2026:HHC:11499

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Civil Revision No.72 of 2025

Reserved on: 19.03.2026

Decided on: 09.04.2026

Rajeev Bansal ….Petitioner

Versus

Parkash Chand & others ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge

Whether approved for reporting?

For the petitioner: Mr. Anand Sharma, Senior Advocate

with Mr. Karan Sharma, Advocate.

For the respondents: Mr. Ashok Kumar Tyagi, Advocate, for

respondent No.1

Mr. Baldev Singh Negi, Additional

Advocate General, for respondents No.2

and 3.

Romesh Verma, Judge

The present petition arises out of the order, as

passed by learned Additional District Judge, Nahan, District

Sirmaur, H.P., dated 07.07.2025, whereby the application filed by

the present petitioner under Section 47 of Civil Procedure Code to

issue direction to judgment debtor to release 50% of

compensation of land belonging to Smt. Indrawati, has been

dismissed.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the present petitioner

Rajeev Bansal filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief

of permanent prohibitory injunction in the Court of learned Sub

2

Judge, Nahan. Learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree

dated 14.06.1999 dismissed the suit as preferred by the present

petitioner. As per averments as made in the plaint, it was alleged

that one Shri Kaka Ram, son of Roada Mal was the owner of the

land in village Joharon, Tehsil Nahan. He had three sons, namely,

S/Shri Shanti Sarup, Ram Sarup and Gopal Dass. Shri Ram

Sarup died on 14

th

Chait 1998, (1941 AD) during the lifetime of

his father Kaka Ram and was survived by his wife Indrawati and

his son Naresh Kumar. Shri Naresh Kumar also died during the

life time of Kaka Ram.

3. It was stated in the plaint that, after the demise of

Kaka Ram, his sons Shanti Sarup and Gopal Dass entered into a

family settlement on 25.04.2001, whereby 1/3

rd

share in the total

land situated in village Joharon was kept apart as maintenance to

Smt. Indrawati, wife of Ram Sarup and Smt.Surgi Devi,

grandmother of the parties, but the same was relinquished in

favour of Shanti Sarup, in lieu of providing maintenance to both

Smt. Sugri Devi and Smt. Indrawati, whereas the remaining 2/3

rd

share in the land was divided and partitioned between Shanti

Sarup and Gopal Dass in equal shares. It was further averred

that after the separation of 1/3

rd

share of Gopal Dass, the

remaining land measuring 155-02 bighas in village Joharon came

into possession of Shanti Sarup as owner in the said family

3

settlement. Thus, he claimed his exclusive ownership in the suit

land. In the alternative, Shanti Sarup also claimed to have

become owner qua the alleged share of Indrawati by virtue of

adverse possession. The suit land is shown to be owned and

possessed by Shanti Sarup and Indrawati, widow of Ram Sarup,

in equal share. However, said Indrawati left the house and

remarried to one Shri Balkrishan Goyal of Delhi in 1948 AD.

Therefore, under the old Hindu Law prevalent, at that time, she

forfeited her right to maintenance, also, and the suit land reverted

back to Shanti Sarup, brother of Ram Sarup. It was averred that

upon the remarriage of Indrawati to Balkrishan Goyal, her share

was reverted back to Shanti Sarup only and therefore, he became

the full owner of the suit land. Indrawati was not competent to

execute the Will qua her share in the suit land in favour of

Parkash Chand on 21/22.08.1984, nor he was entitled to get the

mutation of her share in the suit land.

4. After the dismissal of the suit on 14.06.1999, the

present petitioner Rajeev Bansal preferred an appeal in the Court

of learned District Judge, Sirmaur on 20.07.1999. The learned

District Judge vide its judgment and decree dated 05.09.2000

accepted the appeal and the judgment and decree passed by

learned trial Court was set aside and the suit of the present

petitioner for declaration that he is the exclusive owner-in-

4

possession of the suit land was decreed. As a consequential

relief, defendant No.1/present respondent Parkash Chand was

restrained from interfering in possession of the plaintiff/present

petitioner over the suit land.

5. Against the judgment and decree as passed by

learned District Judge, Nahan, District Sirmaur, dated 05.09.2000,

the present respondent, Parkash Chand, along with Brij Bhushan

and Pushpa Devi, preferred a regular second appeal in this Court.

The appeal came up for consideration on 26.10.2006, and by the

said order, the appeal was disposed of as having been

compromised between the parties in the following manner:

“This appeal coming up for final hearing on 26 th day

of October, 2006, before a single bench consisting of

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Surjit Singh, Judge, High Court of

Himachal Pradesh Shimla, in the presence of Mr.

Sandeep Kaushik, Advocate counsel f or the

appellants, Mr. Ankush Sood, Advocate, counsel for

respondent No.1 and Mr. Bimal Gupta, Advocate

counsel for respondents No.3 to 6; it is ordered in

terms of the compromise Ex. CA and site plan

(Annexure A-1) to Ex. CA, the decree passed by the

first appellate Court is superseded and the following

ultra is passed.

1. Appellants-defendants Parkash Bansal, Brij

Bhushan and Pushpa Devi are declared to be owners

in possession of 6 Bighas land forming part of Khasra

No.17, as depicted by Khasra No.17/1 in Annexure A-1

to compromise deed Ex. CA, situate in Moza Joharon,

5

Tehsil Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. The possession of

this 6 bighas and is admitted by the respondents to

have been delivered to the appellants.

2. For approaching the aforesaid 6 bighas land

depicted by Khasra No.17/1 from Tarlokpur-Kala Amb

road, a passage has been provided by the

respondents(plaintiff and proforma defendants) from

the land owned and possessed by them and the said

passage is depicted by Khasra Nos.204/135/2/2,

205/135/1/1, 205/135/2/1, 204/135/2/2 and

205/135/2/3 situate in Moza Joharon, Tehsil Nahan,

District Sirmour, H.P. and this passage will be

available for use not only to the defendants-appellants

above named, but also to the respondents.

3. The un-disbursed amount of compensation awarded

on account of acquisition of land bearing Khasra

No.134/18, 146/30/2 and 150/31 situate in Moza

Joharon and any further increase in the amount of

compensation by this Court in the appeal filed in this

Court for enhancement of such compensation, shall be

shared by the parties in the following manner:-

(a) Appellants-defendants shall get 50% of the amount

now lying in deposit as also the amount by which the

compensation may be enhanced by this Court.

(b) The remaining 50% of the amount referred to in

clause (a) above shall be shared equally by

respondent No.1 Rajeev Bansal, respondent No.2

Surinder Nath and the legal heirs of late Sh. Mohinder

Kumar Bansal, who are respondents No.3 to 7 in the

appeal.

The amount of compensation already

withdrawn/disbursed to the appellants shall remain

with them and the respondents will not law any claim

to the same.

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4. The partition of Shamlat land, situate in Moza

Joharon regarding which mutation No.293 has been

sanctioned shall remain intact and binding up on the

parties.

5. The parties are declared to be exclusive owners in

possession of the following properties in terms of the

compromise:-

Sr.

No.

Name of owners Khasra Nos. Area in

bighas

1. Sh. Parkash Chand,

Sh. Brij Bhushan and

Smt. Pushpa Devi

(appellants-defendants No.1 to 3)

17/1 6-0

2. Sh. Rajiv Bansal

respondent/plaintiff No.1

205/135/2/4 to 7

205/135/1/2

17/2

204/135/2/1

204/135/2/3

19-8

1-18

6-18

0-04

2-02

-------

30-10

3. Santosh Bansal,

Dharminder Bansal,

Monika Bansal,

Sanjay Bansal,

respondent No.3 to 6

Smt. Savitri Devi respondent No.7

204/135/1

204/135/1,2 & 3

1-0

5-11

------

6-11

4. Area shall remain in

the name of defendants No.3 to 7.

205/135/1/1 1-0

5-11

------

6-11

5. Rajeev Bansal 204/135/2/2

205/135/2/1

205/135/2/2

205/135/2/3

0-4

0-5

1-4

0-1

--------

1-14

Note:- The aforesaid min Khasra numbers are

depicted in Annexure A-1

6. Compromise decree passed in RSA No.40 of 1991,

decided on 03.07.1991 inter-se respondents No.1 to 8

shall be binding on all of them including respondent

No.8.

7. The parties shall now withdraw all the pending

matter, if any, in different courts, with respect to the

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property of Smt. Indirawati widow of Sh. Ram

Sawroop.

8. The compromise deed aforesaid Ex. CA and

Annexure A-1 thereto shall form part of this decree

(photo copy of Ex. CA and Annexure A-1 are enclosed

herewith). This appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court, this 26

th day of November, 2006.

Superintendent (Judicial) Deputy Registrar (Judicial).”

6. Pursuant to the determination of the rights by this

Court, especially with respect to un-disbursed amount of

compensation which was to be disbursed amongst the parties, it

was specifically held that in view of the compromise entered into

between the parties on the basis of their statements that the

present respondent/defendant shall get 50% of the amount now

lying in deposit as also the amount by which the compensation

may be enhanced by this Court. It was further ordered in para-3

that remaining 50% of the amount shall be shared equally by

present petitioner Rajeev Bansal, Surinder Nath and the legal

heirs of late Sh. Mohinder Kumar Bansal, who were respondents

No.3 to 7 in the appeal. After the passing of compromise decree,

this Court enhanced amount of compensation of present

respondent to Rs.54,06,894/- in RFA No.15 of 1995 and

Rs.36,04,597 to Rajeev Bansal in RFA No.15 of 1995 and

8

compensation amount of Santosh Bansal wife of late Mohinder

Kumar Bansal was decided in RFA No.24 of 1995 amounting to

Rs.18,02,298/- vide its order dated 25.04.2007. After the payment

of compensation amount, the present respondents/decree holder

preferred SLP(C) bearing No.24767/2009 before the Hon’ble

Apex Court. The Hon’ble Apex Court ordered to reduce the

developmental changes from 40% to 30% which ultimately led to

enhancement of compensation amount. After the passing of the

judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the payment of

Rs.16,00,999.75 to the present respondent and Rs.10,67,330/- to

Rajeev Bansal was paid. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did not

approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the order dated

25.04.2007 passed in RFA No.24 of 1995.

7. Three separate execution petitions were filed by the

respective parties, including the present respondent, for payment

of amount of compensation. All the execution petitions were

allowed by passing separate orders vide order dated 26.07.2022.

It is admitted by the respective parties that no objection of any

kind was filed by any of the parties during the pendency of the

execution petition filed by present petitioner. Learned executing

Court vide its order dated 26.07.2022, passed the order whereby

the petition as filed by the present respondent was allowed and

the respondents/judgment debtors i.e. Land Acquisition Collector

9

and State of Himachal Pradesh were directed to pay the

remaining amount of compensation to the decree holder in terms

of the calculations. The said order has been placed on record as

Annexure P-4. Further, the said order has been modified vide

order dated 30.11.2022. Against the order as passed by the

learned Execution Court dated 26.07.2022, the present petitioner

preferred CMPMO No.212 of 2023 before this Court. This Court

vide its order dated 14.05.2024 dismissed the said petition by

passing the following order:-

“12. As I have already mentioned hereinabove in

civil litigation between the parties ended in a comprise

decree before this Court in RSA No.35 of 2001. The

contents of this compromise decree have already been

quoted by me in extensio hereinabove. Para-3 of the

compromise decree mentioned that the undisbursed

amount of compensation awarded on account of

acquisition of land bearing Khasra Nos. 134/18,

146/30/2 and 150/31, measuring 70 -01 bighas,

situated at Mouza Johoran, Tehsil Nahan, District

Sirmaur, H.P., and any further increase in the amount

of compensation by the High Court shall be shared by

the parties in following terms:-

“Appellant/defendant shall get 50% of the amount

lying in by which the compensation may be enhanced

and remaining 50% of the amount shall be shared

equally by respondent No.1 Rajeev Bansal,

respondent No.2 Surinder Nath and legal heirs of

Mohinder Kumar Bansal.”

10

13. Now, the appellants before this Court were

Prakash Chand, Brij Bhushan and Pushpa Devi. Brij

Bhushan and Pushpa Devi are not before this Court.

The petitioners herein are Rajeev Bansal and Surinder

Nath. In terms of the compromise decree, appellants

were entitled to 50% of the amount and not 50% of the

50% as has been argued by the learned Sen ior

Counsel for the petitioner.

14. In fact, the terms of the compromise are very

clear that the appellants in the RSA were to get 50% of

the compensation awarded on account of the

acquisition of the said land and the remaining 50%

was to go to the present petitioners etc.

15. It is not the case of the petitioners that

Prakash Chand has got in excess of 50% of the

amount of compensation on account of the acquisition

of the said land. That being the case, this Court

concurs with the submissions made by lea rned

counsel for the respondent that this petition is without

any merit. The compromise decree has to be read as it

is and the parties cannot be permitted to agitate the

order passed by the learned Executing Court on the

basis of material, which is contrary to the final

compromise entered into between the parties and that

too before the High Court. Therefore, as the orders

passed by the Executing Court could not be proved to

be contrary to the compromise decree passed by the

Court on the basis of compromise, the petitioners are

not entitled for any relief and the petition is dismissed.”

8. Still feeling aggrieved, the present petitioner

preferred Special Leave Petition (Civil) bearing No.13255 of 2024

11

and the Hon’ble Apex Court vide its order dated 28.06.2024

disposed of the said appeal in the following manner:

“We have heard learned counsel for the

petitioners at length.

We dispose of this special leave petition by

observing that the share of the parties herein vis-a-vis

the land acquisition compensation ought to be

apportioned in terms of the compromise decree arrived

at between the parties dated 26.10.2006, which was

with regard to the division of the property vis-a-vis the

share of Indrawati arrived at between the parties.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.”

9. Thereafter, the present petitioner filed an application

before the learned trial Court under the provisions of Section 47

of CPC, when the respondent sought release of compensation

amount with a prayer that order dated 26.07.2022 and

subsequent calculation sheet dated 30.11.2022 be stayed. The

petitioner further prayed that a direction be issued to the

judgment debtor to provide 50% of compensation amount to the

decree holder, Parkash Chand, out of the amount of

compensation for 35.01 bighas of land belonging to

Smt.Indrawati, and 2/3

rd

of the remaining 50% of compensation to

the objector in equal share, as per compromise deed dated

26.10.2006 after rectifying the error in calculation of the amount of

compensation due to the decree holder and the objector

12

individually. The said application was duly replied by the judgment

debtor. Learned Additional Judge, Nahan vide its order dated

07.07.2025 dismissed the application filed under Section 47 of

CPC as being not maintainable.

10. Feeling dissatisfied against the impugned order

dated 07.07.2025, the objector/petitioner has approached this

Court.

11. It is contended by Mr. Anand Sharma, learned Senior

Counsel, duly assisted by Mr. Karan Sharma, Advocate, that the

present respondent/decree holder is entitled to 50% of

compensation amount out of amount of compensation for 35.01

bighas i.e 17.5 bighas of the land and that 2/3

rd

of the remaining

50% of the compensation shall be paid to the objector in equal

share as per compromise dated 26.10.2006.

12. Before delving into merits of the case, it is apposite to

explain the nature and scope conferred to this Court under

Section 115 of the CPC and analyze whether this Court is

empowered to deal with the issues raised by the petitioner in the

instant case. The said provision reads as under:

“Section 115. Revision-

[(1)] The High Court may call for the record of any case

which has been decided by any Court subordinate to

such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto,

and if such subordinate court appears--

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(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by

law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested,

or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction

illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court

may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:

[Provided that the High Court shall not, under this

section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order

deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other

proceeding, except where the order, if it had been

made in favour of the party applying for revision, would

have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.]

[(2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary

or reverse any decree or order against which an

appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court

subordinate thereto.] [(3) A revision shall not operate

as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the Court

except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed

by the High Court.] [Explanation.--In this section, the

expression "any case which has been decided"

includes any order made, or any order deciding an

issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.]”

13. On bare perusal of the above provision, it is clear

that the High Court can only interfere with the orders of the

Subordinate Court if the court has committed illegality or material

irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It is imperative to note

that under the revisional powers, this Court cannot attack the

findings on the facts by the Subordinate Court and can only

interfere if any infirmities are found with the exercise of jurisdiction

14

of the Court and not when the courts erroneously decide the

cases.

14. The primary object of the revision powers conferred

to the High Courts is to prevent subordinate courts from acting

arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their

jurisdiction. The aspect related to the revision powers given to the

High Court has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby the Hon'ble

Court discussed the meaning and scope of the said provision.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing

and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup

Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, has considered the

provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows:

“5. The position thus seems to be firmly established

that while exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not

competent to the High Court to correct errors of fact

however gross or even errors of law unless the said

errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the Court to

try the dispute itself. Clauses (a) and (b) of this section

on their plain reading quite clearly do not cover the

present case. It was not contended, as indeed it was

not possible to contend, that the learned Additional

District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not

vested in him by law or had failed to exercise a

jurisdiction so vested in him, in recording the order that

the proceedings under reference be stayed till the

decision of the appeal by the High Court in the

15

proceedings for specific performance of the agreement

in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply to

the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with

material irregularity" as used in this Clause do not

cover either errors of fact or of law; they do not refer to

the decision arrived at but merely to the manner in

which it is reached. The errors contemplated by this

Clause may, in our view, relate either to breach of

some provision of law or to material defects of

procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to

errors either of fact or of law, after the prescribed

formalities have been complied with. The High Court

does not seem to have adverted to the limitation

imposed on its power u/s 115 of the Code. Merely

because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it

dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different

conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the

reference proceedings pending decision of the appeal,

could hardly justify interference on revision u/s 115 of

the Code when there was no illegality or material

irregularity committed by the learned Additional District

Judge in his manner of dealing with this question. It

seems to us that in this matter the High Court treated

the revision virtually as if it was an appeal.

16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622

of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan &

others, held as under:-

14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has

categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the

registered power of attorney in favour of his father

solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house

16

and carrying out related activities. There is no express

clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to

any person without the appellant’s consent and

knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale

deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the

scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious

doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud.

Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application

under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of

the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action

which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the

trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to

reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to

proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its

revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought

not to have interfered in the absence of any

jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order.

Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes

exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority

under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.”

17. In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar, decided

on 18

th

October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as

under:

“11. The same view is reiterated in a later decision

of this Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig)

Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway

[(1972) 3 SCC 195] wherein a three-Judge Bench of

this Court speaking through Hegde, J. clearly stated

that the High Court under Section 115 CPC had no

jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first

appellate court based on facts or even involving any

17

error of law. It was next observed that it was not the

conclusion of the High Court that the first appellate

court had no jurisdiction to make the order that it

made. The order of the first appellate court may be

right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or may

not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear,

that it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the

case that the first appellate court exercised its

jurisdiction either illegally or with material irregularity.

That being so, the High Court could not have invoked

its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure

Code."

18. The precise case of the objector is that the present

respondent is entitled to 50% of 50% of the total land comprised

in Khasra No.134/18, 146/30/2 and 150/31, measuring 70.1

bighas situated at mauza Joharon, Tehsil Nahan, District

Sirmaur, H.P.

19. Now coming to the factual matrix of the case. It is the

case of the objector/petitioner that the total land acquired was

about 70 bighas. Therefore, the present respondent was not

entitled to compensation for 35 bighas of land, but is entitled for

compensation of 50% of 50% of the land which is 17.5 bighas of

the land. The contentions and submissions as being raised by the

objector/petitioner, in the humble view of this Court are contrary to

the mandate passed by this Court on 26.10.2006. The admitted

fact is that the un-disbursed amount of compensation awarded on

18

account of acquisition of land bearing Khasra Nos.134/18,

146/30/2 and 150/31, situated at mauza Joharon, Tehsil Nahan,

District Sirmaur, H.P. and any further increase in amount of

compensation was to be shared by the parties. It was agreed

upon in the compromise that Parkash Chand, Brij Bhushan and

Pushpa Devi shall be entitled to get 50% of the amount lying

deposited in the Court as well as any amount which may be

enhanced by the Court. To the similar extent, remaining 50% of

the amount was to be shared equally by the petitioner Rajeev

Bansal, respondent No.2 Surinder Nath and the legal heirs of late

Mohinder Kumar Bansal, who were respondents No.3 to 7 in the

RSA.

20. The compromise decree is very clear, specific and

unambiguous and there is no confusion of any kind regarding the

same. By means of objections, which the present petitioner has

raised, it will virtually amount to rewriting of the compromise

decree, which has been passed by this Court. Admittedly, the

compromise decree has not been challenged by either of the

parties in any manner. Therefore, the order as passed by this

Court on 26.10.2006 is final and binding on all. The present

petitioner was a signatory to the said compromise and the same

was executed in his presence. Now, by raising the plea that

Parkash Chand, the present respondent, is entitled to get only

19

50% of 50% of the total land measuring 70.01 bighas, which

comes to approximately to 17.5 bighas, is erroneous and

unsustainable.

21. The record reveals that earlier also similar objections

had been raised by the present petitioner and those objections

were rejected by this Court while deciding CMPMO No.212 of

2023 dated 14.05.2024. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court vide its

order dated 28.06.2024, has ordered that the apportionment has

to be made in terms of the compromise decree as arrived at

between the parties on 26.10.2006. Therefore, the contentions

being raised by the present petitioner appears to prolong the

matter so that the decree holder may not receive the share, which

he is entitled to from the total amount of compensation. The

petitioner is trying to rewrite the compromise decree, which was

entered into between the parties in their presence and was duly

signed by them. The interpretation which is tried to be given by

the petitioner that the present respondent is only entitled for 50%

of the 50% of the total land, which comes to approximately 17.5

bighas and not 35 bighas is unsustainable and beyond the record,

as well as the compromise decree passed by this Court.

22. The petitioner could not point out any error in the

impugned order as passed by the learned Additional District

Judge dated 07.07.2025, whereby the application filed under

20

Section 47 of CPC was ordered to be dismissed as not

maintainable. Learned Additional District Judge, after examining

each and every aspect of the matter, has rightly dealt with the

controversy and rejected the application. The objections which

have been filed/preferred by the present petitioner are neither

sustainable nor legally valid. Therefore, the same have rightly

been rejected by the learned Additional District Judge, Nahan.

The petitioner is trying to take advantage of the judgment and

decree as passed by the learned District Judge, Nahan dated

05.09.2000, which stands superseded by the compromise decree

as passed by this Court on 26.10.2006. The compromise decree

has crystallized the rights of the parties. Therefore, the objections,

which are contrary to the record, cannot be allowed to be

sustained and the learned Court below has rightly rejected the

same. There is no illegality or material irregularity committed by

the learned Court below

23. Consequently, the present petition being devoid of

any merit deserves to be dismissed and the same is accordingly

dismissed along with pending application(s), if any.

( Romesh Verma )

Judge

April, 2026

21

(vt)