HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

* * * *

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 4452/2017

Between:

Ravilla Veeraswamy Naidu & 2 others

..... PETITIONERS

AND

Kondala Venkataiah

....RESPONDENT

DATE OF ORDER RESERVED : 27.07.2026

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 15.10.2026

DATE OF ORDER UPLOADED : 15.10.2026

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers

may be allowed to see the Judgments?

Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

marked to Law Reporters/Journals

Yes/No

3. Whether Your Lordship wishes to see the

fair copy of the Judgment?

Yes/No

_____________________________________

PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI,J

2

* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

CHINTALAPUDI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 4452/2017

% 15.10.2026

# Ravilla Veeraswamy Naidu & 2 others

……petitioners

And:

$ Kondala Venkataiah

…. respondent

!Counsel for the petitioners : Sri G. Ramesh Babu

^Counsel for the respondent : Sri K. Mohan Rami Reddy

<Gist:

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. (2020) 19 SCC 80

2. (2018) 11 SCC 208

2. (2004) 3 SCC 85

3. 2007 (3) ALT 416

4. 1993 (1) ALT 26

5. 2002 SCC OnLine AP 128

6. Order dated 28.07.2022 in W.P.No.13459 of 2022

7. 2018 SCC OnLine Cal 4497

8. AIR 2006 Raj 119

9. 2002 SCC OnLine P&H 274

Date of reserved for orders : 27.07.2026

Date of pronouncement : 15.10.2026

Date of uploading : 15.10.2026

APHC010130212017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE 15

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 4452/2017

Between:

1. RAVILLA VEERASWAMY NAIDU AND 2 OTHERS, S/O.VENKAMA

NAIDU AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS DOOR NO.144, BUCHINAIDU

KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

2. RAVILLA NAGABHUSHANAMMA, W/O. RAVILLA VEERASWAMY

NAIDU DOOR NO.144, BUCHINAIDU KANDRIGA VILLAGE &

MANDAL CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

3. RAVALLA SUBHA CHANDRA, S/O.RAVILLA VEERASWAMY NAIDU

AGED ABOUT 38 YEAR'S ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF DOOR NO.144,

BUCHINAIDU KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR

DISTRICT.

1. KONDALA VENKATAIAH, S/O.SUBBAIAH R/O

KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR DISTRICT

Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the

circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be

pleased to against the order dt. 18/08/2017 passed in IA.no. 1473 of 2016 in

3

Date of reserved for orders : 27.07.2026

Date of pronouncement : 15.10.2026

: 15.10.2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE 15

th

DAY OF OCTOBER 2026

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

CHINTALAPUDI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 4452/2017

RAVILLA VEERASWAMY NAIDU AND 2 OTHERS, S/O.VENKAMA

NAIDU AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS DOOR NO.144, BUCHINAIDU

KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

RAVILLA NAGABHUSHANAMMA, W/O. RAVILLA VEERASWAMY

NAIDU DOOR NO.144, BUCHINAIDU KANDRIGA VILLAGE &

L CHITTOOR DISTRICT.

RAVALLA SUBHA CHANDRA, S/O.RAVILLA VEERASWAMY NAIDU

AGED ABOUT 38 YEAR'S ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF DOOR NO.144,

BUCHINAIDU KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR

...PETITIONER(S)

AND

KONDALA VENKATAIAH, S/O.SUBBAIAH R/O . BUCHINAIDU

KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR DISTRICT

...RESPONDENT

Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the

circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be

pleased to against the order dt. 18/08/2017 passed in IA.no. 1473 of 2016 in

PRADESH

[3606]

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

RAVILLA VEERASWAMY NAIDU AND 2 OTHERS, S/O.VENKAMA

NAIDU AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS DOOR NO.144, BUCHINAIDU

RAVILLA NAGABHUSHANAMMA, W/O. RAVILLA VEERASWAMY

NAIDU DOOR NO.144, BUCHINAIDU KANDRIGA VILLAGE &

RAVALLA SUBHA CHANDRA, S/O.RAVILLA VEERASWAMY NAIDU

AGED ABOUT 38 YEAR'S ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF DOOR NO.144,

BUCHINAIDU KANDRIGA VILLAGE & MANDAL CHITTOOR

...PETITIONER(S)

. BUCHINAIDU

...RESPONDENT

Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, praying that in the

circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein, the High Court may be

pleased to against the order dt. 18/08/2017 passed in IA.no. 1473 of 2016 in

4

O.S.No.95 of 2011 on the file of the Prl. Junior Civil Judge's Court,

Srikalahasthi

IA NO: 1 OF 2017(CRPMP 5845 OF 2017

Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated

in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to

STAY all further proceedings in O.S. No. 95 of 2011, on the file of the

Principal Junior Civil Judge's Court, Srikalahsthi and pass such other or

further orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the

circumstances of the case.

Counsel for the Petitioner(S):

1. G RAMESH BABU

Counsel for the Respondent:

1. K MOHAN RAMI REDDY

The Court made the following:

5

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR

CHINTALAPUDI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 4452 OF 2017

ORDER:

This Civil Revision Petition is directed against the order dated

18.08.2017 passed by the learned Principal Civil Judge (Junior

Division), Srikalahasti, in I.A. No. 1473 of 2016 in O.S. No. 95 of

2011, dismissing the petitioners’ application to club O.S. No. 95 of

2011 with O.S. No. 80 of 2016.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned counsel

for the respondent.

3. The petitioners are the defendants in O.S. No. 95 of 2011, and the

respondent is the plaintiff therein.

Brief facts of the case:

4. The petitioners, who are the defendants in O.S. No. 95 of 2011, filed

an application seeking to club that suit with O.S. No. 80 of 2016. They

stated that the respondent had filed O.S. No. 95 of 2011 seeking a

permanent injunction against them in respect of the plaint ‘B’

Schedule property in Survey No. 250/2. The respondent claimed to

have purchased the property from Yachamaneni Subba

Lakshmamma, Yachamaneni Bhageswari, V. Leelavathi and

Jayachandra.

5. The petitioners/defendants, on the other hand, claim the ‘B’ Schedule

property under a registered sale deed dated 01.10.2015, allegedly

executed by the legal heirs of Subbarama Naidu, son of late Venkata

Subba Naidu. According to the petitioners, the respondent had earlier

filed O.S. No. 95 of 2011 on the basis of a registered sale deed

despite having no title to, or possession of, the suit schedule property.

6

6. The third defendant, Sri Ravalla Subha Chandra, allegedly purchased

the petitioners’ ‘B’ Schedule property and filed O.S. No. 80 of 2016

before the same Court, seeking a declaration in respect of the

property and a consequential permanent injunction. The petitioners

contend that the third defendant purchased the property from its

lawful owner after the institution of O.S. No. 95 of 2011. As both suits

concern the same property, the petitioners sought to have them

clubbed and adjudicated together.

7. The respondent filed a counter denying the averments in the affidavit.

He contended that the evidence in O.S. No. 95 of 2011 had been

completed, whereas evidence in O.S. No. 80 of 2016 had not yet

commenced. He alleged that the latter suit had been filed with an

oblique motive. Since the evidence on both sides in O.S. No. 95 of

2011 had been completed and the suit had reached the final stage, he

argued that clubbing the suits would delay its disposal. He therefore

sought dismissal of the application on the ground that the suits were

at different stages.

8. After hearing both sides, the learned Judge dismissed the application,

observing that the two suits were at different stages.

9. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners have filed the present Civil

Revision Petition.

Arguments:

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that both suits concern

the same property, namely, the ‘B’ Schedule property in O.S. No. 95

of 2011 and the corresponding property in O.S. No. 80 of 2016. He

contended that separate adjudication could lead to multiplicity of

proceedings and conflicting judgments. According to him, the dispute

would not be effectively resolved unless both suits were tried together

and decided on merits. He submitted that the learned Judge failed to

consider this aspect and erroneously dismissed the application.

7

11. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the application for

clubbing on the ground that the suits were at different stages. He

submitted that O.S. No. 80 of 2016, filed by the third petitioner, was

instituted later and would require considerable time for the recording

of evidence. The respondent’s claim to ownership in O.S. No. 95 of

2011, therefore, should not be held up. He further contended that the

parties to the suits were different and that no prejudice would be

caused. He accordingly sought dismissal of the Civil Revision Petition.

12. The ‘B’ Schedule property in O.S. No. 95 of 2011 and the property

described in O.S. No. 80 of 2016 are one and the same, and both

sides claim rights over that property on the basis of documents.

13. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned

counsel for the respondent and perused the record.

Analysis:

14. The present revision arises from the order dated 18.08.2017, by

which the learned Judge dismissed I.A. No. 1473 of 2016 in O.S. No.

95 of 2011. The application sought to club O.S. No. 95 of 2011, filed

by the respondent, with O.S. No. 80 of 2016, filed by the petitioners’

third defendant.

15. The impugned order of the learned Judge is extracted hereunder:

“****

Heard the both. This matter is pertaining to the pre-2011

and this suit at the stage of arguments and clubbing of this

matter with O.S.80/2016 may cause delay and both matters

are not at the same stage. Hence, this petition is closed in the

interest of justice.

****”

16. The impugned order does not set out the parties’ contentions or

disclose cogent reasons. The learned Judge observed that one suit

had reached the stage of arguments, while the other was at an initial

8

stage, and that clubbing them might delay the older suit instituted in

2011. However, the learned Judge did not examine the commonality

between the suits or consider whether their consolidation was

necessary. The application was dismissed solely because the suits

were at different stages.

17. The fact that the suits are at different stages, by itself, is not a

sufficient ground to reject an application for consolidation. The Court

must examine the common questions arising for consideration and

the nature of the subject matter involved.

Legal Position:

18. It is appropriate to refer to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, this Court and other High Courts on the consolidation

of suits.

Hon’ble Apex Court:

19. In B. Santoshamma v. D. Sarala

1

, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

that suits may be clubbed for hearing and disposal by a common

judgment for practical convenience. Such clubbing does not merge

the suits into a single action; each suit retains its separate identity.

The object is to save time and costs, avoid repetition of proceedings

and prevent conflicting judgments. Paragraph 91 is extracted below:

“91. Since we have upheld the dismissal of Suit No. 92 of 1993

filed by the appellant against Pratap Reddy, it is not really

necessary to go into the question of whether the said suit was

barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code as

contended by Mr Navare. It is true that, the clubbing of suits for

hearing them together and disposal thereof by a common

judgment and order is for practical reasons. Such clubbing

together of the suits does not convert the suits into one action

as argued by Mr Navare. The suits retain their separate identity

as held in Mahalaxmi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Ashabhai

1

(2020) 19 SCC 80

9

Atmaram Patel [Mahalaxmi Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v.

Ashabhai Atmaram Patel, (2013) 4 SCC 404, para 41 : (2013) 2

SCC (Civ) 636] . The clubbing together is done for convenience,

inter alia, to save time, costs, repetition of procedures and to

avoid conflicting judgments.”

20. In Kazimunnisa v. Zakia Sultana

2

, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held

as follows:

“26. First, we find that the trial of the two cases before the

Special Court was not satisfactory inasmuch as when

admittedly two LGCs (Nos. 41 of 1994 and 50 of 2004) arising

between the same parties and in relation to the same piece of

suit land were filed for grant of identical reliefs under the Act

then, in our view, both the cases should have been clubbed

together for their disposal on merits in accordance with law to

avoid any conflicting decision in both the cases.

27. It was more so when both the cases were capable of being

clubbed together because both were pending though filed one

after the other, neither the parties nor the courts below took

note of this with the result, the same resulted in passing two

conflicting orders—one was decreed and the other suffered

dismissal. This recourse adopted by the court below caused

prejudice to the parties and, especially, to the party who lost

the case.

28. Indeed, in our view, this was an appropriate case where

the provisions of Order 2 Rule 3 of the Code, which deals with

joinder of causes of action, could have been resorted to by the

Court suo motu for clubbing the two cases as the facts

involved in both the cases satisfied the attributes of Order 2

Rule 3 of the Code.”

21. In Chitivalasa Jute Mills v. Jaypee Rewa Cement

3

, the Hon’ble

Supreme Court held that, although the Code of Civil Procedure does

not expressly provide for consolidation of suits, the Court may order

consolidation in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151

CPC. Unless expressly prohibited, the civil Court may pass such

2

(2018) 11 SCC 208

3

(2004) 3 SCC 85

10

orders as are necessary to secure the ends of justice or prevent

abuse of its process. Paragraph 12 is extracted below:

“12. The two suits ought not to be tried separately. Once the

suit at Rewa has reached the court at Visakhapatnam, the two

suits shall be consolidated for the purpose of trial and

decision. The trial court may frame consolidated issues. The

Code of Civil Procedure does not specifically speak of

consolidation of suits but the same can be done under the

inherent powers of the court flowing from Section 151 CPC.

Unless specifically prohibited, the civil court has inherent

power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends

of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.

Consolidation of suits is ordered for meeting the ends of

justice as it saves the parties from multiplicity of proceedings,

delay and expenses. Complete or even substantial and

sufficient similarity of the issues arising for decision in two

suits enables the two suits being consolidated for trial and

decision. The parties are relieved of the need of adducing the

same or similar documentary and oral evidence twice over in

the two suits at two different trials. The evidence having been

recorded, common arguments need to be addressed followed

by one common judgment. However, as the suits are two, the

court may, based on the common judgment, draw two different

decrees or one common decree to be placed on the record of

the two suits. This is how the trial court at Visakhapatnam

shall proceed consequent upon this order of transfer of suit

from Rewa to the court at Visakhapatnam.”

High Court of Andhra Pradesh:

22. In Boddula Rajesham v. Mahmooda Begum and Others

4

, this

Court observed as follows:

“7. Admittedly the subject-matter of both the suits is one and

the same and the parties to both the suits are also common.

As a matter of fact, cause of action for O.S. No. 147 of 2006

arose during the pendency of O.S. No. 56 of 2000 on account

of the alleged dispossession. However, the request of the

defendant/Revision Petitioner for clubbing the suits for joint

trial was rejected by the Court below only on the ground that

4

2007 (3) ALT 416

11

since O.S. No. 56 of 2000 is one of the identified matters in

which the trial was already closed in the year 2005, the

clubbing of the suits would unnecessarily delay the

proceedings.

8. Having considered the entire material on record and having

regard to the fact that the parties to both the suits are common

and the suit schedule property is also one and the same, I am

of the opinion that it would be appropriate to decide both the

matters together to avoid not only conflicting decisions but

also to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. It is true that the

disposal of O.S. No. 56 of 2000 would be delayed, but

clubbing of both the suits is essential to decide the rival claims

effectively and it cannot be said that any prejudice would be

caused to any of the parties by adopting such procedure.”

23. In Nalamati Latchanna v. Masina Sriramulu

5

, the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh held that consolidation may be ordered where the

parties and issues are common or substantially similar, in order to

avoid multiplicity of proceedings and the possibility of conflicting

decisions. However, consolidation may not be appropriate where suits

instituted by the same plaintiff arise from distinct and independent

transactions and no possibility of conflicting decisions exists.

24. In Mangali Satukuri Anjaiah v. Nethi Rajaiah

6

, the High Court of

Andhra Pradesh held that the Court’s power under Section 151 CPC

to consolidate suits, club them or direct a joint trial cannot be doubted.

25. In M/s Mahaveer Enterprises v. NSOFT India Services Pvt. Ltd.

7

,

the High Court of Karnataka held that, although clubbing suits is a

matter of convenience, the Court has ample power under Section 151

CPC to avoid separate trials and potentially inconsistent judgments.

26. In Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v. Impressions

8

, the Calcutta High

Court held that even where the issues are not identical, it may be just

5

1993 (1) ALT 26

6

2002 SCC OnLine AP 128

7

order dated 28.07.2022 in W.P.No.13459 of 2022

8

2018 SCC OnLine Cal 4497

12

and convenient to try suits together if the same evidence and

witnesses are required to prove the respective issues. Such a course

saves time and expense. The Court has inherent power under Section

151 CPC to direct consolidation.

27. In Anurag & Co. v. Additional District Judge

9

, the Rajasthan High

Court laid down certain considerations relevant to the consolidation of

suits. Paragraph 28 is extracted below:

“28. The upshot of aforesaid discussion of judgment is that

some of the relevant circumstances for consolidating the civil

suits are as follows:-

(i) The parties are substantially the same.

(ii) Complete or even substantial and sufficient similarity of the

issues arising for decision in two suits.

(iii) Common evidence is to be led, if parties are substantially

the same; if only one party is common, then burden of proof of

facts in issue will be on different persons and no common

evidence can be led.

(iv) The consolidation in the aforesaid circumstances will fulfil

the object of consolidation. Any other circumstance may be

relevant; then also the object of consolidation will be decisive

for passing appropriate order.”

28. In Nand Kishore v. Ram Dev

10

, the Punjab and Haryana High Court,

while considering the power under Section 151 CPC, held that

consolidation may be necessary to do complete justice where the

subject matter of two suits is identical and separate trials may result in

contradictory judgments.

29. Consolidation of suits serves the ends of justice by reducing

multiplicity of proceedings, delay and expense. Where the issues

arising for decision are wholly or substantially similar, the suits may

be consolidated, thereby avoiding the need to adduce the same or

similar oral and documentary evidence in separate trials.

9

AIR 2006 Raj 119

10

2002 SCC OnLine P&H 274

13

30. After recording the evidence, the Court may hear common arguments

and deliver a common judgment. Since the suits retain their separate

identities, the Court may draw separate decrees or, where

appropriate, one common decree for placement on the records of

both suits.

31. The principles emerging from the above decisions may be

summarised as follows:

i. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contains no specific

provision expressly providing for consolidation of suits and a

joint trial; consolidation is adopted as a matter of convenience

and in the interests of justice.

ii. The Court may order consolidation in exercise of its inherent

powers under Section 151 CPC.

iii. Consolidation may prevent multiplicity of proceedings and

conflicting judgments and may save time and expense.

iv. One of the principal objects of consolidation is to avoid

conflicting judgments.

v. Where the causes of action and issues in two or more suits are

substantially similar, the Court may exercise its power under

Section 151 CPC to consolidate them.

32. The Court may also consider the principles stated in Chitivalasa

Jute Mills’s case, including the following:

i. The cause of action relied on by one party for the relief sought

in one suit forms the basis of the defence in the other suit.

ii. The issues arising for decision in the suits are substantially

common.

iii. The same oral and documentary evidence is required to

determine the questions of fact and law arising in both suits.

33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that separate trials may result

in duplication of evidence and may lead to two judgments containing

inconsistent findings.

34. In addition, the Court may consider the following circumstances:

14

i. Whether the parties to the suits are substantially the same.

ii. Whether the cause of action in the later suit arises from the dispute

involved in the earlier suit.

iii. The subject matter of the suits and the rights and claims asserted by

the parties.

iv. Whether the issues arising for decision are common.

v. Whether deciding one suit separately may affect or defeat the claims

in the other suit without affording the affected party an effective

opportunity to establish its case.

35. These considerations are illustrative. The Court must decide each

application having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

36. In the light of the above legal position, it is necessary to consider the

facts of the present case.

37. Two suits are pending before the same Court. O.S. No. 95 of 2011

was filed by the respondent against the petitioners, while O.S. No. 80

of 2016 was filed by Revalla Subha Chandra against Kondala

Venkataiah and Setti Munaiah.

38. In O.S. No. 95 of 2011, the plaintiff seeks to restrain the petitioners

from interfering with his possession of the plaint ‘B’ Schedule

property.

I. Parties in both suits

Particulars O.S.No.95 of 2011 O.S.No.80 of 2016

Plaintiff Kondala Venkataiah Revalla Subha Chandra

Defendant No.1

Revalla Veeraswamy

Naidu

Kondala Venkataiah

Defendant No.2

Revalla

Nagabhushanamma

Setti Munaiah

Defendant No.3 Revalla Subha Chandra —

15

II. Schedule Properties and Boundaries

Details

O.S.No.95 of

2011 – Plaint

A

O.S.No.95 of

2011 – Plaint B

O.S.No.80 of

2016 – Item

No.1

O.S.No.80 of

2016 – Item

No.2

Description

Terraced

house, old

Door No.2-3,

new Door

No.2-86,

Assessment

No.456, B.C.

Colony

Chittoor District,

Buchinaidu

Kandriga Village,

Vacant site;

used for

tethering cattle,

manure, hayrick

and agricultural

implements

Survey No.

250/2;

Site adjacent to

Item No.2

Survey No.

250/2;

Vacant site

claimed to

correspond to

Plaint B of

O.S.No.95 of

2011

39. The property common to both suits is the vacant site described as

the ‘B’ Schedule property in O.S. No. 95 of 2011.

40. In O.S. No. 95 of 2011, the plaintiff/respondent claims title to the

property on the basis of a registered sale deed allegedly executed in

his favour on 05.09.2005 by Yachamaneni Subba Lakshmamma, her

daughters Yachamaneni Bhageswari and V. Leelavathi, and her son

Jayachandra. He states that he constructed a terraced house on the

property, described as the ‘A’ Schedule property. According to him,

the ‘B’ Schedule vacant site is appurtenant to the house and is used

for tethering cattle, storing manure and keeping hay for cattle.

41. The respondent states that he could not construct a compound wall

around the ‘B’ Schedule vacant site. He claims to have been in

possession of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ Schedule properties since purchasing

them in 2005. According to him, neighbouring owners who had no

right or title began interfering with his possession of the ‘B’ Schedule

property when he attempted to erect a compound wall. He therefore

filed the suit for a permanent injunction.

16

42. The third petitioner, who is the plaintiff in O.S. No. 80 of 2016, claims

that the vacant site described as the ‘B’ Schedule property in O.S. No.

95 of 2011 belongs to the petitioners. It is pleaded that the petitioners’

family owns a house site in Survey No. 250/1, purchased by the father

of the third petitioner, namely, the first petitioner, from Kalathuru

Gunnaiah under a sale letter dated 30.09.1986.

43. It is further pleaded that the first petitioner occupied the second item

of the plaint schedule and used it for tethering and maintaining cattle.

Certain persons subsequently claimed title to Items 1 and 2 of the

schedule property, following which the first petitioner allegedly

purchased those items under an oral sale in 1987. Thereafter, the

respondent filed O.S. No. 95 of 2011 for a permanent injunction,

disputing the petitioners’ claim. The pleas concerning the sale letter,

the alleged oral sale and the subsequent registration of a sale deed

during the pendency of O.S. No. 95 of 2011 are matters for

appreciation at trial.

44. The above facts indicate that the parties are neighbours and have

houses in the adjoining areas. The disputed vacant site lies between

their properties, and both sides assert rights over it. In O.S. No. 95 of

2011, the respondent alleges that the petitioners are interfering with

his possession of the ‘B’ Schedule property. In O.S. No. 80 of 2016,

the petitioners allege that the same property belongs to them and that

the respondent is interfering with their possession. Thus, both sides

claim rights over the same vacant site.

45. Although the parties to the two suits are not identical in every

respect, the contesting parties are substantially the same, and both

sides assert rights over the same vacant site. In O.S. No. 95 of 2011,

the cause of action is the alleged interference by the petitioners with

the respondent’s possession. In O.S. No. 80 of 2016, the cause of

action is the alleged interference by the respondent with the

17

petitioners’ possession of the same site, arising in the background of

O.S. No. 95 of 2011.

46. These circumstances indicate that the subject matter of both suits is

substantially common. The documents relied on by the parties and

the rival claims arising from them will require consideration in both

suits. Both proceedings concern competing claims over the same

vacant site.

47. The learned Judge did not discuss these aspects and dismissed the

application because the suits were at different stages. Though one

suit had reached an advanced stage, that circumstance did not relieve

the Court of its responsibility to consider the dispute in its entirety.

48. Both suits are pending before the same Court, and the later suit

specifically refers to O.S. No. 95 of 2011. The causes of action and

issues therefore appear to be interconnected, and the learned Judge

ought to have considered that circumstance. Although clubbing the

later suit may delay the disposal of O.S. No. 95 of 2011, that fact

alone does not preclude the Court from exercising its power to

consolidate the suits.

49. While deciding O.S. No. 95 of 2011, the trial Court would have to

examine the parties’ asserted rights over the vacant site on the basis

of their respective documents. A decision in one suit may materially

affect the parties’ rights in the other and may effectively determine

interconnected claims without affording the parties an opportunity to

have those claims adjudicated together. Separate trials may also

result in conflicting findings.

50. The Court may take into account that one suit has reached an

advanced stage and that the application for consolidation was made

later. However, the need for speedy disposal cannot, by itself,

override the duty to do substantial justice. The Court must consider an

18

application for consolidation on the facts and circumstances of the

particular case, keeping the ultimate object of substantial justice in

view.

51. In the present case, both parties assert rights over the same disputed

vacant site. The causes of action and the evidence appear to be

substantially interconnected. The following circumstances favour

consolidation:

(i) The cause of action in the later suit arose against the background of the

dispute already raised in O.S. No. 95 of 2011.

(ii) Both suits concern the same vacant site, over which the parties assert

rights under their respective documents.

(iii) Determination of the parties’ rights would require consideration of

documents and witnesses relating to the suit schedule properties.

(iv) The contesting parties are substantially the same.

(v) The parties claim through persons who are alleged to be common

owners of the schedule property.

(vi) Separate trials may result in conflicting findings concerning the same

disputed property and may affect the adjudication of the other suit.

52. The learned Judge ought to have considered these aspects and the

applicable legal principles and passed a reasoned order. As the

impugned order does not disclose reasons for rejecting the

application, it is liable to be set aside.

Conclusion:

53. Applying the above legal principles to the facts of the present case,

I am of the view that the suits require consolidation. The mere fact

that one suit has reached an advanced stage is not sufficient to reject

consolidation when the subject matter and issues are substantially

common. The Court may use the procedural powers available to it to

expedite the joint proceedings; it should not deny substantial justice

solely on the ground of delay.

19

54. For the reasons stated above, the impugned order, which does not

consider the rival claims or apply the relevant legal principles, cannot

be sustained. This Court finds a material irregularity warranting

interference under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The

impugned order is therefore liable to be set aside.

Result:

55. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order dated

18.08.2017 passed in I.A. No. 1473 of 2016 in O.S. No. 95 of 2011 on

the file of the learned Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division),

Srikalahasti, is set aside, and I.A. No. 1473 of 2016 is allowed. O.S.

No. 95 of 2011 and O.S. No. 80 of 2016, pending before the said

Court, shall stand consolidated and shall be tried together.

56. The learned trial Judge shall proceed with the joint trial of both suits

and dispose of them as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with

law.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Consequently, any miscellaneous applications pending in this revision

shall stand closed.

Any interim orders granted in this revision stand vacated.

______________________________________

PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI, J

Dt: 15.10.2026

DSV

Whether the order is:

Speaking Reasoned √

Reportable √ Non-Reportable

20

51

HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE PURUSHOTTAM KUMAR CHINTALAPUDI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 4452 OF 2017

Dated: 15.10.2026

DSV