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CASE NO.:

Appeal (civil) 1704 of 2007

PETITIONER:

Ravi Khullar and another

RESPONDENT:

Union of India and others

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/03/2007

BENCH:

B.P. SINGH & ALTAMAS KABIR

JUDGMENT:

JUDGMENT

(Arising out of SLP) No.6093 of 2003)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1707 2007

(Arising out of SLP) No.6095 of 2003)

M/s. Palam Potteries \005.Appellant

Versus

Union of India and others .\005Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1705 2007

(Arising out of SLP) No.6384 of 2003)

Hari Chand and another \005.Appellants

Versus

Union of India and others .\005Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1706 2007

(Arising out of SLP) No.8574 of 2003)

Punjab Potteries \005.Appellant

Versus

Union of India and others .\005Respondents

B.P. SINGH, J.

Special leave granted.

In the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6093 of 2003;

6095 of 2003 and 6384 of 2003 the appellants have impugned the

common judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated

February 13, 2003 disposing of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 2672 of

1996 ; 1851 of 1986 and 2003 of 1986.

In the appeal arising out SLP ) No. 8574 of 2003, M/s.

Punjab Potteries has assailed the judgment and order of the High

Court of Delhi in C.W.P. No.2168 of 2003 dated 26th March,

2003.

The High Court dismissed all the writ petitions preferred by

the appellants herein.

A few broad facts may be noticed at the threshold to

appreciate the contentions urged on behalf of the parties in these

appeals.

A Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act

(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was issued by the Lieutenant

Governor of Delhi on January 23, 1965 for acquisition of lands

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measuring 6241 bighas 12 biswas in village Mahipalpur which was

required for a public purpose, namely - Planned Development of

Delhi. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act relating to 4759

bighas 1 biswa was made on December 12, 1966 and another

declaration relating to 1459 bighas 18 biswas was made on December

26, 1968. Another Notification under Section 4 of the Act was

published on December 3, 1971 for acquisition of land in Village

Nangal Dewat for a public purpose, namely - Development of Palam

Airport. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made with

respect to the said lands on July 16, 1972.

The case of the appellants is that the matter remained pending

for a considerable period and it appears from various documents

which have been brought on record that the lands acquired were really

for the benefit of the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI).

Reliance is placed on a Resolution dated September 10, 1981 of the

Delhi Development Authority regarding change of land user from

"Green Belt and Agriculture Cultivable Land" to "Circulation

Airport". The Resolution recites that the Delhi Development

Authority had approved the change of land user so that the land could

be utilized for the purpose of development of the Palam Airport. This

was subject to the condition that the IAAI prepared a detailed plan

which should include the proposal for rehabilitation/resettlement of

the villagers to be affected by the proposed expansion of the Airport,

and the plan be discussed with the Municipal Corporation of Delhi

and the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking. It also appears from the

record that the notice issued under Section 9(1) of the Act on June 22,

1983 was challenged in several writ petitions filed before the High

Court in which an interim order was passed directing maintenance of

status quo with regard to possession of the lands but permitted the

acquisition proceeding to continue. Reliance has been placed on the

correspondence exchanged between the various statutory authorities

to indicate that it was really for the purpose of IAAI that the lands

were being utilised. The letter of the Land Acquisition Officer dated

July 1, 1986 indicates that IAAI had supplied details of khasra

numbers to be acquired for the expansion of the Delhi Airport which

had been discussed. A statement enclosed with the aforesaid

communication showed that the lands to be acquired were in villages

Mahipalpur, Nangal Dewat and Nangal Dewat Village abadi

measuring 69 bighas 11 biswas, which included some of the khasra

numbers belonging to some of the appellants herein. A

communication from the Secretary, Department of Civil Aviation,

addressed to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi dated September 15,

1986 emphasised the need to acquire immediately the industrial

structures in the Mahipalpur and Nangal Dewat area in the overall

interest of security and development of Delhi Airport. The IAAI was

said to be willing to accept the suggestion for provision of land for

land, provided alternative land was acquired by the Delhi

Administration/Delhi Development Authority and no further liability

was imposed on IAAI for payment of additional compensation for

acquired industrial structures.

On September 19, 1996 an Award under Section 11 of the Act

was declared by the Land Acquisition Collector.

On December 23, 1986 a Notification was issued under Section

4 of the Act for acquisition of land for a public purpose, namely for

rehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to the

expansion/development of the Palam Airport. The lands mentioned

therein are in village Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri.

Since the challenge to the acquisition failed and the appellants

were not provided alternative sites under the rehabilitation package,

they approached the High Court for relief which, as noticed earlier,

has been refused by the High Court. It will, however, be necessary to

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deal with each writ petition separately since the facts of each case are

different as also the pleas raised therein.

APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 6093 OF 2003

The appellants before us are the son and daughter of Late Balraj

Khullar. The lands in question in village Mahipalpur measuring 23

bighas and 18 biswas (approximately 5 acres) devolved upon the

appellants after the death of their father. Late Balraj Khullar had

constructed a factory over the lands in question in the year 1955

which went into production later after obtaining registration on July

27, 1960. He carried on the business of manufacture of ceramic goods

in the name and style of M/s. Pelican Ceramic Industries. On January

23, 1965 the aforesaid lands of the appellants were notified for

acquisition under Section 4 of the Act for the public purpose of

planned development of Delhi. According to the appellants, when the

factory was established and became functional, there was no Master

Plan of Delhi, which came into existence only in the year 1962 in

which the lands were shown as 'green area'. Late Balraj Khullar

objected to the acquisition but without considering his objections, a

declaration under Section 6 was made on December 26, 1968. A

notice under Section 9(1) of the Act was issued on June 23, 1983.

Upon receipt of the notice late Balraj Khullar challenged the

acquisition by filing a writ petition before the Delhi High Court, being

Civil Writ Petition No. 1550 of 1983 primarily on the ground of

inordinate delay in completing the acquisition proceeding and other

illegalities in Section 4 Notification. Notice was issued in the said

writ petition on July 26, 1983 and an interim order was passed for

maintenance of status quo with regard to possession. The interim

order dated July 26, 1983 was modified on August 30, 1983 directing

maintenance of status quo with regard to possession but the

acquisition proceedings were allowed to continue. During the

pendency of the writ petition, the award was announced on September

19, 1986 which was followed by notices under Sections 12(2) and

13(1) of the Act. The total area acquired measured 23 bighas and 18

biswas. Ultimately the writ petition filed by late Balraj Khullar was

dismissed by the High Court by its order dated December 14, 2005.

On coming to know about the dismissal of the said writ petition, the

petitioners (appellants herein) filed a special leave petition before this

Court being SLP ) No. 7821 of 1996. The same was, however,

withdrawn on a statement being made on behalf of the petitioners that

they would file a review petition before the High Court. It appears

from the special leave petition filed by the petitioners that a

contention was raised before this Court that the lands having been

acquired for the planned development of Delhi, could not be given to

the IAAI since the development of the Palam Airport was not within

the contemplation of the notification under Section 4 of the Act.

Accordingly the petitioners filed the review petition being Review

Petition No.42 of 1996 before the High Court in which several fresh

grounds were also urged but the said review petition was dismissed by

the High Court by its order of May 24, 1996 observing that the new

points sought to be raised in the review petition had not been pleaded

in the original writ petition. The High Court also rejected the

contention of the petitioners that on discovery of new facts a review

petition was maintainable. No appeal was preferred against the order

dismissing the review petition and hence the proceeding initiated by

filing of C.W.P. No. 1550 of 1983 challenging the acquisition

proceeding got a quietus by dismissal of the review petition by the

High Court. Apparently, therefore, the petitioners cannot be permitted

to challenge the same acquisition proceeding.

However, the petitioners filed another writ petition, being Writ

Petition No. 2672 of 1986 again questioning the acquisition

proceeding. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated July

4, 1996. It appears from the record that the point sought to be urged

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in the aforesaid writ petition was that the acquisition proceeding was

bad for non compliance with the provision of Chapter \026VII of the Act.

The submission proceeded on the basis that the acquisition was for the

purposes of a Company within the meaning of that term in the Act,

namely \026 the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). The

same submission has been urged before us as well.

We are of the view that the High Court was justified in

rejecting this contention. As noticed by it, the Notification under

Section 4 was issued on January 23, 1965. The public purpose for

which the acquisition was made was stated to be "planned

development of Delhi". Admittedly at the relevant time when Section

4 Notification was published, the management of the airport vested

with the Department of Civil Aviation. It cannot be denied that the

words used in the Notification, namely "the planned development of

Delhi" are wide enough to include the expansion and development of

the airport. That is also a "public purpose." Since the IAAI came

into existence much later only on December 8, 1971 and was vested

with the power to manage the airports, there was no question of the

acquisition being made for the purpose of the IAAI since that body

did not exist in the year 1965. The acquisition was for the planned

development of Delhi and, as observed earlier, the expansion and

modification of the airport is a "public purpose". It so happened that

after the constitution of the IAAI, the power of management of

airports, was vested in it and, therefore, the development work which

otherwise would have been undertaken by the concerned competent

authority in the year 1965, was to be executed by the IAAI. The

submission that the provisions of Chapter-VII of the Act were not

complied with must, therefore, be rejected because the acquisition

purported to be for the planned development of Delhi and it is no

one's case that the Notification had been issued mala fide. The

procedure laid down in Chapter-VII of the Act was not attracted since

the acquisition was not for any "Company" within the meaning of

Chapter-VII of the Act.

The High Court has also rejected the submission on the ground

that it was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. It is

not necessary for us to express any opinion on this issue, in view of

our earlier finding, but the appellants have themselves drawn the

attention of this Court to the fact that the land was being acquired for

the purpose of the IAAI as was evident from the Resolution of the

Delhi Development Authority dated September 10, 1981. The

appellants, therefore, admit that they had knowledge of the fact that

the land was to be utilized by the IAAI for its own purposes, which

according to the appellants, was not a part of the planned development

of Delhi. Such being the factual position, the father of the appellants

who filed Writ Petition No.1550 of 1983 ought to have challenged the

acquisition on the ground of non compliance with the provisions of

Chapter VII of the Act since all the relevant facts were within his

knowledge. He not having done so, we do not find that the High

Court was in error in holding that the writ petition was barred also by

the principle of constructive res judicata.

The question which survives consideration is whether in view

of the public purpose declared in the Notification under Section 4 of

the Act, the lands can be utilized for any other public purpose. While

considering this question it would be useful to remember that the

Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued in January, 1965

and the declaration made in the following year. The IAAI came into

existence in December, 1971, six years later, whereafter the task of

developing and extending the Palam Airport was entrusted to the said

authority. When the said authority was constituted, the acquisition

proceeding had already been initiated.

The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of

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the respondents submitted that having regard to the authorities on the

subject the question is no longer res integra. It is not as if lands

acquired for a particular public purpose cannot be utilized for another

public purpose. He contended that as long as the acquisition is not

held to be mala fide, the acquisition cannot be invalidated merely

because the lands which at one time were proposed to be utilized for a

particular public purpose, were later either in whole or in part, utilized

for some other purpose, though a public purpose. He, therefore,

submitted that some change of user of the land, as long as it has a

public purpose, would not invalidate the acquisition proceeding which

is otherwise valid and legal.

In Gulam Mustafa and others vs. The State of Maharashtra

and others : (1976) 1 SCC 800, this Court noticing the submission of

learned counsel for the petitioner that the excess land out of the lands

which were acquired for a country fair was utilized for carving out

plots for the housing colony, held that it did not invalidate the

acquisition. This Court observed :-

"\005..Apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public

necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has

vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no

concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for

invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by

which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because

long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose

other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration."

The same principle has been reiterated in Mangal Oram and

others vs. State of Orissa : (1977) 2 SCC 46.

In Union of India and others vs. Jaswant Rai Kochhar and

others : (1996) 3SCC 491, lands which had been acquired for public

purpose of housing scheme were sought to be utilized for a

commercial purpose, namely for locating a district center. It was

contended before this Court that since the acquisition was for a

housing scheme, the land cannot be used for commercial purposes.

The submission was rejected in the following words:-

"\005.We find no force in the contention. It is conceded by the

learned Counsel that the construction of the District Centre for

commercial purpose itself is a public purpose. No doubt it was

sought to be contended in the High Court that in a housing

scheme, providing facilities for commercial purpose is also one

of the composite purpose and that, therefore, acquisition was

valid in law. However, the contention was rejected by the High

Court. We need not go to that part. Suffice it to state that it is a

well-settled law that land sought to be acquired for public

purpose may be used for another public purpose. Therefore,

when the notification has mentioned that the land is sought to

be acquired for housing scheme but it is sought to be used for

District Centre, the public purpose does not cease to be public

purpose and the nomenclature mentioned in the notification

under Section 4(1) as housing scheme cannot be construed to be

a colourable one. The notification under Section 4(1) could not

have been quashed on the ground that the land is sought to be

used for District Centre, namely, for commercial purpose. It is

obvious that the lands acquired for a public purpose should

serve only the public purpose of providing facilities of

commercial purpose, namely, District Centre as conceded by

the learned Counsel in fairness to be a public purpose. The

notification under Section 4(1) cannot be quashed on the

ground of change of user. The High Court was wholly wrong in

quashing the notification on the ground of change of user."

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Though not directly in point, the observations of this Court in

State of Maharashtra vs. Mahadeo Deoman Rai alias Kalal and

others : (1990) 3 SCC 579 are significant to determine the approach of

courts in such matters. In that case a Notification under Section 4 of

the Land Acquisition Act was issued for the purpose of establishing a

'tonga' stand. The respondent applied for permission to raise a

construction which was denied on the ground that the land was

reserved for road widening under a Town Planning Scheme which

was being implemented. Since the respondent was prevented from

continuing with the construction work undertaken by him, he initially

field a writ petition before the High Court which was withdrawn and

subsequently filed a suit claiming damages etc. The Municipal

Council took a decision to accord permission to the respondent as

asked for, and the suit was withdrawn. When the State Government

came to know about it, it asked the Municipal Council to explain the

circumstances under which such permission had been granted. A

High Powered Committee was appointed to examine the entire matter.

The resolution of the Municipal Council granting permission to the

respondent was rescinded. Another application filed by the

respondent was kept in abeyance which compelled the respondent to

file another writ petition which was allowed by the High Court. The

plea of the Municipal Council was that it had passed a fresh resolution

inter alia deciding to re-plan the scheme with respect to the area in

question in the light of the recommendations made by the Committee.

Consequently the matter was re-opened and the objections from the

affected persons were invited. Even the respondent filed his

objections. This fact was not brought to the notice of the High Court

which allowed the writ petition. This Court, set aside the judgment

and order of the High Court and observed :-

"Besides, the question as to whether a particular Scheme

framed in exercise of statutory provisions is in the public

interest or not has to be determined according to the need of the

time and a final decision for all times to come cannot be taken.

A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given

point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become

essential to modify or substitute it by another scheme. The

requirements of the community do not remain static; they

indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life.

Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public

authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the

changing needs of the public. At the best for the respondent, it

can be assumed that in 1967 when the resolution in his favour

was passed, the acquisition of the land was not so urgently

essential so as to call for his dispossession. But for that reason it

cannot be held that the plots became immune from being

utilised for any other public purpose for ever. The State or a

body like the Municipal Council entrusted with a public duty to

look after the requirements of the community has to assess the

situation from time to time and take necessary decision

periodically. We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated 13-

2-1967 was not binding on the Municipal Council so as to

disable it to take a different decision later."

In Bhagat Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others : (1999)

2 SCC 384 this court upheld an acquisition even when the public

purpose to which the land was put was contrary to the permitted user

under the Master Plan. This Court held that the acquisition was valid

but it was for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent

authority and obtain the sanction of the said authority for change of

user. That it could do only after it got possession of the land in

question.

The learned Additional Solicitor General also relied upon the

decision of this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries vs.

Jaswant Singh and others : (2003) 1 SCC 335 wherein this Court has

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held that the High Court was not right in ordering restoration of land

to the respondents on the ground that the land acquired was not used

for the purpose for which it was acquired. It was held that after

passing of the Award and possession taken under Section 16 of the

Act the acquired land vests with the Government free from all

encumbrances. Even if the land is not used for the purpose for which

it is acquired, the landowner does not get any right to ask for

restoration of possession.

Referring to the facts of the instant case, it cannot be disputed

that the planned development of Delhi for which purpose the land was

acquired under Section 4 of the Act is wide enough to include the

development and expansion of an airport within the city of Delhi.

Thus it cannot be said that the land is actually being utilized for any

purpose other than that for which it was acquired. The only difference

is that whereas initially the development work would have been

undertaken by the D.D.A. or any other agency employed by it, after

the constitution of the IAAI, the said development work had to be

undertaken by the newly constituted authority. Thus there has been

no change of purpose of the acquisition. All that has happened is that

the development work is undertaken by another agency since

constituted, which is entrusted with the special task of maintenance of

airports. Since the said authority was constituted several years after

the issuance of the Notification under Sections 4, the acquisition

cannot be invalidated only on the ground that the public purpose is

sought to be achieved through another agency. This, as we have

noticed earlier, was necessitated by change of circumstances in view

of the creation of the authority i.e. IAAI. Moreover since there is no

change of public purpose for which the acquired land is being utilized,

the acquisition cannot be invalidated on that ground. The purpose for

which the lands are being utilized by a governmental agency is also a

public purpose and as we have noticed earlier, would come within the

ambit of the public purpose declared in Section 4 Notification.

Therefore, the acquisition cannot be challenged on the ground that the

acquired lands are not being utilized for the declared public purpose.

Having regard to the facts of the case it cannot be contended, nor has

it been contended, that the Notification under Section 4 of the Act was

issued mala fide.

We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal arising out of SLP

(C) No.6093 of 2003 and the same is accordingly dismissed.

APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) No. 6384/2003

In this appeal the lands belonging to the appellant in village

Mahipalpur were notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act

on January 23, 1965 A declaration under Section 6 followed on

December 7, 1966. Ultimately an Award was pronounced under

Section 11 of the Act on September 19, 1986. Thereafter the

appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No.2003 of 1986 before the High

Court challenging the acquisition proceeding. The High Court by the

impugned judgment and order dismissed the appeal on the ground of

delay and latches

It will be noticed that the appellants filed the writ petition

challenging the acquisition proceeding which was initiated in 1965 as

late as on September 25, 1986, after the Award had been declared

under Section 11 of the Act. The High Court, in our view, has rightly

noticed that the acquisition was challenged almost 21 years after the

issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. Indeed the

writ proceeding was initiated after the Award was declared. The High

Court has relied upon the decisions of this Court in Aflatoon vs. Lt.

Governor of Delhi : AIR 1974 SC 2077 ; Tilockchand Motichan vs.

H.B. Munshi : AIR 1970 SC 898 ; Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari

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Samiti Ltd. vs. The State of Rajasthan and others : AIR 1974 SC

2085 ; Pt. Girharan Prasad Missir and another vs. State of Bihar

and another : (1980) 2 SCC 83 and H.D. Vora vs. State of

Maharashtra and others : AIR 1984 SC 866. Following the

principles laid down therein the High Court dismissed the writ petition

on the ground of delay and latches. In the facts and circumstances of

the case no exception can be taken to the order of the High Court

dismissing the writ petition. There was no good reason explaining the

delay in moving the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It

is not necessary to refer to the large number of authorities on the

subject since the law is so well settled that there is no need for a

further reiteration.

We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is

accordingly dismissed.

CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 8574 OF 2001

The appellant in this appeal is M/s. Punjab Potteries whose

lands were notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Act on

December 3, 1971 and the declaration under Section 6 was published

on July 10, 1972. The petitioner had earlier filed a writ petition being

C.W.P. No. 432 of 1987. It appears from the order passed in the said

writ petition dated February 18, 1987 that a prayer was made for leave

to withdraw the petition. The order notices the fact that in the

aforesaid writ petition there was no prayer for mandamus directing the

respondents to allot any alternative site. It merely questioned the

acquisition and validity of the Notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of

the Act. The High Court recorded a finding that it found nothing

wrong with the acquisition so far as the validity of the Notifications

under Sections 4 and 6 was concerned. It accordingly dismissed the

writ petition as withdrawn but with liberty to file a fresh petition for

claiming any alternative site, if it had any such right. Whereafter the

petitioner filed the instant writ petition on March 7, 2003. In the

instant petition as well the acquisition proceedings were challenged

but the same was dismissed by the High Court on March 26, 2003.

The High Court noticed the order passed by the Court earlier on

February 18, 1987 and also the fact that the writ petition was being

filed after a lapse of 16 years. It did not entertain the challenge to the

Notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act since challenge

to the aforesaid Notifications stood rejected by order of February 18,

1987. It noticed the earlier common judgment delivered in the writ

petitions preferred by other appellants in this batch of writ petitions

and held that the inordinate delay in filing the writ petition

challenging the validity of the Notifications was not condonable.

It then proceeded to consider the submission urged on behalf of

the appellant that in any event it was entitled to the allotment of

alternative land in lieu of the lands acquired. The High Court after

noticing the Full Bench decision of the High Court in Ramanand vs.

Union of India : AIR 1994 Delhi 29 and the judgment of this Court in

New Reviera Cooperative Housing Society vs. Special Land

Acquisition Officer & others : (1996) 1 SCC 731 observed that if

there was a scheme promulgated by the State to provide alternative

sites to persons whose lands had been acquired, the Court could give

effect to the Scheme. However, it could not be argued as a matter of

principle that in each and every case of acquisition the land owners

must be given an alternative site because such a principle, if adopted,

would result in the State being unable to acquire any land for public

purpose. In the instant case the High Court dismissed the writ

petition in view of the fact that there was nothing on record to indicate

that any application was made to the competent authority for allotting

an alternative site within a reasonable period. Reliance placed on the

decision of the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in

Daryao Singh and others vs. Union of India and others (Civil Writ

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Petition No. 481/1982) dated 2nd August, 2001 was rightly rejected.

That case related to a different award and the land owners concerned

in that case gave up the challenge to the acquisition proceedings in

view of the assurance given that an alternative plot under the Scheme

to be formulated shall be given to them. Those facts do not exist in

the instant case. Moreover the Government had agreed to allot the

plots to the land owners and there was no question of recognizing any

right of the land owners to an allotment of alternative plots. In view

of these findings the writ petition preferred by the appellant was

rejected.

The appellants in the other appeals as well have contended that

an alternative site should be allotted to them in view of the lands

acquired. We may at the threshold notice that the Notification under

Section 4 of the Act was issued in the cases of the other appellants on

January 23, 1965. The lands were located in village Mahipalpur

which were required for the public purpose of planned development of

Delhi.

So far as the case of Punjab Potteries is concerned the Section 4

Notification was issued on December 3, 1971. It related to lands

located in Nangal Dewat acquired for public purpose, namely the

development of Palam Airport.

It was submitted by Mr. Andhyarujina, leaned senior counsel

appearing for the appellant Ravi Khullar in appeal arising out of SLP

No. 6093 of 2003 that in view of the Notification of December 23,

1986 the appellants are entitled to the benefit of rehabilitation in view

of the acquisition of their lands for the expansion/development of the

Palam airport. According to him the lands which were subject matter

of Notification under Section 4 dated January 23, 1965 for the planned

development of Delhi were owned by the appellants over which they

had been carrying on business of ceramic industries for over 15 years.

It is his contention that a Notification under Section 4 of the Act was

issued on December 23, 1986 for acquisition of lands in village

Malikpur Kohi Rangpuri measuring 713 bigha and 0.2 biswa for the

rehabilitation of those displaced or affected due to the

expansion/development of Palam airport. He, therefore, submitted

that regardless of the fact that their lands were acquired under a

different Notification than the lands of Ravi Khullar, in view of the

issuance of the Notification dated December 23, 1986, it made no

difference since all of them were displaced or affected due to the

expansion/development of the Palam airport. The generality of the

aforesaid notification could not be limited by administrative decision

to only certain beneficiaries as a matter of policy.

Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand

contended that though the matter relating to rehabilitation package

was considered, no decision was taken nor any scheme formulated for

the rehabilitation of industries. Only those displaced from village

Nangal Dewat, pursuant to the Notification under Section 4 dated

December 3, 1971 for acquisition of land for development of the

Palam airport, were to be allotted lands in village Rangpuri and that

too for residential purposes. Succinctly stated the State contended

that the acquisition of land in village Rangpuri was meant for

rehabilitation of persons from village Nangal Dewat and that too for

residential purpose, and that the other land owners, whose lands were

acquired for the planned development of Delhi could not claim such

benefit. The State has relied upon three decisions taken in this

regard.

We shall, therefore, consider the material placed on record by

the parties on the question of rehabilitation.

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The first document to be considered is a letter dated December

5, 1986 written by the Joint Director of Industries to the Deputy

Commissioner, Delhi, informing him that the position regarding

acquisition of land occupied by the industrial units in Mahipalpur-

Nangal Dewat area and providing of alternate plots to the land owners

was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary shortly. An enquiry was

made as to whether awards had been announced in respect of affected

industrial units in that area. The Deputy Commissioner was also

requested to intimate regarding the steps taken to provide alternative

lands to the affected units so that the whole position was brought to

the notice of the Chief Secretary. This letter does not refer to any

decision taken by the Government to provide alternate site. At best

the matter was to be reviewed by the Chief Secretary.

It appears that earlier a Joint Survey Report had been submitted

sometime in August, 1983 with a view to assess the needs of the

different ceramic industries located on the Mehrauli-Mahipalpur Road

which had to be shifted in view of the expansion of Palam airport. On

the basis of the survey conducted by the Committee the industries

were classified in three groups. The appellants fell in the first

category, namely \026 those who had a turnover of Rs. 15 lakhs and

above with an area of 5 acres in their possession on ownership basis.

The Committee recommended that they be allowed 25000 sq. yards

each. The Committee also made its recommendations with regard to

other two categories of industries and assessed that the total

requirement of land would be about 20.86 acres if such allotments

were to be made. It also noticed the fact that the aforesaid factories

were located over an area of 25.70 acres.

No document has been produced to show that the

recommendations contained in the said survey report were at any time

accepted by the Government. The appellants also relied upon the

letter written by the Secretary, Civil Aviation, to the Lieutenant

Governor of Delhi on September 15, 1986 wherein a view was firmly

expressed that in the over all interest of security and development of

Delhi Airport, the industrial structures in Mahipalpur and Nangal

Dewat area need to be acquired immediately. The letter also stated

that the IAAI will be willing to accept the suggestion for provision of

land for land, provided alternative land is acquired by the Delhi

Administration/D.D.A. and no further liability is imposed on them for

payment of additional compensation for the acquired industrial

structures. Though this letter records the willingness of the IAAI to

provide land for land subject to the condition that it shall incur no

additional liability for payment of compensation for the acquired

industrial structures, it does not refer to any firm decision taken in this

regard.

Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for the

appellant in Punjab Potteries also placed reliance on a decision of the

High Court of Delhi dated August 2, 2001 in CWP No. 481 /1982 :

Daryao Singh (supra) and submitted that the aforesaid judgment

supports the case of the appellants that the lands acquired in village

Rangpuri were meant for rehabilitation of the persons displaced from

village Nangal Dewat, such as the appellants. As noticed earlier, the

High Court has considered this decision and distinguished the same on

the ground that it related to another award. Moreover a mere perusal

of the judgment discloses that the plea of the petitioners before the

High Court was that they were not interested in challenging the

acquisition but they were only interested in allotment of an alternative

piece of land for the purpose of their residence. In reply counsel

appearing for the respondents stated that for allotment of land to the

persons whose lands had been acquired a scheme was being

formulated. Such persons whose names appear in the Award shall be

allotted land in terms of the Scheme within 6 months. In this view of

the matter the writ petition was dismissed.

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It will be seen that in the aforesaid writ petition the question of

rehabilitating an industrial unit did not come up for consideration. So

far as the allotment of residential site is concerned, counsel appearing

for the respondents submitted before us that if the appellant was

eligible for allotment in terms of the scheme formulated for the

purpose, it could as well have asked for allotment of alternative site,

but the appellant was not interested in allotment of alternative plot for

residence. Its demand was that a site should be given to it for

establishing an industry, which was not contemplated under the

scheme. There is substance in the contention of the respondents that

so far as the aforesaid decision goes it only related to allotment of

alternative sites for residence of the displaced persons and not for

relocation of an industry. The respondents on the other hand relied on

atleast 3 documents and contended that at no time any decision was

taken to allot alternative sites with a view to relocate the displaced

industrial units.

The first document is the Minutes of the Meeting held by the

Lieutenant Governor of Delhi on June 16, 1982 to consider issues

connected with acquisition of lands in village Nangal Dewat etc. for

the International Airport Authority of India (IAAI). At the meeting

were present the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and officers of the

concerned department; the Vice Chairman of the Delhi Development

Authority and its officers as also the representatives of the Municipal

Corporation of Delhi; Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation and

IAAI. The relevant part of the Minutes reads as under :-

"After further discussions, Lt. Governor directed

that in the special circumstances obtaining in Delhi, there

was no alternative to IAAI undertaking t he responsibility

for the rehabilitation of the village abadi. The cost of

rehabilitation would have to be borne by IAAI over and

above the compensation to be paid by them for the land

and structures. International Airport Authority of India

would also bear the cost of acquiring, if necessary, the

alternative area where the abadi would be shifted. The

cost of rehabilitation would include provision of

developed and serviced plots to the residents and also

provision for community facilities such as schools, tube

wells, electricity, community hall and dispensaries etc.

However, the cost of construction of houses would be

borne by the villagers themselves. Lt. Governor felt that

early selection of the alternative plots where the village

abadi would be shifted and announcement of the facilities

to be offered, would be helpful in inducing people to shift

to the new site. This would be the responsibility of Delhi

Administration.

It was pointed out that there were other villages in

the neighbourhood where there were certain other

industrial structures. The owners of these industrial

structures would not be provided any assistance beyond

what they may be entitled to by way of the usual

compensation under the Land Acquisition Act."

It would thus appear that after considering all aspects of the

matter, the IAAI was burdened with the cost of rehabilitation of the

displaced persons from the village abadi, meaning thereby to provide

them land for residence over which the villagers could construct

houses at their own cost. So far as industrial structures are concerned,

it was clearly decided that the owners of industrial structures would

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not be provided any assistance beyond what they may be entitled to as

compensation under the Act.

The second document is the letter of April 16, 1986 written to

the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration which refers to a meeting

held on April 4, 1986 wherein it was decided that a site may be

selected for shifting the residents of village Nangal Dewat. The letter

discloses that the site had been selected in village Rangpuri and the

same may be acquired on priority basis so that the village abadi may

be shifted to this alternative site. This letters also refers to the

rehabilitation of villagers displaced from village Nangal Dewat and

for the purpose of providing them an alternative plot for residence.

The last document on which reliance has been placed by the

respondents is of August 21, 1991 which is the Minutes of the

Meeting held in the room of the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration

on July 30, 1991 regarding acquisition of land for IAAI. The Minutes

disclose that the representatives of the various departments put

forwards their points of view and though the Delhi Administration

suggested that the agency for which the land was being acquired

should pay not only for the land but also for meeting cost of

rehabilitation of the concerned industrial units, the Ministry of Civil

Aviation, Government of India, was not agreeable to pay any amount

over and above the cost of land and super-structures. Paragraph 3.1

of the Minutes is relevant which reads as follows :-

"Reverting to the specific question of acquiring

land under the above said five industrial units the Chief

Secretary remarked that linking obligation of re-location

with the acquisition of their land would not be advisable

as neither DDA nor Delhi Administration could

undertake such an obligation especially as units were

now required to shift out of UT of Delhi. The Delhi

Administration could at best assist in the allotment of the

land by the concerned states. The affected units should

therefore be discouraged from expecting any special

concession. At the same time it would be necessary for

the IAAI to pay rehabilitation cost to these units and not

merely the cost of acquisition of land and super

structures. He advised the Land Acquisition Collector to

keep this in view while determining award for

acquisition. The LAC said that award in 4 of the cases

had already been announced. The Chief Secretary

advised the LAC that in case it was not possible to revise

the award the LAC should determine the additional

compensation on above lines and intimate t he same to

IAAI. He also advised the IAAI representatives that in

case they wanted this land urgently they should be

prepared to pay the said additional cost."

The documents relied upon by the respondents do establish that

though at different stages the question of rehabilitation of the affected

persons as a result of the acquisition was considered, no firm decision

was ever taken to rehabilitate the industries affected thereby. The

decision taken was only to provide alternative sites for residentce of

the oustees from village Nangal Dewat in village Rangpuri. The

proposal to allot lands for setting up the displaced industrial units was

always turned down and it was decided that owners of such industries

would only be entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition

Act. Having regard to the material on record we are satisfied that no

scheme was ever framed for rehabilitation of industrial units. The

scheme was framed only for the affected villagers of village Nangal

Dewat and that too for residential purpose alone.

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Learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged before us

that the land in village Rangpuri is still available and even if the three

industries with which we are concerned in the instant batch of appeals

are allotted land to the extent of 25,000 sq. yards each, as

recommended in the Joint Survey Report, their purpose will be served.

We are afraid we cannot accede to the request because that is a matter

of policy and it is for the government to take appropriate decision in

that regard. In law we find no justification for the claim that even in

the absence of a scheme for rehabilitation of displaced industries

alternative sites should be allotted to them for relocating the industrial

units. It is no doubt true that the acquisition of land in village

Rangpuri by issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act on

December 23, 1986 was for the public purpose, namely \026 for

rehabilitation of the persons displaced or affected due to the

expansion/development of the Palam airport. Learned counsel

appearing for the State contended that this public purpose has been

achieved and the persons who were displaced from village Nangal

Dewat in view of the acquisition of their lands for the development of

Palam airport have been allotted plots in village Rangpuri for their

residence. There is nothing in the Notification which obliges the State

to provide equal alternative site to the industries for their

rehabilitation.

We find substance in the stand of respondents.

CIVIL APPEAL ARISING OUT OF SLP ) NO. 6095 of 2003

In this appeal apart from other questions which have been

raised in this batch of appeals, a question of limitation has been raised.

It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the award made by the

Collector in the instant case was barred by limitation under Section

11A of the Act inasmuch as it was not made within a period of 2 years

from the date of the publication of the declaration after excluding the

period during which an order of stay granted by the High Court

operated. The facts are not in dispute and since this plea became

available to the appellant only after the dismissal of the writ petition

by the High Court, we permitted the appellant to raise this plea after

giving an opportunity to the respondents to reply to the same. Since

the facts are not in dispute, we proceed to decide the question of

limitation in this appeal.

It is not in dispute that the Notification under Section 4 of the

Act was issued on January 23, 1965. A declaration under Section 6 of

the Act was published on December 26, 1968. The appellant filed the

writ petition before the High Court on September 12, 1986 in which

an order for maintenance of status quo was made on September 18,

1986. It is the case of the respondents that in view of the status quo

order the award could not be pronounced. While the awards were

pronounced in other cases on September 19, 1986, it was not

pronounced in the case of the appellant in view of the status quo

order. The High Court by the impugned judgment dismissed the writ

petition filed by the petitioner on February 13, 2003 whereafter the

award was pronounced on March 1, 2003.

We may notice that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,

1984 came into force w.e.f. September 24, 1984.

Keeping in view these dates it will be seen that award ought to

have been made within a period of 2 years from the date of the

publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. However, in

a case where the said declaration was published before the

commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 the

award must be made within a period of two years from such

commencement. This is the mandate of Section 11A of the Act. In

the instant case the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was

published on December 26, 1968 i.e. before the commencement of the

Amendment Act of 1984. Thus the proviso to sub-section (1) of

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Section 11A applied and the award was required to be made within a

period of two years from such commencement. So calculated the

award ought to have been made on or before the 23rd September, 1986

when the period of 2 years from the commencement of the

Amendment Act, 1984 expired. It is not disputed that an order of

status quo was made on 18th September, 1986 which prevented the

Land Acquisition Officer from pronouncing the award. The aforesaid

order of status quo operated till February 13, 2003 which period, as

rightly submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General, had to

be excluded in calculating the period of 2 years. Thus after excluding

the aforesaid period the award should have been pronounced on or

before February 18, 2003. However, the award was pronounced on

March 1, 2003. Ex facie, therefore, the award having not been made

within the period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act, the entire

proceeding for acquisition of the land lapsed on February 18, 2003,

the last date for pronouncement of the award.

The learned Additional Solicitor General, however, submitted

that the judgment in the writ petition was pronounced on February 13,

2003 and an application was made for certified copy of the same on

February 14, 2003. The certified copy was ready on February 27,

2003. It is his contention that the period between February 14, 2003

and February 27, 2003 must be excluded and if that period is

excluded, time to make the award was available upto March 4, 2003

whereas the award was pronounced on March 1, 2003. He submitted

that the period taken by a public authority to obtain the authentic copy

of the order, which is evidence of the contents thereof, must in all

cases be excluded and the period taken to obtain a certified copy

cannot cause any prejudice in the matter of calculation of the period of

limitation. Since the Land Acquisition Officer, who is a public

functionary, had to look into the contents of the order passed by the

court before taking any action including the pronouncement of the

award, the said period ought to have been excluded. In effect the

learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the rule

incorporated in Section 12 of the Limitation Act must apply in

computing the period of limitation under Section 11A of the Act. He

also relied on judgments of this Court reported in N. Narasimbhaiah

and others vs. State of Karnataka and others : (1996) 3 SCC 88 ;

General Manger, Department of Communications vs. Jacob : (2003)

9 SCC 662 ; and Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari and others

: AIR 1969 SC 575. He submitted that since the authority had taken

immediate steps in applying for certified copy and since the

explanation to Section 11A prescribed a principle of limitation, it is

necessary that analogous principles contained in the Limitation Act

must necessarily be applied. Applying the principle underlined under

sub-section (1) of Section 11 A of the Act read with Sections 76 and

77 of the Indian Evidence Act and also based on the principle actus

curaie neminem gravabit, the period during which the certified copy

was not obtained has to be excluded.

Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on

behalf of the intervener also reiterated the same submission and

contended that the Land Acquisition Officer could not have proceeded

to make the award unless he had seen the authenticated copy of the

order which had the effect of vacating the order of status quo passed

as an interim measure.

Learned counsel for the appellants on the other hand contended

that Section 11A of the Act does not provide for extension of time to

make an award or condonation of delay in making the award. Though

it provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or

proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an

order of the court, it does not exclude the time taken for obtaining a

certified copy of the judgment or order vacating or having the effect

of vacating the order of stay. He further submitted that the Land

Acquisition Collector was a party in the writ petition and had,

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therefore, knowledge of the fact that the writ petition had been

dismissed which resulted in vacation of the interim order of status

quo. In the absence of any provision in the Land Acquisition Act for

exclusion of time taken to obtain a certified copy of the judgment of

the High Court, the Land Acquisition Collector, ought to have

proceeded to make the award having come to know that the writ

petition filed by the appellant had been rejected by the High Court.

In the matter of computing the period of limitation three

situations may be visualized, namely \026 (a) where the Limitation Act

applies by its own force ; (b) where the provisions of the Limitation

Act with or without modifications are made applicable to a special

statute ; and (c) where the special statue itself prescribes the period of

limitation and provides for extension of time and or condonation of

delay. The instant case is not one which is governed by the provisions

of the Limitation Act. The Land Acquisition Collector in making an

award does not act as a Court within the meaning of the Limitation

Act. It is also clear from the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act

that the provisions of the Limitation Act have not been made

applicable to proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act in the

matter of making an award under Section 11A of the Act. However,

Section 11A of the Act does provide a period of limitation within

which the Collector shall make his award. The explanation thereto

also provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or

proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an

order of a court. Such being the provision, there is no scope for

importing into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act the

provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The application of

Section 12 of the Limitation Act is also confined to matters

enumerated therein. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy of

the judgment is excluded because a certified copy is required to be

filed while preferring an appeal/revision/review etc. challenging the

impugned order. Thus a court is not permitted to read into Section

11A of the Act a provision for exclusion of time taken to obtain a

certified copy of the judgment and order. The court has, therefore, no

option but to compute the period of limitation for making an award in

accordance with the provisions of Section 11A of the Act after

excluding such period as can be excluded under the explanation to

Section 11A of the Act.

Our conclusion finds support from the scheme of the Land

Acquisition Act itself. Section 11A of the Act was inserted by Act 68

of 1984 with effect from 24.09.1984. Similarly, Section 28A was also

inserted by the Amendment Act of 1984 with effect from the same

date. In Section 28A the Act provides for a period of limitation

within which an application should be made to the Collector for

re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the

award of the Court. The proviso to sub-section 1 of Section 28A

reads as follows:-

"Provided that in computing the period of three months

within which an application to the Collector shall be

made under this sub-section, the day on which the

award was pronounced and the time requisite for

obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded."

It will thus be seen that the legislature wherever it considered

necessary incorporated by express words the rule incorporated in

Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It has done so expressly in

Section 28A of the Act while it has consciously not incorporated this

rule in Section 11A even while providing for exclusion of time under

the explanation. The intendment of the legislature is therefore

unambiguous and does not permit the Court to read words into

Section 11A of the Act so as to enable it to read Section 12 of the

Limitation Act into Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act.

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The judgments cited at the Bar are also of no help to the

respondents. In Shakuntala Devi Jain (supra) this Court held that an

appeal is incompetent unless the memorandum of appeal is

accompanied by a certified copy of the decision. It condoned the

delay in that case giving the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation

Act in the facts and circumstances of the case. The applicability of

the Limitation Act was not in dispute in that case.

In N. Narasimhaiah and others (supra) the order under Section

17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act dispensing with the enquiry under

Section 5-A was quashed by the court with liberty to the State to

proceed further in accordance with law. In such circumstances it was

held that running of the limitation should be counted from the date of

the order of the court received by he Land Acquisition Officer. The

limitation prescribed in clause (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section

(1) of Section 6 would apply to publication of declaration under

Section 6(1) afresh. If it was published within one year from the date

of the receipt of the order of the court by Land Acquisition Officer,

the declaration published under Section 6(1) would be valid. The

principle laid down therein does not help the respondents because by

an order of the court the limitation prescribed for publication of a

declaration under Section 6(1) stood extended. That is how this Court

construed the order of the High Court giving liberty to the State to

proceed further in accordance with law. In the instant case no such

question arises. The situation that arises in the instant case is fully

governed by the provisions of Section 11A of the Act which does not

give any discretion to the court to exclude any period in computing

limitation other than that provided in the explanation to Section 11A

of the Act.

In General Manager, Department of Telecommunications

(supra) a question arose as to whether the High Court by directing the

passing of the award by certain date, irrespective of the provisions

contained in the Act, could prevent the Collector from passing an

award at any time beyond the specified date. In that case the facts

were that the High Court had directed the passing of the award by

December 3, 1992 irrespective of the provisions contained in the Land

Acquisition Act. This was done with a view to avoid further delay

and ensure expeditious conclusion of the proceedings. This Court

found that there was nothing to indicate in the order of the High Court

stipulating or extending the time for passing the award, that beyond

the time so permitted, it cannot be done at all and the authorities are

disabled once and for all even to proceed in the matter in accordance

with law, if it is so permissible for the authorities under the law

governing the matter in issue. This Court held that the court cannot be

imputed with such an intention to stifle the authorities from exercising

powers vested with them under statute, or to have rendered an

otherwise enforceable statutory provision, a mere dead letter. This

Court considered the decision in N. Narasimhaiah and others (supra)

and observed :-

"This decision is of no assistance whatsoever to

the respondents in the present case. Notwithstanding the

statutory period fixed, further time came to be granted

due to intervention of Court proceedings in which a

direction came to be issued to proceed in the matter

afresh, as directed by the Court, apparently applying the

well-settled legal maxim - Actus curiae neminem

gravabit : an act of the Court shall prejudice no man. In

substance what was done therein was to necessitate

afresh calculation of the statutory period from the date of

receipt of the copy of the order of the Court. Granting of

further time than the one stipulated in law in a given case

as a sequel to the decision to carry out the dictates of the

Court afresh is not the same as curtailing the statutory

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period of time to stultify an action otherwise permissible

or allowed in law. Consequently, no inspiration can be

drawn by the respondents in this case on the analogy of

the said decision."

In our view the principle laid down in this judgment is of no

help to the respondents and if at all it supports the contention of the

appellant that the period of limitation prescribed cannot be curtailed

by order of the Court. As a necessary corollary it cannot be extended

contrary to the statutory provisions. We have, therefore, no doubt in

holding that so far as the acquisition of the lands belonging to Palam

Potteries is concerned, the proceedings lapsed for failure of the

Collector to make an award within the prescribed period of limitation

under Section 11A of the Act.

Before parting with this matter we may notice the fact that in

the award made by the Collector three khasra numbers belonging to

the appellant were not included. It was, therefore, submitted before us

that in any view of the matter the acquisition proceedings in relation

to those 3 khasra numbers must lapse. This was indeed not contested

by the respondents. However, in view of the fact that we have

reached the conclusion that the acquisition proceeding as against the

lands of the appellant lapsed for failure to make an award within the

period prescribed by Section 11A of the Act, this aspect of the matter

lose its significance.

In the result Civil Appeals arising out of SLP ) Nos.

6093/2003; 6384/2003 and 8574 of 2003 are dismissed. Civil Appeal

arising out of SLP ) No. 6095 of 2003 is allowed and it is declared

that the award made by the Collector on March 1, 2003 was barred by

limitation prescribed by Section 11A of the Act and as such the

acquisition proceeding in relation thereto lapsed on February 18,

2003, which was the last date for making the award. Parties shall bear

their own costs.