2026:HHC:7955

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

CrMMO No. 371 of 2025

Date of Decision: 19.3.2026

_____________________________________________________________________

Ram Kumar and Anr.

……...Petitioners

Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.

…....Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting? Yes

For the Petitioners: Mr. Janak Raj and Mr. Abhinav Mehta ,

Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Vishal Panwar, Additional Advocates General

and Mr. Ravi Chauhan & Mr. Anish Banshtu,

Deputy Advocates General.

___________________________________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

By way of instant petition, prayer has been made by the

petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 129 of 2020 dated 24.8.2020, under

Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, registered with Police Station Jawali,

District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as well as consequent proceedings

pending before the learned trial Court below.

2. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners as has been highlighted

in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Janak Raj and Mr. Abhinav

Mehta, Advocates, is that there is no evidence suggestive of the fact that

accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the

2026:HHC:7955 2

petitioners and as such, there was no occasion, if any, for the investigating

agency to lodge FIR against the petitioners under Sections 279, 337 and

338 of IPC. While making this Court peruse FIR as well as final report filed

under 173 CrPC, above named counsel vehemently argued that the alleged

incident came to notice of the police on the basis of information furnished

by Medical Officer, CHC Nagrota, before whom petitioners were brought for

treatment. They state that at the time of spot inspection, no person came

forward to depose that accident occurred on account of rash and negligent

driving of the petitioners, rather police after having examined motor cycle

allegedly lying on the spot, proceeded to conclude that accident occurred on

account of negligence of both the petitioners. They stated that since there

is no eye witness to the accident and both the petitioners involved in the

accident have been made accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence,

there is no likelihood of succeeding the trial, rather continuation of criminal

proceedings, if any, pursuant to FIR sought to be quashed would be abuse

of process of law and as such, this Court while exercising power under

Section 528 of BNSS can proceed to quash the FIR.

3. Mr. Anish Banshtu, learned Deputy Advocate General, while

fairly admitting that no independent witnesses ever came to be associated

by the investigating agency to establish rash and negligent driving of the

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petitioners, stated that since factum of accident is not in dispute and at the

relevant time, motor cycle involved in the accident was being driven by the

petitioners, no illegality or infirmity can be said to have been committed by

the investigating agency while registering case under Sections 279, 337 and

338 of IPC against both the accused. While referring to the evidence

adduced on record, learned Deputy Advocate General, stated that there is

overwhelming evidence suggestive of the fact that in the alleged accident,

both the petitioners suffered serious injuries, which is sufficient to connect

them with the alleged offence and as such, they rightly came to be booked

under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC.

4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

material available on record, this Court finds that SHO after having

received telephonic call from the Medical Officer CHC Nagrota that two

persons have been brought for treatment on account of injuries suffered in

the accident, reached the hospital and attempted to record the statement of

petitioners, but since they were declared unfit by the doctor, Investigating

Officer reached the spot of accident and on the basis of circumstantial

evidence proceeded to lodge FIR against both the petitioners under Sections

279, 337 and 338 of IPC.

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5. After completion of investigation, police presented challan in

the competent court of law, but before charge, if any could be framed,

petitioners, who have been made accused in the FIR sought to be quashed,

has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR.

Careful perusal of challan placed on record under Section 173 CrPC,

reveals that no independent witness has been associated, rather police

officials who had no occasion to see the accident have been cited as

prosecution witnesses.

6. Before ascertaining the genuineness and correctness of the

submissions and counter submissions having been made by the learned

counsel for the parties vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, this

Court deems it necessary to discuss/elaborate the scope and competence of

this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under

Section 528 of BNSS (Section 482 of Cr.PC).

7. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and

others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid

down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High

Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C / Section 528 of BNSS . Before

pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court,

a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L.

2026:HHC:7955 5

Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699, held that the High Court is

entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing

the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court

or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.

Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:-

“7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is

entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that

allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process

of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding

ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,

both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary

public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be

permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution.

In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the

very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution

rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the

proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher

than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered

according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity

for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of

the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the 55

inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State

and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and

contours of that salient jurisdiction.”

8. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has

elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C.

2026:HHC:7955 6

Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of

U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections

397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is

entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing

the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or

that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The

Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s

inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a

salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to

degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid

case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power

can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal

(supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to

spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings.

9. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of

Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier

judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3

SCC 330, has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section

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482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused,

at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the

stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with

caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction

under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied

that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the

conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and

indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the

veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the

prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should

be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn

the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial

conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of BNSS) to quash such criminal

proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and

secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti

v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293, the Hon’ble Apex Court has

held as under:-

“22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal

proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to

2026:HHC:7955 8

as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar &

Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as

under: (2013) 3 SCC 330, paras 29-30)

29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of

the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to

quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the

stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the

stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the

commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would

naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the

High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to

hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it

would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing

the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination

must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To

invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the

High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by

the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their

defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the

material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the

assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and

the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule

the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by

the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out,

reject and discard the accusations levelled by the

prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any

evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not

have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted,

being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied

upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a

2026:HHC:7955 9

reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the

accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of

the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would

prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice.

30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we

would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a

prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power

vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is

sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling

and impeccable quality?

30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused,

would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled

against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and

overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the

material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss

and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused,

has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the

material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the

prosecution/complainant?

30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an

abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of

justice?

30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial

conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such

criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section

482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to

the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise

2026:HHC:7955 10

be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising

therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not

conclude in the conviction of the accused.”

10. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011)

11 SCC 259, has held as under:

“12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and

ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C.

though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great

caution and only when such exercise is justified 9 by the tests

specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court

exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process

leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the

Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent

powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.

13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the

case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this

Court has summarized so me categories of cases where inherent

power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This

Court summarized the following three broad categories where the

High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section

482:

(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against

the institution or continuance of the proceedings;

(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or

complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their

entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

2026:HHC:7955 11

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no

legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or

manifestly fails to prove the charge."

14.In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others

(1976) 3 SCC 736, according to the court, the process against the

accused can be quashed or set aside :

"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the

statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same

taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against

the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential

ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently

absurd and inherently improbable so that no 10 prudent person

can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing

process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on

no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or

inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects,

such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally

competent authority and the like".

15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others

(1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power under section

482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it

comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue

would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of

justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High

Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and

criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court

2026:HHC:7955 12

proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of

harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends

of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must

be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case

has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this

court and other courts.”

11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically

held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is

capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on

materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the

complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of

sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the

like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under Section

482 CrPC/ Section 528 of BNSS.

12. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite

apparent that while exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC.

(now Section 528 of BNSS), High Court can proceed to quash the

proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to

continue would be an abuse of process of the law.

13. Now being guided by the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble

Apex Court, this court would make an endeavour to find out “whether

2026:HHC:7955 13

proceedings initiated against the petitioners under Sections 279, 337 and

338 of IPC, can be quashed and set-aside or not?”

14. Factum with regard to accident is not in dispute, but question

which needs to be determined in the case at hand, is “whether petitioners

are liable to be prosecuted under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC for

their having driven the motor cycle involved in the accident rashly and

negligently”.

15. Having carefully perused final report filed under Section 173

CrPC, this Court is persuaded to agree with learned counsel for the

petitioners that no evidence has come on record suggestive of the fact that

accident occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of the accused

i.e. petitioners herein, rather police officials after having received telephonic

call from the CHC Nagrota inspected the spot of accident and thereafter on

the basis of circumstantial evidence i.e. position and location of motor cycle

involved in the accident, registered the case against the petitioners.

16. Conjoint reading of FIR as well as final report filed under

Section 173 CrPC, clearly reveals that at the time of spot inspection, no

person came to report that accident happened due to rash and negligent

driving of the petitioners, who were allegedly driving the motor cycle

involved in the accident. Though learned co unsel for the petitioners

2026:HHC:7955 14

attempted to argue that petitioners herein were never identified, but once it

is not in dispute that motor cycle involved in the accident belongs to the

petitioners, omission, if any, on the part of the prosecution to conduct

identification may not be of much relevance, however, there appears to be

merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that to invoke

Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, prosecution is under obligation to

prove that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently so as

to endanger the human life. In the case at hand, none of the prosecution

witnesses, proposed to be examined, had an occasion to see the accident

with their own eyes and as such, there was otherwise no occasion for them

to depose that vehicle in question was being driven rashly and negligently.

Case of the prosecution is that at the time of spot inspection, motor cycle

involved in the accident was found lying on the spot in damaged condition

and as such, drivers of both the vehicles are liable to be prosecuted under

Sections 279, 337 and 338 of the IPC, however this court is not persuaded

to accept the afore plea of the prosecution.

17. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Sections 279, 337

and 338 of IPC, which reads as under:

“279. Rash driving or riding on a public way-Whoever drives any

vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent

as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to

2026:HHC:7955 15

any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine

which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

“337. Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of

others-Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so

rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or the personal

safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine

which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.”

“338. Causing grievous hurt by act endange ring life or personal

safety of others-Whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by

doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or

the personal safety of others, shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with

fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”

18. As per Section 279 of IPC, whoever drives any vehicle, or

rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger

human life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a

term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one

thousand rupees, or with both. In the case at hand, there is no evidence

adduced on record that vehicle involved in the accident at the time of the

accident was being driven on public way and similarly no cogent and

convincing evidence has been adduced on record, to prove rash and

negligent driving, if any, by the petitioners accused named in the FIR.

Merely having taken note of the position of the motor cycle involved in the

2026:HHC:7955 16

incident may not be sufficient to conclude rash and negligent driving ,

rather for that, a person is required to state on oath that vehicle involved in

the accident was being driven rashly and negligently so as to endanger the

human life.

19. Similarly, Section 337 of IPC provides that whoever causes

hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger

human life shall be punished/sentenced for a term which may extend to six

months, or with fine. In the case at hand, none of the persons involved in

the accident stated before the police that they received injuries on account

of rash and negligent driving of other persons and as such, it is not

understood that how and on what basis, case under Sections 337 and 338

of IPC has been registered against the petitioners. Since accused, who

allegedly were driving the motor cycle nowhere deposed that accident

occurred on account of rash and negligent driving of any one of them

coupled with the fact that no independent witness had an occasion to see

the accident with his eyes, there is no probability that prosecution would be

able to prove rash and negligent driving of the petitioners.

20. By now, it is well settled that specific evidence is required to be

adduced on record by prosecution to prove rash and negligent driving, if

any, on the part of the accused. Mere allegations are not sufficient to hold

2026:HHC:7955 17

accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 279

IPC. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal rashness

negligence, but to prove guilt, if any, under Section 279 IPC, prosecution is

required to prove that the act of the accused was more than mere

carelessness or error of judgment.

21. At this stage, reliance is placed on judgment rendered by our

own High Court in case titled Akshay Kumar v. State of HP, Latest HP LJ

2009 HP 72, relevant para of which reads as under:-

“8. In fact, an injury shall be deemed to be negligently caused

whomsoever it is willfully caused, but results from want of

reasonable caution, in the undertaking and doing of any act either

without such skill, knowledge or ability as is suitable to

consequences of such act, or when it results from the not exercising

reasonable manner of using them or from the doing of any act

without using reasonable caution for the prevention of mischief, of

from the omitting to do any act which is hazarding a dangerous or

wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause

injury, but without an intention to cause injury or knowledge that it

will be probably caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of

doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the

consequences. Rash and negligent act may be described as criminal

rashness negligence. It must be more than mere carelessness or

error of judgment.”

The courts below did not appreciate the above facts that there was

debris on the side of the road on the curve due to the slip, while

negotiating the curve, as stated above, some witnesses have admitted

2026:HHC:7955 18

that the danga gave way to the bus which caused the accident and

the rash and negligent driving by the petitioner is also denied,

therefore, it find that the findings of quilt arrived at against the

petitioner by both the courts below were not based upon legal and

proper appreciation of evidence. In the circumstances aforesaid, the

petitioner cannot be said to have criminal rashness or negligence,

thus he is entitled for the benefit of doubt as two views were

deducible from the evidence on record.”

22. Reliance is also placed upon judgment of this Court in

Gurcharan Singh versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 1990 (2)

ACJ 598, relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced here-in-below:-

“14. Adverting to the facts of this case, it is in evidence that the

truck in question was loaded with fertilizer weighing 90 quintals.

Obviously, it cannot be said that the speed of the vehicle was very

fast. Secondly, it is a State Highway and not a National Highway.

Therefore, the speed on this account as well cannot be considered to

be high.

“15. Coming to the statements of witnesses on this aspect, it has

been stated that the truck was moving in high speed but it has not

been said as to what that speed actually was. To say that a vehicle

was moving in a high speed is neither a proper and legal evidence on

high speed nor in any way indicates thereby the rashness on the part

of the driver. The prosecution should have been exact on this aspect

as speed of the vehicle is an essential point to be seen and proved in

a case under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code. Further, there

are no skid marks which eliminate the evidence of high speed of the

vehicle. In addition to this, it has been stated by the witnesses that

the vehicle stopped at a distance of 50 feet from the place of accident.

2026:HHC:7955 19

This appears to be exaggerated. However, it is not a long distance

looking to the two points; viz, the first impact of the accident and the

last tyres of the vehicle and the total length of the body of the truck

in question. If seen from these angles, the distance stated by the

witnesses cannot be considered to be very long and thus an

indication of high speed. The version of the petitioner that he blew

the horn near about the place of curve which frightened the child,

cannot be considered to be without substance. This can otherwise be

reasonably inferred that the petitioner would have blown the horn on

seeing the child on the road as it is in evidence that the child had

come on the pucca portion of the road while there is no evidence as

to whether the witnesses, more particularly, Ghanshyam, PW7,

Chander Kanta, PW8, mother, and a few other witnesses were there

at that particular time. Rather the depositions of these witnesses

indicate that they were coming from some village lane which was

joining the main road in question. Children of this age, usually crafty

by temperament, move faster than the parents and are in advance of

them while walking. This appears to have happened in the present

case. Minute examination of the circumstances of this case and the

evidence brought on the record, discloses that the deceased had

reached the pucca portion of the road much before the arrival of his

parents and the witnesses. That is why in their deposition they have

said that the child had been run over by the truck. On the other

hand, the petitioner has stated that horn by him and started crossing

the road which could not be seen by him and the result was the

accident and the death of the child. I n case some pedestrians

suddenly cross a road, the driver of the vehicle cannot save the

pedestrian, however slow he may be driving the vehicle. In such a

situation he cannot be held negligent; rather it appears that the

parents of the child were negligent in not taking proper care of the

2026:HHC:7955 20

child and allowed him to come alone to the road while they were

somewhere behind and they could have rushed to pull back the child

before the approaching vehicle came in contact with him as it is in

their depositions that the truck driver was at a distance coming at a

high speed and in case the child wanted to cross the road, it could do

so within the time it reached at the place of the accident. How the

accident has actually taken place, has not been clearly and

comprehensively stated by any of the witnesses. They appear to have

been prejudiced by the act of the driver. Their versions are,

therefore, coloured by the ultimate act of the petitioner and the fact

that the child had been finished.”

23. In the case at hand, there is none to state that at the time of

the accident, motorcycle was being driven rashly and negligently, rather

very factum of the accident on the date of the alleged incident on the spot

given in the final report is doubtful because nobody from that area ever

reported the matter with regard to accident. Had petitioners after having

suffered injuries, given statement to the police with regard to their having

suffered injuries in the accident, things would have been different, but it is

admitted case that neither petitioners ever stated that vehicles were being

driven rashly and negligently nor any person from the area, where accident

took place, lodged complaint. Mere finding of motorcycle at the place of the

accident may not be sufficient to conclude the guilt of the petitioners under

Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, especially when there is no evidence with

2026:HHC:7955 21

regard to rash and negligent driving and injury, if any, caused to the

persons walking or standing on the road.

24. Needless to say, high court while exercising power under

Section 482 Cr.PC can quash the proceedings, which are ultimately likely

to be failed on account of lack of evidence. In the case at hand, evidence

collected on record, if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests that

prosecution would be able to prove the act of rash and negligent driving of

the petitioners and as such, no fruitful purpose would be served by putting

the petitioners to the ordeal of the protracted trial, which is otherwise likely

fail.

25. In view of the detailed discussion made herein above and law

taken into consideration, there appears to be sufficient ground for this

Court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C, for

quashing of FIR and consequent criminal proceedings against the

petitioners, to prevent abuse of process of law and to prevent unnecessary

harassment to the petitioners, against whom there is no evidence to

connect them with the commission of offences as incorporated in the FIR.

Otherwise also, continuance of the criminal proceedin gs against the

petitioners in the present case would be a sheer wastage of time of the

learned trial Court and the same would amount to subjecting the

2026:HHC:7955 22

petitioners to unnecessary and protracted ordeal of trial, which is bound to

culminate in acquittal. If the evidentiary material collected on record to

prove the guilt of the petitioners is perused in its entirety, there is no

material to connect the petitioners with the offence alleged to have been

committed by them. To the contrary, if on the basis of material adduced on

record by the investigating agency, trial is allowed to continue, great

prejudice would be caused to the petitioners and same would amount to

sheer abuse of process of law.

26. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein

above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court finds

merit in the present petition and as such same is allowed and FIR No. 129

of 2020 dated 24.8.2020, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC,

registered with Police Station Jawali, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh as

well as consequent proceedings, are hereby quashed and set-aside and

petitioners are acquitted of the charges framed against them in the

aforesaid FIR. Accordingly, present petition is disposed of, so also pending

applications, if any.

March 19, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),

(manjit) Judge