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PETITIONER:

RAJENDRA KUMAR

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

KALYAN (D) BY LRS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/08/2000

BENCH:

S.B. Majumder., & Umesh C. Banerjee.

JUDGMENT:

BANERJEE,J.

The cardinal issue in this appeal by the grant of special leave

against the judgment of Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) pertains

to the applicability of the doctrine of Resjudicata or

Constructive Resjudicata envisaged under Section 11 of the Code

of Civil Procedure read with the Explanation including

Explanation VIII thereto in terms of the provisions of Amendment

Act of 1976. In order, however, to appreciate the issues as

above, it would be convenient to advert to the contextual facts

at this juncture. The facts disclose that the

plaintiff/appellant herein instituted a civil litigation being

Suit No.13 of 1974 against the denial of claim for possession of

the property. The plaintiff alleged that he was taken in

adoption by one Radhabai on 25th April, 1967 who however was

married to Mahadeo. Admittedly Mahadeo died on Ist August, 1919

and the property being the subject matter of the suit, belonged

to one Mohanlal who died in 1923 leaving him surviving his widow

Kisnibai who died in 1951. The plaintiff/appellants claim was

that his adoptive father Mahadeo, was adopted by Mohanlal as a

son to him during his life time and after the death of Mohanlal,

the family comprised of only two members, namely, Kisnibai who

was Mohanlals widow and Radhabai who, according to the

plaintiff, was Mohanlals predeceaseds son Mahadeos widow. The

first defendant Ramgopal claimed to be adopted son of Mohanlal,

though according to the plaintiff, there was, in fact, no

adoption. The factual score further depicts that the family of

Mohanlal had migrated from Jaipur and was governed by the Benaras

School of Hindu Law. The plaintiff contended that Ramgopals

adoption stands vitiated for want of authority from Mohanlal to

Kisnibai to adopt a son to him. Ramgopal, however, as the

records depict used to live with Kisnibai and Radhabai, and had

an ante- adoption deed executed by Kisnibai on December 9, 1923.

The document recited that Ramgopal was to be adopted only in

respect of half of the property of Mohanlal and Mahadeos line

was to be continued by his widow Radhabai taking in adoption a

suitable boy at any time beyond Kisnibais life-time. A

kararnama was also got executed on December 10,1923 with the

recitals to the above effect. Factual score depicts that

Radhabai on June 29, 1926 gave a public notice declaring that

Ramgopal was in fact the son of Ramden alias Kalyanrao and was

not the adopted son of Mohanlal and had no interest in the

property of Mohanlal. A deed of partition was executed between

the parties. Subsequently, a civil suit bearing No.87 of 1929

was instituted by Kisnibai for setting aside the deed of

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partition on the ground that Radhabai should not get any right to

the property belonging to Ramgopal because Mahadeo was not

Mohanlals adopted son. Ramgopals adoption was also challenged

in the suit. Ramgopal, however, asserted that he was adopted by

Mohanlal himself in Marwad which however, run counter to the

recital in the deed of adoption. The suit (No.87 of 1929) was

decreed against Radhabai and an appeal taken therefrom to the

Court of the Judicial Commissioner, being appeal No. 19 of 1932

was also dismissed. According to the plaintiff herein the

decision in that suit did not bind the plaintiff since his claim

is lodged through Mahadeo and not his heir Radhabai and the

observations of the learned Additional Commissioner, that

Radhabai was entitled merely to maintenance and not to any

interest or share in the property would not bind him. Be it

noted, however, that Ramgopal, was joined as a party thereto and

it is the plaintiffs definite case that Radhabai having taken

the plaintiff in adoption on April 25, 1967, the plaintiff became

entitled to seek possession of the property left by Mohanlal and

he therefore brought the present suit for possession of the

properties as mentioned in the schedule to the plaint.

Incidentally, the records depict that Ramgopal also initiated a

civil action being suit No.157A of 1935 wherein one Balmukund,

Kisnibai and Radhabai were joined as defendants. In the action

an issue pertaining to question of Ramgopals adoption to

Mohanlal was raised and the same was answered in the affirmative

whereas Ramgopals adoption to Kisnibai was negatived. The

records depict that the said finding stands affirmed by the

Appellate Court in Appeal No.2A of 1939.

The learned trial Judge in suit No.87 of 1929 upon consideration

of the evidence tendered in the suit concluded the following on

the factual score:

(i) the first defendant was not proved to be the Kulmukhtyar of

Kisnibai in respect of Mohanlal's property;

(ii) Mohanlal was governed by Benaras School of Hindu law and not

the Bombay School of Hindu Law;

(iii) Radhabai was not living as a member of Mohanlal's joint

Hindu family;

(iv) there was no authorisation to Radhabai to adopt a son to

Mahadeo and though the factum of plaintiff's adoption by Radhabai

was established, his adoption was not legal and valid;

(v) the partition between Radhabai and Kisnibai was not proved

and it was also not proved that the first-defendant fraudulently

got an adoption deed in his favour from Kisnibai;

(vi) the adoption by Mohanlal of Ramgopal, the first defendant,

was held proved.

In the present suit, the learned Trial Judge, while rejecting the

plea that the suit was barred by time and that the

first-defendant acquired title by adverse possession, held that

the decision in Civil Suit No.87 of 1929 and First Appeal No.19

of 1932, as well as the decision in Civil Suit No. 157 of 1935

and the decision in Civil appeal No.2-A of 1939, operated as res

judicata on the question of the adoption of Ramgopal by Mohanlal,

and Mahadeo not being the adopted son of Mohanlal and dismissed

the suit for possession.

The dismissal order, however, was challenged in first Appeal

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No.13 of 1974 before the High Court (Nagpur Bench) but same also

did not find favour with the Appellate Court, resultantly the

appeal was dismissed and hence the appeal before this Court. The

issue pertaining to the doctrine of res judicata thus calls for

discussion at this stage. The factual backdrop has already been

noticed herein above and as such, we refrain ourselves from

dilating thereon in detail but by reason of the specific point

for discussion, the relevant issues raised in Suit No.87 of 1929

before the Sub-Judge, Betul, ought to be noticed. The issues

relevant in the present context being :

I. Whether the Plaintiff No.2 was adopted as a son by Mohan Lal?

IIA Was Mahadev the husband of the Defendant, adopted by Mohan

Lal 20 years ago at Tholai in the Jaipur Estate?

IIB Was Mahadev an orphan at the time of his adoption?

IIC Was his adoption vaild?

The issue No.I as above was answered in the affirmative by the

Trial Judge and the issue Nos.IIA, IIB and IIC were answered in

the negative. Needless to say that the Plaintiff No.2 in the

Suit was Ram Gopal and the Defendant was Radhabai. The findings

of the learned Trial Judge in the suit of 1929 leaves no manner

of doubt that Ramgopal was found to be the adopted son of Mohan

Lal and Mahadeos stated adoption was not proved and hence

answered in the negative. The 1939 appeal arising out of Civil

Suit of 1935 though raises more or less similar issues but to

avoid prolixity we need not dilate thereon but deal with the

issues as raised in the 1968 Suit which has been found to be

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The relevant issues of

1968 suit are:

I Does the Plaintiff prove that Radhabai was authorised to adopt

a son by Mahadeo?

II Does the Plaintiff prove that he was adopted by Radhabai and

his adoption is valid and legal?

III Does the Plaintiff prove adoption of Mahadeo by Mohan Lal?

IV Does the Defendant No.1prove his own adoption by Mohan Lal?

V Is the adoption of Defendant No.1 by Mohan Lal valid and legal?

VI Is the decision given in Civil Suit No.87 of 1929 binding on

the Plaintiff? VII Is the decision given in Civil Suit No.157 of

1935 is binding on the Plaintiff?

The learned Trial Judge in the present suit, being the subject

matter of the appeal presently, answered the issues as below:

I in the affirmative.

II The factum of adoption is proved but the adoption is not legal

and valid.

III .in the negative.

IV .in the affirmative.

V .in the affirmative.

VI .in the affirmative.

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VII .in the affirmative.

- and on the basis whereof dismissed the suit. Records depict

that the Appellate Court confirmed the decree of dismissal of the

suit.

The Appellants definite assertion is that Mohan Lal adopted

Mahadeo in 1910 much before his death in the year 1923.

Admittedly Mahadeo pre-deceased Mohan Lal as he died on 20th

August, 1921 and the Appellants (Plaintiff) adoption by Radhabai

is said to have taken place on 25th April, 1967. There is in

fact a deed of adoption. Exhibit 116 brought before the learned

Trial Judge corroborated such a state of affairs. The deed also

was registered and by reason of registration and other available

evidence on record no exception can be taken to the observations

of the learned Trial Judge that there is overwhelming evidence on

record to prove the factum of adoption. There is existing

evidence on record as regards the adoption ceremony. But the

issue herein does not pertain to the validity and legality of the

adoption in terms of the registered deed in favour of the

plaintiff by Radhabai and it is on this score that strong

reliance was placed on Section 8 of the Hindu Adoption and

Maintenance Act and it is on this count the provision of the Act

(Section 8) would not have any application since the widow has

undoubtedly a right to adopt the child for herself but in the

event the child was to be adopted to the husband the statute is

otherwise silent and thus the law as it stood prior to the

enactment of the legislation as regards the adoption would have

to be taken recourse to for proper appreciation. The Shastric

law provides an express authority by the husband to the widow to

adopt a child and in the contextual facts there is not even an

iota of evidence in regard thereto as such adoption has been

stated to be not legal and valid by both the courts below and we

do also feel it inclined to accept the same. The submissions of

Mr. Sampath on this score thus stands negatived.

The discussion above could have been omitted but by reason of

judicial ethics since very strenuous submission has been made by

Mr. Sampath in support of the Appeal, as regards the merits of

the matter.

The doctrine of res judicata has received a statutory sanction in

the Code as a matter of prudence and to give due weightage to a

finding or a decision so as to reach a finality in the matter of

a dispute between the same parties or litigating under the same

parties. The doctrine thus is to achieve finality of dispute

between the parties being a principle of prudence so as to give

efficacy to a finding of the Court rather than permit the parties

to go to trial more or less on the same issues over again and

thus introducing a possibility of conflict of views. Judicial

verdict has its special sanctity and cannot be the subject matter

of discussion at any future time involving identical or similar

issues. The facts in issue is one where more than one attempt

has been made to establish a fact and in every attempt that

particular fact stands negated. In the present context, the

issue is placed before the Apex Court, and as such therefore,

should have to be considered in its proper perspective so that

similar issues are not raised before the Court for adjudication

on occasions more than one since it has a salutory effect on to

the jurisprudential system of the country. The 1976 Amendment to

the Code and the introduction of Explanations VII and VIII

clarify the dual objective as noticed above. The objection

howsoever technical it may be, ought not to outweigh the

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reasonableness of the doctrine. Raghubir Dayal, J. speaking for

the majority view in off cited Gulab Chands case (Gulabchand

Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Gujarat: AIR 1965 SC 1153) in

paragraphs 60 and 61 observed:

As a result of the above discussion, we are of opinion that the

provisions of S.11 CPC. are not exhaustive with respect to an

earlier decision operating as res judicata between the same

parties on the same matter in controversy in a subsequent regular

suit and that on the general principle of res judicata, any

previous decision on a matter in controversy, decided after full

contest or after affording fair opportunity to the parties to

prove their case by a Court competent to decide it, will operate

as res judicata in a subsequent regular suit. It is not

necessary that the court deciding the matter formerly be

competent to decide the subsequent suit or that the former

proceeding and the subsequent suit have the same subject matter.

The nature of the former proceeding is immaterial.

We do not see any good reason to preclude such decisions on

matters in controversy in writ proceedings under Articles 226 or

32 of the Constitution from operating as res judicata in

subsequent regular suits on the same matters in controversy

between the same parties and thus to give limited effect to the

principle of the finality of decisions after full contest. We,

therefore, hold that, on the general principle of res judicata,

the decision of the High Court on a writ petition under Article

226 on the merits on a matter after contest will operate as res

judicata in a subsequent regular suit between the same parties

with respect to the same matter.

The doctrine of res judicata or constructive res judicata

predominantly is a principle of equity, good conscious and

justice. It would neither be equitable nor fair nor in

accordance with the principles of justice that the issue

concluded earlier ought to be permitted to be raised later in a

different proceeding. It is on this context that the Trial Judge

stated as below:

It is clear from the judgment in Civil Suit No.87/29 that

Mahadeos adoption was the point in dispute. Thus, it is also

clear that the question of Mahadeos adoption is the contention

in both the suits. Again we find that the other questions are

also common in that suit and in this suit the question of

adoption of present Defendant No.1 by Mohanlal, the question of

validity of the adoption deed, dated 9th December, 1923 and the

question of validity of the Kararnama, dated 10th December, 1923

were also directly or substantially in issue in the said suit.

This, in that suit the matter in controversy was decided after

full contest and after affording fair opportunity to the parties

to prove their case. Hence despite the fact that Betul Court was

not competent to try the suit before us the questions referred to

above which were decided in that suit would operate as res

judicata, by the general principles of res judicata, in view of

the observations of the Supreme Court. In that previous suit we

find that it has been decided that Mahadeo was not the adopted

son of Mohanlal and secondly, the Defendant No.1 Ramgopal was

adopted son of Mohanlal. Thirdly, the question the so-called

validity of adoption deed, dated 9th December, 1923 was decided

and it was decided that Kararnama, dated 10th December 1923 and

adoption deed were not binding on the Defendant No.1 who was the

plaintiff No.2 in that case. Hence all these questions cannot

now be agitated in the suit before us and the decisions on those

points would operate as res judicata. The civil Suit

No.157-A/1935 was filed by the Defendant No.1 Ramgopal, as stated

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above, against Kisanibai and Radhabai and three others, now the

question is as to whether the decision in this Suit No.157-A/35

operates as res judicata. In that suit Radhabai was a party.

The issues were

(1) Whether the plaintiff (Defendant No.1in this suit) was

adopted by Mohanlal?

(2) Whether the adoption deed, dated 9th December, 1923 and the

Kararnama, dated 10th December, 1923 were binding on the

plaintiff (Defendant No.1 in this suit)?

It has been held that the Plaintiff (Defendant No.1 in this suit)

was adopted by Mohanlal. Secondly, the adoption deed dated 9th

December, 1923and the Kararnama, dated 10th December 1923 were

held to be not binding on the plaintiff (Defendant No.1 in this

suit). This decision was confirmed by the High Court in Second

appeal No.466/1940 vide Exh.173 certified copy of the judgment.

In my view, the decision on these points would operate as res

judicata against the plaintiff. The reasons for my coming to the

conclusions are the same which I have discussed while deciding

the question of res judicata regarding decision in Civil Suit

No.87/1929. I, therefore, hold that the decisions in Civil Suit

No.87/29 and Civil Suit No.157-A/1935 are binding on plaintiff

and they operate as res judicata. I, therefore, answer issue

Nos. 7,18 and 19 in the positive.

The Appellate Court also relying upon Explanation VIII to Section

11 of the Code, negated the contention of the Plaintiff-

appellant herein. The Appellate Court very rightly observed that

the general doctrine of res judicata could not be applied as has

been so applied by the learned Trial Judge but Explanation VIII

to Section 11 as stated by the Appellate Court and rightly so

makes the objection disappear by reason of its widest possible

conotation. The Explanation VIII as inserted by the Amendment

Act of 1976 reads as below:

Explanation VIII an issue heard and finally decided by a Court

of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall

operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding

that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try

such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been

subsequently raised.

The expression Court of limited jurisdiction ought not to be

given a limited or restrictive interpretation and as noticed

above but widest possible amplitude ought to be given on to the

expression above. The High Court upon reliance on various

decisions of different High Courts of the country observed:

We find that merely because in the present case the Courts,

which decided the earlier suits could not have entertained the

present suits, the finding recorded by them would not cease to

operate as res judicata, in view of the introduction of

Explanation VIII to section11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The submission, however, on this point on behalf of the plaintiff

was that no retrospective operation could be given to the

Explanation VIII inserted by Act 104 of 1976 and the suit which

was instituted in the year 1968 would have to be decided as if

Explanation VIII to section 11 was not on the statute book. The

question, whether retrospective effect should be given to

Explanation VIII would depend on the provisions of the 1976

Amending Act. Section 97 of Act 104 of 1976, so far as relevant

runs as follows:-

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97(1) any amendment made, or any provision inserted in the

principal Act by a State Legislature or a High Court before the

commencement of this Act shall, except in so far as such

amendment or provision is consistent with the provisions of the

principal Act as amended by this Act, stand repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding that the provisions of the Act have come into

force or the repeal under sub- section (1) has taken effect, and

without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of Section

6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897,

(a) the amendment made to clause (2) of Section 2 of the

Principal Act by Section 3 of this Act shall not affect any

appeal against the determination of any such question as is

referred to in section 47 and every such appeal shall be dealt

with as if the said section 3 had not come into force;

(b) ------------------------------to

(zb) ---------------------------------.

(3)Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the provisions

of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply to

every suit, proceeding, appeal or application, pending at the

commencement, notwithstanding the fact that the right, or cause

of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or

application is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had

accrued before such commencement.

Obviously, the effect given to Explanations VII and VIII inserted

in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the amendment,

would act come within the sweep of sub-section 2(af) of the

amending Act and it would be regulated by sub- section (3) of

section 97. As on the date of the commencement of the Amending

Act the present suit was pending in the Court of the Civil Judge,

Senior Division, Amravati, the amended provisions of section 11

would apply to it. Sub- section (2) of section 97 of the

amending Act regulates pending matters with reference to several

provisions of the principal Act, but does not refer to the

amendment brought about in section 11 of the principal Act, which

consequently would come within the sweep of sub-section (3) of

section 97 of the Amending Act and would, therefore, have

retrospective operation, so long as the matter in which the

question of application falls to be considered in pending at the

time of commencement of the Act.

We do feel it expedient to record that the analysis as effected

by the High Court stands acceptable and as such we refrain

ourselves from dilating on this aspect of the matter any further.

It is pertinent to add in this context that some differentiation

exists between a procedural statute and statute dealing with

substantive rights and in the normal course of events, matters of

procedure are presumed to be retrospective unless there is an

express ban on to its retrospectivity. In this context, the

observations of this Court in the case of Jose Da Costa and

Another v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim and Ors 1976 2 SCC

917 is of some relevance. This Court in paragraph 31 of the

Report observed:

Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid

passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it

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would be appropriate to bear in mind two well-established

principles. The first is that while provisions of a statute

dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless

that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective

effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in

existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied

retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary

intendment (Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Income

Tax Commissioner: AIR 1927 PC 242).

The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right

the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that

all successive appeals available under the law then in force

would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest

of the career of the suit. There are two exceptions to the

application of this rule, viz. (1) when by competent enactment

such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with

retrospective effect and (2) when the Court to which appeal lay

at the commencement of the suit stands abolished (Garikapati

Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary : AIR 1957 SC 540 and Colonial

Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving : 1905 AC 369).

Still later this Court in Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh &

Others ( AIR 1990 SC 209) expressed in the similar vein as

regards the element of retrospectivity. The English Courts also

laid that the rule that an Act of Parliament is not to be given

retrospective effect applies only to statutes which affect the

vested rights: It does not apply to statutes which alter the

form of procedure or the admissibility of evidence, or the effect

which the courts give to evidence: If the new Act affects

matters of procedure only, then, prima facie, it applies to all

actions pending as well as future (see in this context the

decisions of the House of Lords in the case of Blyth v. Blyth

(1966) 1 All ER 524: A.G. v. Vernazza: (1960) 3 All ER). In

Halsburys Laws of England (4th Edition: Vol.44: para 925 page

574) upon reference to Wright v. Hale (1860) 6 H & N 227 and

Gardner v. Lucas (1878) 3 Appeal Cases 582 alongwith some later

cases including Blyth v. Blyth (supra) it has been stated: the

presumption against retrospection does not apply to legislation

concerned merely with matters of procedure or of evidence; on

the contrary, provisions of that nature are to be construed as

retrospective unless there is a clear indication that such was

not the intention of Parliament.

The law thus seems to be well settled that no person has, in

fact, a vested right in procedural aspect one has only a right

of prosecution or defence in the manner as prescribed by the law

for the time being and in the event of any change of procedure by

an Act of Parliament one cannot possibly have any right to

proceed with the pending excepting as altered by the new

legislation and as such we need not dilate on the issue any

further.

Before we proceed with the matter further, incidentally, be it

noted that on the factual score, the question whether the

Plaintiff- appellants adoption by Radhabai was, in fact,

established or not there is no divergence of views between the

Appellate Court and the Trial Court: The factum of adoption was

established but whereas the trial Court doubted its legality, the

Appellate Court in no uncertain term recorded: there was no

question of any illegality attaching to the adoption on account

of absence of authority from the husband to adopt the child. It

is noteworthy at this juncture that by reason of the exposition

of law as above and since Mahadeos adoption was negated in the

earlier suit, question of any further claim on the basis of

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adoption of Mahadeo would not arise. The Appellate Court as a

matter of fact laid emphasis on the question as to whether the

Plaintiff by virtue of being Mahadeos adopted son would be

entitled to claim rights in the property which belong to Mohan

Lal and referred to Clause (c) of Proviso to Section 12 of the

Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. For convenience sake the

third proviso to Section 12 is noted hereinbelow:

12. Effects of adoption.

provided that -

(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of

any estate which vested in him or her before the

adoption.

It is on this aspect of the matter the Appellate Court observed:

The whole basis for claiming a right in the property left by

Mohan Lal is that Radhabai is the widow of Mahadeo alleged to be

the deceased son of Mohanlal. The argument was that after the

death of Mohanlal and in the absence of Ramgopals adoption, it

would be Radhabai who would take the property belonging to

Mohanlal to the exclusion, or otherwise, of Kisnibai who died in

the year 1951, as on the date of the adoption, i.e., 25th April,

1967, Radhabai was the only surviving member of the family of

Mohanlal. Succession to Mohanlal opened in the year 1923 when

the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act, 1937, had not been

enacted. The most that could be said in respect of Radhabai

would be that Radhabai, by virtue of her being the widow of

Mahadeo, would be entitled to take widows estate in the property

left by Mohanlal, and by virtue of the provisions of section 14

(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, her estate would be enlarged and

she would become a full owner of the property. At the time when

the previous suits were finally decided, the position of

Radhabai, in pursuance of these judgments, was that she was not a

member of Mohanlals family; and there is no dispute that this

finding bound Radhabai personally. The position on the date of

the plaintiffs adoption would be, if the submission of Shri

Udhoji were to be accepted, in view of clause (c) of Proviso to

Section 12, that the property vested in Radhabai as full

owner.

The position would, therefore, be that during the life time of

Radhabai, the plaintiff, even by virtue of his adoption, could

not have divested Radhabai if she were to have had become the

absolute owner of Mohanlals property. He could only claim by

succession to Radhabai and not by virtue of his being an adopted

son during his life time. In view of this position of law, it is

clear that the plaintiff, in order to succeed in the present

case, would have to claim under Radhabai and he would not get any

rights, by virtue of section 12 only on the basis that he was

Mahadeos adppted son, having regard to the date of his adoption

which was 25th April, 1967.

It is on the above observation that Mr. Sampath very strongly

contended that the Plaintiff by a legal fiction takes the

interest of Mahadeo in 1918 when he is deemed to be born, though,

in fact however, he was born in 1951. We however, cannot lend

any concurrence to the submission of Mr. Sampath. The plaintiff

can only claim by succession to Radhabai and not as a co-parcener

on the basis of a legal fiction. We feel it expedient to record

that the analysis of the situation by the Appellate Court that

the Plaintiff would have to claim under Radhabai but by virtue of

Section 12 of the Act of 1956, the plaintiff would not have any

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right on the basis that he was Mahadeos adopted son.

Admittedly, Radhabai was a party to the previous suit on the

issue regarding Ramgopal and Mohanlals adoption having been

decided against Radhabai specifically, it cannot but be said that

the plaintiff was litigating under the same title.

In view of the discussion as above and having regard to the

provisions of Section 11 read with Explanation VIII, the earlier

decision would operate as a res judicata in the present context.

The adoption of Ramgopal has, as a matter of fact, declared to be

a valid adoption in any event, the same being a finding against

the estate, question of further accrual of any right would not

arise. The Plaintiff cannot as a matter of fact lodge its claim

independently of Radhabai as a co-parcener by reason of being a

deemed son of Mahadeo. As noted above the entitlement is only if

there be any, through Radhabai and not independently of Radhabai.

The legal fiction introduced by Mr. Sampath unfortunately cannot

find favour with us, more so by reason of the fact that the

adoption of Mahadeo stands negated in the earlier suit.

Mr. Mohta appearing for the respondents, however, relying on the

earlier judgment and the findings as regards the affirmation of

Ramgopals adoption and negation of Mahadeos adoption and the

factum of the Plaintiff having been litigated under the same

title as Radhabai and since Radhabai was a party to the previous

suit, very strongly contended that question of any doubt being

raised as regards the applicability of the doctrine of res

judicata or constructive res judicata does not and cannot arise.

Mr. Mohta contended that vesting in any event cannot take place

in favour of an unborn person and vesting must be viz-a-viz a

living person and the legal fiction pertaining to vesting to an

unborn person would not arise. We do find some contentious

substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be

a vesting certain. To vest, generally means to give a

property in. (per Brett L.J. Coverdale v. Charlton 48

L.J.Q.B. 132: Strouds Judicial Dictionary 5th Edition.

Vol.VI). Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the

contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after

about 50 years without any authorisation cannot however but be

termed to be a contingent event: To vest, cannot be termed to

be an executory devise. Be it noted however, that vested does

not necessarily and always mean vest in possession but includes

vest in interest as well.

In the facts of the matter under consideration the issue

pertaining to vesting however does not call for any opinion, more

so by reason of the specific finding as regards the negation of

Mahadeos interest as well as the assertion of Ramgopals

adoption in the affirmative and as such the issue also loses its

significance and we also express no opinion in regard thereto,

save what is noted hereinbefore.

On the wake of the aforesaid we are unable to record our

concurrence with the submission of Mr. Sampath that the doctrine

of res judicata has no manner of application, on the contrary we

record our views that the second suit is barred by the doctrine

and we see no merit in the appeal as such. The Appeal is

therefore dismissed, there shall however be no order as to costs.