[2025:RJ-JP:51818-DB]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN

BENCH AT JAIPUR

D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 833/2018

In

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11728/2015

Rajasthan State Industrial Development And Investment

Corporation Ltd., Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

Represented Through Its Managing Director

---Respondent-Appellant

Versus

M/s Karam Bhoomi Estates, S-20, Niti Marg, Bhawani Singh

Road, C-Scheme, Jaipur (Rajasthan) Represented Through Shri

Sanjeev Mittal S/o R.k. Mittal (Partner Of The Firm).

---Petitioner-Respondent

Connected With

D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 726/2019

In

S.B. Civil Review Petition No.182/2018

In

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.11728/2015

Rajasthan State Industrial Development And Investment

Corporation Ltd., Udyog Bhawan, Tilak Marg, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

Represented Through Its Managing Director

---Respondent-Appellant

Versus

M/s Karam Bhoomi Estates, S-20, Niti Marg, Bhawani Singh

Road, C Scheme, Jaipur (Rajasthan) Represented Through Shri

Sanjeev Mittal Son Of Shri R.k. Mittal (Partner Of The Firm)

---Petitioner-Respondent

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Sr. Adv. assisted

by Mr. Ashish Sharma

For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.N. Mathur, Sr. Adv. assisted by

Mr. Utkarsh Dubey and

Mr. Abhishek Mewara

HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA

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Judgment

Date of conclusion of arguments : 17/12/2025

Date on which judgment was reserved : 17/12/2025

Whether the full judgment or only

the operative part is pronounced : Full judgment

Date of pronouncement : 8th/01/2026

(Per Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice)

1.These are two appeals preferred by the Rajasthan State

Industrial Development and Investment Corporation Ltd. (for

short, 'RIICO'). D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.833/2018 is preferred

against the order dated 22.02.2018 passed by the learned Single

Judge whereby, the writ petition has been disposed of in favour of

the respondent/writ petitioner, while D.B. Civil Special Appeal Writ

No.726/2019 has been preferred assailing the order passed by the

learned Single Judge dated 22.02.2019 whereby, the review

petition was disposed of correcting the statement of fact in its

earlier order dated 22.02.2018 and last two paras of the judgment

were corrected and the direction of payment of interest on the

delayed amount was recalled while maintaining the rest of the

order. In order to understand the controversy involved, it would be

apposite to notice some of the facts which have been carved out

from the arguments advanced before the Court, as under:

Facts of the case

2.An invitation of bid was advertised by the RIICO for

allotment of 13 acres undeveloped land situated in Akera Doongar,

Tehsil Amer, District Jaipur on 22.03.2001. The land was to be

allotted for industrial and non-industrial purposes. The highest bid

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received for industrial purpose was of Rs.1,14,000/- per acre and

Rs.1,30,500/- per acre for non-industrial purposes. The RIICO

having found the bids as deficient against the market price,

decided to issue a fresh bid invitation notice on 31.03.2001 with a

clause that those who have already deposited the security amount

would be eligible to participate for price higher than the earlier

highest bids. The writ petitioner-firm deposited earnest money of

Rs.2,00,000/- and proposed a bid for Rs.4,26,000/-. It may be

noticed that the reserve price was fixed as 1,14,000/- per acre for

industrial use and 1,30,500/- for non-industrial use. The highest

bid of the petitioner was for Rs.4,26,000/- per acre for non-

industrial purposes. The writ petitioner also deposited the earnest

money of Rs.2,00,000/- on 07.04.2001. In spite of the highest

bid, the RIICO did not accept the bid and did not issue the

allotment letter to the writ petitioner-firm and a fresh tender

notice was issued on 24.04.2001 for non-industrial purposes with

a reserve price of Rs.4,26,000/- per acre. The RIICO again

changed the tender condition. Aggrieved thereto , the writ

petitioner-firm filed a civil suit before the Additional Civil Judge

(Senior Division), challenging the approach in inviting fresh tender

and not finalizing the writ petitioner's tender. The Trial Court

issued a temporary injunction on 19.05.2001, restraining the

respondents from proceeding with fresh tender notice dated

24.04.2001. The appellant-Corporation vide its decision dated

30.5.2001 decided not to file any appeal against the order dated

19.05.2001 and on 13.06.2001, the RIICO accepted the bid of the

writ petitioner-firm and directed the writ petitioner-firm to deposit

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25% of the total amount along with security deposit of

Rs.55,380/- within 24 hours. The writ petitioner deposited the DD

on 14.06.2001. Rest of the amount of Rs.41,96,960 was deposited

on 31.08.2001 and 03.09.2001. The land was demarcated by the

Patwari on 03.10.2001 and the RIICO was requested to execute

the lease deed vide letter dated 21.11.2001 in favour of the writ

petitioner, a reminder was also issued on 18.12.2001 and

14.10.2002.

3.The writ petitioner was informed about the decision of the

Committee constituted by the Corporation vide letter dated

04.07.2003, and decided not to issue the lease deed until the civil

suit attains finality. Thereafter, on 29.07.2004, the learned Trial

Court decreed the suit in favour of the petitioner-firm and directed

the appellant herein to execute the lease deed. First appeal was

preferred before the ADJ No.6, Jaipur City. On 09.08.2005, the

first appeal was allowed in favour of the appellant, whereafter the

petitioner-firm filed the second appeal before the High Court

assailing the order of 09.08.2005. The High Court passed a status

quo order on 24.11.2005 and on 09.12.2005. The RIICO cancelled

the allotment letter in spite of the status quo order prevailing. In

the order dated 09.12.2005, it was mentioned that the High Court

has set aside the order of the trial Court vide order dated

09.08.2005 whereas, no such order of cancellation or setting aside

the decree passed by the ADJ No.6 was passed on 09.08.2005.

Simply, status quo order was passed. Thereafter opinion was

sought relating to the petitioner-firm having informed of the

change of constitution of the firm. It was stated that the prior

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approval in change of constitution of the firm is required based on

the circular dated 08.07.2002, which has been contested by the

writ petitioner stating that the circular does not record such prior

approval to be taken for change of the Constitution.

4.On 05.12.2011, the Infrastructure Development Committee

(for short, 'IDC') of the RIICO took a decision to execute the lease

deed in favour of the writ petitioner. However, this decision laid

down an embargo, i.e., subject to withdrawal of the pending

second appeal filed by the writ petitioner herein. Upon such

assurance given by the appellant RIICO, the writ petitioner

decided to withdraw the second appeal and moved an application

for withdrawal which was accepted by the Court on 23.12.2011.

Even after withdrawal of the second appeal, the allotment orders

were not issued. On the other hand, on 16.05.2012 opinion was

sought from the Advocate General as to whether the RIICO could

execute the lease deed. Issue relating to addition of partners of

the firm was also taken up. However, after the petitioner-firm had

withdrawn the second appeal in terms of the assurance given by

the IDC vide its letter dated 05.12.2011, the RIICO withdrew its

letter dated 09.12.2005 vide order dated 30.12.2011. From

26.12.2011 to 11.02.2014 several representations were made by

the writ petitioner. Whereafter IDC of the RIICO took a decision in

its meeting dated 26.02.2014 and communicated to the writ

petitioner to return the amount which the writ petitioner had

deposited. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3413/2013 was thereafter

filed, wherein vide judgment dated 03.02.2015 the orders dated

11.03.2014, 14.03.2014 and decision dated 26.02.2014 relating

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to refund of amount were set aside and quashed. Representation

was submitted by the writ petitioner thereafter for execution of

the lease deed. The RIICO issued a show cause notice under Rule

24(1) of the RIICO Disposal of Land Rules, 1979 as to why the

allotment should not be withdrawn to which a reply was filed by

the writ petitioner on 20.05.2015 and thereafter the legal notice

was also sent to which a reply was filed on 16.07.2015 by the

RIICO and a decision was taken on 05.08.2015 to cancel the

allotment. As per the order dated 05.08.2015, the lease of land

was canceled on the ground that the allotment of land dated

14.06.2001 was in pursuance of the interim order passed by the

Trial Court in temporary injunction which could not be concluded

into a contract and further, that the firm had made changes in the

partnership by inclusion/exclusion during the status quo order

passed on 24.11.2005 and the allotment letter dated 14.06.2001

was withdrawn. Vide another letter dated 05.08.2015, the amount

of Rs.1,27,62,823/- was directed to be refunded after deduction of

TDS of 20%. The refundable amount was assessed as

Rs.1,13,37,527.00.

5.The learned Single Judge after considering the arguments,

proceeded to hold that the order deserves to be interfered with as

Rule 24(1) of the Rules of 1979 provides for a chance to cure any

breach. It was also held that the status quo order passed by the

Court was not to debar the change of constitution of the

partnership, but was pertaining to the land. While passing the final

order it, however, erroneously proceeded to hold that the

remaining amount had been deposited after a long delay, i.e., in

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2011. The said part of the order was corrected in review by the

learned Single Judge noticing that the entire amount had already

been deposited earlier. In the instant appeals, the RIICO has

challenged the two orders passed by the learned Single Judge.

Submissions of the Parties

6.Shri Rajendra Prasad, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the appellant RIICO, has vehemently argued and

submitted that the decision taken to allot the land was solely on

the basis of the temporary injunction order passed by the Civil

Court. He submits that the RIICO had already informed the writ

petitioner of keeping the decision regarding issuance of lease deed

in abeyance till final outcome of the civil suit whereafter, it had

amended the suit and brought subsequent events on record and

the suit was decreed directing the RIICO to execute the lease

deed. However, so far as the allotment letter is concerned, the

same was solely on the basis of the interim order passed on

19.05.2001 which was not challenged by the RIICO in appeal. The

allotment order having merged in the final decree and the final

decree having been set aside in appeal by the concerned

Additional District Judge, therefore, could not be a reason to direct

reviving the allotment order, more so, as the second appeal

preferred by the writ petitioner was withdrawn. Learned counsel

submits that legally the order passed by the learned Single Judge,

therefore, deserves to be set aside.

7.Learned senior counsel further submits that the decision to

again put the land in auction which was originally challenged by

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the writ petitioner in civil suit is, therefore, revived and the

allotment order has rightly been cancelled. The decision dated

05.08.2015, therefore, did not deserve to be interfered with. He

has also relied on the recent judgment passed in the case of

Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust and Anr. Vs. U.P. State

Industrial Development Corporation Limited and Ors.: 2025

SCC Online SC 1264 to submit that the public trust doctrine in

allocation of resources as invoked in the said case needs to be

noticed in the present case.

8.Learned senior counsel has also relied on principle of equity

and cited Union of India and Ors. Vs. Godfrey Philips India

Ltd.: AIR 1986 SC 806, Union of India and Ors. Vs. Unicorn

Industries: (2019) 10 SCC 575, Shrijee Sales Corporation

and Anr. Vs. Union of India: (1997) 3 SCC 398 in support of

his submissions. He also relies on State of U.P. Vs. Prem

Chopra: (2024) 12 SCC 426 .

9.Per contra, Shri R.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner, submits that the

decision of IDC cannot be challenged in the present appeal. The

IDC is a Committee formed by the RIICO itself to take a decision

to allot the land to the auction purchaser. It is submitted that at

the relevant time, the highest price quoted by the writ petitioner

was four times that of reserved price. The auction was nowhere

cancelled and without cancellation, a decision was taken to again

invite bid treating highest price raised by the writ petitioner as the

reserved price. Such decision was wholly illegal and arbitrary. The

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decree was passed in favour of the writ petitioner which was set

aside by the appellate Court without taking into consideration the

facts of the case and therefore, when a second appeal was filed,

status quo order was passed by this Court. IDC thereafter took a

decision and issued a letter asking the writ petitioner to withdraw

the appeal if it wanted the matter to be resolved and allotment to

be made. Based on the promise made, the writ petitioner

withdrew its appeal. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that

the order of the appellate Court had been revived. In fact, it would

mean that in terms of the promise made by the RIICO, the suit

itself would be treated to have been withdrawn as the appellant

had agreed to proceed further and execute the lease deed.

10.Learned senior counsel has also invited attention to the order

passed by the Court allowing withdrawal which reflects of the

promise made by the appellant. He, therefore, submits that it is a

case of out of Court settlement which bound both the parties and

the appellant cannot be allowed to wriggle out of it.

Independently, the learned Single Judge has also examined the

order of cancellation dated 05.08.2015 and has noticed that both

the reasons coming forward were unjustified. He, therefore,

submits that in terms of the judgment passed by the Supreme

Court in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. Godfrey

Philips India Ltd.: (1985) 4 SCC 369 and in terms of the facts

that more than fifteen years have lapsed since the writ petitioner

had deposited the entire amount and it is not a case where the

respondent-writ petitioner is at fault, they should not be made to

suffer merely because the land price for which the petitioner had

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put up a bid for auction has increased, which was accepted and

the amount that was kept by the respondents, cannot be

frustrated in this manner merely because of the change of the

officers and change of the stand of the Government. It is

submitted that the appellant cannot be allowed to approbate and

reprobate.

Relevant case laws:

11.In Union of India Vs. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.: AIR

1986 Supreme Court 806 , the respondents were manufacturer

of cigarettes. The question arose whether the cost of final packing

in the corrugated fibre board containers relating to the package

which were in packing of 10 and 20 and the cost of secondary

packing in cartons and outer should also include the aforesaid cost

of final packing in corrugated fibre in terms of Section 4(4)(d)(i) of

the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. The Union of India

contended that whatever being the packing primary or secondary,

in which the cigarettes are packed when delivered to the buyer in

the course of wholesale trade, the cost of such packing would be

liable to be included in the value of cigarettes. The respondents

urged that though it was true that the explanation did not make

any distinction between the primary packing and secondary

packing, the cost of only such secondary packing were liable to be

included as was necessary for sale of cigarettes in the wholesale

trade and not the cost of secondary packing which was

necessitated in order to protect the packed cigarettes and prevent

them from being damaged during the course of transportation

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from the factory gate to the godowns. Thus, the packing charges

in corrugated fibre board containers was not necessary for the

purpose of sale of cigarettes. While considering the said aspects,

the contention relating to promissory estoppel was examined and

it was held as under:

"9. Now the doctrine of promissory estoppel is well-

established in the administrative law of India. It represents a

principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and, though

commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the

realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The basis of

this doctrine is the interposition of equity which has always,

true to its form, stepped in to mitigate the rigour of strict law.

This doctrine, though of ancient vintage, was rescued from

obscurity by the decision of Mr. Justice Denning as he then

was, in his celebrated judgment in Central London Property

Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1956) 1 All ER 256. The

true principle of promissory estoppel is that where one party

has by his word or conduct made to the other a clear and

unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to

create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in

the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon

by the other party to whom the promise or representation is

made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the

promise or representation would be binding on the party

making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it

would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to

the dealings which have taken place between the parties. It

has often been said in England that the doctrine of promissory

estoppel cannot itself be the basis of an action : it clan only be

a shield and not a sword: but the law in India has gone far

ahead of the narrow position adopted in England and as a

result of the decision of this Court in Motilal Sugar Mills v.

State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 2 SCR 641 (AIR 1979 SC 621),

it is now well-settled that the doctrine of promissory estoppel

is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also

found a cause of action. The decision of this Court in Motilal

Sugar Mills case (supra) contains an exhaustive discussion of

the doctrine of promissory estoppel and we find ourselves

wholly in agreement with the various parameters of this

doctrine outlined in that decision.".

12.In M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Ors. : AIR 1979 SC 621 , which was followed in

the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Justice Shah, J. speaking on behalf

of the Court, observed as under:

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"We are unable to accede to the contention that the

executive necessity releases the Government from honouring

its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to

their detriment. Under our constitutional set up no person may

be deprived of his right or liberty except in due course of and

by authority of law : if a member of the executive seeks to

deprive a citizen of his right or liberty otherwise then in

exercise of power derived from the law - common or statute -

the Courts will be competent to an indeed would be bound to,

protect the rights of the aggrieved citizen.

Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt

from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to

its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and

undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out

the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of

its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement

of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen."

13. In M/s Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Vs. State of Uttar

Pradesh and Ors. (supra) it was held further that public bodies

are as much bound as private individuals. It was further held in

another case, Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd.

Vs. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council : AIR 1971 SC 1021, as

under:

"Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals

to carry out representations of facts and promises made by

them, relying on which other persons have altered their

position to their prejudice."

If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards

of conduct for the people and, the public bodies cannot

ordinarily be permitted. A public body is, in our judgment, not

exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of

representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has

altered his position to his prejudice."

14.Thus, considering the law as above, we find that the writ

petitioner would not have withdrawn the second appeal, claiming

his right for getting the lease deed executed had the appellant not

given him a unanimous decision letter on 15.12.2011. The

appellant cannot, therefore, turn around now and refuse to get the

lease deed executed. Their subsequent action of cancelling the

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allotment on the basis of different reasons is nothing but an

excuse to wriggle out of their own promise.

15.It is a settled law that neither of the party to an agreement

can be allowed to approbate or reprobate. Principle has been

settled so in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vs. N.

Murugesan and Ors. : (2022) 2 Supreme Court Cases 25 , in

which the Apex Court observed as under:

"26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They

would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and

reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold.

The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the

concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a

principle of equity coming under the contours of common law.

Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument,

he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so

while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one

part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to

have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same.

Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction.

This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common

law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully

and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter

questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in

this principle. it is also a species or estoppel dealing with the

conduct of party. We have already dealt with the provisions of

the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his

presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through

his acceptance unconditionally."

16.In Rajasthan State I.D.I. Corporation. Ltd. & Anr. vs

Diamond & Gem Dev. Corporation Ltd. & Anr: 2013 (5) SCC

470, the Supreme Court observed as under:

"15. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot-blow cold", "fast

and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly

accepts the benefits of a contract, or conveyance, or of an

order, he is estopped from denying the validity of, or the

binding effect of such contract, or conveyance, or order upon

himself. This rule is applied to ensure equity, however, it must

not be applied in such a manner so as to violate the principles

of what is right and of good conscience. [Vide Nagubai Ammal

v. B. Shama Rao, CIT v. V. MR. P. Firm Muar, Ramesh Chandra

Sankla v. Vikram Cement, Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD, Cauvery

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Coffee Traders v. Hornor Resources (International) Co. Ltd.

and V. Chandrasekaran v. Administrative Officer.]

16. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on

the rule of estoppel-the principle that one cannot approbate

and reprobate is inherent in it. The doctrine of estoppel by

election is one among the species of estoppels in pais (or

equitable estoppel), which is a rule of equity. By this law, a

person may be precluded, by way of his actions, or conduct, or

silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right

which he would have otherwise had."

17.Applying the aforesaid law, we find that the contention being

raised at the stage after the amount was already accepted and the

respondent was even asked to withdraw its appeal, the RIICO

cannot be allowed to turn back and cancel the allotment letter and

refuse to get the lease deed executed.

18.In Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust and Anr. (supra), relied

on by the learned senior counsel for the appellant, the situation

was otherwise. It would be apposite to quote as under:

"26. For the reasons stated, we are satisfied that the

cancellation of allotment by UPSIDC is fully justified and in

accordance with law.

E. INVOKING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN THE

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

27. The prolonged litigation initiated by KNMT has spanned

over fifteen years, unnecessarily burdening the judicial system

and impeding the efficient functioning of public authorities.

Such protracted disputes highlight the need for more stringent

initial evaluation processes to prevent chronic defaults.

28. While we have upheld the cancellation due to KNMT's

default, the circumstances reveal systemic concerns in the

original allocation process, UPSIDC allotted the Subject Land

to KNMT within merely two months of application, raising

questions about the thoroughness of the evaluation.

Furthermore, during the pendency of this dispute, UPSIDC

demonstrated remarkable alacrity in considering alternative

allotments to M/s. Jagdishpur Paper Mills Ltd.

29. We, therefore, consider it necessary to examine whether

UPSIDC's procedure for industrial land allotment meets

standards of administrative propriety, particularly in light of

the Public Trust Doctrine (Doctrine) mandating that public

resources be managed with due diligence, fairness, and in

conformity with public interest.

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30. The Doctrine emanates from the ancient principle that

certain resources (seashores, rivers and forests) are so

intrinsically important to the public that they cannot be

subjected to unrestricted private control, Rooted in Roman law

and incorporated into English common law, this Doctrine

recognizes that the Sovereign holds specific resources as a

trustee for present and future generations.

31. In the Indian context, the Doctrine has evolved to

encompass public resources meant for collective benefit,

reflecting the constitutional mandate under Article 21. As held

in Natural Resources Allocation In re, while the Doctrine does

not impose an absolute prohibition on transferring public trust

property, it subjects such alienation to stringent judicial

review to ensure legitimate public purpose and adequate

safeguards.

32. When a substantial tract of industrial land is allocated

without a comprehensive evaluation, it raises critical questions

about adherence to these principles. The Doctrine requires

that allocation decisions be preceded by a thorough

assessment of public benefits, beneficiary credentials, and

safeguards ensuring continued compliance with stated

purposes.

33. The allocation of 125 acres of industrial land to KNMT

without a competitive process fundamentally violated the

Doctrine, which demands proper procedure and substantive

accountability in public resource allocation, UPSIDC ought to

have considered verifiable evidence of economic benefits,

employment generation potential, environmental

sustainability, and alignment with regional development

objectives to demonstrate that the decision serves the

collective benefit. The failure to adopt transparent

mechanisms not only deprived the public exchequer of

potential revenue-as evidenced by the substantial appreciation

in the value of such a large tract of land-but also created a

system where privileged access supersedes equal opportunity.

This betrays the fiduciary relationship between the State and

its citizens.

34. Having upheld the cancellation due to KNMT's chronic

default, we observe that the hasty allotment followed by years

of litigation exemplifies systemic deficiencies in the allocation

process. This necessitates comprehensive directions to ensure

that future allocations uphold principles of transparency and

accountability, thereby preventing prolonged disputes while

ensuring that public resources genuinely promote industrial

development and economic growth.

F. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

35. In light of our detailed examination of the contentions

raised by the parties, the comprehensive analysis of the

factual and legal matrix and the resultant conclusions, we

uphold the cancellation of the allotment by UPSIDC.

36. The actual allotment any offer thereof made by UPSIDC in

favour of M/s Jagdishpur Paper Mills Ltd. (Respondent No. 3)

for the Subject Land is also declared to be illegal, contrary to

public policy and is consequently annulled. However, if any

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earnest money or any payment has been received from the

said prospective allottee, the same is directed to be refunded

along with interest at the rate granted. by the Nationalized

Banks.

37. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with no order as to

costs.

38. However, considering the broader implications for the

transparent allocation of public resources and the need to

strengthen administrative accountability in industrial land

distribution, we deem it appropriate to issue the following

directions:

i) The State Government of Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC are

directed to ensure that any such allotment in the future be

made in a transparent, non-discriminatory and fair manner by

ensuring that such allotment process fetches maximum

revenue and also achieves the larger public interest like

industrial development priorities, environmental sustainability,

and regional economic objectives; and

ii) The Subject Land shall also be allotted strictly in

accordance with the procedure as illustrated in direction (i)

above.

39. Ordered accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also

stand disposed of in the above terms."

Our analysis and conclusion :

19.Having heard the learned senior counsels and noticed the

arguments as above, we find that the present appeals filed by the

appellant are wholly misconceived and is an attempt to deprive

the rightful claim of the respondent who, on the basis of the

promise made by the appellant, had withdrawn their civil

proceedings initiated against the appellant.

20.It would be apposite to quote the order by which the second

appeal filed by the respondent was decided by this Court on

23.12.2011, as under:

"Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants submits that in the subject

matter of this second appeal, the defendant-respondent has

written a letter No.Legal/Settlement/16/2011/1484 dated

15.12.2011 to the appellant to execute the lease deed subject

to the withdrawal of the present second appeal filed by the

appellants against the respondent Corporation in this Court.

[2025:RJ-JP:51818-DB] (17 of 18) [SAW-833/2018]

In view of the above, counsel for the plaintiff-appellants wants

to withdraw the second appeal. He is allowed to do so.

S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.589/2005 is dismissed as

withdrawn.

The Application No.37423 dated 17.12.2011 is disposed of."

21.Thus, the withdrawal is based on the letter dated

15.12.2011. From a perusal of the letter dated 15.12.2011, it is

apparent that the respondent was communicated the unanimous

decision of the IDC of the RIICO dated 05.12.2011 to inform the

writ petitioner of the decision to allow him to withdraw his appeal

whereafter, the Corporation would proceed to get the lease deed

registered. The writ petitioner firm had already deposited the

whole of the consideration of the land and no amount was due

towards the writ petitioner. Hence, upon payment of the whole

consideration and restoration of allotment letter and assurance

decision of the IDC, there was no reason not to proceed further to

execute the lease deed as the contract stood concluded. The

appellant cannot be allowed to wriggle out from such promise. The

contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that it is

not a case of breach of doctrine of trust is also found to be

misconceived.

22.Thus, in the present facts in fact there is no fault at all on

the part of the respondent which can be said to be reason for not

executing the lease deed in favour of respondent.

23.In view of above, considering the law as already settled, we

are unable to accept the contention raised by the learned senior

counsel for the appellant.

[2025:RJ-JP:51818-DB] (18 of 18) [SAW-833/2018]

24.The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. The appellant shall

execute the lease deed without any further delay.

25.All pending applications also stand disposed of.

(SANGEETA SHARMA),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ

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