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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 2271 OF 2014

Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company Pvt.

Ltd.

...Petitioner

: Versus :

1. Reserve Bank of India

2. The Estate Of�cer, Reserve Bank of

India

...Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION NO. 2272 OF 2014

Reunion Private Limited ...Petitioner

: Versus :

1. Reserve Bank of India

2. The Estate Of�cer, Reserve Bank of

India

...Respondents

WITH

WRIT PETITION NO. 2273 OF 2014

Reunion Engineering Company

Private Limited ...Petitioner

: Versus :

1. Reserve Bank of India

2. The Estate Of�cer, Reserve Bank

of India ....Respondents

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Mr. P.S. Colabawala with Mr. Samkit Shah and Mr. Farhad Vakil i/b

Mulla & Mulla & Craigie Blunt & Caroe, for the Petitioners.

Mr. Virendra Tulzapurkar, Senior Advocate with Mr. Parag Sharma,

Ms. Aditi Pathak, Ms. Megha More, Ms. Twinkle Kalla and Ms. Juhi

Bhayani i/b BLAC Co., for Respondents.

CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.

JUDGMENT RESD. ON : 7 OCTOBER 2026.

JUDGMENT PRON. ON : 26 OCTOBER 2026

JUDGMENT:

1) These Petitions are �led challenging the judgments and

orders dated 23 January 2014 passed by the Principal Judge, City Civil

Court at Bombay in Misc. Appeal Nos. 52 of 2013, 53 of 2013 and 54 of

2013. The learned Principal Judge has dismissed the Appeals preferred by

the Petitioners and has con�rmed the order of eviction dated 15 April

2013 passed by the Estate Of�cer under Section 5(1) of the Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (Public

Premises Act) directing eviction of the Petitioners from the public

premises.

2) Brief facts of the case are that ‘Amar Building’ was

constructed at P.M. Road, Fort, Mumbai-400 001 in the year 1930. M/s.

Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. was inducted as a tenant in respect of the

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premises located in a portion on the fourth �oor of Amar Building. Later,

a company named M/s. Reunion Pvt. Ltd. was incorporated and the same

started occupying the premises. RBI purchased Amar Building and

acquired its ownership sometime in the year 1947. In the year 1949,

Petitioner-M/s. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company (India) Pvt. Ltd. took

over as a going concern of the Firm- M/s. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. M/s.

Reunion Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. is another group company and this is

how the three group companies started occupying the premises in Amar

Building. RBI was nationalized in the year 1949.

3) In the year 1959, RBI initiated proceedings against M/s.

Munjee Nathoobhoy & Company (India) Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Reunion Pvt. Ltd.

and M/s. Reunion Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. (Reunion Group) under the

provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control

Act, 1947 (Bombay Rent Act) in the Small Causes Court at Mumbai. On

12 January 1961, consent terms were entered into between the RBI and

Reunion Group, under which the Reunion Group companies surrendered

certain portion of the premises in their occupation and continued to

occupy the balance portion. RBI agreed not to institute any suit for

eviction under section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act on bona�de

requirement ground and the Reunion group agreed to �nd alternate

accommodation. However, it appears that Petitioners continued to

occupy the premises and did not �nd alternate premises.

4) On 17 July 2009, RBI issued termination notice terminating

the tenancy of M/s. Munjee Nathoobhoy & Co. On 22 July 2009, notice

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was responded to and the termination was disputed. RBI �led application

before the Estate Of�cer seeking eviction of the Reunion Group under

the provisions of the Public Premises Act by referring to the security

reports dated 28 February 2002 and 20 January 2005. On 16 September

2009, an opinion was formed by the Estate Of�cer based on the two

security reports to the effect that RBI required the premises for its

bona�de use.

5) RBI issued notices to the three Reunion Group companies

(Petitioners) under the Public Premises Act on the ground of security

threats and bona�de requirements of RBI. Petitioners �led their

respective replies on 24 November 2009. On 5 August 2011, Application

was �led by RBI for withdrawal of eviction proceedings initiated against

M/s. Reunion Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd and M/s. Reunion Pvt. Ltd and the

same was allowed 13 October 2011. Thereafter, notices for termination

were issued by RBI to M/s. Reunion Engineering Pvt. Ltd and M/s.

Reunion Pvt. Ltd on 28 November 2011, which were disputed by the

noticees. RBI pressed for eviction of those two companies under the

Public Premises Act. The Estate Of�cer passed order dated 18 November

2011 allowing the security reports to be marked in evidence and rejecting

the objections raised by the Petitioners. Parties led evidence in support

of their respective pleas. On 15 April 2013, the Estate Of�cer passed

orders for eviction of all the three Petitioners from the public premises

under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises Act.

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6) Petitioners �led Appeals before the City Civil Court

challenging the orders of eviction. By separate judgments and orders

dated 23 January 2014, the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court

has dismissed the Appeals preferred by the Petitioners. Aggrieved by

judgments and orders dated 23 January 2014 passed by the City Civil

Court in Misc. Appeal Nos. 52 of 2013, 53 of 2013 and 54 of 2013,

Petitioners have �led the present Petitions. By order dated 6 March 2014,

this Court has granted interim stay on eviction order in favour of the

Petitioners.

7) Mr. Colabawala, the learned counsel appearing for the

Petitioners submits that the learned Judge has grossly erred in

dismissing the Appeals preferred by the Petitioners and con�rming the

eviction orders. That the impugned eviction orders are premised entirely

on an opinion formed by the Estate Of�cer on the basis of two security

reports of 2002 and 2005. At that time, there was no material to record

an opinion that RBI required premises for its own bona�de use. That the

security reports of 28 February 2002 and 20 January 2005 were made by

external agencies and RBI did not have its own security assessment. That

the security reports were submitted in 2002 and 2005, whereas the

opinion was formed thereafter in the year 2009. Since the opinion

formed on the basis of stale security reports of 2002 and 2005 is itself

erroneous, the show-cause notice dated 22 September 2009 premised

thereon is also rendered void. That if foundation for seeking eviction

itself is baseless, the eviction order has to be set aside. In support, he

relies on judgment of this Court in Mine Manager, Manganese Ore

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(India) Ltd. Versus. Shyam s/o. Kunjilal Yadav

1

. That the Estate Of�cer,

as well as the learned Judge have not decided the issue of the �aw in the

show cause notice and the said point has remained undecided.

8) Mr. Colabawala further submits that the Estate Of�cer has

grossly erred in relying on the security reports without examining its

authors. That the objections raised to admissibility of security reports in

evidence are ignored by the Estate Of�cer and the same are erroneously

marked for being read in evidence. That RBI did not even disclose as to

the exact persons who made the concerned security reports. That since

security reports are wholly inadmissible in evidence, the impugned

eviction orders premised squarely on the security reports will have to be

necessarily set aside. He submits that the learned Judge of the City Civil

Court has erroneously upheld the action of the Estate Of�cer by relying

on the security reports erroneously marked in evidence. That Petitioners

did not cross-examine RBI's witness on the security reports. That the

learned Judge has totally misread the evidence for recording a �nding

about Petitioners examining RBI's witness on the security report. He

relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Sait Tarajee Khimchand & Ors.

Versus. Yelamarti Satyam alias Satteya & Ors.

2

in support of his

contention that mere marking of a document does not mean that the

same can be read in evidence in absence of proof thereof. He submits

that the learned Judge has erroneously relied on the aspect of non-

applicability of provisions of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 for upholding the

directions of the Estate Of�cer for admitting the security reports in

1 2002 SCC Onlline Bom 518

2 (1972) 4 SCC 562

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evidence. He relies on judgment of the Apex Court in M/s. Bareilly

Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. Versus. The Workmen & Ors.

3

in support of

his contention that even if Indian Evidence Act, 1872 does not apply to

quasi-judicial proceedings, the principles of natural justice would still

continue to apply. He relies on judgment of the Division Bench of this

Court in Nandini J. Shah & anr. Versus. Life Insurance Corporation of

India & Ors.

4

in support of his contention that the primary onus lies on

the RBI to establish its claim by leading documentary and oral evidence.

9) Mr. Colabawala further submits that when Petitioners

highlighted impermissibility to rely upon stale security reports, RBI

produced the third security report of 2010. He submits that RBI

selectively relied upon security reports for ensuring eviction of the

Petitioners. Without reiterating the various recommendations contained

in the security reports, he takes me through the testimonies of the

witnesses to demonstrate that most of the recommendations in the said

reports remained unimplemented. He submits that the security reports

were deliberately procured solely with the aim of ensuring eviction of

the Petitioners. He takes me through the evidence recorded by the Estate

Of�cer in support of his plea that what is sought to be projected under

the security reports is mere general risk and that no steps were taken by

RBI to implement various suggestions made in the security reports. He

submits that since RBI is an instrumentality of State, it cannot act

arbitrarily. That there has to be a valid reason for seeking eviction of the

occupant under the Public Premises Act. He relies on judgment of the

3 1971 (2) SCC 617

4 2008(4) Mh.L.J. 106

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Apex Court in Jiwan Dass Versus. Life Insurance Corporation of India &

Anr.

5

in support of his contention that there has to be a valid reason and

such reason has to be speci�ed for terminating the tenancy under

Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

10) Mr. Colabawala relies on the guidelines published by the

Government of India on 30 May 2002 in support of his contention that

eviction action cannot be initiated with the commercial motive or for

securing vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate its

own staff. That the guidelines provide that occupation of the premises

could not be treated as unauthorised merely upon service of a notice of

termination; rather, the question of unauthorised occupation had to be

determined by following due process of law. He submits that the

guidelines do not have binding effect and need to be necessarily

followed. That the Apex Court has held in Banatwala & Co., Versus. Life

Insurance Corporation of India & Anr.

6

that the guidelines dated 30

May 2002 are required to be followed and that they expressly recognise

the relevance of certain provisions of the Rent Control Act to properties

covered under the Public Premises Act. In support of his contention that

security aspect does not fall outside court’s power of judicial review, he

relies on a judgment of this Court in Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL &

Ors. Versus. Union of India & Ors.

7

. He submits that the Courts need not

blindly accept the security perception projected before it and can go into

the validity of the perception of real threat.

5 1994 Supp (3) SCC 694

6 (2011) 13 SCC 446

7 WP No. 3013-2018 decided on 27.2.2019

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11) Mr. Colabawala further submits that so far as the ground of

bona�de requirement is concerned, no material is produced. That there

was speci�c agreement between the parties under the Consent Terms

that eviction of Petitioner was not to be sought on the ground of

bona�de requirement. That RBI's witness also admitted that bona�de

requirement was not a ground available for eviction. He accordingly

prays for setting aside of the impugned orders.

12) Dr. Tulzapurkar the learned Senior Advocate appearing for

the Respondents opposes the petitions submitting that the Petitioners

have suffered two concurrent �ndings recorded by the Estate Of�cer and

the learned Principal Judge. That factual �ndings are recorded

concurrently regarding the security threat as well as the bona�de

requirement. That this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence in

exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of

India. That the Petition is argued as if it is an appeal in disguise. That

there is due application of mind to all the factors both by the Estate

Of�cer as well as by the Appellate Court. That therefore no ground is

made out by the Petitioner to interfere in the �ndings recorded by the

Estate Of�cer and by the Appeal Court.

13) Dr. Tulzapurkar further submits that the Petitioner cannot

question RBI's perception of security. That once security threat is

perceived by the RBI, it is justi�ed in terminating the tenancy. He

submits that the guidelines relied upon by the Petitioner do not have

statutory force. That, in any case, the guidelines prevented State

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instrumentalities from seeking eviction for commercial motives or for

the purpose of making the premises available to their own employees.

That in this case, the Petitioner does not have any commercial motive.

RBI is not proposing to rent out the premises after recovering possession

thereof from the Petitioners.

14) Dr. Tulzapurkar further submits that the Respondent need

not even establish any ground for eviction since rent control protection

is withdrawn by virtue of declaration of law by the Apex Court in the

judgment in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. Versus. Vita

8

.

That tenancy can be terminated by issuance of notice under Section 106

of the Transfer of Property Act,1882. That the moment the tenancy is

terminated, occupation automatically becomes unauthorised. In support

of his contention that bona�de requirement need not be established nor

any ground needs to be demonstrated for seeking eviction of

unauthorised occupant, Dr. Tulzapurkar relies on judgment of this Court

in Bank of Maharashtra Versus. Mrs. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar &

Ors .

9

He prays for dismissal of the Petition.

15) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my

consideration.

16) Petitioners are aggrieved by dismissal of Appeals �led by

them before the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court in which

they had challenged the orders dated 15 April 2013 passed by the Estate

8 Civil Appeal No.(s). 2638 of 2023 dated 11.12.2025

9 WP-10765/2012 decided on 16 September 2026.

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Of�cer under Section 5(1) of the Public Premises Act. By those orders,

Petitioners have been directed to handover possession of the premises in

their occupation. As observed above, Petitioners are group companies of

Reunion Group. The premises were occupied initially by M/s. Munjee

Nathoobhoy & Co. since the year 1930 long before RBI arrived at the

scene. RBI purchased the building in the year 1947. M/s. Munjee

Nathoobhoy & Co. was taken over as a going concern by M/s. Munjee

Nathoobhoy & Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. (Petitioner in WP No. 2271 of 2014).

The other two Petitioners are part of the same group and all the three

Petitioners occupy the premises as Reunion Group Companies.

17) Earlier RBI had sought eviction of the Petitioners under

Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rent Act by �ling Suit No. 766 of 4261 of

1959. Consent Terms were tendered in the said suit on 12 January 1961

under which Petitioners surrendered some portion of the premises to the

RBI. Reciprocal promises were made by RBI and the Petitioners under

which RBI agreed not to seek eviction of the Petitioners on the ground of

bona�de requirement under the provisions of Section 13(1)(g) of the

Bombay Rent Act and Petitioners agreed to make an endeavour to �nd

alternate premises. It appears that Petitioners did not act on their

promise and continued to occupy the premises for the next 48 long years

when RBI was required to terminate the tenancy. After issuance of

notices for termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of

Property Act, 1882, eviction proceedings were initiated against the

Petitioners before the Estate Of�cer. It appears that, on 16 September

2009, the RBI �led an application before the Estate Of�cer, contending

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that there was a security threat to the RBI and that the presence of the

Petitioners on the Bank’s premises increased its exposure and

vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The Petitioners’ presence in the

premises was identi�ed as a security threat. RBI relied on reports of

Intelligence Bureau (Ministry of Home Affairs) dated 28 February 2002

and of Additional Commissioner of Police, Mumbai dated 20 January

2005, both recommending inter-alia removal of non-RBI entities from

Amar Building. The Bank also stated that it had bona�de requirement in

respect of the premises in possession of the Petitioners.

18) On the basis of application made by RBI, it appears that the

Estate Of�cer formed an opinion on 16 September 2009 that it was

necessary to adopt proceedings under the Public Premises Act by

issuance of show cause notice for eviction of the Petitioners. Accordingly,

the Estate Of�cer issued show cause notice dated 22 September 2009

under Section 4 of the Public Premises Act.

19) According to the Petitioners, issuance of show cause notice

was itself faulty and the same was premised entirely on the opinion

dated 16 September 2009, which in turn was based only on the security

reports dated 28 February 2002 and 20 January 2005. Petitioners believe

that the reports of 2002 and 2005 could not have been the basis for

formation of opinion in the year 2009 for issuance of show cause notice

by the Estate Of�cer. It is therefore sought to be contended that the very

foundation for issuance of show cause notice was faulty. I am unable to

agree. There is no separate step/stage provided for in the Public Premises

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Act of ‘formation of opinion’ by the Estate Of�cer. Under Section 4 of the

Act, the Estate Of�cer can issues show cause notice if he has

‘information’ that a person is in unauthorised occupation of public

premises and that he should be evicted. Thus, before issuance of show

cause notice, the Estate Of�cer is not required to ‘record satisfaction’ on

the basis of any material that a person is in unauthorised occupation of

the public premises. He is empowered to act merely on ‘information’.

Section 4 of the Public Premises Act provided thus:

4. Issue of notice to show cause against order of eviction.—

(1) If the estate of�cer has information that any person is in unauthorised

occupation of any public premises and that he should be evicted, the estate

of�cer shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing within

seven working days from the date of receipt of the information regarding the

unauthorised occupation calling upon the person concerned to show cause why

an order of eviction should not be made.

(1A)If the estate of�cer knows or has reasons to believe that any person is in

unauthorised occupation of the public premises, then, without prejudice to the

provisions of sub-section (1), he shall forthwith issue a notice in writing calling

upon the person concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not

be made.(1B)Any delay in issuing a notice referred to in sub-sections (1) and

(1A) shall not vitiate the proceedings under this Act.

(2)The notice shall—(a)specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is

proposed to be made; and(b)require all persons concerned, that is to say, all

persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the public

premises,—(i)to show cause, if any, against the proposed order on or before

such date as is speci�ed in the notice, being a date not later than seven days

from the date of issue thereof, and(ii)to appear before the estate of�cer on the

date speci�ed in the notice along with the evidence which they intend to

produce in support of the cause shown, and also for personal hearing, if such

hearing is desired.

(3)The estate of�cer shall cause the notice to be served by having it af�xed on

the outer door or some other conspicuous part of the public premises, and in

such other manner as may be prescribed, whereupon the notice shall be

deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned.* * * *

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20) Thus it was not even necessary for the Estate Of�cer to

record an opinion in writing before issuance of show cause notice nor

correctness of that opinion can be questioned in appeal �led against

eviction order. What can be challenged is only the �ndings recorded in

the �nal eviction order.

21) I therefore do not �nd that the very premise on which the

show cause notice was issued was faulty as sought to be suggested by the

Petitioners. Mr. Colabawala’s reliance on the judgment of this Court in

Mine Manager, Manganese Ore (India) Pvt. Ltd. is also inapposite. In

that case, the foundation for initiating eviction proceedings was the

cessation of the Respondent’s service, which was found to be incorrect,

as it was ultimately established that the Respondent had never been in

service of the establishment. Since the basis for issuing the show-cause

notice was held to be erroneous, the eviction order was set aside. This

Court held in Para 7 of the judgment thus:

7. Having said this, it is equally clear to my mind from a perusal of the notice

to show cause that was issued under the Act, that the entire basis of the

proceeding was that the respondent had ceased to be in the employment

of the appellant 25 years ago and was therefore in unauthor ised

occupation. The respondent denied that he was at any time in the service

of the undertaking or that his father was at any time employed with the

appellant or its predecessor. Now it is a common ground between the

parties that neither the respondent, his father nor any member of the

family has been in the service either of the appellant or the predecessor

in interest of the appellant. Therefore, the basis of the show cause notice

which was that the respondent was in unauthorised occupation, after the

period of his service had come to an end, is completely �awed. The

proceedings before the Estate Of�cer ought to have been quashed on this

limited ground. Once it is an accepted position that neither the respondent

nor his predecessor was an employee of the appellant or the erstwhile British

Company, the basis of eviction proposed in the show cause notice, cannot be

sustained. Under the provisions of the Act an order of eviction has to be

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preceded by the notice to show cause which speci�es the grounds on the basis

of which the Estate Of�cer determines that the occupant is in unauthorised

occupation and as to why he should be evicted. The issuance of a proper notice

to show cause is a mandatory requirement of the statute. The show cause

notice is fundamentally �awed in the present case and the eviction proceeding,

is, therefore liable to be quashed and set aside on the aforesaid ground. In

these circumstances, I am of the view that this civil revision application is

liable to be dismissed. However, it is expressly clari�ed that the observations

contained in the impugned order in regard to the plea of adverse possession,

are overruled and the eviction proceedings are quashed only on the ground

that, as stated earlier, the basis and the foundation of the show cause notice

issued under section 4(1) of the Act is vitiated. This was a matter of prejudice

to the respondent because what he was required to meet was whether he had

or had not been in the service of the applicant or the erstwhile British

Company and whether upon the expiry of the period of service, he should be

regarded as a person in unauthorised occupation. However, while disposing of

this civil revision application, it would be appropriate to direct that the

applicant would be at liberty to pursue such remedies as are open to it in law

for the purpose of securing the possession of the premises in question. All the

rights and contentions of the parties are expressly kept open.

(emphasis added)

22) Thus, in the judgment in Mine Manager, it was found that

neither the Respondent therein nor his predecessor was an employee of

the Appellant or of the erstwhile British Company and that therefore the

basis of eviction proposed in the show cause notice was held to be

unsustainable. The basis of loss of employment for initiation of eviction

proceedings cannot be compared with the basis of security perception

forming the basis for issuance of show cause notice. In the present case,

there is no foundational error in issuance of show cause notice for

eviction and therefore the judgment in Mine Manager has no

application to the facts of the present case.

23) Also, in the present case, merely passage of some time for

seeking eviction of Petitioners on the basis of security reports, does not

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mean that the proposal becomes ab-initio void on account of delay. It

must be appreciated that the security reports were not con�ned only to

Amar Building or only to occupation of premises by the Petitioner. The

Ministry of Home Affairs, Intelligence Bureau, had conducted a security

inspection of RBI buildings and submitted its report dated 28 February

2002. A report was provided to RBI in respect of 26 storey New Central

Of�ce Building, 3 storey Main Building and 6 storey Amar Building.

Various security aspects were highlighted and several recommendations

were made in respect of the three buildings. Of the 14 recommendations

made by the Intelligence Bureau, the last one directed that the feasibility

of shifting non-RBI of�ces from Amar Building be explored. Thus,

shifting of Petitioners from Amar Building was actually one of the

several recommendations made by the Intelligence Bureau. While RBI

could have immediately proceeded to initiate eviction proceedings

against the Petitioners after 28 February 2002, it possibly permitted

Petitioners to occupy the premises since the report had recommended

exploration of possibility of shifting of new RBI of�ces at Amar Building.

Another report was received by RBI from the of�ce of Addl.

Commissioner of Police, Mumbai in respect of its three buildings. In

respect of Amar Building, it was once again highlighted that entries to

non-RBI of�ces were not regulated and their visitors could access Amar

Building. May be there was error in the report in describing the location

of Petitioners’ premises on the ground �oor when in fact the entire

premises are situated on the fourth �oor of Amar Building. However,

what needs to be borne in mind is the fact that the Additional

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Commissioner of Police highlighted security threat on account of visitors

of non-RBI of�ces having access to the entire Amar Building.

24) RBI decided to act on the two reports in the year 2009 and

initiated process for eviction of the Petitioners. It cannot be contended

that the delay on the part of the RBI in acting on the two security reports

would enure to the bene�t of the Petitioners in any manner. Such delay

enabled the Petitioners to occupy the premises though the process for

their eviction could have been initiated in the year 2002 itself. In any

case, during pendency of the eviction proceedings, one more security

report of 31 July 2010 was prepared by the Protection and Security

Branch of RBI again recommending eviction of the Petitioner from Amar

Building. It was noted in that report that there were about 650

employees working in non-RBI premises and about 150 visitors were

visiting the premises everyday.

25) It appears that apart from the Petitioners, the premises in

Amar Building were also in occupation of MTNL, David & Co. etc. Those

occupants have already shifted out of Amar Building. Thus, there are as

many as 3 security reports which clearly recommended shifting of non-

RBI occupants from Amar Building from security perspective. The

security aspect needs to be considered from the perception of RBI and

not from the perception of the Petitioners. In my view, the Estate Of�cer

was justi�ed in issuing the show cause notice to the Petitioners and the

foundation in the show cause notice cannot be treated as erroneous in

any manner.

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26) Petitioners have also raised objection about admission of

the security reports in evidence without examination of their authors.

The learned Principal Judge has recorded elaborate reasons to justify

Estate Of�cer’s action in marking the security reports in evidence. In this

regard �ndings recorded by the learned Judge in paragraphs 13 to 19 of

the judgment are relevant, which read thus:

13. In his cross-examination he was asked some questions as to the

security reports submitted by other two agencies namely Intelligence

Bureau and Mumbai Police who have conducted independent

inspection of the said premises. Hence, those two reports are marked

exhibits by Estate Of�cer on the threefold grounds- Firstly as original

reports are produced on record. Secondly, the questions were asked

about the contents of those reports in cross-examinat ion of

Respondent's witness Girdharilal and lastly as provisions of Evidence

Act are not strictly applicable to proceedings before him as they are

summary in nature.

14. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has however seriously assailed

the reasoning of the Estate Of�cer. According to him, unless the authors

of the documents are examined, contents thereof cannot be proved. To

substantiate his contentions, he has relied on Sait Tarajee Khimchand

& Ors. Yelamati Satyam alias Satteyya & Ors. (1972) 4 SCC 562 wherein

it was held that "mere marking of an exhibit does not dispense with the

proof of documents". 

15. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also relied on M/s. Bareilly

Electricity Supply Co.Ltd. V/s.The Workmen & Ors 1971 (2) SCC 617 and

Nandini J.Shah & Anr. V/s. Life Insurance Corporation of India 2008(4)

Mh L.J. 106 to submit that though in proceedings under The Public

Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, the provisions of

Indian Evidence Act or the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable,

even then, the Estate Of�cer is required to hold summary proceedings

in the manner which is in consonance with the basic rule of law and the

principles of natural justice. Herein the case, according to him, though

original security reports are produced on record, the Appellant did not

get an opportunity to cross examine the authors of these reports to

prove that contents thereof are not true or correct and in that way the

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principles of natural justice are not followed by the Estate Of�cer while

relying on these security reports.

16. There may be some substance in the contention of the Learned

Counsel for the Appellant that contents of the said report cannot be

considered as strictly proved as their authors are not examined, but in

my considered opinion, at the same time by production of those

documents it is proved on record that R.B.I. has, in addition to its own

assessment about perception of threat to the security of the said

building, has also got assessed security of the said building from two

independent agencies which are authenticate and experts in the �eld.

This fact is brought on record through examination in chief of the

witness Shri Girdhari Lal. A speci�c question was asked to him that

whether other than Reserve Bank's Security Department, any other

professional agency had made the security study of the R.B.I.'s Security

concern? and he has answered 'Yes' Intelligence Bureau of India and

Mumbai Police have made study and they had also submitted reports.

He has further stated that there is mention about Amar Building

Security in the said reports. Thus, the fact is brought on record that it is

not only the assessment of RBI itself about perception of threat to the

security of Amar Building but it is also backed by reports of two

independent agencies like Intelligence Bureau and Mumbai Police.

17.  Therefore, even if the contents of these reports are for the sake of

argument not taken into consideration being not strictly proved by

examining the authors of the documents, it can be held as proved that

assessment of the security arrangement of Amar Building was done by

two independent agencies in addition to the own security agency of

R.B.I. and relying on this assessment, the opinion about perception of

threat to the security of R.B.I. was arrived at and on the basis thereof,

the eviction proceedings were initiated. Hence, it cannot be said that it

is mere whim, fancy or illusory perception of threat projected by the

R.B.I. to evict the Non-R.B.I. entities from the said building but that

threat perception is also backed by the reports of two independent

agencies.

18. This factual aspect is proved independent of proof of those reports.

It is not the case of the Appellant also that no such security assessment

of Amar Building was done by these two independent agencies. As a

matter of fact, cross-examination of Shri Girdhari Lal categorically goes

to reveal that several questions were put to him, may be without

directly referring to those reports, to bring on record that

recommendations made in the security reports were not implemented.

Though there is no direct reference to the security reports, the contents

thereof were put to this witness indirectly to point out that R.B.I. has

not acted on those security reports. Therefore, in any way, it cannot be

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said that those security reports were totally alien documents and Estate

Of�cer has committed grave illegality by relying on those security

reports. The copies of those security reports were very much made

available to the Appellant though they were secret reports. The

Appellant was given full opportunity not only to cross-examine the

witness Shri Girdhari Lal on those reports but even in the Written

Submissions submitted before the Estate Of�cer contents of those

reports were elaborately dealt with by Learned Counsel for the

Appellant by pointing out that those reports are �awed as they proceed

on assumption that enquiry premises are situate on ground �oor.

Therefore, in that way, it cannot be said that there is violation of

principles of natural justice by the Estate Of�cer when he relied on

those reports, even if in the strict sense they were not proved by

examining the authors of those documents.

19. Moreover, the provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Civil

Procedure are not made strictly applicable to the proceedings before

the Estate Of�cer which are of a summary nature, the very object being

to decide such cases expeditiously without being entangled with the

technicalities of the proof of the documents and strict evidence as such.

What is contemplated, is the observance of principles of natural justice

and herein the case principles of natural justice were observed because

the Appellant was given the copy of those reports and also suf�cient

opportunity to cross-examine the witness of the Respondent No.1 on

the contents of those reports and then also allowed suf�cient

opportunity to advance submissions to challenge the contents of those

reports and to show how they were not correct and not implemented.

The Estate Of�cer has also dealt with all these aspects in detail.

Therefore, there appears no substance in the submission of the Learned

Counsel for the Appellant that as these reports were taken into

consideration though strictly not proved, there is violation of principles

of natural justice.

27) I am in agreement with the �ndings recorded by the learned

Judge for upholding the admissibility of security reports in evidence. It

must be borne in mind that when the RBI assessed the security threat on

the basis of con�dential reports received from the Intelligence Bureau

and the Additional Commissioner of Police, it was not expected to

examine authors of those reports. The security reports were outcome of

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observations by a team of of�cials, who visited the premises from

security perception. Even if the of�cers who have signed the reports were

to be examined, Petitioners would have insisted on examination of all

the of�cers who visited the premises and made their observations. This

is not a criminal trial to apply strict rules of evidence. Petitioner is an

occupant of public premises, who does not enjoy protection of rent

control legislation. They cannot enjoy possession of public premises for

eternity. The Public Promises Act is enacted to ensure swifter recovery

of possession of public premises by the public authorities who do not

have to �le complex legal proceedings for recovery of public property.

This aspect is dealt with in greater details in the latter part of the

judgment. Seen from this perspective, can it be said that the RBI or the

Estate Of�cer are prohibited to rely on con�dential information received

from the IB and Police only for establishing the security perception in

the mind of RBI? The answer, to my mind, appears to be in the negative.

When security concerns are highlighted by the security agencies, the

public authority is justi�ed in entertaining a threat perception and the

affected party cannot question the correctness of the opinion of security

agencies in quasi-judicial proceedings by seeking to cross examine the

of�cers of security agencies. It must also be borne in mind that what is

sought to be established by production of security reports is the factum

of receipt of those reports and perception of RBI about the threats. In

such circumstances, the entity in possession of public premises cannot

seek to question �ndings and recommendations made by security

agencies and seek to establish that there is actually no security threat.

The whole objective behind cross examining the of�cials of IB and Police

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is to establish that presence of Petitioners in the building does not pose

any security threat. That exercise would be impermissible. Petitioners

could only cross examine RBI’s of�cial to establish that the security

reports do not make out any security threat due to presence of

Petitioners in the building. Recommendations made by the security

agencies is one concept and perception of threat due to presence of an

occupier in the public premises by the public authority is a different

concept. There can be no cross examination on the former aspect while

the cross examination can be conducted on the latter aspect.

28) Reliance by Mr. Colabawala on judgment of the Apex Court

in Sait Tarajee Khimchand (supra) is inapposite. The judgment is an

authority on the principle that mere marking of a document as exhibit

does not dispense with the requirement to prove the document. This

principle has no application in the facts of the case in view of the

discussion above. Evidence about the reports is given by the of�cer of

RBI, who has received those reports and therefore it cannot be contended

that there is absolutely no evidence qua those reports.

29) Reliance by the Petitioner on the judgment of the Apex

Court in M/s. Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. does not assist its case.

The judgment is an authority for the principle that, although the

Evidence Act does not apply to the Industrial Tribunal, it must follow

natural justice, and cannot reply upon unproven documents or copies

without proper formal proof or testimony. In that case, the Apex Court

has held that that mere production of a balance sheet and pro�t-and-

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loss account by the management is not enough when the entries and

�nancial claims were seriously contested by the workmen. In the present

case, the principles of natural justice were duly adhered to. The RBI

placed the security reports on record, and copies thereof were supplied

to the Petitioners even though the same concerned security and were

con�dential documents. The security reports contained

recommendations made by security agencies, which were made available

to the Petitioners. Petitioners have conducted in-depth cross

examination of the witness on the security reports. Independent of the

security reports, the RBI’s witnesses also led evidence. In my view,

therefore, it cannot be contended that the Estate Of�cer’s reliance on

security reports violates the principles of natural justice or that there is

no evidence in support thereof.

30) In a quasi-judicial inquiry, where strict rules of evidence do

not apply, it is permissible for of�cer of the organisation, which has

received a report, to give evidence in relation to that report. There is no

absolute allegory to even hearsay evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Hearsay evidence is admissible in domestic inquiries and quasi-judicial

proceedings provided it is logically probative, credible, and possesses a

reasonable nexus to the issue at hand. [SEE: State of Haryana and Anr.

Versus. Rattan Singh

10

]. Here the evidence is not hearsay in strict sense.

The security of�cer of the organisation, which has received the security

reports from security agencies has led evidence about the same.

Ultimately, the evidence is intended to establish the threat perception

10(1977) 2 SCC 491

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and the necessity for evicting the occupants on security grounds. In such

circumstances, the evidence of an RBI witness may be suf�cient to prove

the security report, even in the absence of examination of its authors.

31) Reliance by the Petitioner on the judgment of the Division

Bench of this Court in Nandini J. Shah is also inapposite as this Court

has dealt with a case involving breach of condition of lease by subletting

the premises without authority/consent and change of user. The Division

Bench held that the onus lied on the LIC to establish subletting and

change of user. The Division Bench highlighted the need for Estate

Of�cer to hold summary proceedings in a manner which is in consonance

with the basic rule of law. In that case, a presumption was raised by the

Estate Of�cer about unauthorised occupancy in absence of any concrete

proof of unauthorized subtenancy and change of user. This Court

therefore remanded the proceedings for fresh adjudication before the

Estate Of�cer. The ratio of the judgment has no application to the facts

of the present case where eviction is directed primarily on the ground of

security requirements of RBI. The security requirement is fully

established by production of cogent evidence. The �ndings recorded by

the Estate Of�cer in the present case are not presumptive, but there is

direct evidence on record to support the same. The �ndings cannot be

said to be perverse by any stretch of imagination.

32) Petitioners’ reliance on judgment of this Court in Tirandaz

Subha Niketan CHSL (supra) is inapposite. In that case, this Court has

dealt with the issue of legality of a stop-work notice issued near a

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defence establishment and has ruled that the Central Government's

executive guidelines or circulars requiring a mandatory No Objection

Certi�cate from naval/defence authorities cannot have retrospective

effect or can override the lawfully granted municipal permissions, where

no statutory backing under the Works of Defence Act, 1903 was validly

noti�ed for the land. Relying on the judgment of Division Bench in

Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL, Mr. Colabawala has contended that

security perspective put forth by defence establishments cannot fall

outside the scope of judicial review. The Division Bench has upheld the

cardinal principle that the security of nation must be accorded

supremacy over individual commercial interests. The observations made

in Para 21 of the judgment about scope of judicial review are in the

context of naval establishment being a mere residential colony and

presence of higher buildings in the vicinity. This Court went through the

communication of Senior Police Inspector about security issues and held

that the letter did not cite any security threat for construction of a

building of a particular height. In the present case however, there are

speci�c recommendations for removal of non-RBI establishments from

Amar Building by the security agencies. The judgment of this Court in

Tirandaz Subha Niketan CHSL, rendered in the facts of that case,

therefore cannot be cited in support of an abstract proposition that in

every case, the scope of judicial review would extend over security

matters.

33) I am also not able to accept the allegation of arbitrariness

sought to be leveled by the Petitioners. The RBI has not acted on mere

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whims and caprices in the present case and initiated the eviction

proceedings based on concrete material. The eviction action is also not

motivated by commercial considerations.

34) Mr. Colabawala has submitted that the de�nition of the term

'unauthorised occupation’ under Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act

talks of determination of tenancy ‘for any reason whatsoever’ and that

therefore there has to be a cogent reason for determination of the

authority to occupy the premises. Section 2(g) of the Act de�nes the term

'unauthorised occupation' thus:

“unauthorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means

the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority

for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any

person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of

grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to

occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any

reason whatsoever.

(emphasis and underlining added)

35) Thus, occupation of the premises becomes unauthorised

either when a person occupies the premises without any authority or

when the authority, under which the person was permitted to occupy the

premises, expires or is determined. The expression “for any reason

whatsoever” used in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act in relation to

the determination of authority essentially refers to a case where the

authority to occupy the premises is determined during the subsistence of

such authority. For example, if the premises are leased for a tenure of 30

years and the lease is terminated in the 28

th

year, the reason for such

determination of authority must be justi�ed. To illustrate, if it is alleged

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that the lessee has unauthorisedly sublet the premises or changed the

user of the premises, and the authority to occupy the premises is

determined during subsistence of such authority, the speci�c ground of

unauthorised subletting or change of user must be stated in the notice

and must also be duly proved in the eviction proceedings. Another

example can be where an employee is permitted to occupy service

quarters and the condition of service permits him to occupy the same

while being in service. Suppose he breaches the condition of authority to

occupy by subletting the quarters, the authority can be determined by

assigning that reason. However when he/she reties from service, the

authority to occupy the public premises expires and no reasons are

required to be recorded or established for his/her eviction.

36) There is no necessity to record or establish a reason for

determination of authority where there is no speci�c tenure of lease and

the occupant occupies the public premises under a misnomer that his

tenancy is protected by Rent Act. Once it is clear that there is no

protection of Rent Act to the premises or to the tenancy, the same

becomes simple monthly tenancy, terminable under Section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act, without assigning any reason.

37) In the present case, Petitioners have continued to occupy

the premises on a misconception that they are statutory tenants and are

entitled to protection of Rent Control legislation. They otherwise did not

have any authority to occupy the premises. Once it got clari�ed that they

are not entitled to protection of their tenancy under the rent control

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legislation, their occupancy becomes that of a simple monthly tenancy,

terminable by giving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property

Act. In such situation, neither any reason is required to be speci�ed for

termination of tenancy nor such reason needs to be established before

the Estate Of�cer.

38) Therefore, it was not really necessary for the RBI to prove

any grounds such as security threat or bona�de requirement for seeking

eviction of the Petitioners. The expression 'for any reason whatsoever'

appearing in Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act has to be

understood in the context of the reason for determination of the

authority. In cases involving leases in absence of tenure under Section

106 the Transfer of Property Act, no reasons are required to be cited for

termination of tenancy and the only requirement is service of notice of 6

months where the tenancy is annual (agricultural or manufacturing

purposes) or 15 days where the tenancy is monthly (for all other

purposes). Therefore, when tenancy is a simple monthly tenancy

determinable under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, use of

the expression 'for any reason whatsoever' cannot be interpreted to mean

that even for terminating a monthly tenancy under Section 106 of the

Transfer of Property Act, reasons are required to be recorded or that such

reasons are required to be established before the Estate Of�cer. This is

settled position by the judgment of the Apex court in Jiwan Dass (supra),

ratio of which is discussed in the latter part of the judgment.

39) Once rent control protection to the premises is withdrawn,

the occupation gets converted into a normal monthly tenan cy

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terminable by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act

without assigning reasons. Illustration in this regard can be considered

under Section 3(1)(b) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (MRC

Act). After advent of the MRC Act, certain entities enumerated in Section

3(1)(b) thereof, are excluded from the application of the MRC Act. One of

the excluded entities is where the share capital of the tenant company

exceeds Rs.1 crore. Thus, a corporate entity whose share capital exceeds

Rs.1 crore loses protection from eviction and rent escalation under the

MRC Act. Similar is the case with regard to Banks, PSUs, etc. Since

provisions of MRC Act are inapplicable to the premises occupied by such

excluded entities, their tenancy can be terminated by issuance of notice

under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. No reasons are

required to be cited or established for termination of tenancy of such

excluded entities. The landlord in such cases can �led ejectment action

under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act 1882. On

similar lines, once the judgment of the Apex Court in Life Insurance

Corporation of India V/s. Vita has clari�ed that protection of rent

control legislation is no longer available to premises governed by the

provisions of the Public Premises Act, the authority to occupy public

premises can be withdrawn by issuance of notice without citing any

reason.

40) If Mr. Colabawala’s contention that valid reasons must be

cited and established for the determination of the authority to occupy

public premises is accepted, it would place public premises on a higher

pedestal than the private premises occupied by an excluded entities

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under Section 3(1)(b) of the MRC Act. Thus, in the case of a private

landlord, a tenancy in respect of premises which earlier enjoyed rent

control protection under the Bombay Rent Act, but which is now

excluded under Section 3 (1)(b) of MRC Act, can be terminated without

citing any reason. However, Petitioner contends that the public authority

would be required to justify the reasons for withdrawing the authority to

occupy public premises that no longer enjoy the protection of rent

control legislation. Such a position is wholly incongruous, absurd and is

incapable of being countenanced. This principle is also accepted by the

Apex Court in Jiwan Dass (supra) which is discussed in latter part of the

judgment.

41) In my view therefore when premises are occupied on the

assumption of protection of rent control legislation, on account of

declaration of law by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation of

India V/s. Vita about non-applicability of rent laws, the authority to

occupy the public premises can be withdrawn without citing any reason

and it is not necessary for the public authority to establish any valid

reason for withdrawal of such authority. An entity occupying public

premises in respect of which rent control protection is inapplicable and

in respect of which authority to occupy has expired or has been

determined, cannot remain in occupation of public premises and must

vacate the same. While a private landlord may have to �le a suit for

eviction under Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts

Act,1882 for eviction of excluded entities under Section 3(1)(b) of the

MRC Act, for government authority swifter mechanism in the form of

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Public Premises Act is created for ensuring faster eviction from public

premises.

42) Reliance by Petitioners on judgment of the Apex Court in

Jiwan Dass (supra), far from assisting their case, actually militates

against them. The Apex Court has held in the judgment that public

statutory corporations under the Act can terminate tenancies and seek

eviction under the Public Premises Act without any need to justify the

action or disclose speci�c reasons. The Apex Court has held thus:

4. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does indicate that the landlord is entitled to

terminate the tenancy by giving 15 days' notice, if it is a premises occupied on

monthly tenancy and by giving 6 months' notice if the premises are occupied

for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, and on expiry thereof proceedings

could be initiated. Section 106 of the T.P. Act does not contemplate of

giving any reason for terminating the tenancy. Equally the de�nition of

the public premises ‘unauthorised occupation’ under Section 2(g) of the

Act postulates that the tenancy “has been determined for any reason

whatsoever”. When the statute has advisedly given wide powers to the

public authorities under the Act to determine the tenancy, it is not

permissible to cut down the width of the powers by reading into it the

reasonable and justi�able grounds for initiating action for terminating

the tenancy under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. If it is so read Section 106

of T.P. Act and Section 2(g) of the Act would become ultra vires. The

statute advisedly empowered the authority to act in the public interest and

determine the tenancy or leave or licence before taking action under Section 5

of the Act. If the contention of the appellant is given acceptance he would

be put on a higher pedestal than a statutory tenant under the Rent Act.

Take for example that a premises is let out at a low rent years back like the

present one. The rent is unrealistic. With a view to revise adequate market

rent, tenant became liable to ejectment.

(emphasis and underlining added)

43) The principle of absence of necessity to cite and establish

reasons/grounds for eviction from public premises, not enjoying rent

control protection, is discussed by this Court in Bank of Maharashtra

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Versus. Mrs. Gunwanti Kashinath Zarkar in which it is held in

paragraph 23 as under:

23. As a matter of fact, the inquiry into existence of any bona�de

requirement is not even required in the facts and circumstances of the

present case. The PP Act does not envisage any protection to the

occupants of public premises unlike the provisions of Section 13 of the

Bombay Rent Act or Section 16 of the MRC Act. It is not necessary for

the owner of the premises to establish any ground for seeking

eviction of the occupant from the public premises. Occupation of

public premises can only be under express authority and only for

so long as such authority continues to subsist. The moment the

authority comes to an end, the occupation is automatica lly

rendered unauthorised. In that sense, it was not even required for

the Petitioner to establish any bona�de requirement. The authority

to occupy the premises is terminated by issuance of notices by the Bank.

The moment the authority is terminated, the occupation becomes

unauthorised. In my view, therefore an inquiry into the aspect of

bona�de requirement was quite unnecessary and it is not necessary to

delve any further into that aspect.

(emphasis added)

44) In my view therefore, it was not necessary for the

Respondents to establish any speci�c ground for seeking eviction of

premises in occupation of the Petitioners. Nonetheless, the ground of

security threat is properly established in the facts of the present case.

45) Mr. Colabawala had relied on the Guidelines published by

the Government of India on 30 May 2002 in support of his contention

that eviction action cannot be initiated with the commercial motive or

for securing vacant possession of the premises in order to accommodate

its own staff. According to him, the guidelines provide that occupation

of the premises could not be treated as unauthorised merely upon

service of a notice of termination; rather, the question of unauthorised

occupation needs to be determined by following due process of law. In

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my view the guidelines, apart from not having any statutory force,

otherwise does not assist the case of the Petitioners. Here, RBI is not

seeking eviction of Petitioners for commercial motives. There is nothing

on record to show that RBI would rent out the premises or would offer

the same to its employees for residence after recovering possession

thereof from Petitioner.

46) Reliance by Mr. Colabawala on judgment of the Apex Court

in Banatwala & Company (supra) is inapposite. That judgment is an

authority on the principle that state rent control laws continue to apply

to public premises for matters not covered by the Public Premises Act,

speci�cally regarding the �xation of standard rent and the maintenance

of essential services. Here the issue of determination of standard rent or

provision of essential services is not involved. Also, in view of the law

subsequently declared by the Apex Court in Life Insurance Corporation

of India V/s. Vita it would be too adventurous on the part of the

Petitioners to suggest that they can still enjoy the protection of MRC Act

qua eviction aspect. Mr. Colabawala has fairly not travelled to that

extreme proposition. Therefore the judgment in Banatwala & Company

cannot be relied on to suggest that the grounds akin to Section 16 of the

MRC Act must be established even for eviction under the provisions of

the Public Premises Act.

47) Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the

view that no palpable error can be traced in the judgments and orders

passed by the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court. Even otherwise

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exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 by this Court for

protecting possession of premises by the Petitioners is not at all

warranted. This Court cannot sit as an Appellate Court over the �ndings

recorded by the Estate Of�cer and by the Principal Judge by re-

appreciating the evidence. I �nd no perversity in the �ndings recorded by

the Estate Of�cer and by the Principal Judge. Though not required, RBI

has established its requirement of the public premises for security

purposes. Petitioner has not been able to make out a case that the threat

perception and security concerns perceived by RBI, based on material on

record, is totally unfounded. Thus, no case is made out for interference in

the impugned orders.

48) Petitioners have been occupying the premises for the last 13

long years after passing of the impugned eviction order on 15 April 2013.

Pendency of litigation has enabled them to remain in occupation of the

premises for a considerable period of time. As a matter of fact,

Petitioners had undertaken to scout for alternate premises on 12 January

1961. However, for the last 65 long years, they are still occupying the

public premises. Time has come for them to vacate the possession of

public premises.

49) The Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed. However,

considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, there shall

be no order as to costs.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

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50) After the judgment is pronounced,  Mr. Colabbawala, the

learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner prays for continuation of

interim order for a period of four weeks.  Request is opposed by Mr.

Tulzapurkar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for th e

Respondennt-RBI. Considering the fact that interim protection is

running in favour of the Petitioners since 6 March 2014, the same shall

continue to operate for a period of four weeks.

[SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]

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NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Digitally

signed by

NEETA

SHAILESH

SAWANT

Date:

2026.10.26

20:11:22

+0530