RAM DASS

v.

ISHWAR CHANDER AND OTHERS

MAY 9, 1988

[R.S. PATHAK, CJ., S. NATARAJAN AND

M.N. VENKATACHALIAH,

JJ.]

Constitutioi:i of India, 1950-Article 136---Bonafide need of land·

lord of accommodation-Eviction of tenant-All conclusions drawn

from,primary facts-Not necessarily questions of law-Often are pure

questions

of fact-Bonafide requirement is one such.

East Punjab Rent Restrictions Act,

1949: Section

15~ Tenant­

Eviction of-On ground of bonafide need of landlord-Righ Court­

Jurisdiction of-To interfere in revision-Court call take cautious

cognizance

of subsequent events to mould relief

A

B

c

D

The appellant and the respondents were tenants or separate

por­

tions of the premises which wa• later sold by the landlord to the respon­

dents, who were four brothers. The respondents filed a petition for

eviction

or the appellant on the ground of bonafide requirement. They'

contended

that they were in all

10 brothers, who; alongwith their

families, were living together

with their father, and the accommodation E

in

their occupation was insufficient for their needs.

The Rent Controller upheld the claim

of the respondents. The

Appellate Authority (District Judge), however, allowed the appellant's

appeal.

The High Court, in revision under section 15(5),

reversed the

appellate judgment and restored that pf the Court of first Instance. F

Before this

Court the appellant contended:

(1)

That the High Court in exercise of

its revisional jurisdiction

was precluded from re-opening the rmdings of fact recorded by the

appellate authority; and (2) that the findings of the High Court on G

reappraisal of evidence were wholly erroneous.

Dismissing the appeal,

it was,

HELD:

(I) It was, no doubt, true that the question whether the

requirement of the landlord was bonafide or not was essentially one or H

239

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A fact, notwithstanding the circumstance thmt a finding of fact in that

behalf was a secondary and inferential fact drawn from other primary

or perceptive ones. All

conclusions drawn from primary facts were not

necessarily, questions

of law. They could be, and quite often were, pure

questions

of fact. The question as to honafide requirement was one

such. !242G-H]

B

(2) The landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might

otherwise be, had inevitably a subjective element in it, and that

"desire" to become a "requirement" in law must have the objective }

element of a "need". [243C] ''

c

(3) Statute had been enacted to afford protection to tenants from

eviction.

In considering the reasonable requirement of the landlord the

court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the

protection afforded by law to the tenant was not rendered merely

illusory

or whittled down. [243A, C-D]

D ( 4)

Subject to the well-known limitations of all revisional jurisdic-

tions, the scope

of revisional power essentially turned on the language of

the statute investing the revisional jurisdiction. [243E]

(5) Section 15(5) of the Act enabled the High Court to satisfy itself

as

to the

"legality and propriety" or the order under revision,

E which was quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction in the exercise

of which, an appropriate case, the High Court could reappraise the

evidence

if the finding of the appellate court was found to be infirm in law. (243G; 244F]

(6) Courts could take a 'cautious-cognizance' of the subsequent­

F events in order to mould the relief. [24SF -G l

Mattu/a/ v. Radhe Lal, [1975) 1SCR127; Phiroze Bamanji Desai

v. Chandrakant

M. Patel, [1974) 3

SCR 267; Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman

Hemraj, AIR 1938

Born. 223; Hari

Shankar v. Girdhari Lal Chow­

dhury, -(AIR 1963 SC 698); Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakata v. Vit-

G halrao Marutirao, AIR 1975 SC 1111 and M/s Ranalakshmi Dyeing &

Others v. Rangaswamy, referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2969

of 1984.

H From the Judgment and Order dated 29.5.1984 of the Punjab

\1

RAM DASS v. ISHWAR CHANDER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.J 241

and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 1934 of 1982.

A

Harbans Lal and Balmokand Goyal for the Appellant.

V.C. Mahajan and K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court

was delivered by: B

VENKATACHALIAH, J. This appeal, by special Leave, by the

tenant arises out of the proceedings for eviction instituted against him

under the East

Punjab Rent Restriction Act 1949 and is preferred

against the judgment, dated, 29.5.1984 in Civil Revision No.

1934 of

1982 of the

Punjab and Haryana High Court, reversing the judgment, C

dated, 30.4.1982 made

by the Appellate Authority, Kapurthala, in

Rent Appeal No.

130 and restoring that of the Rent Controller, dated,

17.12.1978 in rent case no.

47 of 1977, granting possession to the

Respondent--landlords.

2. Appellant was a tenant of the premises concerned

in the pro­

ceedings on a monthly rent of Rs.3 having been inducted into posses­

sion

oh 9.12.1965 by the then owner Smt. Manohar Kaur. The pre-

D

' mises in the occupation of the appellant consist of a portion of the

ground-floor

of the building.

On 15.12.1976, the said Manohar Kaur

sold the entire property in favour

of respondents. The respondents are E

four brothers.

Prior to the purchase, they were occupying, as tenants,

other portions of the same building both in the first floor and the

second floor. They were in occupation of three rooms in the first floor

and .one in the second.

On 27.9.1977, respondents filed a petition for eviction oLthe

appellant on the ground of their own bonafide .requirement_ of the

premises. They alleged that the portion in their occupation was insuffi­

cient for their needs and that they required additional accommoda­

tion. They said that they were in all 10 brothers who, alongwith their

families, were living together with their father.

3. Appellant contested, the claim, urging that the first-respon­

dent one

of the brothers, was in occupation of other rented-premises

F

G

in the saine town at a place called Mohalla Malka-na; that the respon­

dents' father was himself in occupation

of a separate rented premises;

that the accommodation already available

to the respondents was H

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A more than sufficient for their requirements and that, accordingly, their

projected need was fictitious and malafide. Appellant also said that

the proceedings were brought in collusion with the previous owner.

4.

On an appreciation of the evidence, the Rent Controller

upheld the claim of the landlords and made an order granting posses-

B sion. The Appellate Authority (District Judge) however, allowed

appellants' appeal and set-aside the order of eviction. The High Court

in revision under Section 15(5) of the Act reversed the appellate judg­

ment and restored that of the court of first instance. The aggrieved

tenant has come-up by special leave.

5. In support of the appeal,

Shri Harbans Lal, learned senior

C advocate, urged

that the order of the High Court suffers from, and

stands vitiated, by, two serious errors: The first, according to the

learned counsel,

is that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction, was precluded from reopening findings of facts recorded

by the Appellate-Authority and substituting fresh findings of its

owtt

D on a reappraisal of the evidence even if the fresh findings so recorded

could be said to

be. amongst those possible on the evidence. Learned

Counsel placed reliance on

Mattu/al v. Radhe Lal, [1975) 1

SCR 127

and Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel & Ors., [1974) 3

SCR267.

E The second is that the findings as to the bonafides, or the lack of

F

G

it, of the alleged need for the additional-accommodation recorded by

the Appellate Authority were sound, proper and supportable on the

evidence on record and the High Court

in exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction could not have reappraised the evidence afresh and that

the findings so substituted by the High Court are wholly erroneous.

Sh. V.C. Mahajan, learned senior advocate for the respondent­

landlords, however, sought to support the order of the High Court.

6. Upon a consideration of the matter, we are of the view that

both the contentions urged in support of the appeal are in-substantial.

It is, no doubt, true thatthe question whether the requirement of

the landlords is bonafide or not is essentially one of fact, notwithstand­

ing the circumstance that a finding of fact

is a secondary and inferen­

tiaf fact drawn from other primary

or perceptive ones. All concfusions

drawn from primary-facts are not necessarily, questions of law. They

H can be, and quite often are, pure questions of fact. The question

as to

bonafide requirement is one such.

'

RAM DASS v. JSHWAR CHANDER IVENKATACHALIAH, J.( 243

Statutes enacted to afford protection to tenants from eviction on A

the basis of contractual rights of the parties make the resumption of

,

possession by the land-lord subject to the satisfaction of certain statu-

tory conditions. One of them is the bonafide requirement of the land-

lord, variously described in the statutes

as

"bona-fide requirement",

"reasonable requirement",

"bona-fide

and reasonable requirement"

or, as in the case of the present statute, merely referred to as "landlord

B

requires

for, his own

use". But the essential idea basic to all such cases

is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, con-

•

ceived in good faith; and that, further, the court must also consider it

reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession

how-

ever honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element

in it and that, that desire, to become a

"requirement" in Jaw must have c

the objective element of a "need". It must also be such that the court

considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified.

In doing

so, that court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration

so that the protection afforded

by law to the tenant is not rendered

merely illusory

or whittled down.

D

7.

On the first contention that the revisional powers do not ex-

tend to interference with and upsetting of findings of fact, it needs to

t(;

be observed that, subject to the well-known limitations inherent in all

revisional jurisdictions, the matter essentially turns on the language of

the statute investing the jurisdiction. The decisions relied upon

by Shri

E

Harbans Lal, deal, in the first case, with the limitations on the scope of

interference with findings of fact

in second-appeals and in the second,

with the limitation on the revisional powers where the words in the

statute limit it to the examination whether or not the order under

revision

is

"according to law." The scope of the revisional powers of

the High Court, where the High Court

is required to be satisfied that

F

the decision is

"according to law" is considered by Beaument C.J. in

Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bombay 223 a case

referred to with approval

by this Court in Hari Shankarv. Girdhari Lal

Chowdhury,

AIR 1963 SC 698.

c

But here, Section 15(5) of the Act enables 'the High Court to

G

satisfy itself

as to the

"legality and propriety" of the order under

revision, which is, quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction. That

jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate cases, to

examine the correctness of the findings of facts also, though the revi-

'

sional court is n~t "a second court of first appeal" (See Dattonpant

Gopalvarao Devakate

v. Vithalrao Marutirao).

H

244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A Referring to the nature and scope of the revisional jurisdiction

and the limitations inherent

in the concept of a 'Revision' this Court in

Mis. Ranalakshmi Dyeing Works

&

Ors. v. Rangaswamy Chettier,

[ 1980),2 RCJ 165 (at 167) observed:

B

c

D

E

" ..... 2.. "Appeal" and "revision" are expressions of

common usage in Indian statutes and the distinction bet­

ween "appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction"

is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appel­

late jurisdiction involves a rehearing,

as it were, on law as

well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person.

Such

jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for

instance has been done

in the case of second appeals under

the Code of Civil Procedure and under some Rent Acts

in

some

States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is

analogous to a power of superintendence and may some-

. times be exercised even without its being invoked

by a

party. The extent of revision

al jurisdiction is defined by the

statute conferring such jurisdiction

.................

· ... .

Revisional jurisdiction

as ordinarily understood with

reference to our statutes

is always included in appellate

jurisdiction but not vice-versa. These are general observa­

tions. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional

jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with refer­

ence to the language employed

by the statute .....

"

The criticism of Sri Harbans Lal that it was impermissible for the

High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings

of

fact recorded by the appellate authority, however erroneous they be,

is not, having regard to the language in which the revisional power is

F couched, .tenable. In an appropriate case, the High Court can reap­

praise the evidence if the findings of the appellate court are found to

be infirm in law.

8. Now to

the second contention. The High Court was of the

view that certain findings recorded by the Appellate Authority on the

G question of the bonafides Of the requirement of the landlords were

based on material which

was not quite relevant. Secondly, the High

Court took into account certain subsequent events brought on record.

In regard to the first aspect, the High Court observed:

H

" ..... According to the learned Appellate Authority there

was no evidence on record to prove that the fandlords were

~-

:

RAM DASS v. ISHWAR CHANDER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 245

ten brothers since their father had not come in the witness-

box to depose in this regard. This approach of the learned

Appellate Authority

is without wrong and illegal. There

was nothing to disbelieve Ishwar Chander when he says

that they

are ten brothers. No question was put to him in

the cross-examination to challenge the said statement of

h~ ..... " .

The High Court noticed that so far as the premises which were said to

be in the occupation of the Ishwar Chander (Respondent No. 1) were

concerned, the owner of those premises was seeking resumpiion of

possession.Further, in respect

of the accommodation in the hands of

the farther, there were already proceedings for eviction against him

binding decision in

therligh Court.

In regard to the subsequent events which the High Court took

notice of it said:

A

B

c

" ..... Thus, what has to be seen is whether the accommo- D

dation in their occupation is sufficient for their require­

ments or not. Of course, out of the four landlords, one is

married and the others were unmarried when the ejectment

application was. filed in the year

1977. However, about

seven years have passed since then. Mean-while, Surinder

Kumar landlord has also been married and he has got one E

son aged 2 years, whereas Subhash Chand has also been

recently married in March,

1984, as per

the affidavit of

Hukam Chand, father of the landlords, dated 27th May,

1984. Thus, there was nothing on the record to show that

the present accommodation in occupation of the landlords

was sufficient to meet their requirements

.....

" F

Courts can take a 'cautious-cognizance of the subsequent-events in

order to mould the relief. The High Court did that.' No fault could be

found with that.

9. CMP No. 33347 is filed by the appellant, seeking to bring G

certain subsequent events on record. The alleged subsequent event

is

that pursuant to an agreement for purchase of another residential

building entered into by the first respondent and his wife, a sale deed

had subsequently come to be executed in favour of first

respondent's­

wife. The contention is that having regard to this subsequent-acquisi­

tion, the present claim for additional accommodation does not survive. H

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A We are afraid this circumstance, even if true, will not tilt the balance in

favour of the appellant. Even if the need of the other three brothers

who are co-owners

is taken into account, the order of eviction is

supportable on the basis of ther need.

CMP is, therefore, of no practi­

cal assistance to the appellant.

B

10. In the result, we find no merit in this appeal which is accord­

ingly dismissed, but without an order as to costs.

R.S.S. Appeal dismissed.