Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1240 OF 2004

Ram Niranjan Roy …Appellant

Versus

State of Bihar and Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1.A petition was filed in public interest in the Patna High

Court being C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003 by Bihar Vyavsayik

Sangharsh Morcha and another raising several issues

relating to law and order problem in the State of Bihar. The

State of Bihar, the Director General of Police of Bihar and

others were made party respondents. The issues raised

inter alia were whether the respondents were duty bound to

Page 2 provide safe and healthy atmosphere for the proper

development of the State or not and whether the inaction of

the respondents was violative of fundamental rights

guaranteed under Articles 19 and 20 of the Constitution of

India. The petitioner inter alia sought direction to the

respondents to take measures to stop exploitation of

shopkeepers, dealers, artisans, labourers and industrial units

by officers and police personnel.

2.The High Court issued notices to the respondents

pursuant to which they filed affidavits. On 14/08/2003 the

High Court directed the Director General of Police to make a

list of officers from the Station House Officers upto the

Additional Director General of Police, of those who have

remained in their station for more than four years. Relevant

paragraphs from the High Court’s order could be quoted:

“The court suggests the following measures as an

ad interim exercise:

a)Let the Director General Police make out a

list of officers from the Station House Officer upto

the Additional Director General of Police, of those

who have remained in their station for more than

2

Page 3 four years. This dossier is to be supported with

information from service record as to which officer

throughout their career has remained at which

station and for how long. Officers who have

remained at one station for over four years must

see a posting out within six weeks from today.

These would be officers below the rank of

Inspector General of Police. Staff below the SHOs

who have remained at a particular station beyond

three years will be identified by the District heads

of police concerned and their movement will be

undertaken by the Director General of Police.

It must be mentioned that the period of four

years is set because in the normal course of

government service, transfers and postings are

made for officers if they have been at a particular

station for more than three years. This order

obviously does not preclude the Director General

of Police from making any transfers should an

officer have been at a posting for a lesser period,

which is within normal administrative powers.”

3.In December, 2003, the appellant, who was holding the

post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation

Department (CID), Bihar, filed an intervention application

being I.A.No.5588 of 2003. The appellant claimed in the

application that he was the President of Bihar Police Seva

Sangh, a service association of members of Bihar Police

Service. He stated in the application that the transfers and

postings of the officers of Bihar Police Service were done

3

Page 4 arbitrarily in violation of guiding principles framed by the

Home Department of Government of Bihar. The appellant

referred to a Writ Application filed by him being C.W.J.C.

No.12225 of 1999 against the State of Bihar for an order

directing the respondents to implement the said guiding

principles. He stated that the said writ application has been

pending in the High Court for last four years during which

the government has tried to victimize him mala fide. He

further stated that his application should be heard along with

the C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003. He, therefore, prayed that he

may be impleaded in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.

4.Admittedly, the appellant is posted at Patna for several

years. It is clear from several orders that the High Court has

passed in this matter that while dealing with the question of

law and order situation in Bihar, the High Court was looking

into the State Government’s policy of postings and transfer

of police officers, obviously because that has a direct bearing

on efficiency and rectitude of the police officers. The High

Court even recorded the statement of the Advocate General

4

Page 5 that certain transfers of police officers are being effected.

The appellant was unhappy and disturbed about the task

undertaken by the High Court. This is evident from the first

paragraph of his intervention application where he has

referred to the order passed by the High Court directing the

respondents to submit a list of officers who have not been

removed from their station for more than four years. It is

this that made him intervene in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.

5.The appellant wanted his writ application pending in the

Patna High Court to be heard with C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003.

We have, therefore, carefully gone through that petition.

The appellant wants to create an impression that he is

fighting for the cause of police officers of Bihar, but a careful

reading of his application makes it clear that he is espousing

his own cause. He has stated that he is continuously posted

for seven years in Cabinet Vigilance Department. He has

stated that his posting in Criminal Investigation Department

is wrong and he should be posted as Sub Divisional Police

Officer anywhere in Patna or in any other proper office such

5

Page 6 as traffic or transport department in Patna, so that he may

do government duties and take over the responsibility as

the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. We shall advert to

this Seva Sangh a little later, but, suffice it to say at this

stage that the appellant’s pending writ application

concentrates on his posting and he figures in the prayer

clause also.

6.From the impugned order it appears that on

27/01/2004, the appellant appeared in-person before the

High Court. He shouted and told the court that he was

intervener and that the High Court has not focused its

attention on the wrong policies of transfers within the police

department. He raised his voice with impertinence and

declared that the High Court is not taking up his case

wherein he has challenged his transfer and posting made in

the police department. Learned Judges, then, asked him

whether he had been granted leave by the Director General

of Police to present his case. He again shouted at the court

and stated that he had applied for leave but whether leave is

6

Page 7 granted to him or not is not the concern of the court. The

High Court has observed that he could not show to the court

that leave had been granted to him by the Police

Headquarters to argue his case in-person and challenge

transfer policy of the police department. The High Court has

further observed that the appellant baited the court. He

wanted his writ application to be considered out-of-turn on

the ground that it was concerning transfers and postings of

police officers. The High Court, therefore, called for the

record, perused the appellant’s application and found out

that it mainly related to his own transfer. The appellant,

then, claimed to be an office bearer of Bihar Police Seva

Sangh and stated that the Police Manual has declared him a

member of the protected staff and he has immunity from

transfers and he cannot be touched. He produced a letter

addressed by a Cabinet Minister to the Chief Minister of

Bihar questioning why he was transferred from one

establishment to another, though, within the city. The said

letter is quoted in the impugned order. It appears from the

impugned order that the appellant did not show the slightest

7

Page 8 remorse nor regret and instead continued to bait the court

and repeat that even the Minister had given him protection

and had granted stay of his transfer. In view of this

contumacious behaviour, the High Court directed that the

appellant may be taken into custody by the Court Officer and

the Sergeant and sent to jail as punishment for a day i.e. for

twenty four hours. His intervention application came to be

rejected. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant has

approached this Court.

7.The appellant appeared in-person. Looking to the

importance of the matter, we requested Mr. Siddharth

Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, to assist us. As

usual, Mr. Luthra has rendered remarkable assistance to this

Court. We heard the appellant at some length. He

submitted that he is not guilty of contempt of court. He

submitted that he has highest regard for the court and he

never shouted in the court as stated in the impugned order.

He submitted that he is the President of the Bihar Police

Seva Sangh and is espousing the cause of police officers in

8

Page 9 general. On a query made by this Court, whether the Bihar

Police Seva Sangh is a registered society or whether it has

got any recognition, he submitted that the application in that

behalf is pending. The Bihar Police Seva Sangh, however,

has not received any recognition so far. He submitted that

the respondents have not refuted any of his contentions by

filing any affidavit in reply. He drew our attention to Section

14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and submitted that

no opportunity, as contemplated therein, was given to him to

make his defence. He submitted that he had filed an

application for bail. However, no order was passed thereon.

He further submitted that the High Court has unnecessarily

cast aspersions on him. He urged that the impugned order

may be set aside.

8.Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, on the

other hand, submitted that the appellant is guilty of

contempt committed in the face of the High Court and his

case is covered by the judgment of this Court in Leila

9

Page 10 David(6) v. State of Maharashtra and Others

1

where

this Court has observed that when a contemnor disrupts the

court proceedings by using offensive language, it is

permissible to adopt summary proceedings to punish him.

Mr. Luthra further submitted that the appellant tried to get

his personal application tagged to the Public Interest

Litigation petition for his personal gain and he utilized a

letter of a Cabinet Minister to overawe the court. Besides,

he produced incorrect copy of the impugned order in this

Court. He claimed that he had filed bail application when no

such application is found in the record. He has committed

breach of undertaking given in the affidavit filed in this

Court. Mr. Luthra submitted that no leniency should be

shown to such a person and the appeal may, therefore, be

dismissed.

9. We have extensively referred to the contents of the

impugned order of the High Court with a purpose. It reflects

the appellant’s rude behaviour. The intemperate language

used by the appellant while addressing learned Judges of the

1

(2009) 10 SCC 337

10

Page 11 High Court is most objectionable and contumacious. The

appellant is Deputy Superintendent of Police. He claims to

be the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. A responsible

police officer is not expected to behave in such undignified

and unruly manner in the Court. He shouted at the Judges.

When they asked him whether the police headquarters had

granted him any permission to argue his case in-person and

challenge transfer policy of the police department, he rudely

stated that that was not the concern of the court. He was,

however, unable to produce any permission. Thereafter, he

told the court that his application should be heard along with

Public Interest Litigation as it related to postings and

transfers of police officers. On scrutiny, it was found that it

mainly related to his transfer. Thus, he made a wrong

statement before the Court. He, then, stated that he is a

protected staff member and has immunity from transfer and

he cannot be touched. He tried to overawe the court by

producing a Cabinet Minister’s letter addressed to the Chief

Minister recommending his case. He did not show any

remorse. He did not tender any apology, but, continued his

11

Page 12 rude behaviour of shouting at the court and baiting the

court. By this behaviour he lowered the dignity and

authority of the High Court. He challenged the majesty of

the High Court by showing utter disrespect to it.

Undoubtedly he committed contempt of the High Court in its

presence and hearing. He is, therefore, guilty of having

committed contempt in the face of the High Court. His case

is squarely covered by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts

Act, 1971.

10.In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra

2

, on a question put to

him by a Judge of the Allahabad High Court, the contemnor,

who was an advocate, started shouting at the Judge and told

him that the question could not have been put to him and he

would get the Judge transferred or see that impeachment

motion is brought against him in Parliament. He made more

such derogatory comments. Learned Judge addressed a

letter to the Acting Chief Justice narrating the incident. The

Acting Chief Justice forwarded the letter to the then Chief

2

(1995) 2 SCC 584

12

Page 13 Justice of India. This Court, then, issued a notice to the

advocate taking a view that there was a prima facie case of

the criminal contempt of the court. This Court treated the

said contempt as criminal contempt committed in the face of

the High Court and sentenced the advocate. Commenting

on the contemnor’s conduct, this Court observed as under:

“To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be

disrespectful to him, to question his authority to

ask the questions, to shout at him, to threaten him

with transfer and impeachment, to use insulting

language and abuse him, to dictate the order that

he should pass, to create scenes in the court, to

address him by losing temper are all acts

calculated to interfere with and obstruct the

course of justice. Such acts tend to overawe the

court and to prevent it from performing its duty to

administer justice. Such conduct brings the

authority of the court and the administration of

justice into disrespect and disrepute and

undermines and erodes the very foundation of the

judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people

in the ability of the court to deliver free and fair

justice.”

The above observations of this Court have a bearing on

the present case.

13

Page 14 11.In Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar

3

the

appellant and the other contemnors disrupted the court

proceedings by aggressively exchanging heated words and

created unpleasant scenes in the Court. The decorum and

dignity of the court was so much threatened that the Judge

was forced to rise. This Court held that the offending acts of

the appellant constitute contempt in the face of the court.

The relevant paragraph could be quoted.

“The offending acts of the appellant constitute

contempt in the face of court. When contempt

takes place in the face of the court, peoples’ faith

in the administration of justice receives a severe

jolt and precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore,

the offending acts of the appellant certainly come

within the ambit of interference with the due

course of judicial proceeding and are a clear case

of criminal contempt in the face of the court.”

12.The appellant’s contention that no opportunity was

given to him to make his defence must be rejected. In

Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh,

Jabalpur, through Registrar

4

, while dealing with the

nature and scope of power conferred upon this Court and the

3

(2010) 11 SCC 493

4

1993 Supp (1) SCC 529

14

Page 15 High Court, being courts of record under Articles 129 and

215 of the Constitution of India respectively, this Court

observed that the said power is an inherent power under

which the Supreme Court and the High Court can deal with

contempt of itself. The jurisdiction vested is a special one

not derived from any other statute but derived only from

Articles 129 and 215. This Court further clarified that the

constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged,

abrogated or cut down by legislation including the Contempt

of Courts Act.

13.In Leila David(6) this Court has discussed what is

contempt in the face of the Court. In this case, the

petitioners made contumacious allegations in the writ

petition and supporting affidavits. Notices were issued to

them as to why contempt proceedings should not

be issued against them. The hearing commenced. The

writ petitioners disrupted the proceedings by using

very offensive, intemperate and abusive language at

a high pitch. One of the petitioners stated that the Judges

15

Page 16 should be jailed by initiating proceedings against them and

threw footwear at the Judges. The petitioners stood by what

they had said and done in the Court. One of the learned

Judges felt that there was no need to issue notice to the

petitioners and held them guilty of criminal contempt of the

court. The other learned Judge observed that the mandate

of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 must be

followed before sending the contemnors to jail. The question

was, therefore, whether the petitioners were entitled to any

opportunity of hearing. The matter was thereafter placed

before a three Judge Bench. The three Judge Bench resolved

the difference of opinion and observed as under:

“Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no

doubt contemplates issuance of notice and an

opportunity to the contemnors to answer the

charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of

natural justice. However, where an incident of the

instant nature takes place within the presence and

sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to

contempt in the face of the Court and is required

to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself.

This is necessary for the dignity and majesty of

the courts to be maintained. When an object, such

as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in

a court proceeding, the object is not to merely

scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to

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Page 17 scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower

its dignity in the eyes of the public.”

14.Thus, when a contempt is committed in the face of the

High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalize or humiliate

the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do

not deal with such contempt with strong hand, that may

result in scandalizing the institution thereby lowering its

dignity in the eyes of the public. The courts exist for the

people. The courts cherish the faith reposed in them by

people. To prevent erosion of that faith, contempts

committed in the face of the court need a strict treatment.

The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not

remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology

nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful

and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court he has

not tendered apology. Therefore, since the contempt was

gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court,

learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain

honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question

of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence.

17

Page 18 This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be

rejected.

15.In this Court also the appellant’s behaviour is far from

satisfactory. He told us that he had filed an application for

bail in the High Court, but the High Court did not consider it.

The bail application attached at Annexure-A/6 to the petition

is unsigned, supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no

name of the lawyer. We have gone through the entire

record of the High Court and we find that there is no bail

application in the record. Still worse is the tampering of the

impugned order. The appellant has not filed the true copy of

the impugned order. The first sentence of paragraph 4 of

the copy of the impugned order filed in this Court reads as

under:

“The intervenor who presents himself in person

otherwise a police officer didn’t shout at the Court

that he is an intervenor in this case….”

18

Page 19 However, in the original impugned order the said

sentence does not have the words ‘didn’t shout.’ It reads

as under:

“the intervenor who presents himself in person

otherwise a police officer shouted at the Court

that he is an intervenor in this case…….”

Thus, the words ‘didn’t shout’ have replaced the

word ‘shouted.’ When we asked for an explanation, the

appellant stated that there is no tampering, but it is merely a

typing error. We refuse to accept this explanation. In this

case, by replacing the word ‘shouted’ by the words ‘didn’t

shout’ the appellant has changed the entire meaning of the

sentence to suit his case that he did not shout in the court.

Thus, he is guilty of tampering with the High Court’s order

and filing it in this Court. This would, in our opinion, be

criminal contempt as defined by Section 2(c) of the

Contempt of Court Act, 1971. There is abundance of

judgments of this Court on this issue. This Court has taken a

strict view of such conduct. We may usefully refer to

Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma

5

where in a

5

(1995) 1 SCC 421

19

Page 20 transfer petition the contemnor had filed a forged

experience certificate purportedly issued by the Principal of

a college from Nagpur. The Principal filed affidavit stating

that the said certificate is forged. This Court observed that

an act which interferes or tends to interfere or obstructs or

tends to obstruct the administration of justice would be

criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt

of Courts Act, 1971. This Court further observed that if

recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same

would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of

justice and would prevent the courts from performing their

legal duties as they are supposed to do. The contemnor

was, therefore, suitably sentenced.

16. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh

6

a forged/fabricated

order of this court was used for the purpose of conferring

some benefits on a group of persons. This Court took a strict

view of the matter and observed as under:

“The law of contempt of court is essentially meant

for keeping the administration of justice pure and

6

(2001) 5 SCC 501

20

Page 21 undefiled. It is difficult to rigidly define contempt.

While on the one hand, the dignity of the court has

to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne

in mind that the contempt jurisdiction is of a

special nature and should be sparingly used. The

Supreme Court is the highest court of record and

it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of

protecting the dignity of the court. To discharge its

obligation as the custodian of the administration

of justice in the country and as the highest court

imbued with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction

over all the lower courts and tribunals, it is

inherently deemed to have been entrusted with

the power to see that the stream of justice in the

country remains pure, that its course is not

hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice

is delivered without fear or favour. To discharge

this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take

cognizance of the deviation from the path of

justice. The sole object of the court wielding its

power to punish for contempt is always for the

course of administration of justice. Nothing is

more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to

preserve their proceedings from being

misrepresented, nor is there anything more

pernicious when the order of the court is forged

and produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal

contempt has been defined in Section 2( c) to

mean interference with the administration of

justice in any manner. A false or misleading or a

wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by

a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable

order would undoubtedly tantamount to

interference with the due course of judicial

proceedings. When a person is found to have

utilised an order of a court which he or she knows

to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons

who are not entitled to the same, the very

utilisation of the fabricated order by the person

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Page 22 concerned would be sufficient to hold him/her

guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact

whether he or she himself or herself is the author

of fabrication.”

We respectfully concur with these observations.

17.We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant

in this Court. He has sworn an affidavit stating that the

annexures of the criminal appeal are the true copies of the

originals and the facts stated in the criminal appeal are true

to his knowledge. As already noted by us, the appellant has

tampered with the original impugned order. He stated that

he had filed a bail application in the High Court. The copy of

the said bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and

supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no name of the

lawyer. The appellant has not made the Registrar of the

Patna High Court party to the appeal. The Registrar could

have clarified whether any bail application was, in fact, filed

by the appellant. In any case, we have perused the record

and we find that there is no such bail application in the

record. Thus, in this Court the appellant has filed a false

affidavit. This amounts to contempt of this Court.

22

Page 23 18.Another very disturbing feature of this case is the

manner in which the appellant flourished in the High Court a

Cabinet Minister’s letter addressed to the Chief Minister

recommending his case. We do not want to comment on the

propriety of the Cabinet Minister in addressing such a letter

to the Chief Minister in this case, though this Court has in

Prakash Singh and ors. v. Union of India and ors

7

sought to insulate the police from political interference. In

any case, the appellant should not have tried to overawe the

High Court by producing the said letter. We deprecate this

conduct. We were also taken aback when we were informed

that the appellant is the President of the Bihar Police Seva

Sangh. We are, however, informed that membership of such

association is permitted in the State of Bihar even to the

police officers. However, the fact remains that the said

association is not registered.

19.The appellant’s contention that since the respondents

have not filed affidavit, his case is unrebutted is without any

7

(2006) 8 SCC 1

23

Page 24 merit. A contempt matter is essentially between the

contemnor and the court. On the basis of the record and the

attendant circumstances the court has to decide whether

there is any contempt or not. No doubt, the respondents

could have filed an affidavit, but merely because there is no

affidavit, the contemnor cannot escape his liability. The

facts of the case are gross. The contempt is in the face of

the High Court. The fact that the respondents have not

filed affidavit in reply does not dilute the contempt

committed by the appellant.

20.In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the High

Court cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for

contempt of court. No interference is necessary with the

impugned order. We are also concerned with the contempt

of this Court committed by the appellant. We direct the

appellant to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/-. The fine shall be

deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee

within four weeks from today, failing which the appellant

shall suffer simple imprisonment for seven days. The

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Page 25 amount deposited by the appellant may be utilized for issues

concerning juvenile justice.

21.The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.

…….……………………………..J.

(Ranjana Prakash Desai)

…………………………………… J.

(Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi;

March 31, 2014.

25