CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)

Pronounced on : 04.07.2025

Raj Arora (since deceased) through His LRs ...... Petitioner

Versus

Smt. Santosh Lamba ...... Resp ondent

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAM AGGARWAL

***

Argued by : Mr. Chetan Mittal, Senior Advocate with

Mr. Kunal Mulwani, Advocate and

Mr. Divanshu Jain, Advocate and

Mr. Abhinav Goel, Advocate

for the petitioner.

***

VIKRAM AGGARWAL , J

This is tenant’s revision petition against the order dated 17.04.2025,

passed by the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, dismissing the appeal filed by the

petitioner/tenant against the order dated 08.12.2023, passed by the Court of Rent

Controller,   Chandigarh   vide   which   the   eviction   petition   preferred   by   the

respondent-landlady under Section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act,

1949 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rent Act’) was allowed.

2(i). The facts, as emanating from the pleadings, are that the respondent-

landlady (Smt. Santosh Lamba) instituted a petition (Annexure P-2) under Section

13 of the Rent Act against Raj Arora (Predecessor in interest of the present

petitioners, who are the legal representatives of Sh. Raj Arora) for his eviction

from the first floor of House No.1162, Sector 37-B, Chandigarh (hereinafter

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           2

referred to as ‘the demised premises).

2(ii). The case set out in the eviction petition was that Sh. Raj Arora was a

tenant on the first floor of the demised premises since 01.04.2008.  The demised

premises had been let out at a monthly rent of Rs.8,000/- which was increased to

Rs.8400/- w.e.f. 11.06.2009 when the rent agreement was extended for a period of

11 months.

2(iii). Eviction of the tenant was sought on the ground that the respondent-

landlady required the demised premises for her daughter namely Preeti Lamba

who was a teacher in Sachdeva Public School, Pitampura.  She was a divorcee and

was living with her parents.  She was due to retire on 31.03.2019.  The petitioner

and her husband, both of whom were old and ailing, wanted to shift to Chandigarh

alongwith their daughter where the landlady and her husband would reside on the

ground floor and their daughter would reside on the first floor and would also take

tuitions for her day to day expenses.

2(iv). It was averred that the husband of the respondent-landlady who was

owner to the extent of 50% share in the house had earlier filed an eviction petition

against the tenant in occupation of the ground floor, on the ground of personal

necessity, pursuant to which the ground floor had been vacated in 2015.  However,

for, the respondent-landlady suffered a paralytic attack, she alongwith her husband

could not shift to Chandigarh.

3(i). The eviction petition was opposed by way of written statement

(Annexure P-3).  Certain preliminary objections were raised.  It was averred that

there was no bonafide need and the sole purpose of the institution of the eviction

petition was to evict the petitioner and enhancement of rent by letting out the

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           3

demised premises to some other tenant.   It was averred that pursuant to the

eviction of the tenant on the ground floor, the respondent-landlady and her

husband had not occupied the same as a result of which it stood proved that there

was no need of the first floor.   It was also averred that the ground floor was

sufficient for the needs of the landlady even if she intended to shift.  On merits,

the relationship of landlord and tenant, execution of the lease deed, rate of rent etc.

were admitted.  Remaining averments were denied and a case was set up that there

was no bonafide need of the respondent-landlady.

3(ii). It was stated that Smt. Preeti Lamba was residing at Delhi and had no

intention of shifting to Chandigarh.   It was averred that since the demised

premises was residential, no tuitions could be taken in the same as it would

amount to misuse of residential premises.  It was also averred that the respondent-

landlady alongwith her husband had been living in a joint family in Delhi with

their   married   son   and   grand   children   and   had   no   intention   of   shifting   to

Chandigarh.

4. Replication was filed in which the averments made in the written

statement were denied and those in the eviction petition were reiterated.

5. From the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed

by the trial Court:-

1. Whether the petitioner is entitled for eviction on the ground

of bona fide personal necessity ? OPP

2. Whether this Court at Chandigarh has got no territorial

jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit ? OPR

3. Whether the petitioner has not approached the Court with

clean hands and concealed material facts ? OPR.

4. Relief.

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           4

6. The parties led their respective evidence.

7. The Court of Rent Controller decreed the eviction petition filed by the

respondent-landlady. The  appeal filed by the petitioner-tenant against the said

decision was dismissed, leading to the filing of the present revision petition.

8. Learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner was heard.

9(i). Sh. Chetan Mittal, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner

strenuously urged that the impugned orders are not sustainable. He submitted that

the need of the landlady was not bonafide and was a mere wish and desire and was

in fact her greed and that she wanted eviction of the petitioner from the demised

premises with a view to let it out to some other person at a hefty rent. Learned

Senior Counsel referred to the entire oral and documentary evidence as also the

pleadings which were duly produced during the course of arguments and it was

submitted that both Courts had erroneously and illegally accepted the eviction

petition.

9(ii). Learned Senior Counsel submitted that despite the ground floor of the

house in question having been vacated in 2015, pursuant to an eviction petition

having been filed by the husband of the respondent-landlady on the ground of

personal necessity, the respondent-landlady and her husband did not occupy the

same, which itself proves that there is no actual need of the demised premises.

Learned Senior Counsel submitted that this alone would be sufficient to demolish

the case of the respondent-landlady.

9(iii). It was further contended that the ingredients of Section 13 (3)(a)(i) of

the Rent Act were missing in the eviction petition as also in the evidence. It was

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           5

submitted that once the respondent-landlady had sought eviction of the petitioner-

tenant from the demised premises on the ground that the same was required for

use and occupation of the daughter of the respondent-landlady, it was a legal

requirement for the respondent-landlady to have pleaded in the eviction petition

that her daughter did not possess any such premises in Chandigarh or that she had

not vacated any such premises without any reasonable cause. Learned Senior

Counsel submitted that neither were such averments made in the eviction petition

nor they were made in the evidence of the respondent-landlady or her daughter.

9(iv). Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that even the second floor

of the house in question is lying vacant which has been concealed in the eviction

petition but has been admitted by Smt. Preeti Lamba in the cross-examination and

that the said portion would be sufficient for their needs, even if they intend to

shift.

9(v). It was lastly contended that even the application for additional

evidence (Annexure P-6) was erroneously rejected by the First Appellate Court.

Learned Senior Counsel submitted that by way of additional evidence, the

petitioner-tenant intended to prove that the demised premises could not be used for

conducting tuition classes and the same would be considered a misuse. The

application had also been filed to prove that the ground floor of the premises were

again let out to a tenant namely Arabindo after getting the same vacated on the

ground of personal necessity. In support of his contentions, reliance was placed

upon the judgments of Coordinate Benches of this Court in the cases of State

Bank of Patiala versus S.Zulzuaoar Singh Virk and others 2003 (1) RCR (Rent)

670, (Law Finder Doc Id # 43342), Manmohan Lal versus Shanti Parkash Jain

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           6

2014 (5) RCR (Civil) 667 (Law Finder Doc Id # 603761), Ajit Singh & Anr.

Versus Jit Ram & Anr. 2008 (4) RCR (Civil) 390 (Law Finder Doc Id # 146060),

Rajiv Gupta versus Jiwan Ram 2015 (1) RCR (Civil) 762 (Law Finder Doc Id #

631813), Subhash versus Yash Pal 2014 (10) RCR (Civil) 1370, Joginder Singh

Sawhney versus Harbans Lal 2003 (1) RCR (Rent) 528 and Vidya Rattan Taneja

& Anr. Versus Ram Lal Sachdeva & Anr. 2009 (1) RCR (Civil) 639.

10. I have considered the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel

representing the petitioner and have perused the paper book including the

pleadings and part of the oral evidence which was duly produced during the

course of arguments.

11(i). The demised premises is the first floor of House No. 1162, Sector 37-

B, Chandigarh.  The respondent-landlady (Smt. Santosh Lamba), who is stated to

be 86 years old, is a co-owner of the same alongwith her husband Sh. Amrit Lal

Lamba.  Without going into the effort that must have been put in by the Couple in

acquiring the said property, a part of which is now under occupation of a

belligerent tenant, this Court cannot help but notice the settled position of law that

a landlord is the best Judge of his requirements and a tenant is absolutely no one to

dictate terms and conditions to the landlord.   Reference can be made to the

judgments of the Supreme Court of India in the cases of Ragavendra Kumar Vs.

Firm Prem Machinery and Co., 2001 (1) RCR (Rent) 135 (SC), Rishi Kumar

Govil Vs. Maqsoodan and Others, 2007 (1) RCR (Rent) 405 and United India

Insurance Co. Ltd. Versus Sarla Ahuja 1998(46) DRJ 29 (Law Finder Doc Id #

371758). It would be the absolute wish of the landlord as to which portion of the

property they would require for what purpose and the manner in which they wish

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           7

to utilize the same.  The only condition is that such need should be bonafide and

should not be a mere wish or desire.  In the considered opinion of this Court, the

respondent-landlady successfully proved that her need was bonafide and that in

the evening of her life, she wished to settle down in Chandigarh on the ground

floor of the house in question with her daughter staying on the first floor.

11(ii).The argument that no commercial activity would be permitted in a

residential premises is a completely mis-founded argument not all open to be

raised by a tenant.  Each and every person who resides in a residential property is

bound by the laws of the area.  Nowhere was it stated nor was it ever the case of

the respondent-landlady that her daughter would run a coaching centre in the

demised premises.  If a retired teacher teaches a few students for a social cause, it

cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be a commercial activity violating

the rules and regulations.  In any case, the Appellate Authority rightly observed

that it would be for the landlord to deal with such situations.  In any case, merely

because it was stated that the daughter of the respondent-landlady would take

tuitions would not mean that this is the sole ground on which eviction was being

sought and infact the primary ground was that the respondent-landlady wanted her

retired divorced daughter to live with her in her old age and the need projected in

the eviction petition was that of the landlady and not that of the daughter.  It was

nowhere the case of the respondent-landlady that the demised premises was

required for the purpose of holding tuitions by her daughter.  The argument is,

therefore, completely devoid of merit and is rejected.

11(iii). The second argument that despite the ground floor having been

vacated pursuant to an eviction petition having been filed by the husband of the

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           8

respondent-landlady on the ground of personal necessity, the same was not

occupied which proves that there was no actual bonafide necessity is also devoid

of merit.  Due explanation about non-occupation of the ground floor was given by

the landlady and was proved by leading evidence.   It came on record that the

landlady had suffered a paralytic attack in March, 2015 as a result of which she

could not shift to Chandigarh.  It has to be borne in mind that the landlady is an

old woman and her husband also unfortunately expired in 2019.  Merely because

they were unable to occupy the ground floor of the house in question would not

mean that their need is not bonafide.  

11(iv). As regards the second floor being vacant, no doubt, Smt. Preeti

Lamba while appearing as PW2 admitted in her cross-examination that the second

floor was lying vacant.  However, in the same breath, she stated that it comprises

of two rooms.  She also stated that she would reside on the ground floor with her

mother.  In the considered opinion of this Court, a tenant cannot be permitted to go

into such minute details as to whether the daughter of the landlady would reside

on the ground floor or on the first floor.  Anybody would have a desire to have an

independent set up on an independent floor and then whether she sleeps at night

on the ground floor or on the first floor would hardly be a concern of the tenant.

The second floor must not have been found to be suitable for the needs of the

respondent-landlady or her daughter.  In any case, it would not be open for the

tenant to suggest that the daughter of the respondent-landlady can reside on the

second floor.  At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the tenant is absolutely

nobody to give such a suggestion.

11(v). As regards the dismissal of the application for additional evidence,

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           9

adequate reasons were given by the Appellate Authority.   I do not find any

illegality in the same.  All points had duly been covered and there would be no

necessity of permitting additional evidence to be produced which appeared to be

an attempt to delay the proceedings.

11(vi). Coming to the argument on which a lot of stress was laid by

learned Senior Counsel that the ingredients of Section 13 (3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act

were missing as it had not been pleaded that the daughter of the landlady also did

not have any such premises in her occupation or that she had not vacated any such

premises without reasonable cause, the same is also found to be devoid of merit.

First of all, it was duly averred in the eviction petition as also in the affidavit

tendered in examination-in-chief on behalf of the respondent-landlady that she did

not possess any other residential premises in the urban area of Chandigarh nor she

had vacated any such premises after the enforcement of the Rent Act.  It has to be

borne in mind that the need which was projected in the eviction petition was that

of the respondent-landlady and not that of her daughter.  Under the circumstances,

it was not essential for her to have mentioned that her daughter did not possess

any other residential premises in the urban area of Chandigarh nor had she vacated

such premises.  In arriving at this opinion, I draw support from a judgment of a

Coordinate Bench in the case of Harbhajan Singh (deceased) through his LR

Versus Lakhbir Singh and others 2019 (2) RCR (Rent) 316 (Law Finder Doc Id #

1486326);

12. To have a look on the need as projected by respondent No.1-

landlord, reference may be made to the pleadings in para 5 as

reproduced above, wherein he has pleaded that son of respondent

No.1, respondents No.2 and 4 want to live in this house. While

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           10

appearing as PW1, he has stated that after being given possession

of 1st and 2nd floor, respondent No.1 started living there with his

family, which, however, was got vacated by respondent under police

pressure. Kamalpreet Singh son of elder sister of respondent No.1

Lakhbir Singh is suffering from blood cancer and is regularly

getting treatment from PGI, Chandigarh for which family has to

stay at Chandigarh to attend the patient. Father of Kamalpreet is

also suffering from serious ailments and is bed ridden, as such, the

house in question is urgently required by the family. He has further

stated that entire house is required by respondents as they do not

own any other accommodation in or around Chandigarh. He and

his family are frequent visitors to Chandigarh and want to live here

with their son, who is residing at Chandigarh in a rented

accommodation. Kuldeep Kaur, respondent No.2 has stated that her

son Jagmohan Singh has come to Chandigarh in connection with

his transport business and she wants to settle here. She has also

corroborated the statement of PW1 Lakhbir Singh regarding the

requirement of demised premises. From the aforesaid statements of

witnesses, it is evident that respondents have requirement of the

demised premises. Respondents are four in number and they want

to live in this house with son of respondent No.1, 2 and 4. The

requirement has also been projected for the son of sister of Lakhbir

Singh, who with his family comes to Chandigarh for treatment

from PGI. From the above evidence, it is clear that respondents-

landlord required this entire house for their bonafide need. It has

though not been specifically averred in the petition that son of

respondent No.1 is dependent on him but the tone and tenor of his

pleadings and evidence, it is evident that his son wants to live with

him in this house and to explain the need of the son, no specific

wording is provided under the Rent Act for pleading this fact. The

same can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of each

case. Lakhbir Singh has stated that after completing his studies, his

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son respondent No.3 has come to Chandigarh. He is doing his job

here and living in a rented accommodation. This shows that the

accommodation with the respondent is not sufficient to

accommodate his son. Even otherwise, it is a settled principle of law

that the landlord is best judge of his need and tenant cannot dictate

any terms in this regard.

11(vii). No doubt, in the case of Ajit Singh & Anr. versus Jit Ram &

Anr. (supra), the Supreme Court of India held that such averments were essential.

In that case, eviction was being sought from a non-residential premises.   Still

further, the premises in question had fallen to the share of the son of the landlord

and it was under those circumstances that the Supreme Court held that such

averments were essential.  A coordinate Bench dealt with the issue in the case of

Navyug Goods Carrier versus Manpreet Singh and another 2018 (2) RCR

(Rent) 496 (Law Finder Doc Id # 1242986) wherein a similar issue had arisen.

After discussing the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ajit

Singh & Anr. versus Jit Ram & Anr. (supra), the Coordinate Bench held that no

such averments were required;

19. On careful reading of the aforesaid judgments, it is apparent

that the Court has relied upon the case of Ajit Singh (supra). The

facts of the case of Ajit Singh (supra) are entirely different. Still

further, even with respect to the landlord, this Court after the

judgment passed by the Full Bench, has taken a consistent view

that the landlord is required to prove the ingredients, however, it is

not necessary that those ingredients must be pleaded. Even if the

requirements are not pleaded but those are proved by leading

evidence, it is sufficient compliance of the 1949 Act. Although, the

view on this aspect is consistent, however, reference can be made to

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a judgment in the case of M/s Bhatia Cloth House v. Dr. Raj Kumar

Gupta and another, 2008(4) RCR (Civil) 250 and para 16 thereof is

extracted as under:-

"The first contention relates to the assertion by counsel for

the petitioner that the respondents have failed to plead that

they are not occupying any other building and have not

vacated any such building without sufficient cause, within the

urban area of Ambala City. A perusal of the ejectment

petition discloses that in sub-para (b) of para 5 and para 6 of

the ejectment petition, the landlords pleaded that they are not

in possession of any other shop within the urban area of

Ambala City. In the written statement, the aforementioned

averment was not denied. Further more, it is consistent

position in law that ambiguity in pleadings regarding the

ingredients, set out in Section 13(3)(a) of the Act, if made

good in the evidence, is sufficient compliance of the statutory

provisions. Reference in this regard may be made to Daulat

Ram v. Girdhari Lal, 1980 (2) RCR (Rent) 108, Romesh v.

Mukand Lal, 1982(2) RCR 66 and Baldev Raj v. Ram Lal,

2006(2) RCR (Rent) 193 : 2006(4) CCC 264. Respondent No.

1 admittedly, does not occupy any shop within the urban area

of Ambala City. He is in occupation of a residential premises.

Ejectment in the instant petition has been sought from a

shop. Requisite and necessary evidence has been led to

establish that respondent No. 1 is not in occupation of any

other shop in the Urban Area of Ambala City. The sale of the

adjoining shop, initially occupied by respondent No. 1 for his

clinic, would not adversely affect the merits in any manner.

The shop was sold in the year 1994, whereas the ejectment

petition was filed in the year 2001. Respondent No. 1 sold and

vacated the shop housing his clinic on the bona fide belief

that he could carry on his clinic at his house and in

furtherance of his belief, opened a clinic at his residence.

Respondent No. 1 has been compelled to pray for ejectment,

as he faces an imminent threat of resumption of his house.

The tenant has not denied, whether by pleadings or by

evidence, that respondent No. 1 is not in occupation of any

commercial premises in the Urban Area of Ambala City and,

therefore, as the necessity pleaded is commercial in nature,

and as the landlords are not in occupation of any commercial

premises in the urban area of Ambala City and have not

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vacated any commercial premises without just cause, they

have satisfied the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a) of the Act.

The argument, raised with regard to the failure to comply

with the statutory ingredients of the Act, must, therefore, fail

and the concurrent findings, returned by the learned Courts

below, must be upheld. An argument that as the landlords did

not disclose the sale of the adjoining shop and other

properties, while filing the ejectment petition, would merit

dismissal of the ejectment petition for concealment of

material facts, cannot be accepted. All material evidence,

namely, with respect to the sale of the adjoining shops and

the other properties, was adduced before the Rent

Controller."

20. If one carefully reads the judgments passed by the Court in the

cases of Manmohan Lal (supra) and Rajiv Gupta (supra), it is

apparent that the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to

the consistent view of this Court in the judgments referred to above.

21. As noticed earlier, the 1949 Act does not require any particular

form of pleadings and there is no format of the rent petition

provided under the 1949 Act. The Court is required to examine the

pleadings and the evidence and then find out whether sufficient

facts have come on record to prove that the landlord fulfills those

ingredients.

22. In the present case, the petitioner-tenant cannot be heard on the

ground of absence of specific pleadings of the ingredients of the

Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) of the 1949 Act, because the tenant never took

this objection while filing reply. The landlords still complied with

the requirements of the 1949 Act, while filing replication. Still

further, when the evidence was led, the landlords specifically stated

that their son does not own any other property in the urban area

concerned. Once in the reply no objection is taken by the tenant, the

landlord is deprived of opportunity to amend the pleading. Hence,

this Court is of the view that the tenant is estopped from

subsequently raising this plea once no objection to this effect has

been taken in the reply.

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           14

11(viii).Another aspect is that no such objection was ever raised in the written

statement by the tenant and, therefore, it would not be open for the tenant to now

raise this objection.  This view was also taken by the Coordinate Bench in the case

of   Navyug Goods Carrier versus Manpreet Singh and another (supra) with

which I am in respectful agreement.

11(ix).I have gone through the judgments relied upon by learned Senior

Counsel representing the petitioner.  In the case of  State Bank of Patiala versus

S.Zulzuaoar Singh Virk and others (supra), a Coordinate Bench took the view

that a residential building could not be reconstructed to make a non-residential

building and that eviction from a non-residential building could not be sought for

a residential purpose. The judgment seems to have been referred since the vice

versa would also be true. However, the matter has been dealt with in detail in the

preceding paragraphs and for the reasons given therein, the said judgment would

not come to the aid of the petitioner. In the case of Manmohan Lal versus

Shanti Parkash Jain (supra), a Coordinate Bench, while relying upon the

judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Ajit Singh & Anr. Versus

Jit Ram & Anr. (supra), held that in the absence of the ingredients as envisaged

under Section 13 of the Rent Act, an eviction petition could not succeed.

However, in view of the judgment in the case of Navyug Goods Carrier versus

Manpreet Singh and another (supra), this judgment would also not come to the

aid of the petitioner.  In the remaining judgments, it was held that in the absence of

ingredients, generally, as laid down under Section 13 of the Rent Act, an eviction

petition would not succeed. As has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the

ingredients of Section 13 (3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act were duly pleaded in the

CR-3377-2025 (O&M)           15

eviction petition as also in the affidavit tendered in examination-in-chief and,

therefore, the argument is devoid of merit.

11(x). It is also settled law that in revisional jurisdiction, concurrent findings

are not liable to be disturbed unless the findings are found to be perverse.  The

Supreme Court of India, while deciding with a matter where concurrent findings

recorded by the Court of Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority had been

reversed by the High Court in revision, held that in exercise of revisional

jurisdiction, unless a finding is perverse, there can be no interference. 

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present revision petition is

devoid of merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly.

04.07.2025 ( VIKRAM AGGARWAL)

mamta JUDGE

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether Reportable Yes/No