W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 1 of 17

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 09

th

March, 2026

Pronounced on: 16

th

April, 2026

Uploaded on: 16

th

April, 2026

+ W.P.(C) 7270/2019

RAM RATAN VERMA AND ORS. .....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Shailendra Singh and Mr.

Abhyuday Dhasmana, Advocates.

versus

THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. .....Respondents

Through: Mr. Manoj and Ms. Aparna Sinha,

Advocates for R-2.

Dr. Monika Arora, CGSC with Mr.

Prabhat Kumar, Advocate for R-1, 3,

4.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

JUDGMENT

SANJEEV NARULA, J.:

1. This writ petition has been filed by retired direct recruits of the Food

Corporation of India

1

seeking a mandamus directing the Respondents to

grant them the benefit of pension on the footing that they were wrongly

excluded from the regime available to the employees who had come into

FCI from the erstwhile Food Department. The claim is founded essentially

on parity and discrimination.

2. FCI was established in the year 1965. The FCI Staff Regulations came

1

“FCI”

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 2 of 17

into force in the year 1971. According to the Petitioners, employees

recruited prior to the coming into force of those Regulations were initially

governed by the Central Civil Services Rules.

2

They further state that, till

the year 1983, both the employees transferred from the erstwhile Food

Department and the direct recruits of FCI continued on the Central Dearness

Allowance pattern, with pay and allowances broadly aligned to those of

Central Government employees.

3. The Petitioners who belong to the class of direct recruits have a

grievance that, although they worked in the same establishment, under the

same pay pattern for long periods, and within the same service structure as

the transferred employees, they were denied the pensionary benefit that the

latter were permitted to retain or elect. According to them, while the

transferred employees had access to pension on the Central Government

model, the direct recruits were continued under the FCI Contributory

Provident Fund Regulations, 1967 and were never afforded any

corresponding option to move to pension.

4. The Petitioners place reliance on the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987, under which CPF beneficiaries in service on 1

st

January, 1986

were to be treated as having come over to pension unless they opted to

remain under the CPF scheme. Their case is that a similar liberalised

approach was adopted in several other public bodies and public sector

institutions, including public sector insurance companies by instruction

dated 2

nd

March, 2019, but no such benefit was ever extended to FCI direct

recruits. The exclusion of that class is, therefore, assailed as arbitrary and

discriminatory.

2

“CCS Rules”

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 3 of 17

5. The Respondents dispute the claim. Their case, in substance, is that

the direct recruits and the transferred employees never formed one legal

class in the matter of terminal benefits. According to them, the position of

the transferred employees flowed from their antecedent status as

Government employees and from the statutory arrangement governing their

transfer to FCI, whereas the Petitioners, being direct recruits of the

Corporation, were governed by FCI’s own service and provident fund

framework. It is, therefore, their case that the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 had no application to the Petitioners.

Issues

6. Having considered the submissions advanced on behalf of the parties,

the pleadings, the statutory provisions, the office memoranda placed on

record, the rejection order dated 30

th

June, 2015, and the authorities relied

upon by both sides, the following issues arise for determination:

(i) whether the Petitioners, being direct recruits of FCI, can claim

pensionary benefits at par with the food transferees as a matter of legal right;

(ii) whether the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 applies, either

directly or by necessary implication, to FCI direct recruits;

(iii) whether the denial of such benefit to the Petitioners offends Article 14

of the Constitution; and

(iv) whether the rejection order dated 30

th

June, 2015 has any disabling

effect on the present claim.

Analysis and findings

Whether the Petitioners can claim pensionary benefits at par with the food

transferees as a matter of legal right

7. The Petitioners’ case undoubtedly carries equitable appeal. One can

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 4 of 17

readily understand why a retired employee, who served in the same

organisation, under the same pay pattern for long periods, and within the

same service hierarchy as another class of employees, would regard a

divergence in retiral benefits as unfair. However, perceived unfairness is not,

by itself, a source of legal entitlement. A writ of mandamus does not issue

merely because one service arrangement is more advantageous than another.

The claimant must show a right recognised in law and enforceable against

the Respondents. That foundation is absent here.

8. The position of the food transferees was anchored in the statutory

scheme itself. Section 12 empowered the Corporation to frame service rules

for its employees. Section 12A, however, was introduced specifically to

facilitate the transfer of employees from the erstwhile Food Department of

the Central Government and its attached or subordinate offices to FCI. Such

employees entered the Corporation with antecedent Government service,

and the option available to them in relation to pay and retirement or terminal

benefits formed part of that special statutory arrangement.

9. The direct recruits stood differently from the outset. They entered

service as employees of the Corporation itself and were governed by the

service framework framed for FCI employees, including the Food

Corporation Rules and Regulations, 1965, the FCI Contributory Provident

Fund Regulations, 1967, the FCI Staff Regulations, 1971, and the circulars

and instructions issued by FCI from time to time. Under that framework,

they were entitled to such retiral benefits as were admissible to direct

recruits of FCI, including leave encashment, contributory provident fund and

gratuity; their service was not pensionable. Their position cannot, therefore,

be equated with that of transferred Government employees merely because

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 5 of 17

both classes later served in the same establishment, worked under the same

employer, or remained on the same pay pattern for long periods.

10. The Petitioners place considerable emphasis on the functional

similarities shared with the food transferees. They highlight that both groups

served under the same employer, performed broadly similar duties, followed

an identical pay pattern for extended periods, and progressed through a

unified promotional structure. While these factors are certainly relevant in

assessing claims of equality, they cannot, by themselves, establish a legal

entitlement to pensionary benefits at par with the food transferees. In

matters of service law, equality analysis requires more than merely

comparing the situation of employees after years of working within the same

establishment. It is essential to consider the circumstances and character

with which each employee entered into service. The pensionary benefit in

question extended to food transferees originated from antecedent

Government service and was expressly preserved through a specific

statutory arrangement. Consequently, this benefit cannot be detached from

its statutory origin and extended as a general entitlement for all employees

who under FCI. The Petitioners’ argument, therefore, founded on functional

similarity alone is insufficient to claim pensionary benefits as a matter of

legal right.

Whether the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 applies to FCI direct

recruits

11. The Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 marked an important

shift in pension policy for Central Government employees under CPF. It

declared that CPF beneficiaries in service on 1

st

January, 1986, and

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 6 of 17

continuing in service on the date of issue, would be deemed to have

switched over to pension unless they opted to remain under the CPF scheme.

It also dealt with specified categories of retirees and family cases.

12. The memorandum, however, also defined the limits of its own

application. Paragraph 6.1 stipulated that the orders applied to civilian

Central Government employees subscribing to the Contributory Provident

Fund under the Contributory Provident Fund Rules (India), 1962. It further

provided that, in the case of other contributory provident fund systems, the

necessary orders would be issued by the respective administrative

authorities. Paragraph 7.2 advised the administrative Ministries

administering contributory provident fund rules other than the 1962 Rules to

issue similar orders in consultation with the Department of Pension and

Pensioners’ Welfare.

13. The Petitioners have placed significant reliance on paragraph 3 of the

Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987, particularly the deeming clause,

in support of their claim. However, such reliance, when divorced from the

context provided by paragraphs 6.1 and 7.2 of the memorandum, is

misplaced. The deeming clause was not intended to serve as a blanket

directive converting every Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) arrangement

across the public sector into a pension scheme. Instead, the memorandum

expressly limited its direct application to civilian Central Government

employees who subscribed to the Contributory Provident Fund Rules

(India), 1962. Furthermore, the memorandum anticipated that other

contributory provident fund systems, those outside the Central Government

CPF structure, would be governed by distinct or analogous orders issued by

the respective administrative authorities. Therefore, the Petitioners cannot

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 7 of 17

claim automatic coverage under the deeming clause by isolating it from the

provisions that delineate the scope and field of operation of the

memorandum. When the memorandum is read holistically, it is evident that

it was not self-executing for employees outside the Central Government

CPF framework. Its direct effect was confined to a specific class, and for

other CPF arrangements, further administrative action was contemplated and

required.

14. That is the difficulty the Petitioners have not overcome. No order has

been placed on record extending the 1

st

May, 1987 framework to FCI direct

recruits. Their complaint, in substance, is that such an order should have

been made. It does not establish that the memorandum automatically

governed them as a matter of law.

15. The grievance-portal response dated 19

th

June, 2017, though not

decisive in itself, reflected the same position. It stated that the Office

Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 was applicable to those Central

Government employees governed by the Government of India CPF Rules,

1962, or other CPF rules administered by the concerned administrative

ministries.

16. The subsequent instruction dated 2

nd

March, 2019, which was issued

to public sector insurance companies, further reinforces this understanding.

This instruction demonstrates that, even many years after the issuance of the

1987 Office Memorandum, it was necessary to undertake a new policy

decision and to provide a fresh, sector-specific final option for a different

class of employees who were not direct Central Government employees.

17. The Court, therefore, is unable to accept the Petitioners’ submission

that the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987, by its own force, covered

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 8 of 17

FCI direct recruits.

Whether denial of such benefit violates Article 14

18. This is the core of the Petitioners’ case. Their submission is that, even

in the absence of an express order extending the pension-switch framework

to FCI direct recruits, their exclusion from pension, despite long parity of

work, pay pattern and service conditions with the food transferees, is

arbitrary and violative of Article 14.

19. Article 14 of the Constitution of India is a safeguard against arbitrary

State action. Courts, are empowered to examine whether a distinction drawn

by the State is arbitrary or lacks a rational nexus to the objective sought to

be achieved. However, it is equally important to recognise the limitations

inherent in the application of Article 14. The constitutional guarantee of

equality cannot be stretched to create a substantive benefit that is not

otherwise conferred by the applicable statutory or regulatory framework. In

other words, Article 14 is not a source of substantive rights in itself. The

principle of equality cannot be invoked to rewrite the foundational legal

source of a particular benefit. Nor can it invoke Article 14 to transplant the

incidents or advantages of one service regime onto another, simply because

the latter is perceived as more favourable to a particular group of employees.

The scope of judicial review under Article 14 is to ensure that the existing

regulatory or statutory provisions are applied without arbitrariness or

irrational discrimination, rather than to create new entitlements or benefits

where none exist under the law.

20. Here, the food transferees entered FCI with antecedent Government

service and were dealt with under the special statutory arrangement

governing such transfer. The Petitioners, by contrast, entered as direct

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 9 of 17

recruits under the Corporation’s own service and provident fund framework.

That difference goes to the root of the claim. It inheres in the legal origin of

the two classes and bears directly upon the source of the pensionary benefit

asserted.

21. Once the difference between direct recruits and food transferees of the

Corporation is properly understood, the challenge under Article 14 largely

loses its persuasive strength. The Petitioners’ grievance is not that there has

been unequal treatment within a single, homogenous legal class, but rather

that the pension-switch benefit has not been extended to them. However, this

benefit originated from a different legal source and applied only to a specific

class of employees governed by the Central Government CPF Rules or

similar frameworks issued by the relevant administrative authorities.

Therefore, the claim is not one of discrimination within the same legal class,

but of non-extension of a benefit to a class not originally contemplated

within its scope.

22. Although the Petitioners have not relied on them, the discussion

would remain incomplete without noticing the decision of the Supreme

Court in Food Corporation of India v. Ashis Kumar Ganguly

3

as well as

the subsequent judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Abasarprapt

Bhartiya Khadyanigam Karmachari Kalyan Samity and Another v. Food

Corporation of India and Others

4

, both of which bear upon the service

position of FCI employees in a related setting.

23. In Ashis Kumar Ganguly, the Supreme Court was concerned with the

grant of advance increments under Regulation 81 of the applicable FCI

3

(2009) 7 SCC 734

4

2025 SCC OnLine Cal 6428

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 10 of 17

regulations. The said provision, on its plain terms, applied to employees

drawn both from the Central Government and the State Government.

However, the benefit had been extended only to one category, namely

employees transferred from the Central Government. It was in that context

that the Supreme Court held that a benefit traceable to the same regulatory

source could not be denied to another class of employees equally within its

fold. The decision thus proceeded on the footing of equal application of an

existing benefit under a common regulatory regime.

24. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court proceeds on the same basis.

It concerns parity between employees transferred from the Central

Government, covered under Section 12A and those who had initially come

on deputation from State Governments and were later absorbed. The

extension of parity in that case rested on the same principle recognised in

Ashis Kumar Ganguly, namely, that where the governing framework itself

covers both classes, the benefit available under that framework cannot be

confined to one and withheld from the other.

25. The present case stands on a materially different footing. The

Petitioners are direct recruits of the Corporation and do not share the same

legal origin of service as employees transferred from the Central

Government under Section 12A. The claim herein is not for equal

application of any existing provision governing such categories, but for

extension of a pensionary scheme which is not part of the regulatory

framework applicable to the Petitioners. Accordingly, the aforesaid

decisions, which address parity between categories of employees entering

the Corporation through distinct governmental service channels, are

distinguishable and do not advance the case of the Petitioners.

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 11 of 17

26. The reliance on Union of India v. S.L. Verma,

5

is equally misplaced.

In that case, the governing service regulations themselves provided that

employees would be governed by the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, subject

only to a specific election to continue under CPF. The Office Memorandum

dated 1

st

May, 1987 operated within that framework by deeming CPF

employees to have shifted to pension, unless they opted out. The Supreme

Court, therefore, did not extend a pension regime to a new class of

employees, but merely enforced a consequence flowing from an existing

regulatory structure.

27. In the present case, no such incorporation of the CCS (Pension) Rules

or any equivalent pension framework has been shown. The Petitioners are

governed by the FCI CPF-based regime. The analogy to S.L. Verma thus

fails, as it seeks to derive a right where none is shown to exist in the

applicable service framework.

28. Nor does Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical

Biology,

6

advance the Petitioners’ claim. At the highest, that decision

strengthens the position that FCI, having been constituted under statute and

discharging functions of public importance, is amenable to writ jurisdiction

and constitutional scrutiny. But that does not take the Petitioners to the next

step. The issue here is not whether FCI is “State”. It is whether direct

recruits of FCI acquired, as a matter of legal right, the benefit of a Central

Government pension-switch framework. Pradeep Kumar Biswas does not

answer that question.

29. The Petitioners’ reliance on paragraph 96 of Pradeep Kumar Biswas

5

(2006) 12 SCC 53

6

(2002) 5 SCC 111

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 12 of 17

does not take the matter much further. Even if FCI is an authority created by

or under a statute and discharges functions of public importance, that only

means it is subject to constitutional discipline as an instrumentality of the

State. It does not mean that every service benefit available to another class

of employees must automatically be extended to the Petitioners.

30. These contentions, therefore, do not take the Petitioners much further

than reaffirming what was never seriously in dispute, namely, that FCI is a

public authority amenable to constitutional scrutiny. They do not show that

the Petitioners were covered by the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May,

1987. Nor do they negate the Respondents’ objection that the direct recruits

and the food transferees never stood on the same legal footing in the matter

of terminal benefits.

31. In Surjit Singh Bhatoa v UOI & Ors,

7

concerning the CDA/IDA

batch, this Court dealt, in a different context, with a situation where a

substantial class of employees, pursuant to an administrative decision, came

to be treated inequitably when such decision was applied retrospectively to

retirees. The Court disapproved coercive recoveries and one-sided

implementation of the pay-pattern conversion framework. However, that

decision was confined to issues of CDA/IDA conversion, recoveries, and

withholding of dues. It did not adjudicate the present pension issue. At best,

it illuminates the service history; it does not create the pension right asserted

herein.

32. The result is that the Petitioners have shown hardship, but not

arbitrariness of a kind that would justify judicial creation of the pension

regime they seek. Article 14 does not permit the Court to ignore the

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 13 of 17

statutory scheme and direct that the Petitioners be treated as though they had

always fallen within the framework of Section 12A.

Effect of the order dated 30

th

June, 2015

33. The Kerala High Court proceedings do not appear, on the material

placed before this Court, to have finally adjudicated the pension claim on

merits. What followed, however, was the order dated 30

th

June, 2015, in

which the Government expressly rejected the claim after hearing. That order

recorded that the direct recruits were governed by FCI Staff Regulations,

that the option under Section 12A belonged to transferred Government

employees, and that the Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 did not

apply to the Petitioners. The said order was never challenged.

34. The Respondents say this is fatal to the present claim. The Petitioners

dispute any such conclusive bar. In the facts of the case, it is not considered

necessary to rest the decision entirely on res judicata or issue estoppel. The

matter has been argued fully on merits, and it is preferable to deal with it on

that footing.

Claim of parity with other statutory bodies

35. The Petitioners’ comparison with the employees of LIC, nationalised

banks, and employees of Doordarshan and All India Radio under Prasar

Bharati is equally misplaced. Each of those entities is governed by its own

statutory and regulatory framework, and the pensionary benefits available to

them arise from materially different legal arrangements. Parity cannot be

claimed by comparing outcomes while ignoring the legal source of the

benefit itself.

36. In the case of employees of Doordarshan and All India Radio under

7

W.P.(C) 3365/2012

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 14 of 17

Prasar Bharati, the statutory scheme shows that such employees, including

those under the CPF scheme, were placed on “deemed deputation” to the

Corporation and continued to be governed by Central Government service

conditions, including pension. The pensionary benefit available to them was

thus a continuation of an existing entitlement as Government employees. It

was not the result of a fresh extension of pension policy to employees of an

independent statutory corporation. Their position, therefore, is

fundamentally different from that of the Petitioners.

37. In the case of LIC, pension is governed by the LIC of India

(Employees) Pension Rules, 1995, which constitute a self-contained

statutory framework. The said scheme was introduced as a matter of policy

through specific rule-making and is funded through a dedicated pension

fund, with eligibility contingent upon the exercise of option and fulfilment

of stipulated conditions. The pensionary benefits available to LIC employees

are thus not a direct consequence of Central Government Office

Memoranda, but flow from an independent statutory regime framed for that

organisation.

38. Similarly, employees of nationalised banks derive pensionary benefits

from separate Pension Regulations framed by each bank under the relevant

statutes governing such institutions.

8

These regulations were introduced with

the approval of the Central Government, and operate as distinct statutory

instruments. The extension of pensionary benefits in the banking sector was

therefore the result of a conscious regulatory framework and not the

automatic application of Central Government pension policies.

8

See: Bank of India (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995; Punjab National Bank (Employees’)

Pension Regulations, 1995 ; Punjab & Sind Bank (Employees’) Pension Regulations, 1995

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 15 of 17

39. A comparative analysis of the above demonstrates that pensionary

benefits in each of these entities arise either from (i) continuation of Central

Government service conditions, as in the case of Prasar Bharati, or (ii)

independent statutory or regulatory schemes, as in the case of LIC and

nationalised banks. In the absence of any corresponding statutory

framework, rule, or binding decision extending similar benefits to the

employees of the Respondent-organisation, no claim of parity can be

sustained merely on the basis of functional similarity or status as a statutory

body.

40. The plea of parity, therefore, is devoid of merit and is liable to be

rejected.

Case law relied upon by the Respondents

41. The Respondents have relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas, All India

ITDC Workers Union and Ors. v. ITDC and Ors.,

9

P. Bandopadhya and

Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

10

and BSNL v. Pramod v. Sawant.

11

Since some of these authorities also feature in the Petitioners’ submissions,

it is appropriate to notice the true bearing of each of them.

42. Pradeep Kumar Biswas does not materially advance the

Respondents’ case on the question whether FCI is “State”. The majority

view in that decision held CSIR to be “State” within the meaning of Article

12 and, in the course of the discussion, noticed that FCI had already been

treated as an instrumentality of the State. To that extent, the Petitioners are

justified in relying on the decision to affirm the public character of FCI and

the amenability of its actions to scrutiny on constitutional principles. The

9

AIR 2007 SC 301

10

2019 1NSC 390

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 16 of 17

Respondents can, however, legitimately draw from the same line of

authority the narrower proposition that Article 12 status does not, by itself,

carry with it the service protections or incidents available to Government

servants under other constitutional or statutory provisions. That distinction is

of real significance here, because the present issue is not whether FCI is

“State”, but whether its direct recruits acquired, as a matter of legal right, the

benefit of a pension regime that arose in a different statutory and regulatory

setting.

43. All India ITDC Workers Union arose in the context of disinvestment.

It is of limited assistance here. It may support the general proposition that

employees of a public sector body do not, by reason of that status alone,

acquire every incident of Government service. But its factual setting is

materially different.

44. P. Bandopadhya is more instructive. It underscores that pension

options and policy memoranda must be read together with the governing

statutory rules and eligibility conditions, and that absorption or service

transitions cannot be ignored while determining pension claims. It also

underlines that earlier final adjudications are not to be lightly sidestepped in

later representative litigation. Though the facts there are not identical, its

analysis lends support to the Respondents’ case.

45. The decision in Pramod V. Sawant, on which the Respondents rely,

does not concern a pension dispute. It arose in the context of sanction for

prosecution and the status of employees after absorption. What it establishes

is the limited proposition that employees of public sector undertakings do

not, merely because the undertaking falls within the meaning of “State”

11

AIR 2019 SC 3979

W.P.(C) 7270/2019 Page 17 of 17

under Article 12, acquire or retain the status of Government servants upon

absorption. Beyond that proposition, the decision has no real bearing on the

present dispute.

Conclusion

46. The Petitioners’ grievance is understandable. The distinction between

them and the food transferees may appear harsh in its operation. But the

Court is not deciding whether a more generous policy might have been

desirable. The question is whether the Petitioners have shown an enforceable

legal right. They have not.

47. The benefit available to the food transferees was rooted in their prior

status as Government employees and in the statutory transfer arrangement

embodied in Section 12A. The Office Memorandum dated 1

st

May, 1987 did

not automatically extend to FCI direct recruits, and no corresponding order

bringing them within that pension-switch framework has been shown. The

exclusion, though it results in hardship, rests on a legally relevant

distinction. Article 14 does not permit the Court to create, by judicial

direction, a pension regime which the governing law or any binding policy

never made applicable to this class.

48. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

APRIL 16, 2026

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