As per case facts, the plaintiff initially sought property ownership via adverse possession but later amended the suit to claim recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief ...
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 1 of 16
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 15.05.2026
Judgment Delivered on: 08.07.2026
+ CS(OS) 344/2020 and I.A. 10463/2020, I.A. 12458/2022, I.A.
12459/2022, I.A. 21097/2022, I.A. 3087/2023, CRL.M.A.
5747/2023, I.A. 8557/2023, I.A. 24514/2023 & I.A. 3061/2026
RAKESH SACHDEVA .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Biraja Mahapatra and Mr. Abhay
Singh, Advocates.
versus
RAJESH SACHDEVA .....Defendant
Through: Mr. T.K. Ganju, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Vivek Singh, Ms. Kirti Mewar,
Ms. Kriti Sharma and Mr. Kartik
Shoukeen, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
VIKAS MAHAJAN , J
I.A. 580/2023 (under XII Rule 6 read with Order VII Rule 11 read with
Section 151 CPC by the defendant)
1. The facts in brief as borne out from the record are that the captioned
suit was filed by the plaintiff on 06.11.2020 claiming ownership of the entire
property comprising of basement, ground floor, first and second floors at
B/1/2, Pramod Mahajan Marg, Saket, New Delhi [hereinafter referred to as
‘the building’] on the plea of adverse possession.
2. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved an amendment application under
Order VI Rule 17 CPC and thereby explicitly abandoned the plea of
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 2 of 16
ownership by hostile and adverse possession, and in the amended plaint, the
plaintiff prayed only for recovery of possession of the ‘ground floor’ of
building [hereinafter referred to as ‘suit property’] under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 [in short, ‘Act’], not on the basis of his title, but
only on the ground that he was allegedly dispossessed illegally on
26.10.2020.
3. The amended plaint which has been placed on record seems to have
been signed and verified in February, 2021. The defendant filed his written
statement to the amended plaint taking, inter alia, a preliminary objection
that the suit is barred by limitation as there is sufficient material on record to
suggest that the defendant is in continuous uninterrupted possession of the
suit property for a long period, not less than six months from the alleged
dispossession.
4. Later on, the defendant filed the present application under order VII
Rule 11 read order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking rejection of plaint in terms of
the admission of the plaintiff and further praying for passing a judgment
thereby dismissing the suit of the plaintiff.
5. It is alleged in the application that the defendant is the recorded owner
of the suit property. It is further stated that the defendant/applicant has filed
a suit for recovery of possession and mesne profit being CS-DJ
No.9302/2016, titled as Rajesh Sachdeva v. Rakesh Sachdeva, against the
plaintiff herein with respect to the recovery of possession of first floor,
second floor and basement of the building and the remaining portion of the
said property, except ground floor, front and back open yard and terrace,
which were always in possession of the defendant/applicant.
6. It is stated that in the aforesaid civil suit i.e. CS-DJ No.9302/2016, the
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 3 of 16
defendant/applicant moved an application under Order VII Rule 14 CPC for
bringing the registered lease deed dated 20.08.2015 qua the ground floor
(i.e. the suit property) on judicial record for the purpose of proving the
prevailing rate of rent based on which the defendant/applicant could claim
mesne profit in the said suit. The relevant para 3 of the application, reads
thus:
“3. That in order to prove damages, the plaintiff places
reliance upon the lease deed dated 20.08.2015 executed by the
plaintiff himself in favour of one Ms. Shobha Rani Gupta,
Advocate in respect of the ground floor of the property in
question. The said lease deed has been duly registered in the office
of Sub-Registrar vide registration No. 4758 in Book No.I, Volume
No. 1144, pages 158 to 169.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. In reply to the said application, filed by the plaintiff herein on
15.04.2017, particularly in para 1 of the preliminary objections, it was
specifically pleaded as follows:
“1. That the answering defendant is in possession of the ground
floor of the property since 31.10.87 as it was handed over by Shri
Bhagwan Din as explained in WS. Defendant permitted his parents
to occupy and use the ground floor of the said property out of love
and affection. Mother of the defendant expired on 18.01.2015.
Defendant never asked his father to vacate the ground floor due to
his old age. On seeing this document the defendant is shocked to
note that plaintiff had illegally & unlawfully leased the said floor.
Defendant reserves his right to seek possession back in
accordance with law and shall soon begin/initiate the process.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. It is the case of the defendant/applicant that by way of reply filed by
the plaintiff herein, who is the defendant in the said suit, a categorical
admission has been made admitting that the possession of the suit property
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 4 of 16
i.e. ground floor of the building was not with the plaintiff at least on or
before 15.04.2017, and accordingly, the plaintiff sought to reserve his right
to seek possession back in accordance with law.
9. It is stated in the present application that certified copy of the
application dated 20.10.2016 filed by the defendant/applicant under Order
VII Rule 14 CPC in the aforesaid suit i.e. CS-DJ No.9302/2016, as well as,
the reply thereto dated 15.04.2017 filed by the plaintiff herein, have been
placed on record along with the written statement.
10. Mr. T.K Ganju, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
defendant/applicant submits that the present suit, filed in November 2020, is
barred by limitation. He further submits that a suit under Section 6 of the
Act must be filed within six months of dispossession, whereas the plaintiff's
own admission in the reply dated 15.04.2017 before the Ld. ADJ establishes
that he was not in possession of the ground at least as on said date.
11. He contends that the defendant is the sole, absolute, and lawful owner
of the building including the suit property by virtue of sale deed dated
06.12.1990 and conveyance deed dated 01.02.2001, and that the Defendant
had permitted the plaintiff, who is his brother, a permissive use of the
building, which does not include the ground floor, for his residence, on
purely a license basis without any consideration, in view of the close
relationship between the parties.
12. He further contends that subsequently, the relationship between the
parties got strained, inter alia, on account of the ill-treatment of parents of
the parties by the plaintiff. The father of the parties published public notices
in daily newspapers, thereby disowned and severed all relations with the
plaintiff and even made his wish that plaintiff/Rakesh Sachdeva should not
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 5 of 16
lit his pyre.
13. He submits that on account of above, defendant had terminated the
license of the Plaintiff vide notice dated 15.06.2009 and subsequently, filed
a suit, being CS DJ No. 9302/2016, for Decree of possession, Permanent
injunction and mesne profits against the plaintiff in respect of the Basement,
First and Second Floors of the Building. The ground floor of the building, at
all times, was in the exclusive occupation, possession and under the lock and
key of the Defendant.
14. He argues that the plaintiff deliberately concealed material facts, and
the proceedings of aforesaid suit [CS DJ No. 9302/2016], including the
pleadings of the application under order VII Rule 14 CPC, which
demonstrate that the plaintiff was never in possession of the ground floor.
15. Mr. Ganju places strong reliance on a reply dated 15.04.2017 filed by
the plaintiff to the application under Order VII Rule 14 in CS DJ No.
9302/2016, to contend that the plaintiff has categorically admitted that he
was not in possession of the ground floor at least as on 15.04.2017 and
sought to reserve his right to seek possession back in accordance with the
law.
16. He submits that the date of 26.10.2020 as the date of alleged
dispossession, that has been pleaded in the present suit, is a false and
concocted averment, deliberately inserted in the plaint to bring the suit
within limitation, whereas the admission suggests otherwise.
17. Mr. Ganju places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramisetty Venkatanna vs. Nasyam Jamal Saheb (2024) 18 SCC
426 to contend that clever drafting creating an illusion of a cause of action
should be nipped in the bud. He also relies upon the decision of Hon’ble
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 6 of 16
Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Ichharam (1974) 1
SCC 242 to assert that judicial admission or admissions in the pleadings, are
fully binding; and in Keshav Chander Thakur vs. Krishan Chander 2014
SCC OnLine Del 3092 to contend that the Court can pass a decree on
judicial admissions.
18. Mr Ganju further submits that the wife of the plaintiff namely, Smt.
Sadhna Sachdeva has filed a Suit No. 407/2017 before the Ld. SCJ, Saket
Courts, wherein at para 5 she categorically stated that the ground floor is in
the exclusive possession of the defendant/applicant herein, who has kept a
tenant and is realising rent. To buttress his contention he has also brought to
the attention of this Court the said para 5 of the suit filed by the plaintiff’s
wife. He further submits that the plaintiff herein in the written statement
filed by him in the said suit did not deny the said assertion. He thus,
contends that the assertion made by wife shall be deemed to have been
admitted in view of the doctrine of non-traverse as enshrined in Order VIII
Rule 5 CPC. To fortify his submission, Mr. Ganju places reliance on Lohia
Properties (P) Ltd., Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Assam v. Atmaram Kumar,
(1993) 4 SCC 6.
19. Mr. Ganju also places reliance on the decision of the Division Bench
of this Court in Babita Pal & Ors. v. Jagdish Bansal, 2012 SCC OnLine
Del 6043, to contend that while deciding an application filed under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC, apart from the plaint and the documents filed with the
plaint, the Court can also see the documents which ought to have been filed
with the plaint but have deliberately been withheld by the plaintiff.
20. Elaborating further, he submits that the pleadings of the application
under Order VII Rule 14 CPC filed by the defendant/applicant in CS-DJ
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 7 of 16
No.9302/2016, as well as, the pleadings of the Suit No.407/2017 before the
learned SCJ, Saket Courts, New Delhi filed by the plaintiff’s wife, were
material for the purpose of deciding the issue of limitation in the present
case and the same have deliberately been withheld by the plaintiff, therefore,
this Court could look into the said documents while deciding the present
application.
21. Per contra, Mr. Biraja Mahaptra, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the plaintiff vehemently opposes the application and submits that the suit
was filed well within the limitation period.
22. He submits that the plaintiff has specifically pleaded in the plaint that
the cause of action arose on 26.10.2020, when the defendant forcibly
removed the belongings of the father and seized possession of the ground
floor.
23. He contends that for the purpose of deciding the application under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC, only the contents of the plaint have to be seen
which shows that the cause of action is within the period of six months, thus,
the suit is not barred by limitation.
24. He submits that the limitation is a mixed question of law and fact,
therefore, it is a triable issue necessarily requiring leading of evidence and
the same cannot be decided summarily under Order VII Rule 11 CPC or
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. In support of his contention, he places reliance
on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maria Margarida
Sequeira Fernandes and Ors. v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead)
Through LRs. (2012) 5 SCC 370.
25. He submits that the reply of the plaintiff to the application of the
defendant/applicant under Order VII Rule 14 CPC filed in CS-DJ
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 8 of 16
No.9302/2016, if read as a whole, would reveal that there is no clear and
unequivocal admission.
26. He places reliance on the decision in Balraj Taneja and Anr v. Sunil
Madan and Anr. (1999) 8 SCC 396, as well as, the decision in Nisha
Chandola v. Manoj Sharma (2026) SCC OnLine Del 1206, to contend that
admission has to be clear and unequivocal for the court to pass a judgment
on admission.
27. I have heard Mr. T.K. Ganju, learned Senior Counsel for the
defendant/applicant, as well as, Mr. Biraj Mahapatra, learned counsel for the
plaintiff/non-applicant.
28. A short question which arises for consideration of this Court in the
present application is that whether at this interlocutory stage, the plaintiff
could be non-suited only on the ground of limitation.
29. As noted above, the suit has been filed by the plaintiff under Section 6
of the Act seeking possession of the suit property. To appreciate the limited
controversy, relevant would it be to extract Section 6 of the Act, which reads
as follows:
“6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property.—
(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of
immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he
or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover
possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may
be set up in such suit.
(2) No suit under this section shall be brought—
(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of
dispossession; or
(b) against the Government.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any
suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 9 of 16
such order or decree be allowed.
(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to
establish his title to such property and to recover possession
thereof.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. A perusal of the above quoted provision makes it clear that in order to
establish the claim under Section 6 of the Act, following three things are
required to be established:
(i) The plaintiff was in possession of the suit property.
(ii) The plaintiff has been dispossessed without his consent otherwise
than in due course of law.
(iii) The suit for recovery of possession has been filed within the period of
six months from the date of the alleged dispossession.
31. The object of Section 6 of the Act is speedy disposal of cases so that
the legally ousted person is put back to possession giving liberty to other
party to sue for possession on the basis of title. However, in a suit for
possession under Section 6 of the Act, the question of title is irrelevant, and
the suit is maintainable only by virtue of previous possession.
32. Evidently, sub-section 2(a) of Section 6 bars instituting of a suit after
six months from the date of dispossession. Reference in this regard may also
be had to the decision in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M.
Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331, where the plaintiff had alleged that he had
been dispossessed from the suit property and the suit for possession had
been filed beyond six months of dispossession, it was held to be not
maintainable, the same being barred by limitation. It is against this backdrop
of settled legal position that the facts of the present case have to be tested.
33. The present suit was initially filed by the plaintiff on 06.11.2020
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 10 of 16
claiming possession of the suit property on the plea of ownership by hostile
and adverse possession. The plaint was subsequently amended, and the suit
was converted to one for recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Act,
not on the basis of the title, but only on the premise that the plaintiff was
allegedly dispossessed illegally on 26.10.2020. Such amendment was
allowed vide order dated 10.02.2021 and the amended plaint came to be
filed on or about 05.02.2021.
34. In the amended plaint, the plaintiff has pleaded alleged dispossession
on 26.10.2020, however, a perusal of para 3 of the application filed by the
defendant/applicant under Order VII Rule 14 CPC in a suit for recovery of
possession and mesne profit filed by him i.e. CS-DJ No.9302/2016, shows
that it was specifically alleged therein, that the defendant/applicant herein
executed a lease deed dated 20.08.2015 in favour of one of Ms. Shobha Rani
Gupta, Advocate in respect of the suit property i.e. ground floor of the
building.
35. In reply to the said application filed by the plaintiff herein on
15.04.2017, the following stand was taken in respect of the ground floor i.e.
the suit property: “……. On seeing this document the defendant is shocked
to note that plaintiff had illegally & unlawfully leased the said floor.
Defendant reserves his right to seek possession back in accordance with law
and shall soon begin/initiate the process”. Clearly, the plaintiff referencing
to the lease deed dated 20.08.2015 executed by the defendant/applicant
herein qua the ground floor (i.e. the suit property) in favour of one Ms.
Shobha Rani Gupta, made a categorical admission in the pleadings about the
fact that he is no more in possession of the suit property and will take steps
to recover the possession thereof by taking legal recourse at the earliest.
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 11 of 16
36. This reply was filed by the plaintiff on 15.04.2017, suggesting in
unequivocal terms that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit
property at least on, or even before, 15.04.2017.
37. The said admission made by the plaintiff herein, is clear, categorical
and unambiguous. The law is well settled that admissions in pleadings or
judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act stand
on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. Reference in this regard
may be had to the decision in Nagindas Ramdas (supra) wherein it was
observed as under:
"27.xxxxxx Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions,
admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the
Parties or their agents at/ or before the hearing of the case, stand
on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class
of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and
constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the
foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand,
evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as
evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to
be wrong. "
(emphasis supplied)
38. Indubitably, the plaint was originally filed on 06.11.2020, which is
after more than three years of above referred admission in the reply dated
15.04.2017. Based on such admission, the suit is clearly beyond the period
of six months as provided in Section 6 of the Act and is thus, barred by
limitation.
39. Mr. Biraja Mahaptra, learned counsel for the plaintiff/non-applicant
has argued that for the purpose of deciding the application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC, only the contents of the plaint have to be seen, which in the
present case clearly shows that the dispossession of the plaintiff occurred on
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 12 of 16
26.10.2020, therefore, the pleaded cause of action is within the period of six
months of the filing of present suit filed on 06.11.2021.
40. This Court does not, however, find favour with the submission of Mr.
Mahapatra. A Division Bench of this Court in Babita Pal (supra) has held
that for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC not only the plaint
but the documents which ought to have been filed with the plaint but were
deliberately withheld by the plaintiff can also be seen. The relevant extract
from the said decision reads thus:
“14.......It is well settled that for rejection of a plaint under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC, all that can be seen is the plaint, the
documents filed with the plaint and the documents which ought to
have been filed with the plaint but which have deliberately been
withheld by the plaintiff. The defence that the appellants may set
up in their written statement cannot be the basis of an application
under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. An application filed by the defendant/applicant under Order VII Rule
14 CPC in CS-DJ No.9302/2016, as well as, a reply thereto filed by the
plaintiff herein, are material documents for the purpose of deciding the
question of limitation and the same ought to have been filed by the plaintiff
with the plaint but it seems that the plaintiff deliberately withheld them and
projected an illusionary cause of action alleging that the plaintiff was
dispossessed on 26.10.2020, to bring the suit within the period of limitation.
42. Intriguingly, it is not the case of the plaintiff that after his
dispossession from the suit property i.e. ground floor, he had issued a notice
to the defendant/applicant or filed any complaint with the police. By merely
pleading an illusionary cause of action, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to
circumvent the provisions of the limitation Act, when from the admission in
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 13 of 16
the reply to the application under Order VII Rule 14 CPC in CS-DJ
No.9302/2016 it is ex facie borne out that the suit is not within limitation.
Thus, it is not a case where the limitation could be said to be a disputed
question of fact.
43. Incidentally, the plaintiff in reply to the present application has not
even denied the fact that reply to the application under Order VII Rule 14
CPC in CS-DJ No.9302/2016 was filed by him on 15.04.2017 wherein it is
stated that he shall soon be taking steps to recover back possession of the
suit property i.e. the ‘ground floor’ of the ‘building’. Further, the plaintiff
has neither explained nor controverted in any manner the said admission
made in the reply to the application under Order VII Rule 14 CPC. He has
also not denied the existence of registered lease deed dated 20.08.2015 with
the tenant, that was specifically pleaded by the defendant/applicant in his
application under Order VII Rule 14 CPC.
44. Therefore, given the fact the application filed by the
defendant/applicant under Order VII Rule 14 CPC and the reply thereto filed
by the plaintiff, are not in dispute, it is a fit case for the Court even to
exercise powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on the basis of clear admission
made by the plaintiff as regard his dispossession from the suit property at
least on, or even before, 15.04.2017, and hold that the suit is barred by
limitation, even assuming arguendo that the aforesaid application and reply
thereto cannot be looked into for the purpose of rejection of plaint under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Notably, the present application has been filed by
the defendant/applicant by invoking both the provisions i.e. Order VII Rule
11 CPC read with Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
45. At this juncture, it would be advantageous to refer to the decision of
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 14 of 16
the Division Bench in Keshav Chander Thakur (supra) wherein the Court
while deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, though did not
entertain a plea under the said provision, but still exercised the powers under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC to suo moto pass a judgment based on pleadings and
admitted documents on record. The relevant extract from the said decision
reads thus:
“38. We concur with the view of the learned Single Judge.
However, we may like to note that the learned Single Judge has
exercised powers under Order VII Rule 11 CPC while rejecting
the plaint. The scope of exercise of powers under Order VII Rule
11 CPC is limited by the contours of the provision. While
exercising those powers what has to be seen is only the averments
in the plaint and the documents filed alongwith the plaint. The
defence as taken in the written statement is not to be gone into for
the said purpose. To that extent, the judgment of the learned
Single Judge may suffer from an infirmity. However, in our view
given the nature of pleadings and admitted documents on record
and the extensive arguments advanced by the parties on the issues
discussed herein, this was a fit case for the Court to exercise
powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC where the Court has powers
to suo moto pass a judgment. There is no requirement in Order XII
Rule 6 CPC for filing of a formal application. The Court can on its
own motion without any application by a party proceed to pass a
decree on admissions as stated in Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Order XII
Rule 6(i) CPC reads as follows : -
“6. Judgment on admissions.- (1) Where admissions of fact
have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether
orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit,
either on the application of any party or of its own motion and
without waiting for the determination of any other question
between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as
it may thing fit, having regard to such admissions.”
In our view based on the pleadings and documents placed on
record by the parties there are clear admissions of fact which
warrant passing of the order of dismissal of the plaint.”
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 15 of 16
(emphasis supplied)
46. However, before parting, the decisions relied upon by the plaintiff
may also be adverted to. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the
plaintiff on Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes (supra) is misplaced.
The said decision primarily deals with the maintainability of a caretaker's
suit for injunction against the true owner, and importance of pleadings and
documents in a suit for possession, and the duty of courts to critically
examine pleadings and documents at the threshold. Far from assisting the
plaintiff’s case, the ratio in the said decision actually supports the
defendant’s position, inasmuch as the Hon’ble Supreme Court therein
emphatically held that courts must carefully and critically examine the
pleadings and documents, and that if the pleadings do not give sufficient
details, they will not raise an issue, and the court can reject the claim or pass
a decree on admission.
47. Likewise, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the plaintiff
on Balraj Taneja (supra) is also misplaced. In this case the suit was for
specific performance in which the High Court had decreed the suit under
Order VIII Rule 10 CPC solely because the written statement had not been
filed, without any examination of the plaint, and the observation of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court’s cautioning against acting blindly upon deemed
admission was in that wholly distinct setting where there was no
independent judicial admission by the plaintiff. In contrast, in the present
case, the defendant/applicant is not invoking the doctrine of non-traverse but
there is a positive and unequivocal admission made by the plaintiff in the
proceedings before another court, which the plaintiff has not denied or
explained even in his reply to the present application.
CS(OS) 344/2020 Page 16 of 16
48. Lastly, even decision in Nisha Chandola (supra) does not assist the
plaintiff's case. The said decision was a case where the plaintiff sought
judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on the basis of a
handwriting expert’s opinion and the alleged inconsistencies in the
defendant's written statement, and the Court dismissed the application
precisely because the averments therein did not refer to any clear and
unambiguous admission on the part of the defendant. That decision,
therefore, stands on a different footing, whereas in the present case the
defendant invokes the plaintiff’s own admission in the pleadings of the
application in another suit.
49. In view of the undisputed documents in the form of application filed
by the defendant/applicant under Order VII Rule 14 CPC and the reply
thereto filed by the plaintiff, as well as a clear admission of the plaintiff, the
application is allowed, the plaint is rejected and suit is dismissed under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC read with Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
50. The application is disposed of.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J
JULY 08, 2026/aj
In a significant ruling, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has once again underscored the importance of timely legal action and consistent pleadings, dismissing a suit for recovery of possession under the Section 6 Specific Relief Act. The case, Rakesh Sachdeva vs. Rajesh Sachdeva (CS(OS) 344/2020), delivered on July 8, 2026, highlights the stringent limitation period for such actions and the binding nature of judicial admissions, especially in the context of a Judgment on Admissions. This pivotal judgment, now available on CaseOn, serves as a critical precedent for property disputes.
The dispute revolved around a property located at B/1/2, Pramod Mahajan Marg, Saket, New Delhi. The plaintiff, Rakesh Sachdeva, initially filed a suit on November 6, 2020, claiming ownership of the entire building based on adverse possession. Subsequently, the plaintiff amended the plaint, abandoning the plea of adverse possession and instead seeking recovery of possession of only the 'ground floor' of the building (hereinafter referred to as 'suit property') under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The plaintiff specifically alleged that he was illegally dispossessed on October 26, 2020.
The defendant, Rajesh Sachdeva, filed a written statement to the amended plaint, raising a preliminary objection that the suit was barred by limitation. The defendant subsequently filed an application (I.A. 580/2023) under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) for rejection of the plaint, and Order XII Rule 6 CPC for passing a judgment based on the plaintiff's admissions.
The central question before the Delhi High Court was: Can a suit for recovery of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, filed in November 2020, be dismissed at an interlocutory stage on the ground of being time-barred, particularly when the plaintiff's own admissions in prior judicial proceedings suggest dispossession much earlier than the pleaded date?
Section 6 of the Act provides a speedy remedy for persons dispossessed of immovable property without due process of law. Key conditions for a suit under this section include:
The court referenced Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v. K.M. Krishnaiah, (1998) 3 SCC 331, reiterating that a suit filed beyond this six-month period is not maintainable.
This rule allows a court to reject a plaint if it appears from the statements in the plaint that the suit is barred by any law. While generally, only the plaint's contents are considered, the court cited Babita Pal & Ors. v. Jagdish Bansal, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 6043, which established that "documents which ought to have been filed with the plaint but which have deliberately been withheld by the plaintiff" can also be examined.
This rule empowers a court to pass a judgment at any stage of the suit based on clear and unequivocal admissions of fact, whether made in pleadings or otherwise, even without a formal application. The Supreme Court in Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Ichharam (1974) 1 SCC 242, held that judicial admissions are fully binding and constitute a waiver of proof, forming the foundation of the rights of the parties.
The High Court meticulously examined the defendant's application, focusing on a critical admission made by the plaintiff in a previous suit (CS-DJ No.9302/2016). In that earlier proceeding, the defendant had sought to place a lease deed dated August 20, 2015, on record, showing that the defendant had leased the ground floor to a third party.
In response to this, the plaintiff (who was the defendant in that suit) filed a reply on April 15, 2017, stating:
“...On seeing this document the defendant is shocked to note that plaintiff had illegally & unlawfully leased the said floor. Defendant reserves his right to seek possession back in accordance with law and shall soon begin/initiate the process.”
The High Court interpreted this statement as a "categorical admission" by the plaintiff that he was not in possession of the suit property at least on or before April 15, 2017. This admission directly contradicted the plaintiff's assertion in the current suit that he was dispossessed on October 26, 2020.
Applying the principle from Babita Pal, the court held that it could look into these deliberately withheld documents (the previous application and the plaintiff's reply) to determine the issue of limitation. The court found that the plaintiff's claim of dispossession on October 26, 2020, was an "illusionary cause of action" designed to circumvent the six-month limitation period mandated by Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
Since the plaintiff's own admission in April 2017 clearly indicated non-possession, filing the present suit in November 2020 (even with the amended plaint filed in February 2021) was well beyond the stipulated six-month period. The court emphasized that the plaintiff failed to deny or explain this prior admission.
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The court also distinguished the precedents relied upon by the plaintiff, clarifying that Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes supported critical examination of pleadings, while Balraj Taneja and Nisha Chandola were factually distinct and did not apply to clear judicial admissions.
Based on the clear, categorical, and unambiguous admission made by the plaintiff regarding his dispossession well before the six-month limitation period, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court allowed the defendant's application. The court concluded that the suit was evidently barred by limitation under Section 6(2)(a) of the Specific Relief Act. Consequently, the plaint was rejected, and the suit was dismissed.
This judgment serves as a crucial reminder of several key legal principles:
Lawyers must advise clients on the critical timeline for property possession suits and the irreversible impact of admissions made in any judicial forum. For students, it provides a practical example of how procedural law (CPC) and substantive law (Specific Relief Act) intersect to determine the fate of a civil suit.
All information provided in this article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances. The author and publisher are not responsible for any actions taken based on the information contained herein.
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