2026 INSC 1049 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL/CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13119 OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 1092/2024)

‘R’ …….Appellant(s)

Versus

‘E’ & Anr. ……. Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4534 OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C rl.) NO. 7710/2024)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4533 OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C rl.) NO. 7711/2024)

CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 208/2024

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13119 OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 1092/2024)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 4535-4536 OF 2026

(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C rl.) NOS. 10197-

10198/2024)

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J U D G M E N T

K. V. Viswanathan, J.

1) To be caught in the crossfire between warring parents

would undoubtedly be a painful experience for any child.

When the acrimony, however, is escalated to the level of

unjustifiably attributing sexual assault of the child by one

parent, the matter acquires a different dimension altogether.

Quite apart from the trauma that the minor child is put through

in the process, the accusation can damage the very fabric of

the parent-child relationship and the resultant wound is bound

to leave an indelible scar in the minds of both. This is

independent of the hurt, humiliation and the public

opprobrium the accused parent faces, even long after

exoneration from the charges. What is alarming is that this

tendency of making false accusations is on the rise. Instances

are not infrequent where gullible parties are misguided by

their advisors, including in some cases by recalcitrant legal

professionals, who in their pursuit of the motto of “win at any

cost”, end up fuelling the fire. The only objective is to tie up

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the accused spouse and their family members in knots with

the foisted criminal case and ensure that they are kept busy

with the Court process for a considerable period. Very often,

the enraged parent who is engulfed by anger and blinded by

ego falls prey to these machinations, oblivious to the

consequences that may ensue. Some of the above attributes

are present in this case. We have, in this judgment,

endeavoured not just to find a solution to the case at hand but

have also ventured to lay down certain safeguards, to check

this growing menace.

2) Leave granted. Let the names of the parties in the cause

title, except the first alphabet, be redacted.

BRIEF FACTS:-

3) The Husband, ‘R’ and Wife, ‘E’, who are the appellant and

respondent in the Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave

Petition (C) No.1092 of 2024, got married in the year 2011. This

was a second marriage for both of them. There were certain

misunderstandings soon after the marriage; however, they

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appeared to have been sorted out since a child ‘M’ was born

in the year 2015.

4) Serious misunderstandings arose between the parties

since 2017, and ultimately, on 02.04.2018, the Wife -‘E’ left the

matrimonial home with the child ‘M’. The wife-‘E’ has a case

that she was driven out of the house, after being assaulted. A

criminal case was indeed registered, which was closed.

5) On 24.04.2018, the Husband-‘R’ filed Guardianship

Petition under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act,

1890 in G & WC No. 128/2018 before the Court of Principal

Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru. A First Information Report

(for short ‘the FIR’), bearing No. 165/2018, dated 05.06.2018,

also came to be filed by the Husband-‘R’ against the Wife-‘E’

and one ‘S’ at Jayanagar Sub-Division, Bangalore City,

Bangalore, under Sections 420, 497, 109, 504, 506, 418 read

with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the

IPC’) and Sections 75 and 87 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and

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Protection of Children) Act, 2015, (hereinafter referred to as

‘the JJ Act’) wherein certain allegations were made.

6) Later, on 07.07.2018, the Husband-‘R’, filed a Petition

under Section 13(1)(1-A) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955,

before the Court of Ist Additional Principal Judge, Family

Court, Bengaluru, bearing MC No. 3654/2018, seeking a

decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and adultery.

Pending the Guardianship Petition, certain visitation

arrangements were made.

7) On 03.03.2022, the IVth Additional Principal Judge,

Family Court, Bengaluru, allowed the petition filed by the

Husband-‘R’ and directed the Wife-‘E’ to handover the

custody of the minor child ‘M’, then aged 7 years, to the

custody of the Husband-‘R’, within one month. Further order

was made, permanently restraining ‘E’ from removing the

child from the jurisdiction of the Court till the child was

handed over to Husband-‘R’.

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8) Being aggrieved, Wife -‘E’ filed MFA No. 2786 of 2022

before the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru. The High

Court, vide order dated 31.01.2023, while dismissing the

appeal, made certain visitation arrangements in the following

terms:-

"68. The appeal is dismissed. We feel that the interest of

the minor child will be best served if the custody of the

child is handed over to the respondent, but with sufficient

access to the appellant to visit the minor at frequent

intervals, and therefore, while confirming the judgment

and decree dated 03.03.2022 passed by the Family Court

in G & WC. No. 128/2018 filed by the respondent under

Section 25 of the Act, and directing appellant to grant

custody of the minor child to the respondent, we are

inclined to grant visitation rights to the appellant though

she has not prayed for the same, on the following terms:

(i) The appellant is directed to hand over the minor child

to the custody of the respondent after completion of the

child's annual final examinations for the present academic

year i.e., 2022-23.

(ii) The respondent shall make arrangements for the child

to continue her studies in her present school and shall shift

his residence to a place which is within the radius of 5

kms. from the child's school.

(iii) The respondent shall provide the school calendar of

the child with list of holidays along with dates of

examination to the appellant.

(iv) The respondent shall meet all the expenses of the

minor child towards her education, health, care, food and

clothing and in the event the appellant also wishes to

contribute towards the upbringing of the child, the

respondent shall not create any obstruction to and/or

prevent the appellant from also making such contribution.

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(v) The appellant will be at liberty to visit the minor child

either in the respondent's house or in the premises of a

mutual friend or any other place as may be agreed upon

on every Sunday. To enable the appellant to meet the

child, the respondent shall ensure the child's presence

either in his house or in the house of the mutual friend or

in a public place agreed upon at 10.00 a.m. The appellant

will be entitled to take the child out with her for the day,

and to bring her back to the respondent's house or the

premises of the mutual friend within 7:00 p.m. in the

evening.

(vi) On all important festival days for which holiday is

declared to the School, the appellant shall be entitled to

take custody of the child between 10.00 a.m. and 1.00 p.m.

(vii) The appellant, upon prior intimation to the

respondent, will also be entitled to meet the minor at her

school once a week after school hours for about an hour.

(viii) The appellant will also be entitled to the custody of

the minor for 10 consecutive days during the summer

vacation on dates to be mutually settled between the

parties.

(ix) During long holidays/vacations covering more than

ten days, the child will be allowed to be in the company of

the mother for half of the said long holidays/vacations.

(x) The mother is entitled to communicate with the child

through phone/video call/skype etc., between 7.00 p.m.

to 8:00 p.m. everyday.

xi) The aforesaid arrangement will continue for the

present, but the parties will be at liberty to approach the

Family Court, Bengaluru, for fresh directions should the

same become necessary on account of changed

circumstances."

9) Against the said judgment dated 31.01.2023, Wife -‘E’

preferred a Special Leave Petition (C) No. 4869/2023 before

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this Court. On 17.03.2023, at her request, the special leave

petition was adjourned to 24.03.2023. On 24.03.2023, when

further adjournment was sought by Wife -‘E’; this Court

adjourned the matter to 29.03.2023 with a notice that the

petition will be heard and disposed of on the next date of

hearing.

10) In the meantime, on 25.03.2023, the Court of Ist

Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, allowed

the petition for divorce filed by the Husband-‘R’ and dissolved

the marriage between the parties.

11) Reverting back to the proceedings in the Special Leave

Petition (C) No. 4869 of 2023 pertaining to the custody of child

‘M’, the matter was taken up by this Court on 29.03.2023. The

Mother-‘E’ did not appear before the Court on 29.03.2023

though she was prosecuting the case in person. The Court

dismissed the Special Leave Petition by the following order:-

“1. On 7 March 2023, this Court, while taking note of the

grievance of the petitioner, granted protection to her to

operate till 15 March 2023 with liberty to approach the

High Court.

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2. On 17 March 2023, the hearing was adjourned to 24

March 2023.

3. On 24 March 2023, the petitioner circulated a letter in

pursuance of which an adjournment was granted and the

petitioner was placed on notice that the petition will be

disposed of on the next date of listing.

4. Again the petitioner has persisted with filing another

letter seeking an adjournment. In view of the previous

order, an adjournment cannot be granted again.

5. We have gone through the impugned order of the High

Court and see no infirmity in the findings. The High Court

has upheld the order which was passed by the trial Judge.

6.The Special Leave Petition shall stand dismissed.

7.Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.”

12) A Miscellaneous Application, being MA (Diary) No.

13822/2023 was filed by the Mother-‘E’ to recall the order

dated 29.03.2023, was dismissed on 10.04.2023. A SLP (C)

Diary No.19821/2023 filed by Child ‘M’, through her Mother

‘E’, was also dismissed.

13) On 11.04.2023, the Father-‘R’ filed a Writ Petition before

the High Court being W.P.H.C. No. 30 of 2023, for a direction

to ‘E’ to produce ‘M’. Non-bailable warrants (NBWs) were

issued by the High Court on 27.04.2023 against ‘E’. A

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challenge by Mother-‘E’ to the NBWs in this Court was

dismissed on 16.05.2023 in Diary no. 19469/2023.

14) On 07.06.2023, the Division Bench of the High Court,

allowed the W.P.H.C. No. 30 of 2023 filed by the Father-‘R’ and

the directions were given to the Commissioner of Police,

Bengaluru, to ensure that the concerned Station House Officer

(SHO), hands over the custody of ‘M’ to ‘R’ within 24 hours of

the receipt of the order of the High Court.

15) It is not in dispute that on 07.06.2023 itself, custody was

indeed handed over to ‘R’, the father of the Child ‘M’. Multiple

proceedings including criminal proceedings were filed by ‘E’

against ‘R’ and the family members soon after the handing

over. It was alleged that Father-‘R’ was committing violence

against ‘M’. It is not disputed that these proceedings are all,

as on date, closed with the surviving criminal proceeding

being the one arising out of FIR No.76/2024 with which we are

concerned in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.

1092/2024.

11

16) No doubt, as far as Mother-‘E’ is concerned, there is a

criminal proceeding arising out of FIR No. 165 of 2018 dated

05.06.2018, which we have dealt with later in the judgment.

17) Thereafter, Mother-‘E’ filed a Contempt Petition being

CCC No.586/2023, before the High Court for violation of

directions given in MFA No. 2786/2022, vide judgment dated

31.03.2023. The High Court, vide order dated 14.12.2023,

modified certain visitation arrangements in favour of the

Mother ‘E’-Respondent No. 1 herein in the following terms :-

“We had a long interaction with the child in the

Chambers. In this interaction, we found that the child is a

sensitive child and is interested in extra-curriculum

activities like sports, drawing and painting. We also found

that there is scope for healthy bond between the child and

the parents and for this healthy bond and natural growth

of the child, there is need for some modification in the

arrangement which is made, either under the terms

arrived at between the parties or under the orders passed

by the Courts. On enquiry made to the parents, it is

informed that the child would have Christmas Vacation

from 23.12.2023 to 01.01.2024. In view of the above, we

deem it appropriate to pass the following order with

certain modifications to the earlier arrangement:

(i) The father shall bring the child to the mother's house on

Friday i.e. on 15.12.2023 in the evening by 6.30 p.m. and

the child shall stay with the mother for Saturday and till

Sunday evening. The mother shall then allow the father to

take the child back on Sunday evening at about 8.30 p.m

and the child will be with the father till 22.12.2023.

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(ii) As informed to us, the child will enjoy Christmas

Vacation for 10 days. We direct that during the first half of

the Christmas Vacation i.e. for the first 5 days, the child

shall stay with the mother and the second half of the

Christmas Vacation, the child is allowed to stay with the

father. Thereafter also, the child will remain with the

father till the next date of hearing.

(iii) As stated above the mother or the father, whoever will

be in custody of the child shall permit the child to speak

with other parent by phone call, video call, whatsapp call

or whatever mode is available.”

18) Against the said Order dated 14.12.2023, the Father filed

the present Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition

(C) being No 1092/2024. While the said petition was pending

before this Court, an FIR dated 28.03.2024, came to be lodged

by Mother-‘E’, bearing No. 76/2024 registered at Jayaprakash

Nagar Police Station, Sub-Division -Jayanagar, District

Bangalore City wherein startling allegations on Father-‘R’ and

his family members for having committed offences punishable

under Section 10 of the Protection of Children from Sexual

Offences Act, 2012 (for short ‘the POCSO Act’) read with

Section 75 of the JJ Act and Sections 323, 504 and 506 read with

Section 34 of the IPC against ‘M’, were levelled. The gist of the

allegations in the FIR was in the following terms:

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“…On 24.03.2024, when the child came to the

complainant’s house, the child appeared very sad. When

the complainant enquired with the child about this, the

complainant’s daughter did not say anything initially. The

child told the complainant that she was feeling dizzy. The

complainant immediately took the child to Manipal

Hospital for treatment and brought her back home.

However, since the child was still not lively, after some

time, when the complainant again enquired with her

daughter, the child hugged the complainant and started

crying and was in great distress.

Observing all this, the complainant took the child to a

child psychologist. After counselling the child, the doctor

informed the complainant about the following: the child’s

grandfather, grandmother, and their aunt were scolding,

beating and using abusive language against the child. The

child’s father was forcibly touching the child’s private

parts and also pressuring the child to touch his private

parts, thereby subjecting the child to sexual harassment.

Furthermore, the father had threatened the child that if

she disclosed this matter to anyone, he would kill the

complainant (mother).

Subsequently, on 10.02.2024, at approximately 11:30 AM,

the father ‘R’ made the child sit in his car and sexually

harassed the child. Later, on 24.02.2024, at approximately

10:30 PM at night, the father took the child outside in his

car, stopped the car near a traffic signal, and forcibly

made the child touch his private parts. When the child

refused, he assaulted the child inside the car, as stated by

the child to the doctors.

The complainant presented the child before the Child

Welfare Committee and got the child’s statement

recorded in the presence of the committee’s doctor, and

has come late today to file the complaint. Therefore, the

complainant requests that appropriate legal action be

taken…..”

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19) The statements of the child ‘M’ were also recorded. The

child was subjected to medical examination at KIMS Hospital

& Research Centre, Bengaluru.

20) This Court, on 22.07.2024, on being informed about the

FIR No. 76 of 2024, directed the investigation to be handed

over to a Senior Woman Police Officer of the concerned Police

Station, not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of

Police (ACP). Further, the directions were given that the child

be examined by a Panel consisting of three Doctors of

Bangalore Medical College & Research Institute.

21) The case was again taken up on 01.10.2024 and after

interacting with the parties and the child, the criminal

proceedings filed by both the parties were stayed and the

child was permitted to reside with the Mother-‘E’ in

Bengaluru. Thereafter, when the matter was taken up on

16.10.2025 in the Committee Room of this Court and after

interaction with the child ‘M’, it was directed that for the

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present, the child shall continue to stay with Mother-‘E’ and

continued the stay, as ordered earlier.

22) This matter was heard over a period of time, namely, on

08.09.2025, 23.09.2025, 16.10.2025, 17.12.2025 and

29.01.2026. Thereafter, when the case was taken up on

07.04.2026, this Court directed that the investigation in FIR No.

76/2024, should be taken over by the Central Bureau of

Investigation (CBI). The operative part of the said Order of this

Court is as under:-

“12. In such circumstances, we are of the view that we

should direct the CBI to takeover the investigation from

the investigating agency in-charge of the investigation as

on date.

13. The CBI, for the purpose of effective and meaningful

investigation shall constitute a Committee. The

Committee should be headed by an officer not below the

rank of DIG nominated by the Director, CBI. The second

Member in the Committee should be a well renowned

lady Psychologist. Insofar as other Members of the

Committee are concerned, including lady doctor, etc., we

leave it to the better discretion of the CBI.

14. We have thought fit to resort to this process keeping

in mind the sensitivity of the entire issue.

15. The investigating agency in -charge of the

investigation of the said FIR shall transfer all the papers of

the investigation at the earliest to the CBI.

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16. The CBI shall commence with the investigation after

constituting the Committee at the earliest and file a status

report before this Court.

17. If the CBI intends to file any first preliminary status

report, it may do so.

18. The parties shall extend full cooperation in the

investigation that the CBI shall undertake.

19. We make it clear that the CBI shall proceed with the

investigation notwithstanding any orders passed by the

High Court or this Court so far.

20. We further clarify that the CBI shall not take any

coercive steps against both the parties, except that they

shall cooperate in the investigation.”

23) The CBI gave the Final Report with its covering letter

dated 13.07.2026, which we shall deal with in this judgment a

little later. The matter was taken on 17.07.2026 when the CBI

Report was submitted to us. On that day, judgment was

reserved. We also directed parties to surrender their

passports, including the passport of minor daughter, to the

Registry of this Court within a period of five days. On

29.07.2026, the parties reported to us that the passports have

been duly surrendered.

24) At the outset, we must place on record our deep

appreciation for the remarkable efforts put in by the CBI in the

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present matter. Pursuant to our order dated 07.04.2026, a

Committee was constituted under the leadership of Shri K.

Sivasubramani, DIG, CBI, Hyderabad, Shri Vinayak Varma,

SP, CBI and Ms. Shipa D., SP, CBI, as part of the police officers’

team. Further, the Committee inducted Dr. Lakshmi Sravanti

Tanuku, Assistant Professor of the Department of Child and

Adolescent Psychiatry, National Institute of Mental Health and

Neurosciences, Bengaluru (NIMHANS) and Dr. Anamika Sahu,

Assistant Professor of the Department of Clinical Psychology,

NIMHANS. We place on record our appreciation to the

Members of the Committee for the outstanding work done by

them and for the detailed Report, with convincing reasons,

that has been made available to us.

25) The Report is very logically structured and has 8 (Eight)

Chapters with the following details:-

“I. Background of the Case.

II. Investigation by Jayaprakash Nagar Police Station,

Bengaluru.

III. Developments during CBI Investigation.

IV. Findings During CBI Investigation.

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V. Evidence Derived From Psychological/Psychiatric

Evaluation.

VI. Determinations made by CBI.

VII. Conclusion.

VIII. Appendices.”

26) Dealing with the background of the case, the factual

aspects which we have set out hereinabove, have been

encapsulated. Thereafter, the investigation done by the

Jayaprakash Nagar Police Station has been discussed. Dealing

with the developments during the investigation by the CBI,

first, the matrimonial litigation between ‘R’ and ‘E’ has been

discussed. List of key witnesses examined and the summary

of the examination have been made available to us. Similarly,

the list of key documents collected have also been set out and

wherever necessary the documents have been discussed and

woven into the Report at appropriate places with great care

and precision.

27) The medical examination carried out, along with the

physiological examination of the victim, at the time when the

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matter was in the hands of the Jayaprakash Nagar Police, have

also been set out. The Doctors, who carried out the said

examination have been examined. Other crucial witnesses

like the Class Teacher, the Tuition Teacher, the School

Counsellor, the housemaid, co-employees of ‘R’ and ‘E’,

neighbours have also been examined and the statements have

been set out. The CCTV footage procured from the house of

Father-‘R’ during the time when ‘M’ was there between

07.06.2023 and 24.03.2024 (the CCTV footage of crucial

dates) have been analysed, forensically examined and

meticulously discussed in the Report. Observations on CCTV

videos have been carefully set out. What is praiseworthy is

the CCTV footage pertaining to the dates of the alleged sexual

assault and the time as well as the timings immediately

succeeding the alleged assault have been carefully analysed.

28) ‘R’ and ‘E’ have been examined, the family members

have been examined; the allegations against Father-‘R’ and

each other family members have been threadbare discussed

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in the background of the events. The litigation history

including the multiple complaints registered by both the

parties have been referred to. The context of matrimonial

discord has been appreciated.

29) The most important aspect of the Report is the

psychological/psychiatric evaluation. While the main CBI

Report summarizes evidence derived from the

psychological/psychiatric evaluation, Appendix 7 to the CBI

Report annexes the entire Report.

30) We have, apart from the summary of the integrated

psychiatric and psychological evaluation report in child

forensic context, which is available in the report of the CBI,

also perused the full report minutely. The detailed report runs

into 79 pages and threadbare the matter has been gone into.

The main report is divided into following Sections:

Section 1: Background

Section 2: Purpose and scope of evaluation

Section 3: Forensic interview process and clinical

observations

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Section 4: Clinical Evaluation of the Child

Section 5: Review and analysis of collateral information

Section 6: Statement Credibility Analysis

Section 7: Trauma in the context of child sexual abuse

Section 8: Assessment of behavioural indicators

consistent with grooming

Section 9: Evaluation of loyalty conflicts and family

relational dynamics

Section 10: Integrated formulation

Section 11: Conclusions

At the end of the Report, the psychiatric and psychological

evaluators have answered the SIT-Mandated questions put to

them.

31) We shall revert back to the summary in the CBI report.

The psychological/psychiatric evaluation has been analysed

and divided into the following sub-headings, namely,

(a) Disclosure history of Victim;

(b) Witness statements;

(c) CCTV footages/Video Recordings;

(d) Independent psychiatric & psychological analysis of

victim; and,

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(e) Forensic interview of victim

Thereafter, findings of the psychiatric & psychological

assessment have been set out. It has been found that no signs

of anxiety/trauma consistent with the allegations were found

in the victim. Under this head too, the Report has kept in mind

the following:-

(a) Independent psychologist analysis or the psychological

report.

(b) Perception of/attitude towards/relationship with

mother;

(c) Perception of/attitude towards/relationship with father;

(d) Perception of/attitude towards/relationship with

members of father’s family;

(e) Cause/Origin of allegations;

(f) Inconsistencies observed during interactions with

victim; and,

(g) Analysis of influence by any members of her family.

A conclusion has been recorded that factors like prolonged

parental conflict, on-going custody litigation, repeated

discussions of the allegations, multiple psychological

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consultations and continued exposure to family narratives,

may have influenced the child’s perceptions and narratives.

32) Not stopping there, the CBI, in detail, discusses the legal

provisions and the judgments of this Court; the

inconsistencies in the statements have been analysed; the

analysis of the CCTV footage with the analysis of the

statements of the witnesses have been set out separately and

the opinion of experts has been discussed.

33) Applying the legal principles, the following conclusion

was arrived at:-

“In conclusion, the investigation believes that the

testimony of the victim does not appear reliable or

trustworthy. The contradictory testimonies, the absence

of independent corroborative proof, the CCTV footages

that suggest a different series of events, as well as the

psychiatric/psychological evaluation, are sufficient to

raise doubt as to the reliability and trustworthiness of the

allegations. While each individual aspect may be

insufficient in itself to negate the allegations, but taken

together in their entirety, the Committee finds that the

allegations are not made out against the accused and the

matter is not fit for prosecution.”

34) Having elaborately considered the facts and minutely

evaluated the exhaustive Report submitted by the CBI, we are

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of the opinion that interest of justice requires that FIR No.

76/2024, re-numbered as CBI Case RC0352026S0003, as

registered by the CBI, ACB, ought not to be proceeded with

any further, as doing so would be a gross abuse of process.

We are satisfied that on material, the proceedings have to be

quashed forthwith. Hence, we quash FIR No. 76/2024,

originally registered with Jayaprakash Nagar Police Station,

Jayanagar Sub-Division, Bengaluru, re-numbered as CBI Case

RC0352026S0003 for offences punishable under Section 10 of

the POCSO Act, Section 75 of the JJ Act as well as Sections 323,

504, 506, and 34 of the IPC against Father-‘R’ and three other

family members.

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD: -

35) It is not disputed that the custody battle that was started

in 2018 resulted in Father-‘R’ succeeding right up to this Court.

The present proceedings arose only on the registration of FIR

being No. 76/2024 dated 28.03.2024. That aspect has been

discussed hereinabove and we have concluded by quashing

the said proceedings. We are fully convinced that keeping the

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overall facts and circumstances, applying the long list of

precedents on the welfare of the child principle, evolved by

this Court from Rosy Jacob vs. Jacob A. Chakramakkal,

(1973) 1 SCC 840 onwards, the welfare of ‘M’ will be best

served if she is in the custody and guardianship of Father-‘R’.

In Rosy Jacob (supra) it was held as under:-

“15…..The Court’s power under Section 25 of the

Guardians and Wards Act is also, in our opinion, to be

governed primarily by the consideration of the welfare of

the minors concerned. The discretion vested in the Court

is, as is the case with all judicial discretions to be

exercised judiciously in the background of all the relevant

facts and circumstances. Each case has to be decided on

its own facts and other cases can hardly serve as binding

precedents, the facts of two cases in this respect being

seldom—if ever—identical……”

36) We have also borne-in-mind the education, maintenance

and other considerations including health of the child ‘M’. We

find no good ground to differ from the final order passed by

the Guardianship Court which has been sustained right up to

this Court. If at all, the findings of the Inquiry Report of the CBI,

have only reinforced the fact that the interest of the child

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would be best subserved if she is in the custody and

guardianship of Father-‘R’.

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ABUSE OF LEGAL PROVISIONS: -

37) We opened the judgment observing an alarming trend

that is on the rise where one parent misuses the legal

provisions to gain strategic legal advantage. This Court and

some High Courts have already taken judicial notice of this

unfortunate but a chronic syndrome.

38) In Geddam Jhansi and Anr. vs. State of Telangana and

Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, highlighting the propensity of

parties to exaggerate allegations in matrimonial disputes, this

Court, speaking through N. Kotiswar Singh J., observed as

under: -

“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with

penal consequences involving coercive measures, which

can be permitted only when specific act(s) which

constitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or

any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the

accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with

equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic

disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without

specific allegations and credible materials to support

the same may have disastrous consequences for the

institution of family, which is built on the premise of

27

love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. Institution

of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic

relationships, such as those between family members, are

guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural

expectations. These relationships are often viewed as

sacred, demanding a higher level of respect,

commitment, and emotional investment compared to

other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid

reason, preservation of family relationship has always

been emphasised upon. Thus, when family relationships

are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal

proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be

circumspect and judicious, and should allow invocation of

criminal process only when there are specific allegations

with supporting materials which clearly constitute

criminal offences.

32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of

matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in

the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic

violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other

members of the family who do not come to the rescue of

the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged

incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself

constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts

attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and

relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to

exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily

mean that such domestic disputes should be given the

colour of criminality.” (Emphasis supplied)

39) In Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (2025) 3 SCC

756, highlighting how in matrimonial disputes the main

sufferers are the children, this Court, speaking through one of

us (J.B. Pardiwala J.) held as under: -

28

“32. ……..In matrimonial disputes the main sufferers

are the children. The spouses fight with such venom

in their heart that they do not think even for a second

that if the marriage would come to an end, then what

will be the effect on their children. Divorce plays a

very dubious role so far as the upbringing of the

children is concerned. The only reason why we are

saying so is that instead of handling the whole issue

delicately, the initiation of criminal proceedings would

bring about nothing but hatred for each other. There may

be cases of genuine ill-treatment and harassment by the

husband and his family members towards the wife. The

degree of such ill-treatment or harassment may vary.

However, the police machinery should be resorted to

as a measure of last resort and that too in a very

genuine case of cruelty and harassment. The police

machinery cannot be utilised for the purpose of

holding the husband at ransom so that he could be

squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her parents

or relatives or friends……..” (Emphasis supplied)

40) In Ishwar Chand Sharma and Ors. vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Anr., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 1004, directly

addressing the issue as to how the POCSO Act is used as a

weapon to wreak vengeance and advised the legal fraternity

to refrain parties from filing frivolous complaints, this Court,

speaking through B. V. Nagarathna J., held as under: -

“9. In the backdrop of the facts of the present case, we

wish to underline a worrying trend that has come to

29

our attention. Parties involved in matrimonial or

commercial relationships with one another are

resorting to filing of frivolous and vexatious claims

and allegations of a criminal nature to settle personal

scores and grudges against each other and therefore

turn to nefarious/oblique means to attain the said

objective. We also painfully take judicial cognizance

of the fact that the courts of law are being misused and

overburdened by such vague and vexatious litigations

between spouses as many a times, the recourse to law

and police is taken, in an oblique way so as to

antagonise, pressurise, hound and harass the other

spouse and their family members in order to retaliate

and exact revenge that is carried out due to sheer

hatred and disdain for the said spouse and their family

members.

9.1 While we are cognizant of the fact that there are

genuine and bona fide cases in the courts wherein the

aggrieved parties are genuinely looking for relief and

respite from the actions and omissions of their spouses,

that often require immediate care and attention of the

courts of law and public authorities, such cases get

frequently overshadowed and obscured by the

overwhelming number of false and frivolous cases

filed by spouses against one another as an ‘arm

twisting’ method so as to reach a more favourable

outcome or settlement or more lucrative monetary

settlement. The onus is on courts to be careful and

cautious so as to separate the wheat from the chaff and

separate the genuine cases of matrimonial

oppression, rape and offences against women from

the cases wherein the legal process and procedure is

being used as a tool to file false and frivolous cases out

of vengeance. While doing so, care should be taken to

ensure that the rights and freedoms of innocent

parties are not trampled or arbitrarily taken away by

unscrupulous and baseless litigation.

9.2 We are conscious of the fact that there are many

instances where women are gravely affected by

matrimonial disputes and violence that they have to

endure at the hands of the spouse and in laws and other

30

family members. Such cases deserve our utmost attention

and judicial scrutiny so as to make sure that the ends of

justice are met and the offenders do not go scot-free and

rather get the punishment they deserve. However such a

zeal to meet the ends of justice should be

countenanced, by courts of law and executive

authorities of the State, with a pragmatic approach

bearing in mind the recent trend of criminal litigation

in this country wherein the legal machinery and

statutes are being used as a tool by mischievous

litigants so as to create unnecessary hurdles and

punish unsuspecting and often innocent citizens

particularly in the sphere of matrimonial disputes.

The litigating parties and their advocates should also

be cognizant of the fact that such vexatious filing of

false and frivolous claims and cases cast unnecessary

burden on the already overburdened machinery and

apparatus of the State and Judiciary. This factor also

diverts the attention of courts and its resources

whereas genuine cases of the parties with actual

verifiable grievances are not being able to be

adjudicated in time owing to the time spent in

adjudicating upon phantom claims of mischievous

litigators seeking to create litigation out of thin air or

in the absence of a cause to do so.

9.3 One particular offshoot or a species of vexatious and

frivolous litigation is in family disputes, particularly, a

‘matrimonial bouquet’ that is presented by the estranged

wife against the husband and his family out of personal

animosity and spite once the relationship turns sour and

rancorous and vice versa. This ‘matrimonial bouquet’

often includes claims of dowry demands; cruelty under

498A IPC; harassment by in laws and domestic violence,

made by the complainant against her spouse and in-laws.

This set of cases frequently include bogus and empty

allegations and false claims of harassment, cruelty and

marital hardships that, more often than not, contain little

to no substance at all and are usually not backed by any

material or other documentary evidence. A tell-tale sign

of such vexatious cases is that often they contain vague

and sweeping general allegations that are not specific in

31

nature but rather are aimed at arraying several family

members if not all of the spouse's family, including those

who are old and ailing, as accused and consequently cast

the prosecution net as wide as possible by invoking

multiple provisions of law by using general, vague and

omnibus allegations that are not backed either by fact or

law. We say so while being mindful of the fact that

although any complaint or a FIR is not an encyclopaedia

of evidence and factual circumstances so as to contain all

details of the alleged incident, by no means can it be a

general conglomeration of statements made by the

disgruntled spouse with a mala fide intent, containing

little or no details of the alleged criminal acts that often

lack a chronology of events. Further, sweep ing

allegations and vexatious claims often fail to highlight and

elaborate upon how the alleged acts happened, the

manner in which such acts were undertaken, the aftermath

of such incidents etc.

9.4 In this regard, we would be remiss to not highlight the

recent upswing in the false and frivolous matrimonial

cases which have unfortunately brought to the fore the

uglier side of litigation. A recent trend in this regard is

when the wife resorts to filing false complaints and

cases under POCSO Act alleging that the husband,

who is also the father of the minor child, has

committed wanton acts which are sexual in nature

especially against the minor daughter. At the centre of

this sort of litigation is a child who is often used by her

mother against her father, against her will and wishes,

so as to make false and vexatious complaints against

her father and other male members of her paternal

family in order to exact revenge or as an arm-twisting

tactic to obtain a higher monetary settlement or to

simply harass.

9.5 There are also instances where in cases of enmity

between the members of a family, between

neighbours or business partners or associates, or even

between borrowers and lenders of financial

assistance, a weapon of harassment being resorted to

is a complaint under the POCSO Act at the instance of

a parent of a child (in most cases being the daughter)

32

so as to wreak vengeance or to get over civil disputes

between the parties by a subdued accused under the

said Act yielding to the demands of the complainant.

Also, the threat of a false complaint under the POCSO

Act is used as a means to escape legal consequences

arising out of a commercial transaction, a

matrimonial dispute or such other disputes.

9.6 While we are conscious of the fact that there are

instances and a plethora of cases that are true and deserve

the utmost attention and deft handling on the side of

authorities and Courts and which should be pursued

vigorously to reach a logical conclusion, on the other side

of the spectrum, are cases invoking such serious and

heinous allegations which are prima facie vague, omnibus

and general in nature and thereby lacking any material

backing or evidence which should be shunned at the very

threshold. We say so for the reason that if a person is

made an accused and forced to face a criminal trial on

general and sweeping allegations without bringing on

record any specific instances of criminal conduct, it would

tantamount to an abuse of the process of law and court.

Hence, legal practitioners who tender advice in such

cases must restrain parties from filing such false/frivolous

complaints when requested to do so. Further,

lawyers/advocates must also not advise filing of

criminal complaints which are false/concocted so as

to keep the opposite parties under a tight leash so that

they could come forward for a settlement on the terms

dictated by their parties or else, to face a criminal

prosecution which can prolong for years. When such is

the trend, on the other side, efforts are made to seek

anticipatory bail by persons apprehending arrest owing

to a false/frivolous complaint being lodged which

sometimes reach the portals of this Court after being

unsuccessful at the level of the trial court and High Court.

Also, steps are taken for seeking quashing of such

false/frivolous complaints before the High Court which

has its own saga of uncertainties causing undue pressure,

harassment, stress and tension on the so-called accused.

The consequence of all this is docket explosion and

burden on Courts resulting in genuine complaints and

33

cases not being given due time and attention that they

need.

9.7 Courts then owe a duty to subject the allegations

levelled in the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to

ascertain if a prima facie case is made out or not, and

whether there is any kernel of truth in the allegations or

whether the said allegations have been made only with

the sole intent of spite so as to harass the opposite party

with a prolonged process of criminal litigation, arrest and

sometimes a conviction which later on may result in an

acquittal by a higher Court or in a worse case, no relief at

all being given to an innocent party. This stands more true

when prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute.

9.8 We are also cognisant of the fact that a genre of

matrimonial litigation is on the rise in this country

which inevitably includes, within its ambit, a rise in

filing of false, frivolous and vexatious cases with a

mala fide intent and ulterior motive to wreck havoc

and vengeance on the spouse and in the bargain seek

the best compromise. Therefore, the Courts have to

exercise utmost caution and restraint while

entertaining such suits and criminal proceedings as

any misstep and overreach can have a cascading

effect on the health, both mental and physical, of the

parties involved and the sanctity of the institution of

marriage itself…..” (Emphasis supplied)

41) The High Courts, across the country, have also been

cognizant of this malaise. The Kerala High Court, in Suhara vs.

Muhammed Jaleel, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1237, while

cautioning the Family Courts to not be carried away by

allegations of commission of offences under the POCSO Act

by a parent, noticed the growing tendency as early as in 2019,

34

to foist false crime against the biological father. The Court

held as under: -

“28. In our opinion, mere registration of a crime under the

provisions of the POCSO Act against the parent of the

ward is no assurance to a Family Court that allegation of

sexual abuse made against him is nothing but true. The

allegation made against the biological father could be

true in rare cases, but could be wholly false also. The

Family Court, before which such registration of crime is

proved must necessarily apply its mind and endeavour to

find out the true circumstances which activised the

registration rather than being allured by the mere fact of

registration. Unless a very cautious approach is adopted

by the Family Court to ensure that information on which

crime was registered is not frivolous and vexatious, many

a innocent parent fighting for custody of his own ward

would be victim of false implication of crimes under the

POCSO Act. There is a growing tendency in the recent

years to foist false crimes against the biological father

alleging sexual abuse of own child misusing the

provisions of the POCSO Act when serious fight for

custody of ward is pending resolution before the

Family Courts. The Family Courts to whose notice

registration of crime under the POCSO Act is brought

owe an onerous responsibility to ensure that the

registration of crime against the parent is not a ruse

for defeating his legitimate claim for custody of the

ward. The Family Courts ought to examine the

outcome of investigation of the crime placed before

the court and also take into consideration all relevant

facts and circumstances which would help the Judge

form a prima facie opinion as to whether the allegation

of sexual abuse of the ward is baseless or not. Each

case requires to be approached and evaluated on its

35

own facts and we realise that no hard and fast

approach could be laid in this respect at all. We do not

mean to say that Family Courts should disregard the

materials collected by the investigating agency in the

crime and hold a total independent enquiry in order to

get at the truth or veracity of the allegation. We make

it clear that unless there are reliable materials

capable enough to convince the allegation of sexual

abuse to be well founded, mere registration of crime

shall not be reckoned as a ground for rejecting the

claim of the parent for custody of the child.”

(Emphasis supplied)

42) In N. Chandramohan vs. State and Another, 2019 SCC

OnLine Mad 3666, the High Court of Judicature at Madras,

highlighting the damage caused to a parent, in case of false

accusations, made the following telling observations: -

“11. There were instances when the attention of this

Court was drawn to similar such incidents, where

false complaint were given as if the husband has

committed an offence under POCSO Act against the

daughter and it was informed to this Court that such

cheap tactics are adopted in the family court cases,

just to arm twist the husband and make him fall in

line. This Court was not willing to believe that such

instances can happen and this case is an eye opener

for this Court. This Court was made aware, the extent

to which POCSO Act can be misused.

12. The object of the POCSO Act was to protect

children from offence of sexual assault, sexual

36

harassment, etc., and that is why the Act specifically

provides for a legal presumption as to the commission

of the offence and the culpable mental state, once a

prosecution is launched under this Act. The burden of

proof is upon the accused to prove that he had no such

mental state with respect to the Act charged as an

offence in that prosecution. The consequences of

prosecuting a person under this Act are very serious

and apart from providing for stringent punishments,

the person who is prosecuted virtually comes down in

the eyes of the society at large and he is virtually

shunned from the main stream of the society.”

(Emphasis supplied)

43) The judgments set out above thus recognise a trend of

misuse of the provisions of the POCSO Act for extraneous

considerations. In some cases, the provisions are invoked as a

pressure tactic in divorce or custody proceedings, while in

others they are used simply to settle scores or seek revenge.

No doubt, the POCSO Act, under Section 22, provides for

prosecution of persons making false complaints or giving false

information in respect of Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the POCSO

Act respectively. However, by the time Section 22 is invoked

substantial damage would be caused to the party falsely

charged. Section 22 of the POCSO Act reads as under:-

37

“22. Punishment for false complaint or false

information.—(1) Any person, who makes false complaint

or provides false information against any person, in

respect of an offence committed under sections 3, 5, 7 and

section 9, solely with the intention to humiliate, extort or

threaten or defame him, shall be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months

or with fine or with both.

(2) Where a false complaint has been made or false

information has been provided by a child, no punishment

shall be imposed on such child.

(3) Whoever, not being a child, makes a false complaint or

provides false information against a child, knowing it to be

false, thereby victimizing such child in any of the offences

under this Act, shall be punished with imprisonment, which

may extend to one year or with fine or with both.”

44) The possible misuse of the POCSO provisions was

highlighted in the 240th Report on the POCSO Bill by the

Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource

Development. The Report observed thus:-

“11.4 The Committee observes that the National Commission

for Protection of Child Rights, the statutory body at the

national level meant to act as a watch dog for protection of

child rights is in agreement with this provision. The

Committee understands that the proposed law is meant to

instill in children a sense of confidence to report abuse and

exploitation instead of deterring them from reporting. But at

the same time, provision of this proposed law is not

meant for settling scores and such attempts need to be

curbed. The argument that the CrPC contains adequate

provisions to deal with false complaints is also not very

convincing. The Committee has observed that all such

legislations invariably have a provision which would serve as

a deterrent in case of false complaints being made. The only

38

thing is to ensure that such a provision is free from any

unnecessary or uncalled for stipulation.”

(Emphasis supplied)

45) Thus, it is clearly mentioned in the aforesaid report that the

POCSO Act is not meant for settling scores and any attempt

made to misuse the provisions would accordingly need to be

curbed. Although Section 22 of the POCSO Act is meant to

deter false complaints, yet by the time this provision comes

into application, irreparable harm may already have been

done to the accused. This harm can take two forms. First, the

accused may suffer prolonged incarceration, with the loss of

liberty and the other adverse consequences that ordinarily

accompany the registration of an FIR. Secondly, the accusation

may adversely affect guardianship or custody proceedings

being litigated in a different forum. Therefore, we are of the

considered opinion that certain precautions must be taken,

within the four corners of the law, to prevent such harm from

befalling the accused.

39

46) We shall now discuss the safeguards, the context in which

they would come into play, and their scope.

SAFEGUARDS TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE HARM :-

47) While we are cognizant that the provisions of the POCSO

Act are, in some situations, misused, it would be remiss not to

bear in mind the avowed object and purpose for which the Act

was enacted i.e., to provide a self-contained, comprehensive

legislation to protect children from the offences of sexual

assault, sexual harassment and child sexual exploitation and

abuse material (CSEAM), with due regard to safeguarding the

interest and well-being of the child at every stage of the

process. Any precaution we envision to prevent irreparable

harm to the accused in certain contexts and circumstances

must, therefore, not run counter to the stated object of the Act,

or dilute the stringency with which such offences are meant to

be treated. What is needed is a balancing exercise:

precautions that neither dilute the object of the Act nor weaken

its provisions, while allowing sufficient leeway to ensure that

40

irreparable harm is not caused to the accused. Therefore, any

safeguard we introduce should be read in this specific context.

48) Before the precautions to prevent such harm are set out,

we must be clear as to the exact context in which they would

apply. They would apply only when both of the following

threshold conditions are met:-

i) Firstly, an offence under the POCSO Act is alleged

to have been committed by a parent, or any other

family member who is living under the same roof

as the child victim.

ii) Secondly, a matrimonial dispute of some form,

irrespective of whether it is before a court of law

or not, exists between the parents of the child

victim, thereby indicating the possibility of a

strained relationship. It would be the duty of the

police officer receiving the complaint to verify, at

the time of receipt of the complaint, that a

matrimonial dispute as aforesaid exists between

the parents.

41

(i) IN CASE OF A POLICE REPORT :-

49) First, let us deal with irreparable harm being caused to the

accused parent or a family member living under the same roof

in the form of arrest by the investigating authorities. When the

above-stated threshold conditions are met, post the

registration of an FIR, we are of the considered opinion that the

investigating officer should not act in haste or take coercive

actions in the form of arrest immediately. Such caution, which

must necessarily accompany the exercise of the power to

arrest, has already been emphasized by a long line of

decisions of this Court, and also by the plain words of the

relevant statutory provisions. Arrests vis-à-vis POCSO

offences should be no different. It is towards such statutory

provisions and decisions that we now turn.

50) Section 35 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, (For

short ‘the BNSS’) (pari materia to erstwhile Sections 41 and 41-

A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the

Cr.P.C.’) pertains to when a police officer may arrest without

warrant and reads thus:-

42

“35. When police may arrest without warrant.— (1) Any

police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and

without a warrant, arrest any person—

(a) who commits, in the presence of a police officer, a

cognizable offence; or

(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been

made, or credible information has been received, or a

reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a

cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a

term which may be less than seven years or which may

extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if

the following conditions are satisfied, namely:—

(i) the police officer has reason to believe on the

basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion

that such person has committed the said offence;

(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is

necessary—

(a) to prevent such person from committing any

further offence; or

(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or

(c) to prevent such person from causing the

evidence of the offence to disappear or

tampering with such evidence in any manner; or

(d) to prevent such person from making any

inducement, threat or promise to any person

acquainted with the facts of the case so as to

dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the

Court or to the police officer; or

(e) as unless such person is arrested, his

presence in the Court whenever required

cannot be ensured,

and the police officer shall record while making

such arrest, his reasons in writing:

Provided that a police officer shall, in all cases where

the arrest of a person is not required under the

provisions of this sub-section, record the reasons in

writing for not making the arrest; or

43

(c) against whom credible information has been

received that he has committed a cognizable offence

punishable with imprisonment for a term which may

extend to more than seven years whether with or

without fine or with death sentence and the police

officer has reason to believe on the basis of that

information that such person has committed the said

offence; or

(d) who has been proclaimed as an offender either

under this Sanhita or by order of the State

Government; or

(e) in whose possession anything is found which may

reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and

who may reasonably be suspected of having

committed an offence with reference to such thing;

or

(f) who obstructs a police officer while in the

execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or

attempts to escape, from lawful custody; or

(g) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter

from any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or

(h) who has been concerned in, or against whom a

reasonable complaint has been made, or credible

information has been received, or a reasonable

suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in,

any act committed at any place out of India which, if

committed in India, would have been punishable as

an offence, and for which he is, under any law

relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable to be

apprehended or detained in custody in India; or

(i) who, being a released convict, commits a breach

of any rule made under sub-section (5) of Section

394; or

(j) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written

or oral, has been received from another police

officer, provided that the requisition specifies the

person to be arrested and the offence or other cause

for which the arrest is to be made and it appears

therefrom that the person might lawfully be arrested

44

without a warrant by the officer who issued the

requisition....”

(Emphasis supplied)

51) A bare reading of Section 35 of the BNSS itself reveals that

the power to arrest is a statutory discretion vested in the police

officer and is therefore not mandatory. It prescribes conditions

that must be fulfilled before the discretion to arrest can be

exercised. The police being entrusted with the power to

arrest, and the power being lawfully exercised with proper

justification are two different things. This has been aptly stated

by this Court in Joginder Kumar vs. State of U.P and Ors.,

(1994) 4 SCC 260, in the following manner:-

“20.…No arrest can be made because it is lawful for the

police officer to do so. The existence of the power to arrest

is one thing. The justification for the exercise of it is quite

another. The police officer must be able to justify the arrest

apart from his power to do so. Arrest and detention in police

lock-up of a person can cause incalculable harm to the

reputation and self-esteem of a person. No arrest can be

made in a routine manner on a mere allegation of

commission of an offence made against a person. It would

be prudent for a police officer in the interest of protection

of the constitutional rights of a citizen and perhaps in his

own interest that no arrest should be made without a

reasonable satisfaction reached after some investigation

as to the genuineness and bona fides of a complaint and

a reasonable belief both as to the person’s complicity and

45

even so as to the need to effect arrest. Denying a person of

his liberty is a serious matter.... A person is not liable to arrest

merely on the suspicion of complicity in an offence. There

must be some reasonable justification in the opinion of the

officer effecting the arrest that such arrest is necessary and

justified....”

(Emphasis supplied)

52) This Court has on multiple occasions reiterated that arrest

is not mandatory, even for cognizable offences, and that such

power to arrest should be exercised only after scrupulously

complying with the relevant conditions set out under Section

35 of the BNSS (erstwhile Sections 41 and 41-A of the Cr.P.C.).

[See: Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 273,

Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr., (2022) 10 SCC 51,

Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI & Anr., (2026) 7 SCC 311].

53) This Court in Arnesh Kumar (supra) was tackling a similar

issue i.e., the rampant misuse of Section 498A IPC r/w Section

4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, wherein false allegations

were levelled by the disgruntled wife against the husband and

his relatives. In this context, it was observed that since arrest

brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casts social stigma

46

forever, it would be prudent for a police officer to reasonably

satisfy himself as to the genuineness of the allegation before

proceeding to arrest the accused person(s). It was opined that

scrupulously following, both in letter and spirit, the

requirements laid down under Section 41 of the Cr.P.C. (now,

Section 35 of the BNSS) would sufficiently take care of the

problem. The directions issued in Arnesh Kumar (supra) read

thus:-

“10. We are of the opinion that if the provisions of Section 41

CrPC which authorises the police officer to arrest an accused

without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant are

scrupulously enforced, the wrong committed by the police

officers intentionally or unwittingly would be reversed and

the number of cases which come to the Court for grant of

anticipatory bail will substantially reduce. We would like to

emphasise that the practice of mechanically reproducing in

the case diary all or most of the reasons contained in Section

41 CrPC for effecting arrest be discouraged and

discontinued.

11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police

officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily and

Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and

mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed

above, we give the following directions:

11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its

police officers not to automatically arrest when a

case under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to

satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest

under the parameters laid down above flowing

from Section 41 CrPC;

47

11.2. All police officers be provided with a

check list containing specified sub-clauses under

Section 41(1)(b)(ii);

11.3. The police officer shall forward the check

list duly filled and furnish the reasons and

materials which necessitated the arrest, while

forwarding/producing the accused before the

Magistrate for further detention;

11.4. The Magistrate while authorising

detention of the accused shall peruse the report

furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid

and only after recording its satisfaction, the

Magistrate will authorise detention;

11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be

forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from

the date of the institution of the case with a copy to

the Magistrate which may be extended by the

Superintendent of Police of the district for the

reasons to be recorded in writing;

11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section

41-A CrPC be served on the accused within two

weeks from the date of institution of the case,

which may be extended by the Superintendent of

Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded

in writing;

11.7. Failure to comply with the directions

aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police

officers concerned liable for departmental action,

they shall also be liable to be punished for

contempt of court to be instituted before the High

Court having territorial jurisdiction.

11.8. Authorising detention without recording

reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate

concerned shall be liable for departmental action

by the appropriate High Court.”

(Emphasis supplied)

54) It would be apposite that we look into the parameters laid

down under Section 35 of the BNSS (erstwhile Sections 41 and

41-A of the Cr.P.C.) which provides a protective shield against

48

unnecessary, hasty or mechanical arrests. Since, we are

primarily concerned with offences under the POCSO Act, we

only need to deal with the conditions governing arrest for

cognizable offences, particularly those in Section 35(1)(b) of

the BNSS (cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment

for a term of up to seven years) and Section 35(1)(c) of the

BNSS (cognizable offences punishable with imprisonment for

a term exceeding seven years, or with death), respectively.

55) Section 35(1)(b) prescribes two conditions that must be

satisfied before a police officer may exercise the discretion to

arrest. First, the officer must have “reason to believe”, on the

basis of the complaint, information or suspicion that the person

whose arrest is sought has committed the offence. Secondly,

the officer must be satisfied that arrest is necessary: (i) to

prevent the person from committing any further offence; or (ii)

for proper investigation of the offence; or (iii) to prevent the

person from tampering with evidence; or (iv) to prevent the

person from making threats or promises to persons

49

acquainted with the facts of the case; or (v) to ensure the

person’s presence in Court whenever required, which cannot

otherwise be secured.

56) Section 35(1)(c), on the other hand, permits arrest where

the police officer has “reason to believe” that the person has

committed the offence based on credible information

received. Unlike, Section 35(1)(b), it does not require the

officer to be satisfied that arrest is necessary on other grounds.

57) Despite some clear differences existing between Section

35(1)(b) and Section 35(1)(c) respectively, there runs a

common thread across both the provisions, i.e., arrest is only

allowed when the police officer has “reason to believe” that the

offence in question has been committed by the person whose

arrest is sought. No doubt, the existence of such ‘reason to

believe’ is a prerequisite even where arrest is sought for the

alleged commission of offences under the POCSO Act.

58) In the present context, i.e., in cases where the threshold

conditions are met, where a parent or relative living under the

50

same roof is alleged to have committed an offence under the

POCSO Act against the child and where a matrimonial dispute

of some form exists between the parents of the child victim,

the investigating authorities may encounter some difficulties.

In such instances, although the nature of allegations made in

the FIR may indicate that such offence has been committed, yet

the surrounding circumstances, more particularly, the

strained relationship between the parents, may raise a doubt

as to whether those allegations simpliciter can safely be relied

upon. In other words, the investigating authority may hesitate

to conclude that there is ‘reason to believe’ that the accused

has committed the offence. Faced with such a conundrum, the

investigating officer may find himself in a dilemma to proceed

insofar as arrest is concerned and satisfy the requirements laid

down under Sections 35(1)(b)(i) and 35(1)(c) of the BNSS,

respectively. In such circumstances, something more would

be needed to assist and aid the investigating authorities.

51

59) In this regard, in the facts of the present case, the role

played by Dr. Lakshmi Sravanti Tanuku, Assistant Professor of

the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, NIMHANS

and Dr. Anamika Sahu, Assistant Professor of the Department

of Clinical Psychology, NIMHANS, was an eye-opener for us.

60) Therefore, we are of the opinion that in aforesaid

situations, the investigating officer or the Special Juvenile

Police Unit (“SJPU”) shall engage the services of an expert in

child and adolescent psychiatry/clinical psychology in

consultation with the District Child Protection Unit (“DCPU”)

or the District Legal Services Authority (DLSA) where DCPU is

not available, of the concerned district, for the purpose of

aiding the investigation. However, the investigating officer

may, in exceptional cases, where the material is palpable, for

reasons to be recorded in writing dispense with the

engagement of the services of an expert in child and

adolescent psychiatry/psychology. Such an expert shall

ordinarily be engaged from the register maintained by the

52

DCPU under Rule 5(1) of the POCSO Rules, 2020, and shall

hold the qualifications contemplated under Rule 5(5). Where

the register does not include a suitable expert in child and

adolescent psychiatry/clinical psychology, the investigating

authorities may, in consultation with the DCPU, engage an

expert from outside the register, provided that the expert

holds equivalent qualifications.

61) Furthermore, if the Child Welfare Committee (“CWC”)

has appointed a support person qualified under Rule 5(6) of

the POCSO Rules, 2020, to render assistance to the child in

accordance with Rule 4(8), then such support person may

accompany the child during the aforesaid

psychological/psychiatric evaluation. It must be ensured that

the evaluation is conducted in an independent manner, free

from any influence of the disgruntled parent and the

investigating authorities. Wherever possible and considered

appropriate, the investigating officer may provide any

additional material collected in the course of investigation thus

far, which may render some assistance to the expert in their

53

evaluation. After due evaluation of the child, the expert shall

submit a report, as expeditiously as possible, to the

investigating officer, or the SJPU as the case may be, detailing

the results of the psychological/psychiatric evaluation.

62) The evaluation conducted by the expert shall be strictly

in consonance with all applicable principles/provisions of the

POCSO Act and the POCSO Rules, 2020, respectively, and in a

manner which ensures that the child is not put under any

pressure or caused any discomfort or repeated harassment, at

any stage. Further, we must clarify that the

aforesaid psychological/psychiatric evaluation shall not in

any manner disturb the procedure already envisaged under

Rules 4(4) to 4(7) of the POCSO Rules, 2020 wherein the CWC

would assess whether the child needs to be taken out of the

custody of the child’s family or shared household.

63) Upon receipt of the psychological/psychiatric evaluation

report, the investigating authorities shall take the opinion of

the expert into consideration, along with other relevant

54

material and circumstances, to decide whether there is a

“reason to believe” that the accused has committed the

offence, for the purpose of effectuating his arrest. At this

juncture, it is important to clarify the following:

a. First, the investigating officer or the SJPU would not be

bound by the findings or the contents of the expert report.

As noted above, the discretion to arrest lies with the

concerned police officer. The report is only a tool in aid of

exercise of discretion diligently in the larger context in

which the allegations of sexual abuse and/or sexual assault

are levelled. It does not control it. Whether coercive steps

in the form of arrest ought to be taken remains for the

investigating officer to decide, after considering the report

along with the other relevant circumstances of the case.

b. Secondly, the expert report shall not be the sole basis for

filing of the chargesheet, or a closure report. Its purpose is

limited to aiding the decision of the investigating agency.

The contents of the expert report will be a relevant factor in

the decision-making process of the investigating officer, in

deciding whether to file a chargesheet or a closure report.

The investigation shall continue in accordance with law.

55

(ii) IN CASE OF A COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 33 OF

THE POCSO ACT:-

64) We may also address ourselves on the manner in which

the aforesaid safeguard would come into application in case a

complaint made under Section 33 of the POCSO Act before the

Special Court. Section 33 of the POCSO Act empowers the

Special Court to take cognizance through two modes: (i) upon

receiving of the complaint of facts which constitute such

offence; and (ii) upon a police report of such facts. It is the first

mode with which we are concerned here.

65) Remarkably, the BNSS does not envisage a complaint

being filed before the Sessions Court. It prescribes the

procedure for filing a complaint before a Magistrate.

Whereas, in contrast, the POCSO Act vests the right in an

aggrieved to approach the Special Court directly. Such an

extraordinary procedure may have been envisaged by the

legislature considering the sensitivity of time, vulnerability of

the victim, and the need to trigger the protective measures

provided under the POCSO Act at the earliest. Therefore, the

56

exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33 via the private

complaint route must not be initiated lightly and the Special

Court before issuing process must find sufficient grounds to

believe that an offence has taken place.

66) Once such a complaint is received by the Special Court, it

would apply its mind to the complaint and the facts disclosed

therein. At this stage, the Court is not obliged to proceed

further in terms of taking cognizance, and it may instead order

the police to investigate into the offence alleged in the

complaint. This would ultimately initiate the process

applicable to a case arising from a police report.

67) In case, the Special Court deems it appropriate to proceed

with the complaint itself, it has to ascertain whether there is a

prima facie case against the accused in the complaint. The

Special Court is not bound to take cognizance of an offence

merely because a complaint has been filed. This application of

mind by the Court would ensure that cognizance and issuance

of process are not based on a complaint that is false or

57

vexatious. In other words, at this stage where the Special Court

is applying its mind to the complaint as regards whether it

should proceed to issue process, it is not conducting a full

trial.

68) The Special Court would be said to have taken cognizance

when it decides to proceed against the person accused of

having committed that offence and not at the time when it was

informed either by the complaint, or by the police report

about the commission of an offence. Once the Special Court

has taken note of the allegations, and applied judicial mind to

the contents of the complaint and the material, it can be said

that the Court has taken cognizance. What we are trying to

convey is that as soon as the Special Court would take

cognizance of the offence, it would issue process.

69) In the aforesaid context, the law as regards summoning of

an accused is settled. Summoning is not a routine exercise of

power, it requires due application of mind and caution. An

order taking cognizance and summoning of an accused must

58

reflect that there has been application of mind to the facts of

the case. The formation of this opinion shall be comprehensive

of the overall facts and circumstances of the case and must

reflect in the order. Although, the Court summoning the

accused is not expected to venture into a detailed discussion

on the merits of the case, yet it has to prima facie be satisfied

that there are sufficient grounds to look further into the

allegations. Ultimately, the decision to issue process should be

made after the Court has looked into circumstances emerging

from the record of the case.

70) The safeguards discussed by us in the foregoing

paragraphs comes into application when the Special Court is

dealing with a complaint where the threshold conditions are

met, and it has to decide whether cognizance should be taken

and summons be issued to the accused. Similarly, it is at this

stage that the Special Court shall involve the services of an

expert in child and adolescent psychiatry/clinical

psychology. Such an expert shall conduct

59

psychiatric/psychological evaluation of the child victim and

submit a report to the Special Court detailing the results of

such evaluation. The Special Court shall take into

consideration such report and other relevant circumstances

and form an opinion on whether there are sufficient grounds

for proceeding with the complaint. However, in exceptional

cases, where the material is palpable, the special Court may,

for reasons to be recorded in writing, dispense with the

involvement of the services of an expert in child and

adolescent psychiatry/psychology.

71) In our considered opinion, a Court while dealing with a

complaint filed in the background of a matrimonial dispute of

some form should be circumspect. This context requires the

Court to take into account the overall circumstances leading to

the filing of the complaint and reading between the lines. In

such circumstances, the evaluation report would enable the

Court to look into the allegations with care and a little more

closely with abundant caution.

60

72) We direct that the safeguards enshrined in this judgment,

for cases arising out of first information report (police report

cases), shall apply to cases where investigation is still in

progress on the date of this judgment. We further direct that

the safeguards enshrined in this judgment insofar as private

complaints under Section 33 of the POCSO Act, shall apply to

cases where summons have not been issued as on the date of

this judgment.

(iii) SYNTHESIZING OUR APPROACH :-

73) The rationale behind the approach set out above is simple.

In some cases where the threshold conditions are met, a pre-

existing strained relationship may make it difficult for the

concerned authorities to decide, on the material before them

alone, whether coercive action ought to be taken. To address

this informational deficit, we have prescribed that the services

of an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry/clinical

psychology be engaged. After due evaluation of the child, the

expert shall submit a report detailing the results of the

psychological/psychiatric evaluation. On receipt of the

61

report, the authorities shall consider the expert’s opinion,

along with the other relevant material and circumstances, to

decide whether coercive action ought to be taken against the

accused. The procedure thus operates strictly within the four

corners of the law. It is envisioned to avoid the irreparable

harm in the form of an unwarranted arrest that may cause to

the accused, while not diluting the objects of the POCSO Act,

and the stringency of its provisions.

74) In order to actualize and give effect to the above approach,

it is imperative that in all districts, the respective DCPU shall

update the existing register maintained under Rule 5 of the

POCSO Rules, 2020, to include names of experts in child and

adolescent psychiatry/clinical psychology.

75) Our discussion in the foregoing paragraphs serve a

further purpose. The courts dealing with remand and bail in

cases that meet the threshold conditions should also examine

whether, in taking coercive action, the investigating officer

complied with the statutory provisions discussed above. This

62

would necessarily involve assessing whether the decision to

arrest was taken having duly considered the circumstances in

which the complaint arose, more particularly, the strained

relationship between the parents. This provides a further

safeguard against the prolongation of harm caused by an

unwarranted arrest.

(iv) ADVERSE EFFECT ON OTHER LITIGATIONS :-

76) We may now briefly consider a related situation. The child

who is the alleged victim of an offence under the POCSO Act

may be the subject of guardianship or custody proceedings

between the child’s parents, and the offence may be alleged

against one of the parents or against any other family member

of that parent living under the same roof as the child. In such a

case, the registration of the POCSO case may adversely affect

that parent’s interests in the guardianship or custody

proceedings. If the complaint is made with mala fide intent, its

purpose may be to gain an upper hand in those proceedings.

In such cases, the concerned court should adopt the approach

63

suggested by the Kerala High Court in Suhara (supra), to

which we have already referred. To reiterate, the Kerala High

Court held that: (i) the mere registration of a case under the

POCSO Act should not by itself give rise to an inference that

the allegation is true, and should not be allowed to become a

ruse for defeating that parent's legitimate claim to custody or

guardianship; and (ii) the court concerned, after considering

the relevant material, including the material collected by the

investigating agency, shall, on a case-to-case basis, form a

prima facie view as to whether the allegations are baseless.

77) Beyond the basic principles reiterated above, it is difficult

for us to state precisely the course that the court concerned

should follow. The multiplicity of facts and circumstances in

which such situations may arise, makes any hard and fast rule

impossible to conceive and impracticable to apply. How the

matter should proceed is therefore for the concerned court to

decide, in light of the basic principles laid down above and by

due application of judicial mind.

64

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS : -

78) In view of our findings above, we are fully convinced that

FIR No. 76/2024 dated 28.03.2024 was registered only for the

purpose of laying a foundation to handover the custody of the

child back to Mother-‘E’. This was obviously for the reason that

even this Court had by its order of 29.03.2023 in SLP (C) No.

4869/2023 confirmed the grant of custody to the Father-‘R’.

Now, that the Report of the CBI has, after a threadbare

investigation, found the case to be not maintainable, the very

basis for Mother-‘E’ to seek custody of ‘M’ stands shattered.

79) We have deliberately refrained from making any further

observations. Consequently, Civil Appeal arising out SLP (C)

No. 1092/2024 is disposed of in the following terms:-

(a) FIR No. 76/2024, re-numbered as CBI Case

RC0352026S0003, as registered by the CBI, ACB, for

offences punishable under Section 10 of the POCSO Act,

Section 75 of the JJ Act as well as Sections 323, 504, 506

65

read with Section 34 of IPC against the Father-‘R’, will

stand quashed;

(b) Consequently, we direct the legal custody of ‘M’ will

rest with ‘R’;

(c) We are conscious of the fact that since 24.03.2024,

physical custody of ‘M’ has been with ‘E’. Considering

the overall facts and situations, the process of re-

integration of ‘M’ with ‘R’ and his family needs to take

place.

(d) Considering the sensitivity of the matter, we, for the

limited purpose of re-integrating the physical custody of

‘M’ with ‘R’, remit the matter back to Family Court. The

process of re-integration will be done by the IVth

Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru. In

the process, the Family Court will be advised by a

Committee of Experts, consisting of:-,

I. Shri Vinayak Varma, SP, CBI

II. Ms. Shilpa D., SP, CBI;

66

III. Dr. Lakshmi Sravanti Tanuku, Assistant Professor

of the Department of Child and Adolescent

Psychiatry, NIMHANS; and

IV. Dr. Anamika Sahu, Assistant Professor of the

Department of Clinical Psychology, NIMHANS.

80) The Committee, in the first sitting, which may be held at

a very early date, will decide with whom the interim custody

of ‘M’ should be, pending the reintegration. The Committee

will, keeping in mind the observations in the judgment and the

report of the CBI, be at liberty to take a call on whether the

interim physical custody should be with the Child Welfare

Committee or any other neutral place or even with the mother.

At this stage also, visitation arrangements can be made for ‘R’

and ‘E’, wherever necessary.

81) Their report on interim custody may be given to the

Family Court.

67

82) After the final integration of ‘M’ with ‘R’ is also done, the

Family Court shall make an appropriate order for visitation to

‘E’.

83) Mother-‘E’ shall fully cooperate with the process.

However, we make it clear that any disobedience of the

orders or attempt to disobey will result in serious

consequences.

84) The passports deposited with the registry of this Court by

both parties shall be transmitted to the IVth Additional

Principle Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, who may return the

same to the parties after the process of reintegration of ‘M’

with ‘R’ is complete.

85) We direct that the parties herein, along with the child ‘M’,

to report at 10:00 A.M. in the Chambers of IVth Additional

Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru, along with a copy of

this judgment on 28.09.2026.

86) Let a copy of this judgment be sent to IVth Additional

Principal Judge, Family Court, Bengaluru. Let a copy of this

68

judgment be also sent to Shri Vinayak Varma, SP, CBI, Ms.

Shilpa D., SP, CBI, Dr. Lakshmi Sravanti Tanuku, Assistant

Professor of the Department of Child and Adolescent

Psychiatry, NIMHANS and Dr. Anamika Sahu, Assistant

Professor of the Department of Clinical Psychology,

NIMHANS so as to enable them to be also present at 10:00

A.M. before the Family Court.

Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7710 /2024,

SLP (Crl.) No. 7711/2024 and SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10197 -

10198/2024:

87) These are filed by Mother-’E’ & Father-‘R’ challenging

the order of the Karnataka High Court in Criminal Petition No.

1565/2021 connected with Criminal Petition No. 8562/2021

and Criminal Petition No. 10029/2021. ‘E’ along with one ‘S’

sought quashment of chargesheet bearing CC No. 25342/2018

arising out of Crime No. 165/2018 dated 05.06.2018 pending

before the XXX, ACMM Court at Bangalore for offences

punishable under Sections 120B, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 109,

504, 506 read with Section 34 of the IPC along with Sections 75

and 87 of the JJ Act and all further investigation and

69

proceedings. The High Court, while quashing the chargesheet

for offences under Sections 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 504, 506,

109 read with Section 34 IPC, refused to quash the

proceedings for the offences under Sections 75 and 87 of the

JJ Act. The High Court also allowed the petition of Father-‘R’,

namely, Criminal Petition No. 10029 of 2021 and directed

further investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The Mother-

‘E’ has challenged the order by filing two special leave

petitions, one challenging the refusal to quash offences under

Sections 75 and 87 of the JJ Act and second against the conduct

of further investigation. ‘R’, the complainant in Crime No. 165

of 2018, is aggrieved by the quashment of offences under the

Sections referred to above. ‘S’, who was a petitioner before

the High Court, has not filed any Special Leave Petition. We

have seen the gravamen of the allegations. Crime No. 165 of

2018 was registered on 05.06.2018 when the acrimony

between the parties was at its peak. Today, much water has

flown under the bridge, and we have while disposing of the

civil appeal arising out of special leave petition (C) No. 1092

70

of 2024 made orders, keeping in mind the best interest of the

child. Hence, we direct that no further action need be taken

pursuant to FIR No. 165/2018 dated 05.06.2018 and the said FIR

No. 165 2018 and further proceedings thereto, including the

charge sheet, shall stand quashed.

88) The petition filed by Mother-‘E’, being GWC No.

194/2024, will stand terminated. We have terminated this

fresh guardianship proceedings, because the foundation of

such petition is the lodgement of FIR No. 76/2024. With the

said FIR itself having been quashed, there is no basis to

continue this fresh guardianship petition.

89) The appeals stand disposed of in the above terms.

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 208 OF 2024

90) This Contempt Petition is filed by Father-‘R’ in Civil

Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 1092 of 2024. The petitioner

alleges breach of order dated 22.01.2024 passed by this Court

which had stayed the visitation rights granted to the mother

by the orders of the High Court dated 14.12.2023 and

71

05.01.2024 and continued the visitation rights granted by the

judgment dated 31.01.2023. Considering the order that we

have made in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 1092 of

2024, to give a quietus to all acrimonious litigation in the

larger interest of the child, we close this contempt petition.

The contempt petition also stands disposed of. No further

orders are needed therein. There is a further prayer to direct

withdrawal of Crime No. 76 of 2024. That prayer also does not

survive in view of the fact that we have quashed the

proceedings. We do not propose to proceed further in the

matter.

DIRECTIONS VIS-À-VIS SAFEGUARDS: -

91) The safeguards set out in this judgment will be strictly

observed by the concerned authorities. However, as

clarified, they will operate in the case of proceedings

instituted on first information reports, to investigations which

are underway on the date of this judgment. Similarly, insofar

as private complaints under Section 33 are concerned, the

72

safeguards will apply to cases where summons have not

already been issued, as on the date of this judgment.

92) A copy of this judgment be sent to Registrar Generals of

the High Courts, with a request to place the same before the

Hon’ble Chief Justices of the High Courts. The High Courts

shall transmit a copy of this judgment to every criminal court

after drawing particular attention to para Nos. 47-77

hereinabove.

93) We further direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to

the Chief Secretaries of all the States & Union Territories, for

onward transmission to every police station after drawing

particular attention to para Nos. 47-77 hereinabove.

……….........................J.

[J.B. PARDIWALA]

……….........................J.

[K. V. VISWANATHAN]

New Delhi;

September 24, 2026