0  20 Feb, 1984
Listen in 2:00 mins | Read in 16:00 mins
EN
HI

Ravi Dutt Sharma Vs. Ratan Lal Bhargava

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal /212/1981
Link copied!

Case Background

Bench

Applied Acts & Sections

No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

,

A 614

B

c

F

G

H

RAVI DUTT SHARMA

' '

v.

RATAN LAL BHAR.GAVA

February 20, 1984 '..

'•

S, MuRTAZA FAzAL Au: A. VARADARAJAN & R,N. MISRA, Jl l

Constitution of India 1950, Article 14: Sections 14A, 25A and 25B of Delhi

Rent Control Act 1958 whether ultra vires Article 14:

, Slull) Areas·([nif,rovement and Clearance~·.A~t-1956, s, 19 Delhi.. Rent Contr~l

Act 1958, Ss.14 (!) (e), 14A, 25A, 25B & 25C: suit by landlord for eviction of

tenant under s.14.(1) (e) or s.l4A of the Rent Act-prior permiss(on ofCompetant

Authority urider Slun1 Clearance Act-Whether necessarr.

~ .. '-.

The appt::hant-tenant was induct~ into the suit prenrises as for b~ck as 194~.

'

.:..-

The respondent landlord a,pplied _under section 19 _(!)(a) of the Slum Areas Irilprovc-. ~:..,

ment and Clearance) Act 1956 before the Competent Authority for pennitting .him_ J

to institute a suit for eviction ·or the appellant but that application was dismissed.

·I aod thC order was confirn1ed ill appeal by the Financial Conunissioner: ·Thereafter

the re·spondelit field a1 suit for eviction in April 197!? under section 14 (1) (e) read

with seCtiori 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958. The tenant applied for leave ...

"'to defend the suit but the same was rejected ·and an order of eviction was passed

A revision filed by the ten~n~ Jin the High' Court was dismissed.

- "

. '· 'n the appe~l to this Court .fs ~el1 as in the connected Special LeaV"e Petition

lt, \Vas.contended that: (1) under seetion 19 (1) (a) or the Slum Act it is incumbent

on the landlord to obtain iJenni36ion frQm the Competent Authority before insti~ .

tution of a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit . was no "'

1naintainable, and (2) sections 25A and 2~'.B were ultra vires of ·Article 14 of the

Constitution aud \Vere inconsisterit wit~ the Slun1 Act which was· an existing Statute·

and, ,therefote, the prqcedure substituted under: Chapter, IIlA, particularly sections

25A and 25B should be invaljdated. · ~

DiSmissi~ the Appeal and Spcciill Leave Petition;

IF

:

I

'

RAX' o·uTr v. )lATAN LAL 615

. , HELD: A.(i) The High Court was cotre~t in rejecting the applications of 'A

~ the ten~nts-for setting as_idc the ofder·;-ef eviction. ['624

1

.§] -

. ~.. '

, B.(l). s~ctions 14A; 25A;25B firld 25C Of the Rent Act arc sPecial ·~revisions so

far as the landlord and tenant arc concerned an,f in view Of. the non~obstante clause

th~se proviSions ~verridc the existing-la\V So far as. the neW procedure· is ~oncemed; ·

.[624Al B

'

,J..._. (2) Thef; is lio._differenCe ei_ther on principle or in Ia_w· between sections 14

(l)(e) and 14A of the Rent A~t even though these two: proviSio~s rdate to Cviction.

of tenants under different situationS; [624B]

' .

(3) ;-,The prOccdtire inca'fporated in Ch~pter IIIA ·ar· _th~ A~ending Act into

the Rent Act is in public .. interest and is not vlotatiye-of Artir.fe 14 ·of the Constitu:.

·ti on; [624C] · ' · •

::t: .--

. ·"{ . ....,.

,/

-. .

. (4) ~1n vieW of the prOcedure in Ch3pter IIIA of the Rent Act, thC Slum Act

i~ reqdered inapplicabJe to· the extent of inconsiStency and it is· not; therefore, neces~ -

sary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Compc~ent Authority_ undCr s. 19

· (i)(a): of· ihe Slum· Act. before 'ihstitufing a sUit for evicti-00 arid corning _within .s.14

_(.l)(e) or 14A of the Rent Act.. [624D-E] ·

C.(1) The_dominant object of' the Amending~Act ~f 1976 was to provide a

speCdy, expeditio-us -and effect ieffiedy ·for a.' claS:s of landlords contemplated 9Y seC­

sections 14(1)(e) and J4A and foi avOidinf'unusual dilatorY process pfOvided other.,

wise by the Rcq.t·Act. Suiis'for evicti6n.under the Act take a Jong_time commc'ncing

·with the Rent eOntroller arid ehctlng up with" thO ~.upn .. Jnc-COurt.· ln many ca~es

by 'the 'time. thC eviction decree becanie final several :years elapsed and either

1

:the

. ~ - •) ' '

landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared. It

waS this n1ischief Which the.legisl_ature intended _to ayoid by incorporatingthe·.new

procedure in Chapier IDA: It cannot therefore be said that ·the tlilssification of

sue~ landlords-·wouid be an ureasonaPle one because such a classification has. got

a clear ·nexus withlith_e objects of the Alnending Act ·or 1976 and tP,e purpos·es which-~

it seeks to · subServe. [619D-F; G] · ·. · -. ·, · , . :

1

-.' :'1-

l

: I . :, ',) ,

(2) The ne'v sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C had been introduced for the

purpose Or meeting ~~. pa_Fticular ~ntingencY as spelt out in 'the object and reasons

behind the" new proViSionS. ·once it is recognised that ·the nCwly a'dded sections are

in the nature uf a spedal law inte"nded to apply to speci(\1 classes of landlords, the

. ·inevitable Conclusion would be that the ;pplication of the Sl'um Act st2.nds with-.

''drawn to iha:t exterit and any SUit falling.within the scOpi_ of sections 14(1)(e) 'and

14Awould not be governed.or controlled by section 19(1) (a) of'the Slum Act,

r

. ' ' [621CD-J

,,

·c

E·.

. F·

-G

H

i.

, -

,

·r

•' i·

A

'

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

• I

616 SUPREME COURT . REP,ORTS (1984] 2' S.C.ll.

\.

J • (3)

1

It is open to the ~egislaturc to pick ~ut 'one class of the '1anillords out

of sever.al ·covered by sectioq 14(J)(e) of thc.Re1lt Act so long as they fonned a class

by·thems~lves and the· lcg1slaturc \Vas fr9c to prOvidc the be.ncfit of the special prnce­

dure to them in the matter of eviction of their' tenants as long as the legislation had

an object tci achieve and the special procedure· had a rc.asOnable nexus with su·ch .

object ,to be secured. [621F-G] · ·

, (4). The new p~ovision in the Ariiending Act w~re.intended to haveoverri ..

di~ ~ffect an(.f all pr~cedural. laws wer.e to give waY to .~he ~ew procedure. [623pj

' .

. ' '

~ew.al .Sing/I v. ·Lajwaftti [1980] 1 S.C.R. 854; Sar.wan Sing11 & Anr. 'v.,, Kasturi

Lal [.l9Tlj 2 S.C.R. 421; Vinod Kun1ar ,Chowdhry v. Narain DeVi Taneja [1,80) i ·

S.C.R. 746 referred to.

Smt:'Krislma ·Devi Nigpm ~Ors. v. Slryan1 Babu Gupta & Ors. AIR 1780 ·Delhi

.165 ~pproved. ; ·~

C1v1L APPELLATE JuRIS4lICTION : Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1981

. Appeal by specie! .leave

the 26th.August, 1980 of the

of 1979:

from the judgment and order dated

Delhi .High Court in C.R. No. 790 .

'

..

. WITH

~ . . - , .

SPBCIAL LFIAVB PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2948 OF 1982

From· the judgment and order d,ated the 17th December,

ofthe Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 873 of 1981.

. . . .

1981

V.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h

Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners.

Bikarmjit Nayer aicd D.D. Sharma for the Respci~dent in CA.

212/81.

..

(

''

l

'.

RAVI DUI? v. RATAN LAL (Faz'al Ali, J.) 617

. . . . '· ' ' '

. T.s,,.Kawatra & NJ{, Agarwaia•fo'r the Respondent in S.L.P.. A

No .. 2948 bf 1982, . ' . , ' , ,

. ·~-'

·The Judgment .of the Couft was delivered by ·

··•''

B

\,

4FAZAL Au, J. This Appeal'b;.spedal' leave is directed ·against

':Jo an order· passed by the" Delhi High Court ori· August 26, 1980 .· ·

affirmillg an order of eviction of the appelarit ,madeby .the 'Rent

,-Tontroller.The.f(lcts of the ~ase '.ie \~thin.a ·yery, narrow compass·

/

·

. ,;r.

. and the appeal mvolves a pure .Polilt ofraw w)11ch 1s already convered C'

by decisions of this coµrt to which we shall presently refer: : . '

, . , . ~ I , . : ~ .

' '

" .

. ,... The tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, ;;,as inducted into the suit prem-

ises as for back as 1945, Tl(e .landlord· Rat~n Lal Bhargava applied

undj:r' section 19 (I) (a} of the Slum Clearance Act ('Sluin Act' fot'.

. short) before the . Competent Authority for .permitting .him to insti­

tute. a suit for eviction of the ,' appellant but that. application was

. · dismissea on'July 28, 1973. An appeal against this· order was dismi­

ssed by t]je Financial Commissioner 'on October 4,, · 1974. Thereafter

· ,... Respondent filed a suit (or eviction of theienant. under ·s: 14 (I) (e)

·read with s. 25 (B) of the Delhi Rent Control Aci ("Rent Act' for

• - - - •' ' #" , , ' • I

1short) on April 13, 1979. Qrn:Ler the provisions of. !he Rent Act, as ,

.

"-.~wended 'in

1976 it is'incun1bent upon the. defendant tenant to apply·

· for leave· to defend 'a s~it for eviction before. entering contest; The

tenant· applied for sucb leave but the same was rejected and an order. •.

of his' eviction was passed, on September J 4, 1979: A revision by ihe.

tenant to the High Court was dismissed and that has '1ed to the appeal

•, to this Court.' · · · '

D

E

F

. In the special. leave' petition Smt. Puspa Rani filed' a stiit for

eviction against her tenant, Swara~ .Kumar and .others, which also .· G

• w~s all~wed by the Rent Controller and a revision therefrmit has' been ·

. ·dismissed

l)y

the High Court, Ij:ence the ·petition for special leave

"". a,gainst judiiment, of the High Court h_as been filed and that was directed ,

to be heard along with the Civil Appeal. It is unnecessary to giv'

the racts·fovolved in the case in which special !eave . ·has been asked H

for because the poin( of law. for cosideratfon is one and the same.

. . . . ,. . I

, . . . ~

. "

' ..

,,/

"

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

Admittedly the houses for which eviction )1as been asked for.in

·' these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the _.__. .

Slum Act. It was contended on behalf of the t"nants that .the .suits

. for eviction

by the landlords

were not competent in view of want of

· permissio~ from the competent Authority under the Slum Act. Under

section 19 (1) (a) of t]].e Slum Act •it' is incumbent'on the landlord to

B obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a

suit for evicting a tenant all(! without such permission the suit is . iot

maintainable. · · .•

t This argument was co11ntercd by the respondent on the ground """

C .. that by virtue of the. Amending' Act of 1976 (referred to as the

'A'.mending Act' for short) a 'new procedure has been substituted for

two types of eviction of tenant-one of . which was covc,red

by. s . .14 (I) (e) and the other by . section 14 (A). In the

instant case ·we ate mainly concerned with eviction. applications

covered by s'. · 14(1) le) ' and' the · special procdure provided in

D Chapter III-A. introduced by the Admending Act. It was contended

by the respqudent that by virtue of the Rent Act a special·protection

was gtven to a particular class of landlords who fell within ·the pro­

visioi:is of s. 14 (l).(e) of the ·Rent Act (personal necessity) and in such

E

F

. ,

I

· cases a procedure different ·rrom the procedure fo)lowed in other

~ases had been prescribed. Section 25 (A) and 25 (B) so~ght to sim­

plify the procedure

by

·insisting on the tenant to obta;,; permission

to ·enter defence. In other word.s, so far as "suits for eviction on the ' .

ground

of personal necessity weae

con~er~ed, the case for eviction_....>-'

" was put at par· witlis.uits m1der Order 37, Code of Civil' Procedure .

where the Court

was satisfied that the tenant

had-an arguable case,·

1eave to defend would be. granted;. otherwise the order of eviction

would

be passed straightway.

,

Learned counsel for the tenants then argue<! that. sections 25(A)

'and 25 (B) were 1:1ltra vires of Article 14 · of the Constitution and

were inconsistent

with the Slum Act which

was an existing· statute

and, therefore, the procedure substituted under Chapter III-A,

particulary in ·ss. 25(A)°and 2'5 (B) sho11ld be invalidete<l. On the

other hand, counsel for the landlords contended that by virtue of the

Amending Act a new procedure has been added in respect of evictions .

under

s. 14(1) (e) as

also the newly added 14(A), and sections 25(A)

and 25(B} have been brought into the 'Statute to give efiect to the

intention of ·the legislature by providing a Special .procedure and

' . .

..

, .

"

-v

' -

/ . ' •"-. " . .

·.RAVID,UTT V. RATt,NLAL (Faza/A/i, J,) 619

·also making provision ~at the.

existing lawto the contl'ary.

riew • procedure would override the

..

.,

. In 'order to appreciate 'this contention it niay be necessary to

give: an extract of Statement of objects and re~sons of'the Amending

""' . , B

·Act : · , , ·

r

1.

· ..

I

' .

~ ' . . ' ·.· . ' ' '

"There I.as been a persistent demand for amendments to the

iDelhi Rent Control Ad, 1958 with a view. ~to ccfnferring1 a

right

of

tenancy on' certain heirs/successors of a d~ceased ..

statutory, tenant to that they may be protected froril eviction

, by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure,, for

eviction of tenants in case. the landlord requiresthe pre!llises

. bona. fide for his personal occupation. Further Government

·decided on tlle 9th Scoten~ber J9i5. that, a p~rso11 who owns

his own ho us~ in his place of ;.ork should vacate,the Govern­

ment accommodation· allotted'. to him before· the 31st DEX<em--

ber 1975. · do\)~rnm-~nt · cmisi~iered that in the circum­

stances, the Act requi..rcs to be a111cnded_ urg~·ntly.", .

.

The dominant obj~ct of the Amending Act was, therefore, to pro­

vide a spoody, expoditious .and effective remedy for a class of landlords .

.

;·{_ · contempbt1'd by· ss. _14 (l)(C)

.and 14 (A) and ror avoidin'g unusual

1

dilatory process provided .otherwise by the Rent Act. Jt is commo'n

experience that su_its fo~ eyiction under the Act take a long time. ·

cmninencirig with the Rent Controller and endi1ig up with the Sup­

reme Court. In many cases experience-has indicated thatby the time

the eviction .tiecrec became final' several years elapsed and eitlie[ ..

the. hndlord died _or the necessity which provided the cause of ·

action ·dissappered and' if. the're wasfurther delay in securing eviction

and tfor family of t_he landlord' ha\:l by .then expanded, in· the abse­

n.ce of acc6mmodation _the 1ncnibers of the family ,_were virt-11ally.

thrown on the road. It.was this mischief wihch the legislature intended

to avoid by incorporating _the new procedute in Cliapter'III:A. The

legislature in its wisdom thought that -in cases where the landlorils

required their own premises· for bona fide and personal· necessity

they shriuid< be treated as a .. ieparat~ class along with the landlords .

covered-by s .. 14 A ·and should be allowed to reap the fruits of

decrees for eviction wiihin the. quickest possible time. It cannot, .

therefore, be said that the Cl~ssification. of such 'landlords would be

, .

C,

D

E

G

H

!_

. ,,,,

'

. '.

620 SUPREME COURT REfORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.

. I

A.

an unreasonabl~ one because such a classification has got a clear

· nexus with the objects of the Amending.Act and the· purposes which

: it seeks 'to subserve. Tenants cannot complain of any discrilnination

because .the' Rent Aci merely gave . certain protection to them in

public· i;1terest and if ihe protection 'or part of'. it afforded by the

Rent Act

was .withdrawi1 and the

common law right of the tenant:

: ~nden the l'ransfer of property Act was stilL preserved; no genuine

grievance could be made. This wa~ clearly held in the case of

''

B

'

D

E . .

F

G.

[(ewaf Singh v. Lajwan!i.(

1

) . '

~-

~ ' '

The matter )s no longer res, integra and· is coverecf by' two' : .-

decisions of this Court which.ate directly in •point. ·The first cine is

the' case of Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal,

1

"

hi

which, ari .

identical point came up for.consideration, It.was held by this Court

that sections 2'5 (A), 25 (BJ and. 25 (C) of the Rent Act (introduced .-

by the Amend,ing Act) were special provisions with reference to s. · 1

14 (A) thereof· 'which superseded all existing Ac!s ·to the contrary. ..

It .was also pointed out 'that thefo ilewly added sections in :the)lent

Act were to app)y only to. a ciass Of landlords and, therefore, the

question

of violation of

A~t. 14 of the constitution did not arise.·

While considering verious ,;spects of the aforesaid· provisions, Chand-

. rachud, J. (as.lie then was): spoko· for t1ie Court th.us . ._,,

~'When"two or more !all's operate. in \he same field and _ _.}-'.

eacl;,contains a non

7obstante clause stating that its provisions

will override those of any other law, stimulating and inoisive

problems' of interpretation 'arise. Since statutory inter,

pretat.ion has no conventional ·protocol, cases of such 'conflict .

have to

be decided in refe'rence

Jo the object and purpose JI

of the laws under con'sid.eration ...... For resolving such inter

s~. conflicts, one other ·t.est may also be· applied though the •

persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which

: combine to give a fair, meaning to the language of the' faw.

That test is that the later. en'ilnctment mwst prevail ayer -the

earlier one. Section ·14 A and Chapter I.II A .having been ena-.

. , ·cted with effect from December I 1975, are lat•; ena~tinents .

in reference tO. s. 19 of' !,he Slum 'clearance Act which in its

present form,.

was placed 'on the statute

book with effect·

' .

1

Ji ..; (I) [1980fl S.C.R. 854.

(2)[1977]'2 S.C.R. 421.

·}

·.

...

. '

I

~

'

'

' '

.·' ' ~ ' 1

!\AV! DUTT •. v. RATAN LAL' (Fa~al Ali, J.) 621,

•' '~ ' >!O I • ,'' f ..

from February28, 1965 and in reforen~e to s. 39· of the same

Act, which came into force in 1956 wh.en the Act itself was

passed. The .legislature gave over-riding effect to s. 14 A and

' Chapter

III A

with the knowledge that SS.' ]9 and ,39 'of the

Sluin Clearance Act

cont~ined non-~bstante

clauses.of equa·I

efficacy. Therefore, .the later e~actment must prevail:over·the

former .. , . Bearing iii' mind the langu:lge of the two fuws, their

object and putp9se, and the fact that one.ofthem is later in

point of.time and was ei;~cted with the knowledge of the

'non-obstante 'ciau,ses in, the earlie, law, ~e hcwe' ~ome· to the

. .conclusion .that tl).c p'rovisions of s. 14· A.and ChapteflJI. A

of t!).e Re11t · Control Act must preva'il over those c0ntained

u1 ss, 19 and 39'of the. Slum Clearance Ac't."

" An analysis of. the aforesaid dedi~ion ~]early reve~ls. thaf the.new

sections 14A 25(A)i 25(B) and 25(C) had been intr0dced tor the pur­

pose of meeting a particular contingency aespelt out in the objects and

' .

'

A

B.

c

reasons behind the ,new provisions. Once it is. recoginsed that the D

newly aaded sections are .in the nature of a special law. intended to

' . ' ' - - ' ' . .· . ' . ' -' .

apply to special classes· of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would

'be that the applica:tiol) of·· the Sulm Act •stands· withdraw~ to that

extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesa·id seetions-

14 (!) (e) and 14A ,":ould not be govcnied or controlled bys. '19 (!)

(a} of the Slum: AcL · · · E ·

, __

. '

..

Jt was; however, ;ul:imitted that s. 14A of the Rent act dealt

with a sp·ec~il contingehcyfor which .a. different procCdure had been

provided ii1 the m~der of evicting tenants by the 'landlords iii bccu­

pation of preni.i;es allotted by the Central. Governine~t or any local

authority. This was• to .enable them to get their dwn resid~ntia!'

accommodation so ,that thby would be. in a position to vacate· ,the

premises alloted to them by the Centrai.Government., It was coriten-·,

F •,

-. ..

'. ded that as. the·. Central GJvernment · a11d persons. in occupation as·

tenants pf premises provid~d. by Central Govern.men! were a dhss by

themselves, section 14 A could be taken as a. special provision but

1.4 (I) (e) of the Act could nrit.be ~levated to .that pedestal. We are

no"t able to· accept this 'ilrgument. .. It was open to the legislature to

pick out

'one

class of landlords out of the 'se~eral covered by .s. 14'

· · . (1) (e) of the ·Rent act so long is they formed· a class by themselues

and legislature

was free·to provide the benefit of a special procedure to ,them in .the matter of e.vi6tion o'(their ,tenants is long }he legisl;i-

' .

. ' ,· " .

,G

H

A

B

c

D

,

E

F

G

H

.'

..

I

, 622 SUPREME COURff REPORTS, [1984] 2 $.C.R.

' - ' ' ..

6on had art object to achieve and the ,specaiJ procedure had a reas-·

onaple naxm with such object to be secured.·

r ' ' '. . . • ' ' ,,. . I .

Despite.the ingenius and attractive arguments of Mr, Tarkunde,

it

seems to us

tha~ the distinction made by the learned counsel bet­

ween ss, 14 (l) (e) ~nd 14 A ·is really a distinction without any

difference. Moreover, the

newly

added sections, viz., ss, J4A, 25(AJ,

25 (B) and 25 (C) do constitute parts of a special scheme and have

the effect of makin,g the Sulm Act inapplicable. fo view 'of the

pronouncement of this Court as referred t<;> above, it is impossible

to accede to the contention advanced on behalf of the tenants. In

Kewal Singh's case (supra), a decision to which one of us was a

·party (Fazal Ali, J.), this Court observed as follows~

' '

'

"The Act actually re_plac\d the Ordinance which was promul-

gated on Jst December, 1979, The objects and reasol)s clearly

reveal that the amendme,nt has been made or simplifying the

procedure for evictio'n of tenants in case the landlord requires

the premises bona

fide for his

per.son'al occuration, It -is a

' matter of comm·on knowledge that even though the landlord

may have an in1n1ediate and imperative necessity for. vacating

the house given to a tenant he , is compelled• to resort to the

time consuming and dilatory procedure of a suit,:wb:ich takes

· years before the landlord is able to obtain the 'tiecree and in

most cases· by the tfm,e the d'cree is p~sscd either the landlord

dies or the need disappears and the landlord is completely ,

deprived of getting any relief. It appears to ns that it was for

thes~ reasons that the legislature in.its wisdom thought that a

short ancl. simple procedure should be provided for those land-

' '

· lords who generally want the ·premises ,for their bona fide

necessity so that they may be.able to get' quick and expec.itious

relief. ... , . The landlords having personal necessity have been

-' -' ~ ~

brought together as a separate class because of thei1' special

needs and .such a classification cannot be said to be unreaso­

nable, particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that

. tl:ie landlords should get this reli_ef as quickly as possible

·Thus taking an overall picture of the situation, the circu~­

stanccs under.which the ~landlord's needs have been calssified

and the safeguards

given by the statute it cannot be said by

~

.

·~

...

'y

,

r.

'

-..·

-

....

. -

RAVI DUTT, i:: RATAN LAL (Faza/ Ali, J.)

.. " · ..

-~·· 623

any stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub-s~cti~

. ons are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,

or that section 29 B suffers from,.t}le vice of excessive delega-

• ' · 1· -· · I

tion of powers. In fact section 29 B contain• valuable

and sufficient guldclines'which completely exclude the exercise

of uncanalised or arbitrary power~ by the Rent Co~troller: .

· .. ti' . -

..

-The .ratio ofcthis case reinforces ih~ ruie laid down in Sa~waii

Singh'/case'sµpra and in Vlnod ·Kumar Chowdhry v. "Naraill Devi·

Taneja,11

1

it .was clearly pointed out that wheneyer there . was ·any

conflict·

b.etween.

section 29A and 'any .other provision of law. ·s.' 29

A was to override and prevaiL Here again one of . us (Fazal Ali, J.)

observed; ' ' · · · · '

~.·The non-obstant.e cl~use occurring in sect.ion ·29 A . makes it

quite c,Lear that whenever there is a conflict between the provi-

sions of Chapter III A on the one hand and those of the re&t

· of' the Act or qf any other law foi the ti;,,e bein,g irl force o.n

the other, the ·former shall prevail:" · ·

" ·, I

·D

' '

It is; therefore, clear frDm_ the' new provisipn in the Amending .

. Act thatrthe procedure indicated tj1er.,in was intended to have ovej,-/ .

riding effect and ·au procedural laws weri: to give way 'to the new .E

proceclure. 'Applioations ·under. s.; 14 (I) (e), theref9re, clearly fell

within

the

protective umberlla of the new procedure in Chapter IIIA.

.An iden\ical view has been tak'en by ,the· ·oelhi High. Court

tn the cdse of · Smt. Krishna ·Devi· Nigam & .Ors. v. Shyam }Jabu,

Gupta & O~s., '•' In this decision it has been clearly held that.the pro-

. . . . .. -

visions of s. 29A carniot be controlled by the provmons of the Slum

Act. We fully · app-rov" and endors~ the ratio· laid down in that

decision as it is in conformity with 'the consistent ·opinion of this

.Court.' .,, •

, .

On a consideration, therefor~. of the 'ract~ and· ~irc1imsta~Ces

'of tho case and .the ,law referred to' above, we' reach ·the fo)lowing

·_/

conclusions :

·. ' (I) [19801 2 S.C.R. 747 ..

(2)

0

AIR.1980 Dellii 1~5!

' '

.·~

F

G

. )

;

A

c

D

E

F

G

H

-.

624

"

(1)

I

.

· SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 S.C.R.

That sections 14A, 25A, 1513 and 2SC of the Rent Act

are special pmvisions so far: as the landlord and tena1

are concerned

and in

view of the non-obstante clause

thes,6 .provisions woul.d override. the existing law so far

. as the new· procedure i's concerned;.

(2) · That there is no difference either on principle or in law .

, between sections. 14(1) (e)and !4A of the Rent Act even·

though these two provisions rebte to tenants under diffe­

rent situations;

- 'f'

(3) ·That ihe procedure incorporated. in .Chapter lllA of the

(4)

Amending Aci into the. Rent Act is in ,public interest and

1s not violativ,e.of Article 14 of the Constitution;

I . -

That in'view of the ·procedure in Chapter ITTA of the

Rent Act, the Slum Act· is rendered inapplicable to the

extent

of inconsistency a'nd it is !lot,

therefore, necessary

. for the landlord to obtain permission of th.e Competent·

Authority u~det s. 19 (I) (ii)·of the Slum Act before insti­

tuting a suit for 'eviction and coming· withins. 19(1) (e)

flt •· '

or 19A of the-Rent Act. · -.

' ~

We are: therefore; of the opinion 'that the High Cour.t i\-as

correct in rejecting applications of the tenants for setting rs'de. the.

order of•_eviction. The appeal is a~cordingly dismssed but without

~any. order as to· coSts ..

'

As. a result of o:ir decision, the special leave petition has to

be dismissed. In both these.cases time to hcate the premises i~1exten­

ded till June 30, i 984, subject to filing ~f the usual undertaking with­

in four weeks· from today failing which the landlords shall be free to

· a1k for possession forthwith through the 'executing court.·

'N.V.K. Appeal & /'etition dismissed.

..

' '

..

' .... ·.

"4··

Reference cases

Description

Clash of Statutes: Supreme Court on Delhi Rent Control Act vs. Slum Clearance Act

The landmark Supreme Court judgment in Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava provides a definitive analysis of the conflict between the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956. This pivotal ruling, fully accessible on CaseOn, settles the critical question of whether a landlord must obtain prior permission from the Slum Authority to evict a tenant for bona fide personal need, especially after the introduction of a special, expedited procedure in the Rent Control Act.

Case Background: A Landlord's Long Road to Eviction

The case involved a tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, who had occupied the premises since 1945. The property was located in an area designated under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 ('Slum Act'). The landlord, Ratan Lal Bhargava, initially sought permission from the Competent Authority under Section 19 of the Slum Act to sue for eviction. This application was dismissed, and the dismissal was upheld on appeal.

Undeterred, the landlord later filed an eviction suit in April 1979, this time under the newly introduced summary procedure outlined in Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('Rent Act'). The tenant's application for leave to defend the suit was rejected, and an eviction order was passed. This order was subsequently upheld by the High Court, leading the tenant to appeal to the Supreme Court.


The IRAC Analysis of the Judgment

Issue: The Core Legal Questions Before the Court

The Supreme Court was tasked with resolving two primary legal issues:

  1. Is prior permission from the Competent Authority under Section 19(1)(a) of the Slum Act mandatory for a landlord to institute an eviction suit under the special procedure of the Delhi Rent Control Act?
  2. Are Sections 25A and 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, which establish a summary procedure for eviction, ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution and inconsistent with the provisions of the Slum Act?

Rule: The Governing Laws and Precedents

The Court's decision hinged on the interpretation and interplay of several key statutes and constitutional principles:

  • Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956: Section 19 mandates that no person can institute a suit for eviction of a tenant from a property in a slum area without the prior permission of the Competent Authority.
  • Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:
    • Section 14(1)(e): Allows a landlord to seek eviction on the grounds of bona fide personal requirement.
    • Chapter IIIA (Sections 25A, 25B, 25C): Introduced by a 1976 amendment, this chapter lays down a special, summary procedure for eviction suits filed under Section 14(1)(e) and 14A. It contains a non-obstante clause, giving it overriding effect over other laws.
  • Constitution of India, 1950: Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law and prohibits unreasonable classification.
  • Legal Precedents: The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti and Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal, which had dealt with similar questions of statutory conflict and constitutional validity.

Analysis: The Supreme Court's Reasoning

Legislative Intent and the Need for Speed

The Court began by examining the 'Statement of Objects and Reasons' behind the 1976 amendment that introduced Chapter IIIA into the Rent Act. It noted that the legislature's dominant object was to provide a speedy, expeditious, and effective remedy for a specific class of landlords who genuinely needed their premises back for personal use. The standard eviction process was notoriously slow, often taking years and rendering the eventual decree useless if the landlord's need had passed or they had died. The new summary procedure was designed to cure this mischief.

This nuanced distinction between legislative goals can be complex. For legal professionals on the go, CaseOn.in offers 2-minute audio briefs that break down the core reasoning of rulings like Ravi Dutt Sharma, making it easier to grasp these critical legal principles during a busy day.

Resolving the Clash of Non-Obstante Clauses

The central conflict was between two laws, both containing non-obstante clauses (clauses that state the provision overrides other laws). The Court applied a well-established principle of statutory interpretation: when two special laws conflict, the later one will prevail. The Slum Act was enacted in 1956, while Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act was introduced in 1976. The legislature, being fully aware of the Slum Act's requirements, consciously chose to give the new procedure an overriding effect. Therefore, the provisions of Chapter IIIA of the Rent Act must prevail over Section 19 of the Slum Act in cases of eviction for bona fide need.

Upholding Constitutionality Under Article 14

The Court dismissed the argument that Sections 25A and 25B were unconstitutional. It held that the classification of landlords seeking eviction for bona fide personal necessity was a reasonable one. Such landlords form a distinct class, and providing them with a special, faster procedure has a clear and rational nexus with the legislative object of providing quick relief. The Court affirmed that it is permissible for the legislature to create different procedures for different classes of litigants, provided the classification is not arbitrary. Withdrawing a part of the protection afforded by the Rent Act did not amount to discrimination, as the tenant's common law rights were still preserved.

Conclusion: The Final Verdict

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and the special leave petition, holding that the High Court was correct in its decision. The Court laid down the following clear conclusions:

  1. Sections 14A, 25A, 25B, and 25C of the Rent Act are special provisions with an overriding effect due to their non-obstante clause.
  2. The procedure under Chapter IIIA is in the public interest and does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution.
  3. In view of the special procedure in the Rent Act, the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of the inconsistency.
  4. Therefore, a landlord instituting a suit for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) or 14A of the Rent Act is not required to obtain prior permission from the Competent Authority under Section 19 of the Slum Act.

Why This Judgment is an Important Read

For lawyers and law students, Ravi Dutt Sharma v. Ratan Lal Bhargava is a masterclass in statutory interpretation. It is essential reading for understanding:

  • The 'Later Law Prevails' Doctrine: How courts resolve conflicts between two special statutes with competing non-obstante clauses.
  • Legislative Intent: The importance of analyzing the 'Objects and Reasons' of an amendment to understand its purpose and scope.
  • Constitutional Validity: How to analyze challenges to a law based on Article 14, focusing on the principles of reasonable classification and rational nexus.
  • Landlord-Tenant Law: It clarifies a crucial procedural aspect of eviction law in Delhi, specifically the relationship between the Rent Act and the Slum Act.

Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on any specific legal issue.

Legal Notes

Add a Note....