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2025:CGHC:17141

AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

WPS No. 1473 of 2021

1 Ram Prasad Nayak S/o Bhagbali Nayak Aged About 67 Years R/o

Shanti Vihar Colony, Dangniya Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh.,

District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Energy,

Mantralay Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur (Chhattisgarh), District : Raipur,

Chhattisgarh

2 Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution Company Limited, Through

Managing Director (Cspdcl) Dangniya Raipur, District Raipur

Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

3 Superintendent Engineer Chhattisgarh State Power Distribution

Company (Civil- Distribution), Cercal C-6, Gudiyari Raipur, District

Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

... Respondent(s)

(Cause title is taken from Case Information System)

For Petitioner :Mr. Hemant Kesharwani, Advocate

For Respondents/

State

:Ms. Akanksha Verma, P.L.

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For Respondent No. 2

& 3

:Dr. Veena Nair, Advocate

(HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE BIBHU DATTA GURU)

Order on Board

15/04/2025

1.The challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated 05.02.2021

(Annexure P-1) (in the relief clause wrongly mentioned as

05.02.2019) by which the respondent/ CSPDCL declined to grant

back-wages to the petitioner.

2.The case of the petitioner, as projected in the writ petition, is that

the petitioner was initially appointed in the Electricity board in the

year 1977. Subsequently, he was promoted to the post of

Supervisor (Civil) in the year 1995. According, to the petitioner

one Manshukh Lal made a complaint to the Anti Corruption

Bureau, Raipur against the Additional Superintendent Engineer

and the petitioner in respect of illegal demand of bribe and in the

said proceeding, the FIR was registered for offence under

Sections 7, 13 (1) (d), 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988. On account of registration of FIR, the petitioner has been

placed under suspension by order dated 12.10.2007. Since the

trial could not be concluded within a period of 3 years the

suspension period has been revoked by order dated 04.09.2010.

In the meantime, after completion of trial, the petitioner has been

convicted by the Court of Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption

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Act) Raipur, C.G. The said conviction has been challenged by the

petitioner before this Court in Cr. A. No. 1153/2012. Owing to

conviction imposed by the Trial Court, the petitioner has been

terminated from the services by order dated 01.04.2013. The Cr. A

No. 1153/2012 has been allowed by this court vide judgment

dated 08.05.2020 and the petitioner has been acquitted from the

charges. In the meanwhile, the petitioner retried from service on

31-8-2018. Thus, after acquittal the petitioner made several

representations before the authorities seeking back-wages.

However, by the order impugned the representation of the

petitioner has been rejected and petitioner was declined to grant

back-wages. Hence this petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the petitioner

is entitled for back-wages by virtue of Rule 54-B of the

Fundamental Rules, therefore, the impugned order is liable to be

set aside and the writ petition deserves to be allowed. He further

placed reliance on Arun Kumar Sharma Vs. State of C.G.( WPS

NO. 3904 of 2020) and Abdul Rahman Ahmed Vs. State of C.G.

(WPS No. 3899 of 2006) passed by co-ordinate bench of this

court.

4.Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, would submit that

Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would apparently be not

applicable in case of the petitioner, as the petitioner was not

placed under suspension and not reinstated in service on

revocation of said suspension and he was not under suspension

for the period of his absence, rather he was dismissed from

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service pursuant to his conviction in criminal case by the

jurisdictional criminal court, therefore, the said Fundamental Rule

would not be applicable to him and he would not be entitled for

back-wages. In light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the

matter of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent

Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar

1

, he would

not be entitled for back-wages. As such, the writ petition deserves

to be dismissed.

5.In order to answer the questions formulated herein-above, it would

be appropriate to notice Rule 54-B(1) of the Fundamental Rules,

which states as under: -

F.R. 54-B (1) When a Government servant who has been

suspended, is re-instated or would have been so re-instated

but for his retirement on superannuation while under

suspension, the authority competent to order re-instatement

shall consider and make a specific order-

(a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the

Government servant for the period of suspension ending

with re-instatement or the date of his retirement on

superannuation, as the case may be; and

(b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a

period spent on duty.”

6.A careful perusal of sub-rule (1) of Rule 54-B of the Fundamental

Rules would show that when a Government servant, who has

been suspended, is reinstated or would have been so reinstated

but for his retirement on superannuation while under suspension,

the competent authority to order reinstatement shall consider and

make a specific order regarding the pay and allowances to be

1(1996) 11 SCC 603

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paid to the Government servant for the period of suspension

ending with reinstatement or the date of his retirement on

superannuation, as the case may be; and whether or not the said

period shall be treated as a period spent on duty. However, it is

not the case of the petitioner that he was placed under

suspension and directed for reinstatement while revoking the

suspension, as he was terminated from service on conviction of

criminal charges by the jurisdictional criminal court, therefore,

Rule 54-B of the Fundamental Rules would not be applicable.

7.A Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Munnalal

Mishra v. Union of India and others

2

considered the issue

threadbare with regard to applicability of Rules 54, 54-A & 54-B of

the Fundamental Rules and held that when a Government servant

is dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in pursuance

of any disciplinary proceedings, but without inquiry on the ground

of conviction in a criminal case, then F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B

would not apply and F.R. 17(1), which deals with ‘no work, no

pay’, would apply. It has been observed in paragraph 10 of the

report as under: -

“10.But when a Government (or Railway) servant is

dismissed or removed or compulsorily retired, not in

pursuance or any disciplinary proceedings, but without

inquiry on the ground of conviction in a criminal case, then

F.R. 54, 54-A and 54-B (or corresponding Rules 1343, 1344

and 1345 of Railway Code) would not apply. As a

consequence, we will have to fall back on the general

principles and Fundamental Rule No. 17 (1) which provides

that no work will mean no pay. Therefore, the Government

(or Railway) servant will not be entitled to any pay for the

22005(3) M.P.H.T. 125 (DB)

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period when he was not in service. He will be entitled to be

reinstated from the date of acquittal. If he is not reinstated

on acquittal, he will be entitled to pay and allowances from

the date of acquittal. This position is made clear by the

Supreme Court in several decisions.”

8.This issue in hand is also well settled and no longer res integra

and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the

Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji

Chaturji Thakore (supra) in which their Lordships have

considered a case where an employee was dismissed from

service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his

involvement in an offence under Sections of Prevention of

Corruption Act and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a

consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the

issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the

period between the date of dismissal and the date of

reinstatement held as under: -

"The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has

already been ordered by the High Court. The only

question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was

his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was

taken into account for his not being in service of the

respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is

entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service

was terminated on the basis of the conviction by

operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to

the situation. The question of back wages would be

considered only if the respondents have taken

action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the

action was found to be unsustainable in law and he

was unlawfully prevented from discharging the

duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant.

Each case requires to be considered in its own

backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had

involved himself in a crime, though he was later

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acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering

the service on account of conviction and

incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the

petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages."

9.Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh

3

, the

principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore

(supra) has been followed with approval.

10.In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New

Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal

4

, the Supreme Court has

considered a provision in the service regulation which provided

that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority,

shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of

such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: -

“15.… It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame

and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty

during the period of suspension that such employee is

entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In

other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in

the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or

on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be

validly challenged. During this period, the employee

renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own

involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way

responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The

Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay

him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be

against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively

inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay.

…”

11.In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed

Abdul Rahim

5

, the Supreme Court considering the earlier

decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal

3(2004) 1 SCC 121

4AIR 1994 SC 552

5(2013) 11 SCC 67

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Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India

6

, held

that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though

obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe

out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and

observed as under: -

“11.… During the aforesaid period there was,

therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank

from employing him. If the respondent could not have

remained employed with the appellant Bank during the

said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is

difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to

payment of salary during that period. His subsequent

acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not

operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal

consequences of the conviction under the Act. The

entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be

judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement,

undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and

the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.”

12.Coming back finally to the facts of the present case, it is quite

vivid that the petitioner was convicted by the jurisdictional criminal

court for offences under Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section

13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 pursuant to which

his services were terminated. However, in the criminal appeal this

court acquitted the petitioner from the charges. But in the

meanwhile, the petitioner retired from service on 31.08.2018, on

attaining the age of superannuation. However, he has been

denied back-wages, as the respondent CSPDCL was unable to

take the services of the petitioner due to his facing criminal

charges and as such, in light of the principles of law laid down by

their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji

6(2005) 8 SCC 747

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Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra), Baldev Singh

(supra) and Mohammed Abdul Rahim’s case (supra),

subsequent acquittal of the petitioner though obliterates his

conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal

consequences of the conviction and thus, he would not be entitled

for back-wages. Concludingly, it is held that Rule 54-B of the

Fundamental Rules would not be applicable to the petitioner

herein in the present case. Consequently, Rule 54-B of the

Fundamental Rules would not be applicable and thus, he would

not be entitled for back-wages.

13.In that view of the matter, I do not find any merit in this writ

petition, it deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed leaving the

parties to bear their own cost(s).

Sd/-

(BIBHU DATTA GURU)

JUDGE

Jyoti

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Head Note

“ Employee involved himself in a crime but acquitted later is not

entitled to back-wages, as he had disabled himself for rendering

the service on account of conviction or incarceration in jail.”

" क

र्मचारी

, जो

स्वयं अपराध में लिप्त रहा हो किन्तु बाद में दोषमुक्त किया गया हो वह बकाया

वे

तन प्राप्त करने का हकदार नहीं है

, क्

योंकि उसने दोषसिद्धि या जेल में कैद के आधार पर

स्व

यं को सेवा प्रदान करने से निर्योग्य कर लिया था।

"