A RAGHBIR SINGH

v.

SURJIT SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

AUGUST 22, 1994

B

1[J.S. VERMA AND K.S. PARJPOORNAN, JJ.]

Represe11tation of the People Act, 1951 :

Secti011s 5, 8(3 )-Membership of Legislative Assemblr-£lectio11

C to-Disqualificatio1i-f'rescription ~f period of disqualification based 011 clas­

sification of offences according to their nature and period of convic­

tiolt-Held, not arbitrary-Nor open to judicial scruti11y--i.egislature has wide

discretion in matter of c/assificatio11.

The respondent filed an election petition before the High Court

D challenging appellant's election to Punjab Vidhan Sabha held in Feb. 1992,

on the ground

that be was disqualified to be a candidate at the time

of the

election. The appellant

bad been convicted and sentenced to 3 years

rigorous Imprisonment

under

s.32,~ read with s.149 J.P.C. by the trial cburt

on 15.11.1984, and having failed i10 the High Court and in this Court, be

E served out bis sentence and was released on 14.11.1988. The High Court

declared appellant's election to be void holding that in view of the

provisions or s.8(3) of the Representation or the People Act, 1951, he was

disqualified lo be a candidate in the said election. Aggrieved, the appellant

filed the appeal under s.116A of the Act. He also filed the writ petition

under Article 32 or the Constitution challenging constitutional validity of

F s.8(3) or the Act.

It was t:ontended on behatr or the appellant that the period or

disqualification in sub-sections (l]i, (2) and (3) or s.8 of the Act should be

Identical and, like in sub-s.(1), 11eriod of disqualification in sub-s. (3)

G should also be read as six years from the date of conviction and not from

the date of release as there is no rational basis for providing different

period of disqualification in different sub-sections of s.8 of the Act.

Dismissing the appeal as also the writ petition, this Court

H HELD: 1.1. Prescription ofp,eriod of disqualification in sub-sections

766

' •

'

•

RAGHBIR SINGHv. SURJIT SINGH [VERMA, J.] 767

(1), (2) and (3) of section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 A

for different classes of persons convicted of different offences is based on

the

well recognised mode of classification ofoffecnes having regard to their

nature and period of sentence,

and is within the domain of legislative

discretion and wisdom, which is not open to judicial scrutiny.

The legisla-

ture has

wide discretion in the matter of classification and there is no B

arbitrariness reflected in the classification.

[770-E, F, G)

1.2. The categories of persons covered by sub-sections (1), (2) and

(3) of section 8 of the Act being different and distinct, comparison inter se

between any two of these three distinct classes is not permissible. While

sub-section

(1) enumerates the offences which are considered to be of one C

category and the period of six years disqualification from the date of

conviction

is provided for them irrespective of the sentence awarded on

such conviction, in sub-section

(2) are specified some other offences,

conviction for which

is considered significant for disqualification only if

the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six.months and in that D

case a longer period of six years disqualification since release bas been

considered appropriate. Sub-section

(3), which is the residuary provision,

governs all persons convicted of any offence [other than any offence

referred to in sub-section

(1) or sub-section (2)) and sentenced to

im­

prisonment for not less than two years, and it bas been considered ap- E

propriate to prescribe the same six years period of disqualification since

release for all of them as they constitute one class. The provisions, there­

fore, cannot be said to be discriminatory. [770-D; 769-F -G-H; 770-B, C, El

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 933 of

~~ F

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.93 of the Punjab &

Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 6 of 1992.

R.K Jain and S.B. Upadhyay for the Appellant/Petitioner.

K. Madhava Reddy, M.L. Verma, B.S. Jain, Mahesh Srivastava and

V.D. Khanna for the Respondents.

The following Judgment of the Court

was delivered by

G

VERMA, J.

Pursuant to the notification to elect a Member for the H

768 ..

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Punjab Vidhan Sabha to represent the Giddarbha Assembly Constituency,

the appellant Reghbir Singh filed his 11omination on 1.2.1992 which was

found valid in the scrutiny on 22.1992, and he contested the election held

on

19.2.1992 wherein he was declared only elected on

20.2.1992. There­

after, the ,respondent Surjit Singh, a voter from that constituency filed an

B Election Petition for a declaration that the appellant's election was void on

the ground that he

was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of

·

election. The facts on which this ground is based are admitted.

The appellant

was convicted for an offence punishable under

Section

326 read with Section 149, l.P.C. and sentenced to three years rigorous

C imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 in addition to his conviction and

sentence also under some other sections of the Indian Penal Code, by the

Trial Court on

15.11.1984. The appellant's appeal against his conviction

and sentence

was dismissed by the High Court on 10.4.1987 and the special

leave petition against the same

was rejected by this Court on 30.11.1987.

D The appellant was in jail to serve out his sentence from 8.9.1987 to

21.10.89

and again from 8.2.1988 to 14.11.1989. There is no dispute that in accord­

ance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Repre­

sentation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "RPA

Act") the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election

held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The high Court has upheld

E this contention of the respondent-election petitioner and allowed the elec­

tion petition declaring the appellant's said election to be void. Hence this

appeal under Section l16A of the R.P. Act.

There being no controversy that according to the plain language of

F sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the

R.P. Act, the appellant was disqualified

to be a candidate at the said election held in February

1992, the appellant

has also filed Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 243 of 1994 along with this appeal

challenging the constitutional, it

is obvious that

the appeal also must fail.

Thus, the only question for consideration

by us

is the constitutional validity

of sub-section

(3) of

Section 8 of the R.P. Act.

G

The submission of Shri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant

is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (1) of Section 8 being

only

six years from the date of such conviction, the longer period of

disqualification prescribed in sub-section

(3) thereof extending to six years

H since his release is

discriminat~ry. The submission is that the period of

RAGHBIRSINGHv. SURJITSINGH[VERMA,J.] 769

disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the A

date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to

six years

from the date of release. In short, the submission

is that the period of

disqualification

in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 should be

identical and there

is no rational basis for providing

a different period of

disqualification in the different sub-sections of Section 8. We are unable B

to accept this argument.

Seciion 8 prescribes disqualification on conviction for certain offec-

nes. Sub-section (1) provides the disqualifaction for a period of

six years

from the date of conviction for the offences specified in clauses (a) to (i)

thereof. In sub-section (1), the only

reference is to conviction for the C

specified offences irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction.

Sub-section (2) then prescribes that on conviction for the offences

specified therein and sentence to imprisonment for not less than

six

months, that person shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction

and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of

six years since D

his release. Thus, in case of conviction for the offences specified in

sub­

section (2), the disqualification is attracted only if the sentence is of

imprisonment for not less than

six months and in that event the

dis­

qualification is for a period of not merely six years from the date of such

conviction but commencing from the date

of such conviction it shall E

continue for a further period of six years since

his release. Sub-section (3)

then prescribes a similar longer period of disqualification from the date

of

such conviction to continue for a further period of six

ye¥s since his

release where a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced \o

imprisonment for not less than two years, other than any offence referred

to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). The classification

is clear. This

classification

is made with reference to the offences and the sentences

awarded on conviction. In sub-section (1) are specified the offences which

are considered to be

of one catagory and the period

of six years dis­

qualification from the date of conviction is provided for them irrespective

F

of the sentence awarded on such conviction. In sub-section (2) are G"

specified some other offences, the conviction for which is considered

significant for disqualification only if the sentence

is of imprisonment for

not less than six months and in that case a longer period of disqualification

has been considered appropriate. Then comes sub-section (3) which

is the

H

770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A residuary pro,ision of this kind \'herein the disqualification is prescribed

only with reference to the period of sentence of imprisonment of not less

than

two

years for which the longer period of disqualification is considered

appropriate. The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis

of their nature and in the

residuar:1

1 pro\ision contained in sub-section (3),

B the classific~tion is made only \>ith reference to the priod of sentence being

not less than tv.·o years.

c

D

E

F

In sub-section (3) of Section 8, all persons con\icted of any offence

and sentences

to imprisonment for not less than two years [other than any

offence referred to

in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)) are classified

together and the period of disqualification prescribed for

all of them is the

same. All persons comicted of offences other than any offence referred to

in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and sentenced to imprisonment of not

less than

two years constitute one class and are governed by sub-section

(3) prescribing the same period of disqualification for

all of them. The

category of persons covered by sub-secti.ons (1), (2) and (3)

being different

and distinct; the question of comparison i11ter se between any two of these

three distinct classes does not arise, without such a comparison between

persons governed by these different sub-sections being permissible, the

very basis of attack on the ground of discrimination

is not available. Prescription of period of disqualification for different classes of persons

·convicted of different offences

is within the domain of legislative discretion

and

wiodon;i, which is not open to judicial scrutiny.

Classification of offence for certain purposes on the basis of the

period of sentence

is a well known method of classification. The First

Schedule to the Code of Criminal

Procedure relates to Classification of

Offences for purposes of cognizance, bail and trial, and therein the clas'

sification of offences against laws other than the Indian Penal Code is made

on the basis of the sentence prescribed for the offence. It is, therefore,

clear that the mode of classification adopted

in the different sub-sections

G of Section

8' of R.P. Act is a well recognised mode of classification of

offences. The legislature having wide discretion

in the matter of

classifica­

tion and there being no arbitrariness reflected in the classification, the

matter must end there .

. '

H There is thus no merit in the challange to the constitutional validity

RAGHBIRSINGHv. SURJITSINGH[VERMA,J.] 771

of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act. Consequently, the writ A

petition is dismisaed which results in dismissal of the civil appeal also. The

appellant/petitioner

will pay the costs to the respondents. Costs quantified

at Rs.

10,000 (Rupees ten thousand) only.

R.P. Appeal and petition dismissed.