As per case facts, the appellant, a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL), was convicted for heinous offenses. The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) conducted a preliminary assessment and transferred the ...
1
CRA No. 932 of 2019
2026:CGHC:4041-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 932 of 2019
[Arising out of judgment dated 25.05.2019 passed in Special Sessions
Trial No.61/2017 by 5
th
Additional Sessions Judge / Children’s
Court / Special Judge, under the POCSO Act, Durg, District Durg,
Chhattisgarh.]
Rajkumar @ Raja Dewangan S/o Shiv Kumar, aged about 19
years, R/o Sikola Basti, Ward No. 15, Police Station- Mohan
Nagar, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh through Station House Officer, Police
Station- Mohan Nagar, District - Durg, Chhattisgarh.
... Respondent
For Appellant :-Mr. Rahil Arun Kochar, Advocate.
For State-Respondent:-Mr. Rahul Tamaskar, Government
Advocate, & Dr. S. K. Dewangan, Panel
Lawyer.
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal &
Hon'ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma
Judgment On Board
(23.01.2026)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J
1.The appellant herein – Child in Conflict with Law (for short, “the
CCL”) has been convicted and sentenced by the Children’s Court,
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Durg, District Durg, Chhattisgarh vide impugned judgment dated
25.05.2019 for the heinous offences as defined in Section 2(33) of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
(for brevity “the Act of 2015”) which states as under:-
Conviction Sentence
Under Section 363 of the IPC Imprisonment for 6 months
with fine of 200/-.
₹
Under Section 366 of the IPC Imprisonment for 6 months
with fine of 200/-.
₹
Under Section 376(2) of the IPC and
Section 6 of the POCSO Act
[However, sentenced under Section
376(2) of the IPC as the same is higher
in degree to that of Section 6 of the
POCSO Act]
Imprisonment for 10 years
with fine of 500/-
₹
Prosecution Story:-
2.The CCL was juvenile and found involved in offences as
mentioned in the opening para of this judgment, accordingly, he
was charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board
(for short “the JJB”) for the said offences. The JJB finding him
more than 16 years and less than 18 years of age as the date of
birth of the CCL is 22.02.2000 on the basis of his mark-sheet of
Class-II and Aadhaar Card (annexed with the original record) and
the date of offence is 12.11.2016, meaning thereby on the date of
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offence the CCL was aged about 16 years 9 months 10 days,
proceeded to hold preliminary assessment under Section 15(1) of
the Act of 2015 and called for the Psychologist Report vide order
dated 07.04.2017, with regard to mental and physical capacity of
CCL to commit such offence, ability to understand the
consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he
allegedly committed the offences. However, on 02.05.2017, the
Psychologist report was received to the JJB and, thereafter on the
same day JJB had preliminarily assessed the case of the CCL and
passed order under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015 and
transferred the case to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction to
try the offence i.e. the Children’s Court, Durg, District Durg
constituted under the provisions of the Commissions for
Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005, finding the CCL aged about
16 years 9 months and 10 days at the time of commission of
offence and said act of the CCL is heinous offence under Section
2(33) of the Act of 2015, however, the copy of the Psychologist
report was not served to either the CCL or his counsel or his
guardian.
3.The Children’s Court, Durg, District Durg receipt the case from
JJB on 16.05.2017 and after receipt of case from the JJB and the
preliminary inquiry report conducted under Section 15(1) of the
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Act, 2015, on 04.07.2017 framed the charges against the CCL for
offences under Sections 363, 366, 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of
the POCSO Act and held that the CCL has committed heinous
offence and did not make any further inquiry as envisaged under
Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015. The Children’s Court did not
hold that there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as per the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and after trial,
passed the impugned judgment and convicted ans sentenced the
CCL for offences as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this
judgment.
4.Feeling aggrieved against the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, the CCL i.e. the present appellant has preferred this
appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC calling in question
legality, validity and correctness of the same.
Submission of the parties:-
5.Mr. Rahil Arun Kochar, learned counsel for the appellant, would
submit that neither the JJB conducted the inquiry in accordance
with Section 15 of the Act of 2015 read with Rules 10 and 10A of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model
Rules, 2016 (for short “the Rules of 2016”) nor the Children’s
Court conducted any further inquiry under Section 19(1)(i) of the
Act of 2015 read with Rule 13 of the Rules of 2016 and, therefore,
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the entire trial deserves to be quashed and the appellant is entitled
for acquittal.
6.Mr. Rahul Tamaskar & Dr. S.K. Dewangan, learned State
counsels, would submit that the preliminary assessment was
conducted under Section 15(1) of the Act of 2015 and the
Psychologist report was called by the JJB, thereafter, the order
under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015 was passed and the case
was transferred to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction. They
would further submit that the Children’s Court, Durg, District
Durg, has also proceeded in accordance with law, therefore, the
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence deserves
to be maintained and the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.
7.We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the
records meticulously.
Discussion & Analysis:-
8.Admittedly, the date of offence is 12.11.2016 and as per mark-
sheet of Class-II and Aadhaar Card (annexed with the original
record) the date of birth of the appellant herein/CCL is
22.02.2000, therefore, on the date of offence, the CCL was aged
about 16 years 9 months and 10 days, and the offence mentioned
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in the opening paragraph of this judgment is a heinous offence.
The JJB was required to conduct an inquiry as per Section 15(1) of
the Act of 2015 read with Rules 10 & 10A of the Rules of 2016.
However, it appears from the record of the JJB that the JJB called
the report of the Psychologist, which was received by the JJB on
02.05.2017 and on the same day order of transferring the case to
the Children’s Court having jurisdiction under Section 18(3) of the
Act of 2015 was passed without serving the copy of the
Psychologist report to the appellant herein/CCL, or his guardian
or his counsel, which ought to have been served and reasonable
opportunity to respond to the Psychologist report ought to have
been granted to the appellant herein/CCL, but the said
procedures have not been followed by the JJB.
9.In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Barun
Chandra Thakur v. Master Bholu and another
1
, may be noticed
herein profitably in which their Lordships have considered the
manner and procedure of conducting inquiry by the Board,
whether the child in conflict with law is to be tried as an adult by
the Children's Court or by the Board itself, treating her to be a
child and it has been held that if the child in conflict with law is
tried as an adult by the Children’s Court, it involves
consequences of serious nature and having a lasting effect for the
1 (2023) 12 SCC 401
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entire life of the child, and it has serious civil consequences,
therefore, reasonable opportunity must be afforded. It has been
observed as under: -
“Effect of an order of preliminary assessment
47.The order of preliminary assessment decides whether
the child in conflict with law, falling in the age bracket of 16-
18 years and having committed heinous offence, is to be
tried as an adult by the Children's Court or by the Board
itself, treating him to be a child. There are two major
consequences provided in the 2015 Act, if the child is tried
as an adult by the Children's Court. First, that the sentence
or the punishment can go up to life imprisonment if the
child is tried as an adult by the Children's Court, whereas if
the child is tried by the Board as a child, the maximum
sentence that can be awarded is 3 years. The second major
consequence is that where the child is tried as a child by the
Board, then under Section 24(1), he would not suffer any
disqualification attached to the conviction of an offence,
whereas the said removal of disqualification would not be
available to a child who is tried as an adult by the Children's
Court, as per the proviso to Section 24(1). Another
consequence, which may also have serious repercussions, is
that as per Section 24(2), where the Board or the Children's
Court, after the case is over, may direct the police or the
registry that relevant records of such conviction may be
destroyed after the period of expiry of appeal or a
reasonable period as may be prescribed. Whereas, when a
child is tried as an adult, the relevant records shall be
retained by the relevant Court, as per the proviso to Section
24(2).
48.These consequences are serious in nature and have a
lasting effect for the entire life of the child. It is well settled
that any order that has serious civil consequences,
reasonable opportunity must be afforded. The question is
of what would be a reasonable opportunity in a case where
a preliminary assessment is to be made by the Board under
Section 15.”
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10.Thereafter, their Lordships dealt with the question as to what
would be a reasonable opportunity in a case where a preliminary
assessment would be made by the Board under Section 15 of the
Act of 2015 and it is held that the expression “may” in the proviso
to Section 15(1) and the requirement of taking assistance of
experienced physiologists or psycho-social workers or other
experts would operate as mandatory unless the Board itself
comprises of at least one member who is a practising professional
with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry. It has been
observed by their Lordships as under: -
“83.Therefore, looking to the purpose of the 2015 Act and
its legislative intent, particularly to ensure the protection of
best interest of the child, the expression “may” in the
proviso to Section 15(1) thereof and the requirement of
taking assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-
social workers or other experts would operate as mandatory
unless the Board itself comprises of at least one member
who is a practising professional with a degree in child
psychology or child psychiatry. Moreover, in case the
Board, in view of its own composition with at least one
member, who is a practising professional with a degree in
child psychology or child psychiatry, chooses not to take
such assistance, it would record specific reasons therefor.
84. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Conclusion
85. We are conscious of the fact that the power to make the
preliminary assessment is vested in the Board and also the
Children's Court under Sections 15 and 19 respectively. The
Children's Court, on its own, upon a matter being referred to
under Section 18(3), would still examine whether the child is
to be tried as an adult or not, and if it would come to the
conclusion that the child was not to be tried as an adult then
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it would itself conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass
appropriate orders under Section 18. Thus, the power to
carry out the preliminary assessment rests with the Board
and the Children's Court. This Court cannot delve upon the
exercise of preliminary assessment. This Court will only
examine as to whether the preliminary assessment has been
carried out as required under law or not. Even the High
Court, exercising revisionary power under Section 102,
would test the decision of the Board or the Children's Court
with respect to its legality or propriety only. In the present
case, the High Court has, after considering limited material
on record, arrived at a conclusion that the matter required
reconsideration and for which, it has remanded the matter to
the Board with further directions to take additional evidence
and also to afford adequate opportunity to the child before
taking a fresh decision.”
11.In the case in hand, the procedure prescribed in Rule 10(5) of the
Rules of 2016 has not been followed which provides that in the
cases of heinous offences alleged to have been committed by a
child, who has completed the age of sixteen years, the Child
Welfare Police Officer shall produce the statements of witnesses
recorded by him and other documents prepared during the
course of investigation within a period of one month from the
date of first production of the child before the Board and a copy of
which shall also be given to the child or parent or guardian of the
child. Also Rule 10(9) of the Rules of 2016 has not been followed
in the present case which provides that the Board shall take into
account the report containing circumstances of apprehending the
child and the offence alleged to have been committed by him and
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the social investigation report in Form 6 prepared by the
Probation Officer or the voluntary or non-governmental
organisation, along with the evidence produced by the parties for
arriving at a conclusion and the JJB has simply passed order
transferring the case to the jurisdictional Children’s Court under
Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015 which is a flagrant violation of the
provisions contained in the Act of 2015 read with the Rules of
2016 as well as the principles of law laid down by their Lordships
of the Supreme Court in the matter of Barun Chandra Thakur
(supra).
12.Not only this, in the instant case, there is also total non–
compliance of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015. The Supreme
Court in the matter of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh
2
has held that the procedure prescribed under Sections 15 and
19(1) of the Act of 2015 are mandatory in nature and observed as
under:-
“9. There are two parts to sub-section (1) of Section 19.
The first part requires the Children's Court to decide
whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as
per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
If the Court is satisfied that the child needs to be tried as
an adult as per the provisions of CrPC, the Children's
Court can proceed with the trial and thereafter pass an
appropriate order subject to the provisions of Sections 19
and 21 of the JJ Act.
2 (2023) 15 SCC 678
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10. Clause (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 19 is very
crucial which indicates that though the word “may” have
been used in the opening part of sub-section (1) of Section
19, the same will have to be read as “shall”. Clause (ii)
provides that after examining whether there is a need for
a trial of the child as an adult, if the Children's Court
comes to the conclusion that there is no need for the trial
of the child as an adult, instead of sending back the matter
to the Board, the Court itself is empowered to conduct an
inquiry and pass appropriate orders in accordance with
provisions of Section 18 of the JJ Act. The trial of a child
as an adult and his trial as a juvenile by the Juvenile
Justice Board has different consequences.
11. Therefore, holding an inquiry in terms of clause (i) of
sub-section (1) of Section 19 is not an empty formality.
The reason is that if the Children's Court comes to the
conclusion that there is no need to try the child as an
adult, he will be entitled to be treated differently in the
sense that action can be taken against him only in terms of
Section 18 of the JJ Act.
12. The observation of the High Court that the order
passed under sub-section (3) of Section 18 has attained
finality completely ignores that the order under sub-
section (3) of Section 18 is not a final adjudication on the
question of trying the child as an adult. The reason is that
the order under sub-section (3) of Section 18 is based on a
preliminary assessment made under Section 15. As such
order is based only on a preliminary assessment, the law
provides for a further inquiry in terms of sub-section (1) of
Section 19 by the competent Children's Court. Hence, the
Children's Court cannot brush aside the requirement of
holding an inquiry under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of
Section 19.”
13.Coming to the facts of the present case, it appears from the
records that on reciept of the case from the JJB, the Children’s
Court only relied upon the preliminary assessment report
submitted by the JJB and did not take pain to conduct further
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inquiry as mandated under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015 read
with Rule 13 of the Rules of 2016 as directed by their Lordships of
the Supreme Court in the matter of Ajeet Gurjar (supra) and
passed order without taking decision under Section 19(1) of the
Act of 2015 and registered the case in contravention of Rule 13 of
the Rules of 2016 and further on 04.07.2017 the charges were
framed against the appellant without holding that there is a need
for trial of the child as an adult as per the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. However, the copy of the
preliminary inquiry was not supplied to the CCL and no
reasonable opportunity of hearing was afforded to his counsel to
make submission on the preliminary inquiry report. As such, the
order dated 04.07.2017, framing of charges, of the Children’s
Court is totally contrary and violation of provisions contained
under Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015 read with Rules 13(1) & 13
(6) of the Rules of 2016. The provisions contained under Section
19(1) of the Act of 2015 as well as the Rules 13(1) and 13(6)
deserve to be noticed herein:-
Section 19 of the Act of 2015:-
“19. Powers of Children’s Court.—(1) After the receipt of
preliminary assessment from the Board under section 15,
the Children’s Court may decide that—
(i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as
per the provisions of the Code of Criminal
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Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate
orders after trial subject to the provisions of this
section and section 21, considering the special needs
of the child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a
child friendly astrosphere;
(ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult
and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions
of section 18.”
Rule 13 of the Rules of 2016:-
“13. Procedure in relation to Children’s Court and
Monitoring Authorities.—(1) Upon receipt of
preliminarily assessment from the Board the Children’s
Court may decide whether there is need for trial of the
child as an adult or as a child and pass appropriate orders.
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) xxx xxx xxx
(4) xxx xxx xxx
(5) xxx xxx xxx
(6) The Children’s Court shall record its reasons while
arriving at a conclusion whether the child is to be treated
as an adult or as a child.
14. In view of the aforesaid discussion and analysis, it is quite vivid
that there is complete violation of Section 15(1) of the Act of 2015
read with Rules 10 & 10(A) of the Rules of 2016 as well as Section
19(1) of the Act of 2015 read with Rules 13(1) and 13(6) of the
Rules of 2016 which is held to be mandatory in light of the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the matters of Barun Chandra
Thakur (supra) and Ajeet Gurjar (supra) and which has further
14
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been reiterated in the matter of Thirumoorthy v. State,
represented by the Inspector of Police
3
.
15. Since the CCL, as of now is nearly aged about 26 years as his date
of birth is 22.02.2000 on the basis of mark-sheet of Clas-II and
Aadhaar Card, there is no possibility of finding out the mental
and physical capacity of the accused/appellant to commit the
offence or to assess her ability to understand the consequences of
the offence and circumstances in which he allegedly committed
the offence on 12.11.2016. As such, this Court is of the considered
opinion that it is not a case where the matter be remitted to the JJB
for conducting inquiry afresh in accordance with Section 15(1) of
the Act of 2015 read with Rules 10 & 10A of the Rules of 2016 or to
the Children’s Court for conducting inquiry in accordance with
Section 19(1) of the Act of 2015 read with Rules 13(1) and 13(6) of
the Rules of 2016. Furthermore, the proceedings right from the
stage of the JJB to that of the Children’s Court have not been
conducted in accordance with the Act of 2015 and the Rules of
2016 and also the principles of law laid down by their Lordships
of the Supreme Court in the matters of Barun Chandra Thakur
(supra), Ajeet Gurjar (supra) and Thirumoorthy (supra) have not
been followed and even the clock cannot be reversed to examine
the mental and physical capacity of the appellant on the date of
3 2024 SCC OnLine Sc 375
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incident. Therefore, the entire trial stands vitiated as having been
undertaken in gross violation of the mandatory requirements of
the Act of 2015 as well as the Rules of 2016.
Conclusion:-
16.In view of the above, We are left with no option, but to quash and
set aside the impugned judgment dated 25.05.2019 passed by the
Children’s Court, Durg, District Durg. Since the appellant is
stated to be on bail, he need not surrender. However, his bail
bond shall remain in operation for a period of six months as per
provisions contained in Section 437-A of the CrPC.
17.Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original
record be transmitted to the concerned Children’s Court and all
the Juvenile Justice Board for information and needful action.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Arvind Kumar Verma)
Judge Judge
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