstrued the above statement

and recorded the following finding:-

C

"PW-2 had given evidence that the Defendant was taken for

affixing signature

as witness on the date when the deed of

settlement exhibit A 1 was

executed."

The trial court also held that:-

D "If only the Defendant had executed the deed of settlement in

respect

of the suit property in favour of his daughters i.e. the

Plaintiffs, he would have atleast taken his son Ramasamy for

affixing his signature

as witness. This factor is also

nOt in

consonance with the true nature and bona fides of exhibit A 1."

E

Finding recorded by the trial court clearly shows that the court

misread and misconstrued the testimony

of

PW-2. PW-2 in his deposition

has clearly stated that

he was invited by the respondent to be a witness.

He has no where stated that defendant (respondent herein) was taken for

F affixing signatures as a witness. If respondent was to be a witness then

there was

no need to ask

PW-2 and Govindasamy to accompany the

respondent or for them to sign the document. He also deposed that

respondent affixed his signatures on Exhibit

Al after reading the same.

That he (himself} has signed Exhibit A 1 as a witness. That

he knew the

respondent. Suggestion put to him that signatures

of the respondent on

G Exhibit A 1 were obtained by threat was denied. The trial court did not refer

to this part

of testimony of

PW-2 at all. The question put to him in the cross­

examination which has been reproduced above wherein PW-2 has stated

that the respondent had invited him for signing as a witness has been read

to him

as if PW-2 had stated that the respondent was taken for affixing

H signatures as a witness to some documents on the date when the deed of

R. KUPPAYEE v. RAJA GOUNDER [BHAN, J.] 613

settlement Exhibit

A-1 was executed. This is a clear misreading of the A

testimony of PW-2. The trial court also failed to note that the evidence of

respondent as DW-1 lacked total credibility especially in the light of his

conduct in denying his signature on the settlement deed, vakalatnama as

well as on the summons served on hiin. Projection made by the respondent

in his testimony that the appellants taking advantage

of the fact that he was B

a drunkard got the settlement deed, Exhibit A-1

sig11ed fraudulently cannot

be accepted. Respondent took no steps to get the settlement deed cancelled

though, the appellants had been living in the house for five years after the

execution

of the settlement deed. In his statement he does not say that he

did not know about the execution

of the settlement deed. Plea taken by him C

that he was taken to the Sub-Registrar's office to be a witness to a sale

deed by his son-in-law cannot be accepted as it has not been proved

on

record that the respondent's son-in-law had in fact purchased any house

site. Findings recorded by the trial court and upheld by the First Appellate

Court and the High Court based on misreading

of evidence are liable to

be set aside. The findings recorded on misreading

of evidence being D

perverse cannot be sustained in law.

Coming to the second point, the trial court held that since the property

was ancestral in nature, the respondent had no authority/power to make a

gift

of a portion of the ancestral property in favour of his daughters. In E

appeal the First Appellate Court accepted that the father could give away

a

small portion of the ancestral property to his daughters out of the total

holding

of the family property but since in this case the total extent of

property owned by the family had not been proved it could not be held

that the property gifted by the father was

of a reasonable portion of the

total holding

of the family. The High Court affirmed the finding recorded F

by the First Appellate Court.

The High Court

of Madras in a series of judgments has taken the view

that father could make a gift within reasonable limits

of ancestral immov­

able property to his daughter

as a part of his moral obligation at the time G

of her marriage or even thereafter.

In

Anivillah Sundararamaya v. Cher/a Seethamma and others,

(1911) 21.MLJ 695, it was held that a small portion of the ancestral

immovable property could be given to the daughter at the time of her H

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A marriage or theteafter and such a gift would be a valid gift. In this case

8 acres

of ancestral immovable property out

of200 acres of land possessed

by the family were given

in gift by the father to his daughter after her

marriage.

Upholding the gift it was observed:-

B

c

D

"P. Narayana Murthi for I st respondent:-The present case is

stronger than

Kudutumma v. Narasimhacharyulu, as it is the

father that has

given the property and not the brothers. A gift

made to the son-in-law belongs also to the daughter -vide

Ghose's Hindu Law, 2nd Edn.,

p. 313, Footnote. There is a text

of Vyasa to that effect.

See Ghose, p. 389, for translation; vide

p. 360 also vice versa. A gift to the daughter would belong to

the son-in-law.

If it is proper to make gifts at the time of marriage

it would be equally proper

if made afterwards. Though the texts

do not require gifts to be made to daughters at the time

of

marriage, if made they are not invalid. Churamon

Sahu v. Gopi

Sahu referred to, where Mookerji J. approves of Kudutamma v.

Narasimhacharyulu; Bachoo v. Mankuvarhai.

The same view was taken by the Madras High Court in Pugalia

Vettorammal and another v. Vettor Goundan, (1912) 22 MLJ 321. In this

E case it was held that a father could make gift to a reasonable extent of the .

ancestral immovable property to his daughter. Gift made of 1/6th of the

total holding

of the ancestral property was held to be a valid. The same

view has later been taken by the Madras High Court

in .Devalaktuni

Sithamahalakshmamma

and others v. Pamulpati Kotayya and others, AIR

(1936) Madras 825 and Karuppa Gounder and others v. Palaniammal and

F others, (1963) l MLJ 86. A Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court

in

The Commissioner of Gift Tax v. Te) Nath, (1972)

PLR (74) I and the

High Court

of

Orissa in Tara Sabuani v. Raghunath, AIR (1963) Ori. 59

have also taken the same view.

G

H

The powers of the father or the managing member of the joint Hindu family vis-a-vis coparcenary property have been summarised in paragraphs

225, 226 and 258

of Mulla's Hindu Law which reads:-

"225. Although sons acquire by birth rights equal to those of a

father in. ancestral property both movable and immovable, the

R. KUPPAYEE v. RAJA GOUNDER [BHAN, J.] 615

father has the power

of making within reasonable limits gifts of A

ancestral movable property without the consent of his sons for the

purpose

of performing 'indispensable acts of duty, and for

purposes prescribed by texts

of law, as gifts through affection,

.

support of the family, relief from distress and so forth'.

226. A Hindu father or other managing member has power to

make a gift within reasonable limits

of ancestral immovable

property for 'pious purposes'. However, the alienation must be by

B

. an act inter vivas and not by will. A member of a joint family

cannot dispose

of by will a portion of the property even for

charitable purposes and even

ifthe portion bears a small propor- C

ti on to the entire estate. However, now see section

30 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956.

258. (1) According to Mitakshara law as applied in all the States,

no coparcener can dispose of his undivided interest in coparcenary. D

property by gift. Such transaction being void altogether, there is

no estoppel or other kind

of personal bar which precludes the

donor from asserting his right to recover the transferred property.

He may, however, make a gift

of his interest with the consent of

the other coparceners.

(2) As to disposition by will after the coming into operation

of

the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956, see section 30 of the Act."

E

Combined reading of these paragraphs shows that the position in

Hindu law is that whereas the father has the power to gift ancestral

F

movables within reasonable limits, he has no such power with regard to

the ancestral immovable property or coparcenary property. He can,

however make a gift within reasonable limits

of ancestral. immovable

property for

"pious purposes". However, the alienation must be by an act

inter vivas, and not by will. This Court has extended the rule in paragraph

G

226 and held that the father was competent to make a gift of immovable

property to a daughter,

if the gift is of reasonable

ex~ent having regard to

the properties held by the family.

This Court considered the question

of extended meaning given in

numerous decisions for

"pious purposes" in Kam la Devi v. Bachulal H

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A Gupta, (1957] SCR 452. In the said case a Hindu widow in fulfilment of

an ante-nuptial promise made on the occasion of the settlement of the terms

of marriage of her daughter, executed a registered deed of gift in respect

of 4 houses allotted to her share in a partition decree, in favour of her

daughter as her marriage dowry, after two years

of her marriage. The

B partition decree had given her the right to the income from property but

she had no right to

pa1t with the corpus of the property to the prejudice

of the reversioners. Her step sons brought a suit for declaration that the

deed

of gift was void and inoperative and could not bind the reversioners.

The trial court and the High Court dismissed the suit holding that the gift

was not valid. This Court accepted the appeal and held that the gift made

C in favour of the daughter was valid in law and binding on the reversioners.

D

E

F

G

H

This point was again examined in depth by this Court in Guramma

Bhratar Chanbasappa Deshmukh and Another

v. Malappa, (1964] 4 SCR

497 and it was held

:-

"The legal position may be summarized thus: The Hindu law texts

conferred a right upon a daughter or a sister, as the case may be,

to have a share in the family property at the time

of partition. That

right was lost by efflux

of time. But it became crystallized into

a moral obligation.

The father or his representative can make a

valid

gift, by way of reasonable provision for the maintenance of

the daughter, regard being had to the financial and other relevant

circumstances

of the family. By custom or by convenience, such

gifts are made at the time

of marriage, but the right of the father

or his representative

to make such a gift is not confined to

thq

marriage occasion. It is a moral obligation and it continues to

subsist till it is discharged. Marriage is only a customa1y occasion

for such a gift. But the obligation can be discharged at any time,

either during the lifetime

of the father or thereafter. It is not

possible

to lay down a hard and fast rule, prescribing the

quantitative limits

of such a gift as that would depend on the facts

of each case and it can only be decided by Courts, regard being

had

to the overall picture of the extent of the family estate, the

number

of daughters to be provided for and other paramount

charges and other similar circumstances.

If the father is within

his rights to make a gift

of a reasonable extent of the family

R. KUPPAYEE v. RAJA GOUNDER [BHAN, J.] 617

property for the maintenance

of a daughter, it cannot be said that A

the said gift must be made only by one document or only at a

single point

of time. The validity or the reasonableness of a gift

does not depend upon the plurality

of documents but on the power

of the father to make a gift and the reasonableness of the gift so

made. If once the power is granted and the reasonableness of the B

gift is not disputed, the fact that two gift deeds were executed

instead

of one, cannot make the gift anytheless a valid

one."

(Emphasis supplied)

Extended meaning given to the words "pious purposes" enabling the C

father to make a gift of ancestral immovable property within reasonable

limits to a daughter has not been extended to the gifts made

in favour of

other female members of the family. Rather it has been held that husband

could not make any such gift

of ancestral property to his wife out of

affection on the principle

of"pious purposes". Reference may be made to

Ammathayee Ammal

& Another v. Kumaresan &

Othe~s, [1967] I SCR D

353. It was observed 'we see no reason to extend the scope of words "pious

purposes" beyond what has already been done in the two decisions of this

Court' and rejected the contention that a husband could make any such gift

of ancestral property to his wife out of affection on the principle of pious

purposes.

On the authority of the judgments referred to above it can safely be

held that a father can make a gift of ancestral immovable property within

reasonable limits, keeping in view, the total extent of the property held by

E

the family in favour of his daughter at the time of her marriage or even F

long after her marriage.

The only other point, which remains for consideration,

is as to

whether a gift

made in favour of the appellants was within the reasonable

limits, keeping in view, the total holding

of the family. The total property G

held by the family was 3.16 acres. 12 cents would be approximately I/26th

share

of the total holding. The share of each daughter would come to

1/52nd or I/26th share

of the total holding of the family which cannot be

held to be either unreasonable or excessive under any circumstances.

Question as to whether a particular gift

is within reasonable limits or not H

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A has.to be judged according to the status of the family at the time of making

a gift, the extent

of the immovable property owned by the family and the

extent

of

property gifted. No hard and fast rule pre.scribing quantitative

limits

of such a gift can be laid down. The answer to such a question would

vary from family to family.

B

This apart, the question of reasonableness or otherwise of the gift

made has to be assessed

vis-a-vis the total

yalue of the property held by

the family. Simply because the gifted property

is a house, it cannot be held

that the gift made was not within the reasonable limits. As stated earlier,

C it would depend upon a number of factors such as the status of the family,

the total value

of the property held by the family and the value of the gifted

property and so on.

It is basically a question of fact. However, on facts,

if it is found that the gift was not within reasonable limits, such a gift would

not be upheld. It was for the respondent to plead and prove that the gift

made by the father was

exeessive or unreasonable, keeping in view, the

D total holding of the family. In the absence of any pleadings or proof on

these points, it cannot be held that the gift made in this case was not within

the reasonable limits

of the property held by the family. The respondent

has failed to plead and prove that the gift made was to unreasonable extent,

keeping in view, the total holding of the family. The first appellate court

E and the High Court, thus, erred in non-suiting the appellants on this

account.

For the reasons stated above we accept the appeal, set aside the

judgments and the decrees passed by the courts below.

It is held that the

F respondent had the capacity to make a gift to a

reasonable extent of

ancestral immovable property in favour of his daughters. The gift was not

vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation. The appellants are held to be the

absolute owners

of the suit property and the respondent is injuncted from

interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment

of the suit property

G by the appellant perpetually.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

B.S. Appeal allowed ..