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PETITIONER:

RACHAPUDI SUBBA RAO

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THE ADVOCATE-GENERAL, ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/12/1980

BENCH:

SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

BENCH:

SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)

CITATION:

1981 AIR 755 1981 SCR (2) 320

1981 SCC (2) 577

ACT:

Contempt of Courts Act 1971-Sections 2(c), 3 and 13-

Scope of-Contemner attributed mala fides to a judicial

officer in a judgment which went against him-Notice issued

by the contemner during pendency of execution proceedings-

Whether amounts to contempt.

Words and Phrases : "due course of justice"-meaning of

HEADNOTE:

The appellant was the plaintiff in a suit for

declaration of title in respect of a building. The defendant

in that suit filed another suit claiming damages against the

appellant. Both the suits were heard by the Additional Sub-

Judge who by a common judgment, dismissed the appellant's

suit and decreed the defendant's suit.

The appellant thereupon issued notice to the Additional

Sub Judge alleging that he (the Additional Sub-Judge)

"created new facts", had "intentionally and with bad faith

and maliciously disordered the existing oral and documentary

evidence with a view to help the plaintiff" in the second

suit, had "maintained different standards even with regard

to self-serving statements" and that these acts could not be

said to have been done in the discharge of his judicial

duties within the limits of his jurisdiction in good faith

and threatened to seek redress if damages claimed by him

were not paid.

The Additional Sub Judge submitted this notice to the

High Court for suitable action being taken against the

appellant. At the instance of the High Court the Advocate

General instituted contempt proceedings against the

appellant. Negativing the appellant's defences the High

Court convicted him holding that the passages in the notice

were per se scandalous and scurrilous, that the notice was a

deliberate and determined attempt to scandalise the Judge

and the Court by imputing lack of good faith and mala fides

to a judicial officer in the discharge of his judicial

duties and that what the appellant had stated in the notice

was clearly 'criminal contempt' as defined in section 2(c)

of the Contempt of Courts Act.

In appeal to this Court the appellant contended (i)

that bad faith and malice stated by him in the notice were

facts constituting the cause of action; (ii) that in any

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event since the suit had been disposed of, execution

proceedings did not constitute a pending matter and,

therefore, what he stated fell within the exception of

section 3, particularly the Explanation and lastly, (iii)

assuming that his action technically amounted to contempt of

court no sentence could be imposed on him in view of section

13 of the Act under which a person cannot be convicted for

contempt under the court is satisfied

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that it substantially interferes or tends substantially to

interfere with the due course of justice.

Dismissing the appeal,

^

HELD : The tone, temper and contents of the notice

imputing malice, partiality and dishonesty to the

Subordinate Judge constitute a deliberate attempt to

scandalise the Judge, to embarrass him and to lower the

authority of his office and the Court. The act and conduct

of the appellant in issuing the impugned notice fell

squarely within sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the definition

of `criminal contempt' in section 2(c) of the Contempt of

Courts Act. [326G-H]

The contempt committed by the appellant is serious and

gross. He has recklessly imputed mala fides and lack of good

faith to the judicial officer who had decided the case

against him. The imputations were per se scandalous,

actuated by bad faith. He did not even pretend to give any

reason either in the notice or in the counter-affidavit for

the alleged malicious attitude on the part of the judicial

officer. Even in this court he has not relented. He has not

adopted, even obliquely, an attitude of contrition or a

pretence of remorse. [329 H]

1. Section 1 of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act,

1850 affords protection to two broad categories of acts done

or ordered to be done by a judicial officer in his judicial

capacity, namely (1) acts which are within the limits of his

jurisdiction and (2) acts which though not within his

jurisdiction were done or ordered to be done believing in

good faith that he had jurisdiction. The protection afforded

by the statute to the first category is absolute and no

enquiry will be entertained that the act in question was

erroneous or done without behaving in good faith. [325 B-E]

The expression "jurisdiction" has been used in the

section in a wide sense meaning "generally the authority of

the judicial officer to act in the matters". If the judicial

officer had the general authority to enter upon an enquiry

into the cause, action etc. in the course of which the

impugned act was done, his act, even if erroneous, would

still be within his "jurisdiction". The mere fact that it

was erroneous would not put it beyond his "jurisdiction".

Therefore, if the judicial officer is found to have been

acting in the discharge of his judicial duties, then, in

order to exclude him from the protection of this statute,

the complainant has to establish that (a) the judicial

officer was acting without any jurisdiction whatsoever and

(b) he was acting without good faith in believing himself to

have jurisdiction. [325 H]

In the instant case the judicial officer had

jurisdiction to try the suits. The acts characterised by the

appellant as "wrong", "malicious", and "dishonest" were acts

done in the discharge of his judicial duties i.e. within the

exercise of his jurisdiction and, therefore, those acts

enjoy absolute protection against civil action. The notice

in question can not be said to have been issued bona fide as

a preliminary lawful step to the filing of a suit against

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the subordinate Judge. [326 D]

2. Section 3(2) is not applicable to this category of

contempt which falls under sub-clause (i) of section 2(c) or

which is otherwise of a kind different from those mentioned

in section 3(1).

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In the instant case though the contempt committed was

not in connection with any pending proceeding, it primarily

and squarely fell under sub-clause (i) though the aforesaid

residuary phrase in sub-clause (iii) may also be attracted.

An unfounded imputation of mala fides, bias, prejudice or

ridiculing the performance of a Judge or casting aspersions

on his integrity is always considered to mean scandalising

the Court and lowering the authority of his Court by

bringing him and his office into disrespect and disrepute.

Vilification of the Judge, even in administrative matters or

decided judicial matters, may amount to "criminal contempt"

under sub-clause (i) of section 2(c) as it lowers or tends

to lower the authority or dignity of the Court by

undermining public confidence in the capacity of the Judge

to mete out evenhanded and impartial justice. [328 H]

3. The amplitude of the words "due course of justice'

in section 13 is wider than the words "due course of any

judicial proceedings" or "administration of justice" used in

sub-clause (ii) or (iii) of section 2(c). The contempt of

court committed by the appellant falls under sub-clause (i)

and also within the amplitude of sub-clause (iii). If the

act complained against scandalizes the judicial officer in

regard to the discharge of his judicial functions, thereby

substantially interferes or tends to interfere with "due

course of justice" which is a facet of the broad concept of

the "administration of justice" it is punishable under

section 13. [329 F-G]

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.

172 of 1975.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23-4-1975 of the

Andhra Pradesh High Court in Contempt Case No. 14/1975.

Appellant in person.

P. Ram Reddy, and G. N. Rao for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SARKARIA, J. This appeal by Rachapudi Subba Rao is

directed against a judgment, dated April 23, 1975 of the

High Court of Andhra Pradesh, whereby the appellant was

convicted for committing gross contempt of court under

Section 12 read with Sections 10 and 15 of the Contempt of

Courts Act, 1971, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and

sentenced to undergo one month's imprisonment. It arises out

of these facts :

The appellant filed Original Suit No. 101 of 1973 in

the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, against five

persons for declaration of his title and for injunction in

respect of a building. The 1st defendant in that suit

instituted Original Suit No. 275 of 1972 in the same Court

against the appellant for possession of the same building

and for recovery of damages for use and occupation. The 1st

Additional Subordinate Judge, Vijayawada, heard the two

suits together and by a common judgment, dated October 31,

1974, dismissed the appellant's suit and decreed the suit of

the then 1st defendant against

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him with costs. The decree-holder filed petition for

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execution of his decree against the appellant. The latter

filed an application for stay of the execution.

When the execution and the appellant's application for

stay were pending, the appellant on December 25, 1974 issued

notice to the Additional Subordinate Judge, who had decided

the suits against him. In that notice which is a lengthy

document, he inter alia made these allegations against the

Judge :

"3. In the said judgment (O.S. Nos. 101/73 and

275/ 72) your honour created new facts by making third

version without evidence as detailed below among

others."

"4. Your honour has intentionally, with bad faith

and maliciously, disordered the existing oral and

documentary evidence with a view to help the plaintiff

in O.S. 275/72 causing damage and injury to me."

"5. Your honour has maintained different standards

in the same judgment with regard to Exs. B.9, B.10,

B.13 and A.15 to A.19 and A.20 to A.22 and B.11 and

B.12 in para No. 25."

"6. Your honour has maintained different standards

even with regard to self-serving statements."

"16. Your honour has side-tracked the binding

direct decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme

Court disordering the contents of the said decisions."

"18. So under these circumstances it cannot be

said that these acts done by your good-self in the

discharge of your honour's judicial duty within the

limits of your honour's jurisdiction in good faith; for

the above said acts themselves prove that your honour

has done these acts with mala fide exercise of powers

without jurisdiction."

In the concluding paragraphs of the notice, he stated :

"Your honour has done these acts in excess of

jurisdiction knowing the law regarding your own powers

and duties. So, your honour is liable in tort to pay

damages for the heavy monetary loss incurred by me and

for the injury.

Hence, I request your honour to pay a sum of Rs.

30,000 by way of damages for the heavy monetary loss

incurred by me and for the injury within a reasonable

time, or else I will be compelled to seek legal redress

for the same.

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I hereby reserve my rights to take available legal

actions against your honour under the other

enactments."

After receiving this notice, the 1st Additional

Subordinate Judge sent it to the High Court for necessary

action. The High Court requested the Advocate-General to

institute contempt proceeding. The Advocate-General then

filed a Contempt Petition No. 14 of 1975, supported by an

affidavit and prayed that the appellant be committed for

Contempt of Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge,

Vijayawada and be punished under Section 12 read with

Sections 10 and 15 of the Act.

In his counter-affidavit filed before the High Court,

the appellant not only tried to justify the issuance of the

notice to the Subordinate Judge, but also asserted that the

notice was intended to uphold the purity of administration

of justice and to safeguard the interests of the litigating

public. The High Court found that the passages extracted

above were per se scandalous and scurrilous and the notice

was undoubtedly a deliberate and determined attempt on the

part of the appellant "to scandalise the Judge and the Court

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for having held against him, by imputing lack of good faith

and mala fides to a judicial officer in the discharge of his

judicial duties;" that it was also an attempt to frighten

the judicial officer by threatening to file suit for damages

for Rs. 30,000/- and to undermine his self-confidence in

dealing with causes that might come up before him for trial

in future. The High Court concluded that what the appellant

has stated in the notice in question, is clearly and

squarely "criminal contempt" as defined by Section 2(c) of

the Act. It negatived the defence raised by the appellant

and convicted him as aforesaid.

Before us, the appellant has argued his case in person.

He has also submitted written arguments which he has orally

elaborated and supplemented. As before the High Court, here

also the appellant intransigently maintains that there is

nothing scandalous in the contents of the notice. In the

written arguments he reiterates the imputation that the

Subordinate Judge had deliberately delivered "a dishonest

Judgment" against him and the Judge was "guilty of serious

misbehaviour in the performance of his duties;" that the

allegations of "bad faith" "malice" etc. in the notice were

facts constituting the cause of action, which were essential

to be stated under Section 80, C.P.C. for the suit for

damages which the appellant proposed to file against the

Subordinate Judge; that the giving of the notice containing

such statements of material facts being a mandatory

requirement of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure the

issuance of such notice to the Subordinate

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Judge could not be characterised `scandalous' so as to

constitute Contempt of Court.

The contention is clearly unsustainable. Section 1 of

the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850 provides :

"No Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the Peace,

Collector or other person acting judicially shall be

liable to be sued in any Civil Court for any act done

or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his

judicial duty, whether or not within the limits of his

jurisdiction :

Provided that he at the time, in good faith,

believed himself to have jurisdiction to do or order

the act complained of; and no officer of any Court or

other person, bound to execute the lawful warrants or

orders of any such Judge, Magistrate, Justice of the

Peace, Collector or other person acting judicially

shall be liable to be sued in any Civil Court, for the

execution of any warrant or order, which he would be

bound to execute, if within the jurisdiction of the

person issuing the same."

As pointed out by this Court in Anwar Hussain v. Ajoy

Kumar Mukerjee & Ors the Section affords protection to two

broad categories of acts done or ordered to be done by a

judicial officer in his judicial capacity. In the first

category fall those acts which are within the limits of his

jurisdiction. The second category encompasses those acts

which may not be within the jurisdiction of the judicial

officer, but are, nevertheless, done or ordered to be done

by him, believing in good faith that he had jurisdiction to

do them or order them to be done. In the case of acts of the

first category committed in the discharge of his judicial

duties, the protection afforded by the statute is absolute,

and no enquiry will be entertained as to whether the act

done or ordered to bed done was erroneous, or even illegal,

or was done or ordered without believing in good faith.

In the case of acts of the second category, the

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protection of the statute will be available if at the time

of doing, ordering the act, the judicial officer acting

judicially, in good faith believed himself to have

jurisdiction to do or order the same. The expression

"jurisdiction" in this Section has not been used in the

limited sense of the term, as connoting the "power" to do or

order to do the particular act complained of, but is used in

a wide sense as meaning "generally

326

the authority of the Judicial Officer to act in the

matters". Therefore, if the judicial officer had the general

authority to enter upon the enquiry into the cause, action,

petition or other proceeding in the course of which the

impugned act was done or ordered by him in his judicial

capacity, the act, even if erroneous, will still be within

his `jurisdiction', and the mere fact that it was erroneous

will not put it beyond his "jurisdiction". Error in the

exercise of jurisdiction is not to be confused with lack of

jurisdiction in entertaining the cause or proceeding. It

follows that if the judicial officer is found to have been

acting in the discharge of his judicial duties, then, in

order to exclude him from the protection of this statute,

the complainant has to establish that (1) the judicial

officer complained against was acting without any

jurisdiction whatsoever, and (2) he was acting without good

faith in believing himself to have jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the Subordinate Judge had

unquestionably, the jurisdiction to try and decide the suits

concerned. It is further not disputed that the findings

which the appellant characterises as "wrong", "malicious"

and "dishonest", are acts done by the Subordinate Judge in

the discharge of his judicial duties i.e. within the

exercise of his jurisdiction. This being the position, the

acts of the Subordinate Judge, done by him in his judicial

capacity, on the basis of which the appellant was

threatening to bring an action for damages against the

Judge, enjoy absolute protection against civil action. Nor

would the fact that the appellant had the temerity to

ridicule and characterise the findings and decision of the

Subordinate Judge as "malicious" "dishonest" and motivated

`to help the plaintiff in O.S. No. 275/ 1972', without

stating any particulars or facts on which these scurrilous

allegations were founded, give him the locus to bring a

civil action for damages against the Subordinate Judge. In

the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the

appellant's contention that the notice in question, was bona

fide issued by him as a preliminary lawful step to the

filing of a suit against the Subordinate Judge.

We agree with the High Court that the tone, temper and

contents of the notice, particularly of the passages

extracted earlier, which impute, malice, partiality and

dishonesty to the Subordinate Judge in the judicial

adjudication of the aforesaid suits against the appellant,

constitute a deliberate attempt to scandalise the judge to

terribly embarrass him and to lower the authority of his

office and the Court. The act and conduct of the appellant

in issuing this notice therefore, fell squarely within sub-

clauses (i) and (ii) of the definition of "criminal

contempt" given in Section 2(c) of the Act, reproduced

below:

"2(c) `criminal contempt' means the publication

(whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or

by visible repre-

327

sentations' or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of

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any other act whatsoever which :-

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise or lowers

or tends to lower the authority of, any

court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to

interfere with, the due course of any

judicial proceeding.

(iii)interferes or tends to interfere with, or

obstructs or tends to obstruct, the

administration of justice in any other

manner;"

It is noteworthy, that in the categorisation of

contempt in the three sub-clauses (i) to (iii), only

category (ii) refers to "judicial proceeding". Scandalizing

of Court in its administrative capacity will also be covered

by sub-clauses (i) and (iii). The phrase "administration of

justice" in sub-clause (iii) is far wider in scope than

"course of any judicial proceeding". The last words "in any

other manner" of sub-clause (iii) further extend its ambit

and give it a residuary character. Although sub-clauses (i)

to (iii) describe three distinct species of `criminal

contempt', they are not always mutually exclusive.

Interference or tendency to interfere with any judicial

proceeding or administration of justice is a common element

of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii). This element is not required

to be established for a criminal contempt of the kind

falling under sub-clause (i).

The next contention of the appellant is that his act in

question falls within the exemption of Section 3,

particularly the Explanation to that Section, since the

suits in respect of which the notice was issued had already

been decided and the execution of the decree against the

appellant, though pending, did not constitute a pending

matter for the purpose of availing the protection of Section

3. The material part of Section 3 is as follows:

"3(1). A person shall not be guilty of contempt of

court on the ground that he has published (whether by

words spoken or written or by signs or by visible

representations or otherwise) any matter which

interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or

tends to obstruct, the course of justice in connection

with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at the

time of publication, if at that time he had no

reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding

was pending.

(2) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary

contained in this Act or any other law for the time

being in force,

328

the publication of any such matter as is mentioned in

sub-section (1) in connection with any civil or

criminal proceeding which is not pending at the time of

publication shall not be deemed to constitute contempt

of court."

(3) ...........................

Explanation: For the purposes of this Section a

Judicial proceeding-

(b) which has been heard and finally decided shall

not be deemed to be pending merely by reason of the

fact that proceedings for the execution of the decree,

order or sentence passed therein are pending."

Section 3 is in the nature of an exception to those

categories of "criminal contempt" which fall under sub-

clause (ii) and to certain categories of "criminal contempt"

which come under sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(c), but not

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to that category of contempt which falls under sub-clause

(i) of Section 2(c). This is clear from a comparison of the

language of section 3(1) with that of Section 2(c). The

words "interferes or tends to interfere with the course of

justice in connection with any proceeding pending" in

section 3(1) substantially reiterate the language of sub-

clause (ii) of Section 2(c). Similarly, the words

"interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstruct or tends

to obstruct" in Section 3(1) are a reproduction of the first

limb of sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(c). The phrase "the

administration of justice in any other manner" used in

Section 2(c) (iii) has been substituted in Section 3(1) by

the narrower phrase "the course of justice in connection

with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at the time of

publication". But there are no words in Section 3 which may

be referable to that species of "criminal contempt" which

would fall within sub-clause (i) of the definition given in

Section 2(c). Subsection (2) of Section 3 expressly confines

its operation to those categories of contempt which are

referred to in sub-section (1). Section 3(2) therefore, is

not applicable to that category of contempt which falls

under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(c), or which is otherwise

of a kind different from those mentioned in Section 3(1).

In the instant case, the contempt committed, though not

in connection with any pending proceeding, primarily and

squarely falls under sub-clause (i) though the aforesaid

residuary phrase in sub-clause (iii) may also be attracted.

Unfounded imputation of mala fides, bias, prejudice or

ridiculing the performance of a Judge or casting aspersions

on his integrity as has been done by the appellant in the

notice

329

in question-are always considered to mean scandalising the

Court, and lowering the authority of his court by bringing

him and his office into disrespect and disrepute.

Vilification of the Judge, even in administrative matters or

decided judicial matters, may amount to "criminal contempt"

under sub-clause (i) of Section 2(c) as it lowers or tends

to lower the authority or dignity of the Court by

undermining public confidence in the capacity of the judge

to mete out even-handed and impartial justice.

For the aforesaid reasons, we negative this contention

of the appellant.

The last argument urged by the appellant is that even

if his act technically amounted to contempt of court, no

sentence could be imposed on him in view of Section 13 of

the Act which reads as follows :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for

the time being in force, no court shall impose a

sentence under this Act for a contempt of court unless

it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature

that it substantially interferes, or tends

substantially to interfere with the due course of

justice."

The appellant contends, that the High Court has not

given any finding in regard to this contention which was

raised by him there, also.

The contention must be repelled.

The High Court has dealt with this contention. It has

rightly pointed out that the amplitude of the words "due

course of justice" used in Section 13 is wider than the

words "due course of any judicial proceeding" or

"administration of justice" used in sub-clauses (ii) or

(iii) of Section 2(c). We have held that the contempt of

court committed by the appellant falls both under sub-clause

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(i) and also within the amplitude of sub-clause (iii). If

the act complained scandalizes the judicial officer in

regard to the discharge of his judicial functions, it

thereby substantially interferes or tends to interfere with

the "due course of justice" which is a facet of the broad

concept of the "administration of justice", and as such, is

punishable under Section 13.

We agree with the High Court that the contempt of court

committed by the appellant is serious and gross as he has

recklessly imputed mala fides and lack of good faith to the

judicial officer who had decided the cases against him. The

imputations levelled were per se scandalous and actuated by

bad faith. The appellant did not even pretend to give any

reason for the alleged malicious attitude on the

330

part of the judicial officer, either in the notice or in the

counter-affidavit. Even in this Court he has not relented.

He has not adopted, even obliquely, an attitude of

contrition or a pretence of remorse.

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal and

maintain the conviction and sentence of the appellant.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

331