As per the case facts, the appellant purchased land, a portion of which had been previously acquired by the State. The appellant faced interference from authorities, leading to a civil ...
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3636 OF 2022
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 19035 OF 2021]
REDDY VEERANA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3637 OF 2022
[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 5500/2022]
NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY …APPELLANT
VERSUS
REDDY VEERANA AND OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
1.Leave granted.
2.The present Civil Appeals arise out of the judgment dated
28.10.2021, passed by High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 2272 of
1
2019 filed by appellant Reddy Veerana (copetitioner), by
which, the High Court intervened in the award of
compensation dated 31.01.2011, passed by Additional
District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) for acquired land of
appellant, admeasuring 2.18.00 bighas of Khasra Nos. 422
and 427, situated in village Chhalera Bangar and disposed
off the petition.
3.Assailing the said order, both the parties are before this
Court. Briefly stated, facts are that vide sale deed dated
24.04.1997, appellant alongwith two others purchased the
scheduled property land in Khasra No. 422 admeasuring 3
bighas 9 biswas and in Khasra No. 427 admeasuring 2
bighas 4 biswas and 10 biswansi (i.e., total of 13757.8 sq.
meters) in village Chhalera Bangar, Gautam Buddh Nagar
district for a total sale consideration of Rs. 1,00,00,000/
(One crore only). However, through the prior land acquisition
proceedings in year 19791980, a portion of the purchased
land to the extent of 1 bigha 5 biswas 15 biswansi in Khasra
No. 427 and 1 bigha in Khasra No. 422 was acquired by
State. Thus, the property which remained unacquired with
the appellant was 2 bigha 18 biswa 10 biswansi (i.e. total of
2
7400 sq. meters) in both the aforesaid khasra numbers (in
short be called as scheduled piece of land).
4.As is borne out of the record, pursuant to purchase of land
by appellant, since early 2000s, employees of NOIDA were
interfering with the peaceful possession of the appellant
(landowner), which resultantly led into Civil Suit No.
416/1998 being filed by appellant for permanent injunction
against NOIDA, with a prayer to not interfere with the
possession. For the purpose to demonstrate the utility and
value of land, the averments made in the written statement
filed by NOIDA interalia categorically contended, were as
thus:
“…..the land in dispute is situated in the centre of
development of authority and the use of land has
been prescribed to be used for commercial.
Therefore, this land is very costly. Since………the land
of village Chhalera Bangar under the provisions of Section
2 of Act No. 6 of 1976 is declared as industrial area and
construction on this land without the permission of
defendant is illegal.”
(emphasis supplied)
5.The Trial Court, after due deliberation on the contentions
raised by both the parties, vide order dated 16.02.2000,
partly decreed the suit in favour of appellant (Reddy
3
Veerana) herein and restrained NOIDA from taking
possession of land which was not the subject matter of the
prior acquisition in year 19791980. Further, the Court also
declared the appellant as the owner of the remaining portion
of land of Khasra No. 422 and 427 which was purchased
vide sale deed as mentioned earlier.
6.Being aggrieved by aforesaid order, NOIDA preferred Civil
Appeal No. 61 of 2020 before District Judge, which also
came to be dismissed vide order dated 30.03.2001 with
certain observations made in the following manner –
“The lower court has not committed any error in decreeing
the suit of permanent injunction of plaintiff produced in
regard to the land admeasuring 020900 bigha of Khasra
no. 422 and land admeasuring 000910 bigha of Khasra
No. 427 of village Chhalera Bangar, Tehsil Dadri, District –
Gautam Buddh Nagar against appellant. The
defendant/appellant even now is free to acquire the
remaining land of the aforesaid Khasra Nos. but
until and unless the land is not acquired, till then
the decree of permanent injunction issued by the
lower court shall remain applicable.”
(emphasis supplied)
The judgment and decree granting permanent injunction
passed by District Judge, confirming the order of Trial Court
has not been assailed and therefore, it has become final.
4
Moreover, despite the decree of permanent injunction being
operative, NOIDA in the year 2003 floated a tender for
development of large piece of land including the remaining
piece of land of Khasra No. 422 and Khasra No. 427 which is
the subject matter of this case. The said tender was widely
advertised by NOIDA in various newspapers and
subsequently, nine reputed developers including MGF,
Unitech, Sun City, Sahara India and Omex purchased the
bid documents. It was a known fact that out of the large
piece of the land, the scheduled piece of land was in dispute
and hence, all the reputed developers abstained from
bidding for the tender. Be that as it may, on the closing date
of tender i.e. 9.03.2004, only one tender on behalf of
respondent No. 7 herein, i.e., M/s DLF Universal Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as DLF) was received and evaluated
by Technical Committee, whereafter, respondent No. 7
quoted the rate and qualified in the said tender.
Consequently, the large piece of land as mentioned above
was allotted to DLF vide order dated 12.04.2004, including
the scheduled piece of land for which, the decree of
permanent injunction was in operation.
5
7.After the allotment of land to respondent No. 7, a
preliminary notification dated 02.09.2005 was issued by
NOIDA under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the
‘Land Acquisition Act, 1894’ (hereinafter referred to as 1894
Act), followed by a notification dated 22.11.2005 under
Section 6 of the 1894 Act, to acquire the scheduled piece of
land measuring 0.7400 hectare in Khasra No. 422 and 427
at village Chhalera Bangar, Dadri, NOIDA. The possession of
the scheduled piece of land was taken on 20.01.2006 as per
order passed by Additional District Collector (Land
Acquisition) Noida.
8.The aforesaid notifications were challenged by the appellant
before High Court of Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ
Petition No. 75152 of 2005 and Civil Miscellaneous Writ
Petition No. 70088 of 2006. As per interim orders of the High
Court in the aforesaid petitions, Revenue Inspector visited
the scheduled piece of land on 05.08.2008 and in his report
noted as under –
“In accordance to the spot, the land of Khasra No. 422 and
427 which in present has been converted in Sector 18 in
regards to demarcation, has no identification spot
because the NOIDA authority has been fully
6
developed and in absence of any fixed identification,
demarcation of land is not possible.”
The High Court vide order dated 10.12.2009 disposedoff the
matter and held as under –
“Perusal of record shows that the notification under
Section 4 of the Act was issued on 2.9.2005 and in this
notification under Section 4 of the Act a direction was also
issued under Section17(4) of the Act to the effect that the
provision of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply. A
notification under Section 6 of the Act as contained in
Annexure No. 2 to the instant writ petition was issued on
22.11.2005 and the urgency clause was invoked under
Section 17(1) of the Act.
Mr. S.D. Kautilya, learned counsel for the petitioners made
a statement at bar that the petitioners do not press the
relief claimed in the instant writ petitions and only pray
that their compensation be determined and be paid to
them in accordance with law and also keeping in mind the
Judgement of High Court of Uttaranchal rendered in
Bhopendra Singh and others Vs. Awas Vikas Parishad
and others, reported in 2005(2) Uttaranchal Decision, 295.
According to him this statement is being made keeping in
mind the Commissioner's report that the land cannot be
demarcated and the petitioners cannot get back the land.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, but
without prejudice to the merits of the case, the writ
petition is disposed of with the direction to the
SLAO to determine the compensation according to
law as laid down in the judgement rendered in
Bhopendra Singh and others (Supra). The payment
of the compensation shall be made preferably within
a period of one month. However, it is further provided
that if as per policy of NOIDA any land is to be given to the
petitioners, same shall be expedited for rehabilitation of
the petitioner. Writ petition is disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)
7
It may not be out of context to state that, the appellant (land
owner) gave the concession before the Court in view of the
observation made by Revenue Inspector in the report that the
land was fully developed by NOIDA and demarcation was not
possible. Therefore, the direction for determination of
compensation as per the judgment rendered in the case of
‘Bhopendra Singh and Others Vs. Awas Evam Vikas
Parishad and Others, 2005 (2) Uttaranchal Decision,
295; MANU/UC/0270/2005’ was only prayed.
9.Being aggrieved, NOIDA challenged the aforesaid judgment
in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 2019620197 of 2010
(later admitted and converted into Civil Appeal No. 731732
of 2013). During the pendency of the aforesaid appeal, this
Court vide order dated 10.01.2011, issued notice while
observing that ‘in the meanwhile, there shall be stay of
operation of the impugned judgment and order dated
10.12.2009 passed by High Court’. It is the specific case of
the appellant (landowner) that NOIDA did not even inform
the Court about passing of award under Section 11 of the
1894 Act during the pendency of the said appeal.
8
10.Be that as it may, after almost delay of 5 years, an award
dated 31.01.2011 was passed by Additional District
Magistrate (Land Acquisition), NOIDA, Gautam Buddh
Nagar, under Section 11 of 1894 Act. In the said award, the
compensation was determined by the authority in the
following manner –
“…… a decision was reached in the meeting on the basis
of general acquisition process to pay them compensation
at the rate of Rs. 181.87 per square yard on the basis of
sell letter dated 04.02.2005 for the land sold in village
Sadarpar of this circle, whose borders touch the borders of
village Chhalera Bangar against the land sold in village
Chhalera three years before the advertisement of this Act
on 02.09.2005 under Section 4(1), 17 and were not found
suitable for getting compensation, the approval of which
was given by Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut
through his official letter No. 452/891/200406 dated
18.01.2006.”
Regarding the pending litigation before this Court, the award
dealt with the same as under –
“With reference to the disposal of Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No. 75152/2005 – Vishnu Pradhan Vs. NOIDA & Ors.,
Hon. High Court of Allahabad on 10.12.2009 ordered to
dispose the compensation on the basis of minimum
determined circle rate by the District Collectors as per the
order passed by the Hon. High Court, Uttaranchal, against
the petition filed for compensation, determination and
payment by Bhopendra Singh and Others Vs. Resident
Development Council and Others, but against the orders of
Hon. High Court, a Special Petition No. CC 20196
20197/2010 was filed in the Hon. Supreme Court of India
9
by Naveen Okhla Udyog Vikas Pradhikaran, Noida versus
Vishnu Pradhan and others, in which the enforcement
of the orders of Hon. High Court dated 10.12.2009
was stopped on 10.01.2001 . Due to the postponement
order issued by Hon. Supreme Court of India, the
determined rate of Rs. 181.87 per square yard remains
effective for the uncontracted lands as per the decision
taken in the said meeting convened under the
chairmanship of District Collector, Gautam Buddh Nagar
and the decision of acquired land will be taken on this
basis only.”
Finally, the award was passed in following terms subject to
the decision of this court and compensation was computed
as under –
“Therefore, for the 0.828 ha, land acquired by New Okhla
Industrial Development Authority for planned industrial
development in village Chhalera Bangar, Pargana Dadri,
Tehsil Dadri, District – Gautam Buddh Nagar, the
compensation is Rs. 18,00,481.00 and 30% solatium
payable on it amounts to Rs. 5,40,144.00 and 12%
payable on the compensatory amount is Rs.
53,866.00 which amounts to a total of Rs.
23,94,491.00 (Rupees TwentyThree Lacs Ninety
Four Thousand Four Hundred NinetyOne only) and
the decision upon it is being declared today on
31.01.2011. This decision will be as per the
obedience of the order issued by the Hon. Supreme
Court of India against Special Petition No. CC
2019720197/2010 – NOIDA versus Vishnu Pradhan
and others.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, on 04.11.2015, the appeal of NOIDA before this
Court was dismissed for being devoid of merits.
10
11.It is also relevant to note that, vide order dated 04.11.2015,
this Court also dismissed the Civil Appeal No. 1107 of 2009,
which assailed the judgment of High Court of Uttaranchal in
Bhopendra Singh (supra). In view of the aforesaid order,
Deputy Chief Executive of NOIDA addressed a letter dated
11.05.2016 to Additional District Magistrate (Land
Acquisition) to comply with the order of High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad and Supreme Court of India. In the
meanwhile, the appellant herein preferred representations
before the concerned authority and thereby sought
compensation in terms of the aforesaid orders passed by this
Court, however, in vain. The District Magistrate, Gautam
Buddh Nagar on 08.01.2018, dismissed the representation
of the appellant (landowner) and observed as under –
“In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that when the matter
was pending adjudication before the Hon. Supreme Court,
then in such circumstances, the award/decision
dated 31.01.2011 was not be announced/passed by
then Additional District Magistrate (Land
Acquisition), Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagar and the
Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition),
Noida, Gautam Buddh Nagar, in the matter has to
wait for the final orders of Hon. Supreme Court . The
award/decision dated 31.01.2011 of Additional District
Magistrate (Land Acquisition) is not the compliance of
order dated 10.12.2009 passed by Hon. High Court
11
and stay order dated 10.01.2011 passed by Hon.
Supreme Court, but because this award/decision has
already been passed/declared by then Additional District
Magistrate (Land Acquisition) Noida, Gautam Buddh
Nagar, therefore, legally it is not appropriate to disposeoff
this point at the level of District Magistrate.”
Being aggrieved by the order passed by District Magistrate,
the appellant preferred Contempt Petition (C) Nos. 1841
1842 of 2018 in Civil Appeal Nos. 731732 of 2013. This
Court vide order dated 22.10.2018, dismissed the aforesaid
contempt as withdrawn and granted liberty to the petitioner
to avail appropriate remedy before the High Court.
12.In view of the order passed in Contempt Petition by this
Court, the appellant (landowner) again approached the High
Court in Writ Petition No. 2272 of 2019, wherein the High
Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 28.10.2021,
with regard to question of title of appellant on the scheduled
land, the High Court held as under –
“31.We would first be dealing with the issue as to
whether the writ petition filed by the sole petitioner
to claim compensation of land measuring 2.18.00
bighas of Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 is maintainable.
The respondents have produced a copy of the order
dated 12.09.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior
Division), Gautam Buddha Nagar to deny
acceptance of compromise and accordingly,
allegations have been made about suppression of
12
aforesaid fact. It is also that no compromise deed or
decree has been issued by the competent Court and
for that reason, one coowner of the land, namely,
Vishnu Pradhan contested the case separately to
challenge the acquisition of the land. We, however,
find that petitioner has produced a copy of the
Khatauni of Fasli Year 1407 1412 when the
land was recorded solely in the name of the
petitioner. It was pursuant to the order dated
01.09.2010 in Suit No. 2441 of 2010 under
Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1996 and
the judgment of Civil Judge (Senior Division)
dated 17.06.2010 to record entire land of
Khasra Nos. 422 and 427 in the name of the
present petitioner. A copy of the Khatauni was
submitted alongwith the supplementary
affidavit, thereby the objection on
maintainability of the writ petition in the
hands of the petitioner is not tenable rather
the petitioner became sole owner of the
property in dispute after an order under
Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act and the
judgment of the Civil Court dated 17.06.2010 .
His name was accordingly entered in the khatauni.
The respondents have ignored the subsequent
orders by which land was entered in the name of
the petitioner alone.”
Further, on the aspect of whether the schedule property was
an agriculture land or commercial land, the High Court
referred to the pleadings of respondents themselves in Suit
No. 416 of 1998 and provisions of Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Development Act, 1976, to conclude that the schedule land
13
was a commercial property and the compensation shall be
determined accordingly.
Regarding the deduction towards development charges, the
High Court held as follows –
“63.The respondents were expected to take into account
the circle rate of the land in question and thereupon
to make reasonable deductions towards the
development which may be between 20% and 50%
as per the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of
Viluben Jhalejar Contractor (supra).
64.If the proposition of law laid down by the Apex
Court in the judgment cited above is applied, then
determination of compensation should have been
made after taking the circle rate of Rs.1,10,000/
per square meter of the land in question and
thereupon to make deduction towards the
development. The development charges can be
maximum to the extent of 50% of it and accordingly
respondents should have taken Rs.55,000/ per
square meter to be the market value of the land.
65.The official respondents while doing it could have
noticed that the land was allotted to respondent
no.7 one and half years back prior to the notification
under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. It was by the
allotment letter dated 12.04.2004. The circle rate
was determined thereupon on 16.04.2004. The
allotment of land to the respondent no.7 was 8
times bigger than the land of the petitioner and it
was one and half years back. While applying the
judgment of the Apex Court, the market value
should have been taken @ Rs.55,000/ per square
meter. However, due to the interim order of the Apex
Court dated 11.01.2011 against the judgment dated
10.12.2009, the respondents did not determine the
14
compensation as per the direction given by this
Court.”
And lastly, the High Court disposedoff the petition with the
following directions –
“69.Accordingly, we find reasons to cause interference
in the award dated 31.01.2011 and direct the
respondents to determine the compensation as
under –
1.The respondents are directed to take into
consideration the circle rate of Sector – 18 since
16.04.2004 given in Annexure – 7 of supplementary
counter affidavit filed by the respondent no. 5. It
was Rs. 1,10,000/ per square meter for Sector – 18.
2.After making 50% deduction towards the
development charges, it would come to Rs. 55,000/
per square meter and accordingly the compensation
would be determined on the aforesaid rate for the
land admeasuring 2.18 bighas.
3.The addition of solatium of 30% would be made
thereupon. The amount arrived as per the direction
in paras (1) and (2) would be payable with interest
@ 9% per annum for one year from the date of
possession i.e. February, 2005 and thereupon 15%
per annum as per the Proviso to Section 34 of the Act
of 1894.
4.The amount deposited in the year 2017 would earn
interest @ 15% only till it was deposited. The
amount so deposited would be paid to the petitioner
with the interest earned on it.
5.The amount of compensation would be paid
thereupon to the petitioner.”
13.The High Court on the issue of applicability of Section 24 of
‘Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
15
Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013’
(hereinafter referred to as 2013 Act), held that, the argument
of lapsing of acquisition for an award passed beyond a
period prescribed under Section 11(a) cannot be accepted in
view of the ratio of judgment of this Court in ‘Indore
Development Authority Vs. Manohar Lal & Ors., 2020
(8) SCC 129’. After going through the said judgment, it is
clear that Section 24(1)(a) of 2013 Act, starts with non
obstante clause and states that in case where the
proceedings have been initiated under 1894 Act, but, the
award has not been made under Section 11, the provisions
of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of
compensation would apply. In the case at hand, the award
was made on 31.01.2011 after grant of stay on 10.01.2011
in Civil Appeal No. 731732 of 2013, though it was by a
delay of 5 years. By the final order passed on 04.11.2015,
the said appeals were dismissed. Thereafter, the
representation was made by the appellant asking
compensation at the rate of Rs. 1,10,000/ per sq. mtrs. as
directed by High Court interparty relying upon judgment of
16
Bhopendra Singh (supra) was rejected vide order dated
08.01.2018. Thereafter, the contempt petitions were filed
alleging noncompliance of the order of the High Court
which were dismissed as withdrawn while granting the
liberty to appellant to avail appropriate remedy. Thus, on the
date of commencement of the 2013 Act, the possession was
taken and the award was passed, though as alleged it was
nonest. In our opinion, by the impugned order, the
determination of compensation as per circle rate of Rs.
1,10,000/ per sq. mtrs for commercial land was the
question resintegra in the light of Bhopendra Singh
(supra) judgment and the award, whether rightly or wrongly
passed, was in existence on the date of commencement of
2013 Act. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the High
Court has rightly refused to interfere on the issue of
applicability of 2013 Act for determination of compensation
and rightly relied upon the judgment on Indore
Development Authority (supra).
17
14.Being aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant (land
owner) and NOIDA have filed separate appeals, which are
heard analogously.
Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Senior Counsel for appellant,
in addition to the point of applicability of Section 24 of 2013
Act as discussed above, contended as under –
a.That, the award dated 31.01.2011 passed by District
Magistrate was in violation of order of this Court as well
as the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad;
b.The award itself acknowledged that it was contingent in
nature;
c.There was no personal hearing granted to the appellant,
even though NOIDA knew about the interest of the
appellant in the scheduled property;
d.The impugned award was a void exercise since the
public notice of the same was given two days after the
designated date of hearing under Section 9 of the 1894
Act;
e.The award itself was passed after a delay of 5 years
since the date of hearing, which violates the mandate
18
under Section 11A of the 1894 Act. Therefore, the date
of award of compensation should be shifted or in
alternate, since the compensation was deposited in the
year 2017, therefore, the amount of compensation be
determined as per the provisions of 2013 Act.
f.Deduction with respect to development charges could
not be levied as the plot was already developed even
before the acquisition;
g.NOIDA illegally sold the schedule property even before
the acquisition which is a clearcut violation of right to
property under Article 300A of the Constitution. Such
Constitutional tort should not be allowed to be left
unpunished and the respondent authorities should not
take benefit of their own wrongful acts.
15.Per contra, Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing on behalf of NOIDA, contended as under–
a.Appellant cannot be entitled for a compensation more
than Rs. 31,850/ which was the price tendered by
respondent no. 7 (DLF);
19
b.The said price of Rs. 31,850/ has been adjudicated by
this Court in ‘Anil Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of
U.P., (2004) 8 SCC 671’ to be reasonable;
c.It has been conceded that allotment to respondent no. 7
(DLF) was prior to the date of acquisition of the
scheduled land;
d.Appellant (landowner) acquired the property in year
1997 for a sale consideration of Rs. 1 crore. One of the
earlier land owners namely Vishnu Vardhan had entered
into an agreement to sale dated 07.06.2006, for a sale
consideration of Rs. 3 crores only. These transactions
indicate that the aforesaid land was an agricultural plot,
however, the scheduled land has to be characterized as
agriculture land or at best residential;
e.Jurisdiction of reference court constituted under Section
18 of 1894 Act has been bypassed by the High Court
while determining the compensation;
f.Development charge amounting to 75% has to be
deducted instead of 50%;
20
g.Compensation granted by the High Court would amount
to unjust enrichment for the appellant which cannot be
sustained under the law.
16.Mr. Rayzada, Additional Advocate General appearing for the
State has submitted that, the subject land was bought as
benami property and hence, appellant is only entitled for
1/3
rd
of the amount.
17.Learned counsel for respondent no. 7 has submitted that,
the dispute is interse NOIDA and appellant herein and
respondent no. 7 has nothing to add other than to state that
the allotment of land was subject matter of litigation before
this Court in Anil Kumar Srivastava (supra), which has
upheld the allocation through the process of auction.
However, the compensation, if any, enhanced, may be
directed only against NOIDA.
18.Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions raised
by both parties, at the outset it is relevant to mention that,
the legality and validity of judgment dated 10.12.2009
passed by High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition
No. 75152/2005 has sustained the scrutiny of this Court
21
and has been upheld vide order dated 04.11.2015 in Civil
Appeal No. 731732 of 2013. The judgment has attained
finality interse the parties. It is not the case of respondents
that the previous judgment as well as the impugned order
has been rendered by an incompetent authority. In other
words, the said judgment has effectively put the controversy
interse the parties to rest. Thus, incidentally, what remains
in the matter is mere observance of those directions given by
the High Court in the light of prevailing law. Therefore, the
contention disputing the payment of compensation
altogether for the acquired land is untenable and cannot be
entertained at this stage. The conclusion arrived at by High
Court has been given seal of affirmation by this Court and
hence, the right of the appellant herein to get compensation
in terms of determination as directed has been crystallized
and cannot be interfered with. It would be unjust and
improper to allow reagitation of issues and vexing the
appellant twice when the matter has already been put to rest
by impugned judgment interse the parties.
22
19.At this juncture, we consider it appropriate to refer ‘R.
Unnikrishnan and Another Vs. V.K. Mahanudevan and
Others, (2014) 4 SCC 434’ , wherein para 19, the Court
while dealing with finality to binding judicial decisions
observed as follows –
“19.It is trite that law favours finality to binding
judicial decisions pronounced by courts that
are competent to deal with the subjectmatter.
Public interest is against individuals being
vexed twice over with the same kind of
litigation. The binding character of the
judgments pronounced by the courts of
competent jurisdiction has always been
treated as an essential part of the rule of law
which is the basis of the administration of
justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to
the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court
in ‘Daryao v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1457]’
where the Court succinctly summed up the law in
the following words:
9.…It is in the interest of the public at large that a
finality should attach to the binding
decisions pronounced by courts of
competent jurisdiction, and it is also in
the public interest that individuals should
not be vexed twice over with the same kind
of litigation.
***
11.…The binding character of judgments
pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction
is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and
the rule of law obviously is the basis of the
23
administration of justice on which the
Constitution lays so much emphasis.”
20.Therefore, in view of settled legal position with respect to
binding nature of the judgment that has attained finality,
there is no iota of doubt that NOIDA is under mandatory
obligation to determine the compensation as per law laid
down in Bhopendra Singh (supra). The relevant extracts
from Bhopendra Singh (supra) are being reproduced herein
below for ready reference –
“4.Learned reference court has assessed the market
value of similar land @ of Rs. 6/ per square feet on
the ground that other land of the same area which
was acquired with land in question was also valued
at the said rate by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer. However, learned Counsel for the Appellants
argued that the land in question is adjoining to the
main road unlike the land which was taken into
consideration by the reference court. It is further
argued that the land in question should not have
been valued less than Rs. 50/ Square feet. On
perusal of the oral evidence adduced by the parties
we found that P.W.1 Smt. Raj Dulari has stated
that in the year 1976 value of land in question was
Rs. 50/ per square feet. P.W.2 Arvind Singh, P.W.
3 Ranvir Singh and P.W.4 Harpal Singh have also
made the similar statements. But in the matters
of Land Acquisition, best way to assess the
market value is to examine the value in the
light of price paid by the purchaser of similar
land in the neighbourhood of the land in
question. Such transaction if nearer the date
of notification of acquisition, facilitates the
24
court to assess the more accurate market
value of the land. However, in the present case
none of the above witnesses have adduced any
evidence as to the exemplar sale deed
pertaining to the nearby similar land. In
absence of such sale, deeds we are compelled
to see the valuation of the surrounding land
made by the Collector Nainital under Rule 340
A of the U.P. Stamp (first amendment) Rules,
1976. Paper No. 44C/1 is copy of the Circle
rate showing market value assessed by the
Collector for the purposes of registration of
instrument of sale. The said documents shows
that the circle rate of the land in question for
imposing the stamp duty over the documents is
Rs. 95/ to Rs. 135/ per sq. meter as market
value of the land adjoining to road and Rs.
67/ to Rs. 80/ per sq. meter for the land away
from the road. From the evidence on record, it is
clear that the land in question was near the main
road. As such the market value as per the circle rate
was treated for the purpose of realizing stamp duty
not less than Rs. 95/ per sq. meter. It would be
injustice to the owner of land if for realizing the
stamp duty we apply the circle rate and deny at
least the said rate in making payment of
compensation on acquisition of his land. The total
area of the land in question is 2900 sq. yard. The
learned reference court has erred in law by
multiplying the rate mentioned per sq, feet with area
in terms of sq. yard. That is why due to
miscalculation the amount has been stuck at
meager Rs. 17,400/. Area measuring 0.6 acre is
equal to 2900 Sq, yard which is equal to 2397 sq.
meter. If we assess the market value relying on the
circle rate it would be Rs. 95/ per sq. meter, the
market value of the land in the year 1976 comes out
to be Rs. 95/ A – 2397.80 sq. meters = 2,27,791/.
xxx xxx xxx
25
12.The market value determined for the circle, is the
minimum statutory market value, in accordance with
the statutory rules framed under the Stamp Act, as
amended by the U.P. Act, on the basis of which,
stamp duty is paid as per schedule appended to
Section 3 and sale deed is to be entertained only
after the payment of the stamp duty paid on the
said minimum market value and if in the opinion of
the Registering Authority the value of the property is
more than the minimum value determined as per the
rules, he may refer the matter to the Authority who
may further proceed to require the vendee to pay
more stamp duty. And if not paid they may impound
the sale deed. Thus, the basis of exercise of power,
is the minimum market value determined according
to rule. If for the augmentation of the revenue,
government fixes the market value of the property in
a circle why that not be taken as minimum market
value of the property for the purpose of Land
Acquisition Act. The procedure of determination
of market value provided under Section 23 of
Land Acquisition Act is parimateria to the
rules framed under the Stamp Act. Therefore,
we hold that while avoiding compensation for
land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act,
the compensation cannot be paid at a lesser
rate than that of market value determined for
the purpose of payment of stamp duty under
the Stamp Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
21.Bare perusal of the aforesaid makes it clear that, the
determination of the compensation has to be made by taking
into consideration the circle rate which has been determined
as per the market value. The market value of a property is
26
the price that a willing purchaser would pay to a willing
seller for it, taking into account its current condition, all
existing advantages, and potential possibilities when led out
in the most advantageous manner, while excluding any
benefit resulting from the implementation of the scheme for
which the property is compulsorily acquired. Therefore, the
market value is to be determined in the light of price paid by
the purchaser of similar land in the neighbourhood of the
land in question and in cases, where no records for such
transaction/purchase is available, the minimum statutory
value in accordance with Stamp Act must be taken as
market value for circle rate.
22.In the instant case, since the title of the appellant on the
scheduled piece of land has not been contested by the
respondents and the adjudication is confined only to the
quantum of compensation, we deem it appropriate not to
interfere with the findings of the High Court with respect to
the ownership. Be that as it may, moving further, the order
dated 27.03.2004 passed by District Magistrate, Gautam
Buddh Nagar notifying the circle rate to be Rs. 1,10,000/
27
per sq. mt. as applicable on commercial properties,
residential properties etc., situated in Noida is also on
record. Further, the nature of acquired land is also not in
dispute for the reason that, NOIDA while contesting the Civil
Suit No. 416/1998 filed by appellant herein seeking
permanent injunction, itself admitted that the land has been
determined for use of commercial purposes and hence, it is
a valuable land. This fact is also fortified by the Revenue
Inspector’s report dated 05.08.2008, submitted in
compliance of interim order passed by High Court in Writ
Petition No. 75152 of 2005. By the said report, it is apparent
that, on spot the land of Khasra No. 422 and 427 was
converted into a part of Sector 18, for which demarcation is
not possible because of absence of any fixed identification
points for demarcation since the land is fully developed.
Thus, NOIDA cannot turn around to say in this case that the
land is either agricultural or at best residential. Thus, the
arguments as advanced is contrary to record, far from truth
and cannot be countenanced.
28
23.Now, the argument advanced by learned Additional Solicitor
General for State and counsel for respondent no. 7 relying
upon the judgment of Anil Kumar Srivastava (supra),
which was a PIL filed before the Allahabad High Court and
later transferred to this Court, is also required to be
analyzed. This Court in the aforesaid case dealt with the
challenge made to tender floated by NOIDA in 2003 and
dismissed the said PIL while observing as thus –
“7. In reply, respondent no. 2 has pointed out that the
impugned Scheme was given wide publicity;
that the development of the plot admeasuring
54,320.18 sq. m. became necessary to
decongest Sector 18 where car parking has
become an acute problem; that decongestion
could be achieved by constructing shopping
malls with matching parking facility; that
although the area of the plot in question is
54,320.18 sq. m., FAR is restricted to 150 and
ground cover is restricted to 30% unlike the
instances of plots submitted by the petitioner where
for a smaller plot of 60007000 sq. m., FAR is 150
and for still smaller plots of 600 sq. m., FAR is 250
(see Annexure P1). That by offering the said plot
admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m., the Authority is
saving on internal development for amenities,
parking, etc……..
xxx xxx xxx
9.Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that
the reserve price fixed by respondent no. 2 at the
rate of Rs 27,500 per sq. m. is contrary to clause
29
2(e) of the Board resolution dated 1072003; that
under the said clause, the reserve rate of
commercial plots admeasuring 5001 sq. m. or more
was oneandahalf times the sector rate; that the
sector rate was Rs 90,000 per sq. m.; that the
reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq. m. for the plot
admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m., without sub
division, was abysmally low and
understated……….It was submitted that transfer
of the said plot admeasuring 54,320.18 sq. m.
at such a low reserve price of Rs 27,500 per sq.
m. would result in causing huge loss of Rs 340
crores to the State exchequer.
xxx xxx xxx
14.Applying the above tests to the facts of this case, we
find that there is no material on record to show that
the tender price of Rs 31,850 per sq. m. is a low
price. The entire edifice of the petition is based on
the challenge to the reserve price of Rs 27,500 per
sq. m. As stated above, fixation of the reserve price
is to facilitate the conduct of the sale. It was open
to the petitioner to challenge the tender price
of Rs 31,850 per sq. m. as understated,
notwithstanding the fixation of the reserve
price. No comparative sales instances, with similar
parameters of ground cover of 30% and 150 FAR,
have been placed before us. No figures of cost of
2800 ECS have been placed before us as such costs
would increase the reserve price. On the other hand,
we find that the reserve price has been fixed by
taking into account several factors. Firstly, in the
past tenders invited for relatively smaller plots with
higher reserve price had failed. It is important to
bear in mind that the tender process is an expensive
exercise. To resort repeatedly to this exercise is a
costly affair. Secondly, in the present case, the
reserve price was fixed by taking into account the
comparative offers/sales in the adjoining
sectors……..
30
15.Reading of the said clause indicates that the figure
of Rs 90,000 is not mentioned. It is a figure alleged
by the petitioner. As stated above, there is a
difference between the circle rate and the sector
rate. The petitioner has confused the two. The circle
rate is notified by the Government for the guidance
of the SubRegistrar. They are notified for revenue
purposes. There is nothing to show that Rs 90,000
per sq. m. was the sector rate. In the present case,
we are concerned with a larger plot of 54,320.18 sq.
m. with different variables of 30% ground cover and
150 FAR. Keeping in mind all these factors, the
Authority has fixed the reserve price. In the present
case, undue importance has been given to the
fixation of the reserve price. As stated above,
notwithstanding the reserve price, the petitioner
could have brought before the Court material, if any,
to show undervaluation. In the present case, the
tender price is Rs 31,850 per sq. m. It is higher than
the reserve price. There is no material to show
whether the tender price is understated . In the
circumstances, there is no merit in the contention of
the petitioner that the land is sold at an abysmally
low price.”
(emphasis supplied)
24.From reading of the aforesaid judgment, it is clear that in
the PIL, petitioner had only challenged the reserve rate as
being abysmally low and did not challenge the tender price
of Rs. 31,850 per sq. mtrs. Further, the PIL petitioner inter
alia had not led any evidence to show exemplar deeds as to
the actual market value of the plot or the circle rate
determined under the Stamp Act. On the pleadings and
31
evidence as existed before it, this Court concluded that the
reserve price of land was reasonable and accordingly
dismissed the PIL. It was fairly admitted by the learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for NOIDA that, at the
time of arguments before this Court, NOIDA had not
revealed this fact that they were intending to auction third
party lands without there being formal acquisition as such.
It is not out of place to mention that, emphasis in the PIL
was on the act of handing over of the land by NOIDA to
respondent no. 7 being arbitrary. While in the present case,
the emphasis is on grant of compensation for the land of
third party, whose land has been malafidely and forcefully
handed over to respondent no. 7 in contravention of the
decree of permanent injunction, without any formal
acquisition, though made subsequently. In the said PIL,
what may be the just and reasonable amount of
compensation was not the question for determination.
Therefore, the emphasis made by learned Additional
Solicitor General relying on the judgment of Anil Kumar
Srivastava (supra) in this regard is bereft of any merit.
32
25.As discussed above, with regard to determination of the
compensation in the present case, the judgment of
Bhopendra Singh (supra), wherein the circle rate showing
market value assessed by the Collector for the purpose of
registration of instrument of sale was made valid. The said
judgment was not interfered with by this Court thereafter. In
the case of the land owner itself, the High Court by order
dated 10.12.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 75152 of 2005,
directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer to determine
the compensation according to the law as laid down in
judgment rendered in Bhopendra Singh (supra), which is
sustained by this Court. Therefore, the issue of basis of
determination of compensation has been settled interparty
and also uninterfered by this Court. Now, on the said issue,
relying upon the judgment of Anil Kumar Srivastava
(supra) cannot be interfered with in this case. In no event,
the compensation can be paid at a rate lesser than that of
market value as determined for the purpose of payment of
stamp duty under Stamp Act.
33
26.As previously stated, the land in dispute was not only
designated for commercial use, rather it was also declared to
be part of industrial development plan area. After
development, even a mall has been constructed on it. In our
view, the High Court in the impugned order has rightly
determined payment of compensation at the rate of Rs.
1,10,000/ per square meter as per circle rate. We,
therefore, confirm the findings of High Court for grant of
compensation with rate Rs. 1,10,000/ per sq. mt.
27.In the light of the preceding discussion, the only question
that remains now for our consideration is with regard to
deduction of development charges to the extent of 50% made
by High Court in impugned order. On the said issue, there is
no straight jacket formula to arrive at the quantum of
deduction of development charge and same must be
assessed based on the facts of the individual case after due
consideration of all the factors which might affect such
quantum. As evident, the High Court did not take into
consideration all the factors encircling the issue and
routinely proceeded with the maximum deduction of 50%
34
development charge. We say so because, on perusal of the
impugned judgment, it is clear that the High Court has
interalia highlighted the glaring mischiefs played by NOIDA
in the whole acquisition proceedings but at the same time, it
has failed to accord a substantial reason for maximum
deduction of development charges. It is further observed
that, it is not for the first time that NOIDA is in crossroads
before this Court for playing handinglove with large
developers.
28.Be as it may, it is uncontroverted from the material available
on record that, the scheduled piece of land was allotted by
NOIDA to respondent no. 7 in absence of formal acquisition,
whereafter, the said scheduled land was developed in the
line of commercial hub and even a mall was constructed on
it. Hence, in our considered opinion, the quantum of
deduction of development charges should have been
evaluated by High Court from the contextual perspective of
all the relevant factors, which clearly has not been done in
the instant case. Nevertheless, to cure the anomaly, it is trite
at this juncture to refer to the doctrine enunciated by this
35
Court in case of ‘Bhagwathula Samanna Vs. Special
Tahsildar and Land Acquisition Officer, (1991) 4 SCC
506’, wherein while dealing with the question of principle of
deduction in the land value, this Court held as follows –
“11.The principle of deduction in the land value covered
by the comparable sale is thus adopted in order to
arrive at the market value of the acquired land. In
applying the principle, it is necessary to
consider all relevant facts. It is not the extent
of the area covered under the acquisition
which is the only relevant factor. Even in the
vast area there may be land which is fully
developed having all amenities and situated in
an advantageous position. If smaller area
within the large tract is already developed and
suitable for building purposes and have in its
vicinity roads, drainage, electricity,
communications etc. then the principle of
deduction simply for the reason that it is part
of the large tract acquired, may not be
justified.
12. ….. The land involved in these cases is of even level
and fit for construction without the necessity of
levelling or reclamation. The High Court has itself
concluded on the evidence that the lands covered by
the acquisition are located by the side of the
National Highway and the Southern Railway Staff
Quarters with the town planning trust road on the
north. The neighbouring areas are already
developed ones and houses have been constructed,
and the land has potential value for being used as
building sites. Having found that the land is to
be valued only as building sites and having
stated the advantageous position in which the
36
land in question lies though forming part of
the larger area, the High Court should not
have applied the principles of deduction. It is
not in every case that such deduction is to be
allowed. Where the acquired land is in the
midst of already developed land with
amenities of roads, electricity etc., the
deduction in the value of the comparable land
is not warranted.
13. The proposition that large area of land cannot
possibly fetch a price at the same rate at which
small plots are sold is not absolute proposition and
in given circumstances it would be permissible to
take into account the price fetched by the small
plots of land. If the larger tract of land because of
advantageous position is capable of being used for
the purpose for which the smaller plots are used
and is also situated in a developed area with little
or no requirement of further development, the
principle of deduction of the value for purpose of
comparison is not warranted. With regard to the
nature of the plots involved in these two cases,
it has been satisfactorily shown on the
evidence on record that the land has facilities
of road and other amenities and is adjacent to
a developed colony and in such circumstances,
it is possible to utilize the entire area in
question as house sites. In respect of the land
acquired for the road, the same advantages
are available, and it did not require any
further development. We, are, therefore, of the
view that the High Court has erred in applying
the principle of deduction and reducing the
fair market value of land from Rs 10 per sq.
yard to Rs 6.50 per sq. yard. In our opinion, no
such deduction is justified in the facts and
circumstances of these cases. The appellants,
therefore, succeed.”
37
29.Further, this Court in ‘Trishala Jain Vs. State of
Uttaranchal, (2011) 6 SCC 47’, while dealing with
determination of compensation and deduction of
development charges held as under –
“44.It is thus evident from the above enunciated
principle that the acquired land has to be
more or less developed land as its developed
surrounding areas, with all amenities and
facilities and is fit to be used for the purpose
for which it is acquired without any further
expenditure, before such land could be
considered for no deduction. Similarly, the sale
instances even of smaller plots could be considered
for determining the market value of a larger chunk
of land with some deduction unless, there was
comparability in potential, utilization, amenities and
infrastructure with hardly any distinction. On such
principles each case would have to be considered on
its own merits.
Further, this Court in ‘Kasturi and Ors. Vs. State of
Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 354’ , while dealing with various
factual factors to be taken into consideration while applying
the cut in payment of compensation towards developmental
charges held as under –
“7.........However, in cases of some land where
there are certain advantages by virtue of the
developed area around, it may help in
reducing the percentage of cut to be applied,
as the developmental charges required may be
38
less on that account. There may be various
factual factors which may have to be taken
into consideration while applying the cut in
payment of compensation towards
developmental charges, maybe in some cases it
is more than 1/3
rd
and in some cases less than
1/3
rd
. It must be remembered that there is difference
between a developed area and an area having
potential value, which is yet to be developed. The
fact that an area is developed or adjacent to a
developed area will not ipso facto make every land
situated in the area also developed to be valued as
a building site or plot, particularly when vast tracts
are acquired, as in this case, for development
purpose.”
The aforesaid judgments postulate general factors that are
to be taken into consideration for deciding the quantum of
deduction of development charges. As iterated above, such
factors majorly include the nature of land to be acquired, the
extent of area to be acquired, the extent of development in
the adjoining land as well as land proposed to be acquired,
the commercial potentiality and so on. Therefore, deduction
of development charge in the instant case should have been
made while considering the said factors. However, it is made
clear that this observation is being made in peculiar facts of
the present case and not in general.
39
30.Applying the ratio of said judgments in the facts of the case
at hand, as per the stand taken by NOIDA, the scheduled
piece of land is a costly land, being situated at the centre of
development of authority and has commercial use. On spot,
the demarcation was not possible because the land was fully
developed. In the backdrop, without acquisition, the piece of
land belonging to appellant was transferred to respondent
no. 7. The acquisition was made subsequently in view of the
observations made by the District Court confirming the
decree of permanent injunction for the said piece of land. At
the time of taking over of possession, the amount of
compensation was not made and now, the appellant is
running from pillar to post to receive the adequate
compensation. Even after settling the dispute for payment of
compensation at the circle rate of Rs. 1,10,000/ interparty
in the previous round of litigation, the NOIDA in its own
volition neither determined the compensation nor paid to the
appellant. The possession of scheduled piece of land, though
taken long back in year 20042005, but till date, the
appellant has not been able to reap the fruits of
compensation and kept litigating before courts even up to
40
subsequent rounds. Considering all this aspect, deduction
made to extent of 50% in by High Court in the said cannot
be sustained and is set aside without touching the findings
on the point of payment of solatium.
31.As determined hereinabove, the compensation at the circle
rate of Rs. 1,10,000/ per sq. meter be payable to the
appellant – Reddy Veerana. Now, the issue of interest is
required to be looked into in the context of provisions of
Section 34 of 1894 Act, which reads as thus:
“34. Payment of interest When the amount of such
compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking
possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount
awarded with interest thereon at the rate of [nine per
centum] per annum from the time of so taking possession
until it shall have been so paid or deposited:
[Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is
not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the
date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of
fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the
date or expiry of the said period of one year on the amount
of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid
or deposited before the date of such expiry.]”
On perusal, it is clear that if amount of compensation is not
paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land,
interest @ 9% p.a. leviable from the time of taking of
possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited. It
further provides that if the amount of compensation has not
41
been paid or deposited within one year, the interest would
be payable @ 15% p.a. on expiry of the period of one year.
On perusal of the aforesaid, it is clear that if the amount of
compensation is not paid or deposited, 9% interest would be
leviable and payable. In case the said amount is not
deposited or paid within one year, then interest would be
payable @ 15% p.a. In the case at hand, as discussed above,
the land was given initially in the year 2003 to respondent
No. 7 and the acquisition was made subsequently. The
additional award was passed on 31.1.2011 after a delay of
five years from the date of taking over of possession. The
amount was deposited in the year 2017 by a delay of
approximately 14 years. In the peculiar facts of this case,
in our view, the civil right of appellant Reddy Veerana is
violated in breach of Article 300A of the Constitution of
India. Such action of the NOIDA clearly amounts to
constitutional tort. In the context of acquisition as made in
this case in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of
India, judgment of this Court in the case of ‘Kalyani (Dead)
Through Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Sulthan Bathery Municipality
42
& Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3189 of 2022’ is relevant,
wherein it was observed as under –
“20.Article 300A clearly mandates that no person shall
be deprived of his property save by authority of law.
In the present case, we do not find, under which
authority of law, the land of the appellants was
taken and they were deprived of the same. If the
Panchayat and the PWD failed to produce any
evidence that appellants have surrendered their
lands voluntarily, depriving the appellants of the
property would be in violation of Article 300A of the
Constitution.
21.A Constitution Bench of this Court in this case of
‘K.T. Plantation Private Limited Vs. State of
Karnataka, 2011 (9) SCC 63’ , apart from others,
dealt with an issue relating to payment of
compensation where a person is deprived of his
property after deletion of Article 31(2). It laid down
that there are two requirements to be fulfilled while
depriving a person of his property. Requirement of
public purpose is a precondition and right to claim
compensation is also inbuilt in Article 300A. While
answering the reference in paragraph 221 (e), it
provided as follows –
“221.We, therefore, answer the reference
as follows:
xxxxxx
(e)Public purpose is a precondition
for deprivation of a person from
his property under Article 300A
and the right to claim
compensation is also inbuilt in
that Article and when a person is
deprived of his property, the
State has to justify both the
grounds which may depend on
scheme of the statute, legislative
43
policy, object and purpose of the
legislature and other related
factors.”
32.Taking note of the aforesaid and in the peculiar facts of this
case, we are of the view that in addition to the statutorily
paid interest, the additional amount of penal interest must
be paid in place of shifting the date for determination of the
amount of compensation or to determine the compensation
as per 2013 Act, as demanded by the appellant Reddy
Veerana. It is not out of place to mention here that the
nature of interest is essentially a consideration paid either
for the use of money or forbearance from demanding it after
it has fallen due. Interest, whether it is statutory or
otherwise, represents the profit, the creditor may have made
if he had used the money or from the loss, he may have
suffered because he could not use the amount. Therefore, in
the present case, on the amount of compensation, in our
view, the amount of compensation be payable along with
statutory interest, as directed by the High Court and 3%
penal interest, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, is directed.
44
33.In view of the foregoing, Civil Appeal No.3637 of 2022,
preferred by NOIDA is dismissed, whereas the Civil Appeal
No. 3636 of 2022 filed by appellant Reddy Veerana is hereby
allowed in part with the following directions:
1.Respondents are directed to compute the amount of
compensation by taking the circle rate of Sector18,
i.e., Rs. 1,10,000/ per square meter;
2.The judgment of the High Court directing 50%
deduction towards development charge stands set
aside. In the peculiar facts of the present case, the
respondents are directed not to make any deduction
towards the development charge while
computing/calculating the amount of compensation as
per circle rate, specified in para 1 above;
3.As directed by the High Court, the amount of solatium
of 30% in terms of Section 23(2) of 1894 Act is also
payable;
4.The statutory interest on the amount of compensation
shall be payable @ 9% from the date of taking over of
possession, i.e., February, 2005 for a period of one
45
year. Thereafter, @ 15% p.a. be paid as per the proviso
of Section 34 of 1894 Act. In addition to the said
statutory interest, 3% penal interest is further directed
to be paid in the peculiar facts of this case.
5.It is made clear here that the amount so deposited in
the year 2017 would also earn the interest at the same
rate, as directed in para 4 above till the date of
realization.
6.Since, the acquisition of the land in question was made
by NOIDA which was purchased by respondent No. 7 in
public auction, therefore, the liability to pay the
amount of compensation would be of NOIDA. The
entire amount shall be paid within a period of six
weeks from the date of this judgment.
………..………………...J.
(VINEET SARAN)
….………………………J.
(J.K. MAHESHWARI)
New Delhi;
May 5, 2022.
46
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