High Court of H.P.1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH,

SHIMLA

    Cr.MMO  No.703 of 2019

Date of Decision: 19.11.2019

________________________________________________________

Rishi Sharma  …. Petitioner

Versus 

Prince Thakur              …..Respondent

________________________________________________________

Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting? 

1

  Yes.

For the petitioner:  Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate.

       For the respondent:Nemo.

____________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, Judge  (oral):

Having   regard   to   the   nature   of   the   order

proposed to be  passed in the given facts and circumstances

of the case,  this Court deems it not necessary to issue notice

to the respondent and as such, same is dispensed with. 

2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order

dated   19.7.2019,   passed   by   learned   Additional   Sessions

Judge­I, Una, (Circuit Court camp at Amb) District Una,

H.P., in Criminal miscellaneous application No.298/2019,

1

Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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whereby   learned   Appellate   Court   while   allowing   the

application for suspension of sentence awarded by learned

Judicial Magistrate, 1

st

  Class, Court No.II, Amb, District

Una, H.P. vide judgment/order of conviction/sentence dated

24.5.2019/19.6.2019, passed in complaint No.195­I­11/35­II­

2012,   directed   the   petitioner­accused  (hereinafter

‘accused’)  to deposit a sum of Rs.1, 16,000/­ in the trial

Court towards part realization of the compensation, within a

period of 30 days, accused has approached this Court in the

instant   proceedings   filed   under   Section   482   of   Cr.P.C,

praying therein to set­aside the aforesaid impugned order.

3. In nutshell, grouse of the petitioner­accused is

that bare perusal of Section 389 Cr.P.C, nowhere suggests

that Appellate Court  while considering the application for

suspension   of   sentence,   is   necessarily   required   to   issue

direction to the person in appeal for depositing amount of

compensation, if any, awarded by the learned trial Court.

4. At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce

Section 389 Cr.P.C, herein:­

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“389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal;

release of appellant on bail___(1) Pending any appeal

by   a   convicted   person,   the   Appellate   Court   may,   for

reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the

execution of the sentence or order appealed against be

suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be

released on bail, or on his own bond.

Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing

on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is

convicted   of   an   offence   punishable   with   death   or

imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not

less than ten years, shall give opportunity  to the Public

Prosecutor   for   showing   cause   in   writing   against   such

release:

Provided further that in cases where a convicted person

is released on bail it shall be open to the pubic prosecutor

to file an application for the cancellation of the bail]

(2) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate

Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the

case   of   an   appeal   by   a   convicted   person   to   a   Court

subordinate thereto.

(3) Where the convicted person satisfies the Court by

which   he   is   convicted   that   he   intends   to   present   an

appeal, the Court shall,­

(i) where   such  person,   being   on  bail,  is   sentenced  to

imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or

(ii) where the offence of which such person has been

convicted is a bailable one, and he is on bail,

order   that   the   convicted   person   be   released   on   bail,

unless there are special reasons for refusing bail, for such

period as will afford sufficient time to present the appeal

and obtain the orders of the Appellate Court under sub­

section (1); and the sentence of imprisonment shall, so

long   as   he   is   so   released   on   bail,   be   deemed   to   be

suspended.

(4) When   the   appellant   is   ultimately   sentenced   to

imprisonment for a term or to imprisonment for life, the

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time during which he is so released shall be excluded in

computing the term for which he is so sentenced.

5. True, it is that bare perusal of Section 389 of

Cr.P.C, which is reproduced hereinabove, nowhere suggests

that Appellate Court while considering the application for

suspension   of   sentence   cannot   order   for   suspension   of

sentence awarded by the learned trial Court without calling

upon the person seeking suspension of sentence to deposit

amount of compensation, if any, awarded by the learned

court   below.   Normally   such   orders   are   passed   by   the

Appellate Court to  balance the  equities  and mitigate the

hardship caused  to a person in whose favour  though order

of   compensation/   payment   stands   passed   but   he/she   is

unable to bear fruit of the same on account of  pendency of

appeal, if any, having been filed by the opposite party.

6.   Solely with a view to mitigate the hardship of

complainant, especially in proceedings under Section 138 of

the Negotiable Instruments Act, Section 143 of the Act has

been incorporated, whereby Courts can order  accused to pay

20%   of   the   cheque   amount   during   the   pendency   of

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proceedings   under   Section   138   of   the   Act.   Aforesaid

provision   of   law   has   been   incorporated   with   a   view   to

provide   interim   relief   to   the   complainant,   who   is

unnecessarily compelled to approach the Court of law for

realization of his/her own money. Similarly, the appeal  is

statutory right of a person and such right cannot be allowed

to   be   defeated   merely   on   account   of   non­deposit   of

compensation amount, if any, awarded by the learned trial

Court.

7. Hon’ble   Apex   Court   in   case   titled  Dilip   S.

Dahanukar vs. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. and another,

(2007) 6 Supreme Court Cases 528, has categorically held

that power of Court to suspend the sentence with regard to

realization   of   compensation   is   totally   different   from   its

power to issue direction for realization of fine. Though, in

the aforesaid judgment Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically

held that Appellate Court while suspending the sentence, is

entitled to put appellant on terms, but an order may not  be

passed which the appellant cannot comply with, resulting

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him   being   sent   to   the   prison.   It   would   be   relevant   to

reproduce following paras of the judgment herein:­

“51. Section 389 does  not  deal  with  exactly a   similar

situation. Section 389 of the Code is to be read with Section

387 thereof.   Suspension   of   a   sentence   and   enlarging   an

appellant on bail, who is convicted and realization of fine

has   been   dealt   with   by   the   Parliament   under   different

provisions  of the Code. The power of the Court, thus, to

suspend a sentence in regard to realization of compensation

may be different from that of a direction in realization of

fine.

52.If realization of an amount of compensation payable to a

victim as envisaged under Clause (d) of sub­Section (1) of

Section 357 is to be stayed under sub­Section (2) thereof,

there is no reason why the amount of compensation payable

in   terms   of   sub­Section   (3)   shall   not   receive   the   same

treatment.

53. Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation in a situation

of this nature, in our opinion, shall be applied.

54. In R (Haw) vs. Secretary of State for the Home

Department & Anr. [(2006) 3 All ER pp.438­39, paras 42 &

44­45)

"42...a   passage   from   Bennion   Statutory

Interpretation   (4th   edn,   2002)   810   (section   304)

entitled, `Nature of purposive construction'. That

begins with the following words:

`A purposive construction of an enactment is one

which gives effect to the legislative purpose by­ (a)

following the literal meaning of the enactment

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where   the   meaning   is   in   accordance   with   the

legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive­

and­literal construction), or (b) applying a strained

meaning   where   the   literal   meaning   is   not   in

accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code

called a purposive­and­strained construction).' 

* * *

44. The passage from Bennion continues:

'...I   am   not   reluctant   to   adopt   a   purposive   construction

where   to   apply   the   literal   meaning   of   the   legislative

language used would lead to results which would clearly

defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on

which   a   court   of   justice   is   engaged   remains   one   of

construction, even where this involves reading into the Act

words which are not expressly included in it. [Kammins

Ballroom   Co.   Ltd.  v.   Zenith   Investments   (Torquay)   Ltd.

(1970) 2 All ER 871, [1971] AC 850, [1970] 3 WLR 287]

provides an instance of this; but in that case the three

conditions  that must  be fulfilled in order to justify this

course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine

from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a

whole   precisely   what   the   mischief   was   that   it   was   the

purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that

the   draftsman   and   Parliament   had   by   inadvertence

overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that

required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be

achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty

what   were   the   additional   words   that   would   have   been

inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had

their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill

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passed into law.Unless this third condition is fulfilled any

attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the

Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to

determine  what   is   the  meaning   of  a  written  law  which

Parliament has passed.'

45. The passage from Bennion continues:

'Lord Diplock's third point is, with respect, erroneous. The

argument that in Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates

Lord Diplock was mistaken in saying that for a rectifying

construction to be effected it must be possible to state with

certainty what the missing words are, has been endorsed by

the House of Lords.Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said that

the court must be sure of "the substance of the provision

Parliament would have used" [See Inco Europe Ltd. v. First

Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 2 All ER 109, [2000] 2 All

ER 109, [2000] 1 WLR 586].'"

{See also K.L. Gupta vs. Bombay Municipal Corpn. [(1968) 1

SCR 274 : AIR 1968 SC 303];  Maruti Udyog Ltd. vs. Ram Lal

[(2005) 2 SCC 638 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 308]; Reserve Bank of

India vs. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd.

[(1987) 1 SCC 424]; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation

Corpn. Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [(1990) 3 SCC

682]; Balram Kumawat vs. Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC 628] and

Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 SCC 682].} 

55. Unfortunately, the Legislature has not made any

express provision in this behalf. In absence of any express

provision, the question must be considered having regard to

the overall object of a statute. We have noticed hereinbefore

that Article 21 of the Constitution of India read with Section

374 of Crl.P.C. confers a right of appeal. Such a right is an

absolute one. In a case where a judgment of conviction has

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been awarded, the Court can release a person on bail having

regard to the nature of offence but as also the other relevant

factors including its effect on society. A person upon arrest

may have to remain in jail as an under trial prisoner. So

would a person upon conviction. A person may also have to

remain in jail, in the event he defaults in payment of fine, if

he is so directed. But when a direction is issued for payment

of compensation, having regard to Sub­Section (2) of Section

357 of the Code, the application thereof should ordinarily be

directed to be stayed. It will, therefore, be for the Court to

stay the operation of that part of the judgment whereby and

whereunder   compensation   has   been   directed   to   be   paid,

which would necessarily mean that some conditions therefor

may  also be  imposed.  A  fortiori  a  part  of  the amount  of

compensation may be directed to be deposited, but the same

must be a reasonable amount.

56. An order may not be passed which the appellant

cannot   comply   with   resulting   him   being   sent   to   prison.

Appellate Court, in such cases, must make an endeavour to

strike   a   balance.  Section 421 of   the   Code   of   the   Criminal

Procedure may take recourse to, but therefor he cannot be

remanded to custody.

57.The   Parliament   has   dealt   with   the   imposition   of

substantive sentence and a sentence of fine vis­`­vis payment

of compensation differently.

58.A penal statute, in the event, the different meanings are

possible to be given, must be construed liberally in favour of

an accused.

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59.While the Court shall give due weight to the need of the

victim, it cannot ignore the right of an accused. In a case of

conflict, construction which favours the accused shall prevail.

60.In   a   case   of   this   nature,   the   Court   must   invoke   the

doctrine of purposive construction. Sub­Section (2) of  Section

357 was enacted for a definite purpose. It must be given its

full effect.

61.Reliance has been placed on a judgment of a learned

Single   Judge   of   the   Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   in  V.

Prasada Rao vs. The State of A.P. & Anr. [2002 Crl. Law

Journal 395]. The learned Judge opined that the purpose of

stay in sub­Section (2) of Section 357 would cover a case both

under sub­Section (1) as also under sub­Section (3) stating:­

(Cri. LJ p.397, para 8)

"8. The fine amount imposed by the Court as a sentence

shall have to be recovered in the first instance so that

the whole of the said amount or part of it can be applied

towards expenses and towards compensation. The Code

clearly   envisages   recovery   of   fine   amount.   The

execution,   suspension,   remission   and  commutation  of

sentences passed by a criminal Court is envisaged under

Chapter XXXII of the Code. It is in four parts. Part A

deals   with   the   death   sentences,   Part   B   deals   with

imprisonment, Part C with levy of fine and Part D deals

with general provisions regarding execution. Coming in

the realm of Part C.Section 421 envisages the procedure

of recovery of fine. There has been no specific provision

for recovery of compensation awarded by the criminal

Court. If the compensation awarded is from out of the

fine amount there is no difficulty. However, under the

general provisions of Part D, Section 431 covers the field.

It is a residuary provision, which caters to the above

piquant situation.

The learned Judge referred to  Section 431 of the Code

and observed :(Cri. L.J. p 398, para 9)

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"9.The object of granting compensation is one and the

same   under   these   provisions.   When   the   order   of

compensation   granted   under   sub­section   (1)   gets

automatically stayed in the event of filing an appeal

there is no reason as to why the stay shall not operate in

respect of the compensation granted under sub­section

(3)   of  Section 357 of   the   Code.   Merely   because   sub­

section (2) is coming under sub­section (1) and speaks of

fine imposed by the Court in an appealable case the

benefit of the stay engrafted under the Section cannot

be restricted to sub­section (1) alone nor its application

be excluded to the provisions of sub­section (3) thereof.

It is manifest now even the compensation granted under

sub­section (3) of Section 357 shall have to be recovered

only   as   if   it   were   a   fine.   Consequently,   the   stay

engrafted under sub­section (2) in my considered view

equally applies to the compensation granted under sub­

section (3) of Section 357 of the Code. It is not a case of

suspending the sentence of fine where it is open to the

Court to impose a condition either for deposit of a part

of   the   fine   amount   or   for   such   condition   as   is

appropriate in the context. Section 357 which enables the

Court to grant compensation, inheres in itself a bar for

such   payment   of   compensation   under   sub­section   (2)

which operates automatically. Imposing a condition in

this   regard   has   not   been   clearly   envisaged   by   that

Section.   Oblivious   of   the   legal   position   the   learned

Judge   directed   the   petitioner   to   furnish   third   party

security."

62. In K. Bhaskaran vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan &

Anr. [(1999) 7 SCC 510], this Court held :(SCC p.521, para 31)

"31. However, the Magistrate in such cases can

alleviate   the   grievance   of   the   complainant   by

making resort to  Section 357(3) of the Code. It is

well to remember that this Court has emphasised

the need for making liberal use of that provision

(Hari   Singh   v.   Sukhbir   Singh).   No   limit   is

mentioned   in   the   sub­section   and   therefore,   a

Magistrate can award any sum as compensation.

Of   course   while   fixing   the   quantum   of   such

compensation the Magistrate has to consider what

would be the reasonable amount of compensation

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payable to the complainant. Thus, even if the trial

was before a Court of a Magistrate of the First

Class   in   respect   of   a   cheque   which   covers   an

amount exceeding Rs 5000 the Court has power to

award   compensation   to   be   paid   to   the

complainant."

{See also Suganthi Suresh Kumar vs. Jagdeeshan [(2002)

2 SCC 420].} 

63.Recently,   in  National   Insurance   Co.   Ltd.   vs.   Laxmi

Narain Dhut [2007 (4) SCALE 36], a Division Bench of this

Court laid down the law in the following terms:(SCC pp 717­

18, paras 32­33)

"32. A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in

construing a statute, it  is necessary to seek the

intention   of   its   maker.   A   statute   has   to   be

construed   according   to   the   intent   of   those   who

make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the

true   intention   of   the   Legislature.   If   a   statutory

provision is open to more than one interpretation

the Court has to choose that interpretation which

represents   the   true   intention   of   the   Legislature.

This task very often raises difficulties because of

various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may

not   be   scientific   symbols   having   any   precise   or

definite   meaning   and   the   language   may   be   an

imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that

the assembly of Legislatures consisting of persons

of various shades of opinion purport to convey a

meaning  which  may be obscure.  It  is  impossible

even for the most imaginative Legislature to foresee

all situations exhaustively and circumstances that

may   emerge   after   enacting   a   statute   where   its

application   may   be   called   for.   Nonetheless,   the

function of the Courts is only to expound and not to

legislate. Legislation in a modern State is actuated

with  some   policy   to  curb   some   public  evil   or  to

effectuate  some public  benefit.  The  legislation  is

primarily   directed   to   the   problems   before   the

Legislature based on information derived from past

and present experience. It may also be designed by

use of general words to cover similar problems

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arising   in   future.   But,   from   the   very   nature   of

things, it is impossible to anticipate fully the varied

situations arising in future in which the application

of the legislation in hand may be called for, and,

words   chosen   to   communicate   such   indefinite

referents are bound to be in many cases lacking in

clarity   and   precision   and   thus   giving   rise   to

controversial questions of construction. The process

of construction combines both literal and purposive

approaches. In other words the legislative intention

i.e., the true or legal meaning of an enactment is

derived by considering the meaning of the words

used   in   the   enactment   in   the   light   of   any

discernible purpose or object  which  comprehends

the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment

is directed. (See District Mining Officer and Ors. v. Tata

Iron & Steel Co. and Anr.JT 2001 (6) SC 183).

33.It is also well settled that to arrive at the

intention of the legislation depending on the objects

for which the enactment is made, the Court can

resort   to   historical,   contextual   and   purposive

interpretation leaving textual interpretation aside."

It was also opined:(SCC pp 718­19, para 35)

"35 More often than not, literal interpretation of a

statute   or   a   provision   of   a   statute   results   in

absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory

provisions,   the   Courts   should   keep   in   mind   the

objectives or purpose for which statute has been

enacted. Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court

in   an   article   titled   as   Some   Reflections   on   the

Reading   of   Statutes   (47   Columbia   Law   Reports

527), observed that,

"legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some

mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change

of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That 

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aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of

the   air;   it   is   evidenced   in   the   language   of   the

statutes,   as   read   in   the   light   of   other   external

manifestations of purpose"."

64.We, generally, agree with the observations made by the

learned Judge, the same shall, however, be subject to any

observations made hereinbefore.

65.The matter has to be considered from another angle. An

accused for commission of an offence under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act would ordinarily be granted bail;

in view of the fact that the offence is a bailable one.

66.The right to appeal from a judgment of conviction vis­`­vis

the provisions of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

and other provisions thereof, as mentioned hereinbefore, must

be considered having regard to the fundamental right of an

accused enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

as also the international covenants operating in the field.

67.It is of some significance to notice that in  Jolly George

Varghese and Another vs. The Bank of Cochin[(1980) 2 SCC

360], this Court opined:

"10. Equally meaningful is the import of Article 21 of the

Constitution in the context of imprisonment for non­

payment of debts. The high value of human dignity and

the worth of the human person enshrined in Article 21,

read with Arts. 14 and 19, obligates the State not to

incarcerate except under law which is fair, just and

reasonable in its procedural essence. Maneka Gandhi's

case [1978] 1 S.C.R. 248 as developed further in Sunil

Batra v. Delhi Administration,  Sita Ram and Ors. v.

State of U.P. and  Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration lays

down   the   proposition.   It   is   too   obvious   to   need

elaboration that to cast a person in prison because of

his poverty and consequent inability to meet his 

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contractual liability is appalling. To be poor, in this

land of daridra Narayana, is no crime and to 'recover'

debts by the procedure of putting one in prison is too

flagrantly violative of Article 21 unless there is proof of

the minimal fairness of his wilful failure to pay in spite

of his sufficient means and absence of more terribly

pressing claims on his means such as medical bills to

treat cancer or other grave illness. Unreasonableness

and unfairness in such a procedure is inferable from

Article 11 of  the  Covenant.   But   this   is   precisely   the

interpretation we have put on the Proviso to Section 51

C.P.C. and the lethal blow of  Article 21 cannot strike

down the provision, as now interpreted.

11. The words which hurt are "or has had since

the date of the decree, the means to pay the amount of

the decree". This implies, superficially read, that if at

any   time   after   the   passing   of   an   old   decree   the

judgment­debtor had come by some resources and had

not   discharged   the   decree,   he   could   be   detained   in

prison even though at that later point of time he was

found to be penniless. This is not a sound position apart

from being inhuman going by the standards of  Article

11(of the Covenant) and  Article 21(of the Constitution) The

simple default to discharge is not enough. There must

be some element of bad faith beyond mere indifference

to pay, some deliberate or recusant disposition in the

past or, alternatively, current means to pay the decree

or a substantial part of it. The provision emphasises the

need   to   establish   not   mere   omission   to   pay   but   an

attitude   of   refusal   on   demand   verging   on   dishonest

disowning   of   the   obligation   under   the   decree.   Here

considerations of the debtor's other pressing needs and

straitened   circumstances   will   play   prominently.   We

would   have,   by   this   construction,   sauced   law   with

justice, harmonised  Section 51 with the Covenant and

the Constitution."

68.It is also of some significance to note that whereas under

Section 357(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure a fine of Rs.

5000/­ can be imposed; fine in terms of Section 357(2) thereof

can be twice the amount of cheque whereas there is no upper

limit for award of a compensation. But the same would be

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subject to other provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure

which   mandates   that   the   amount   of   fine   imposed   on   an

accused cannot be more than Rs. 5000/­. The very fact that the

Parliament did not think it fit to put a ceiling limit in regard

to the amount of compensation leviable upon an accused, the

discretionary   jurisdiction   thereto   must   be   exercised

judiciously.   Ordinarily,   an   accused   shall   not   be   taken   in

custody   during   trial.   Thus,   while   exercising   the   appellate

power, ordinarily, a person should not suffer imprisonment

only   because   the   conditions   imposed   for   suspending   the

sentence are harsh.

69. We are of the opinion that having regard to the

aforementioned factors the amount of compensation not only

must be reasonable one, the conditions for suspending the

sentence should also be reasonable. It is only with that intent

in   view,   the   doctrine   of   purposive   construction   should   be

applied.

70. We would, however, like to put a note of caution

that   the   right   of   an   accused   unnecessarily   need   not   be

enlarged but it is the court's duty to duly protect his right.

71. We are prima facie of the opinion (without going

into the merit of the appeal) that the direction of the learned

Trial Judge appears to be somewhat unreasonable. Appellant

herein has been sentenced to imprisonment. Only fine has

been   imposed   on   the   Company.   Thus,   for   all   intent   and

purpose,   the   learned   Trial   Judge   has   invoked   both   Sub­

sections (1) and (3) of Section 357 of the Code. The liability of

the appellant herein was a vicarious one in terms of Section 141

of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The question may also

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have to be considered from the angle that the learned Trial

Judge thought it fit to impose a fine of Rs. 25,000/­ only upon

the  Company.   If  that   be  so,  a   question  would  arise  as   to

whether an amount of compensation for a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs

should have been directed to be paid by the Chairman of the

Company. We feel that it is not.

72.We, therefore, are of the opinion :

i) In a case of this nature, Sub­Section (2) of Section

357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be

attracted even when Appellant was directed to pay

compensation;

ii) The Appellate Court, however, while suspending

the sentence, was entitled to put the appellant on

terms. However, no such term could be put as a

condition   precedent   for   entertaining   the   appeal

which is a constitutional and statutory right;

iii)   The   amount   of   compensation   must   be   a

reasonable sum;

iv) The Court, while fixing such amount, must have

regard   to   all   relevant   factors   including   the   one

referred to in Sub­Section (5) of 357 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure;

v) No unreasonable amount of compensation can be

directed to be paid”.

8. Careful perusal of aforesaid exposition of law laid

down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, suggests that Appellate

Court while suspending the sentence, if any, imposed by the

trial Court though is not totally barred or estopped from

directing the appellant to deposit the amount, but such

amount should be reasonable. In the case at hand, learned

Additional   Sessions   Judge­I,   Una,   while   suspending   the

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sentence imposed by the trial Court has ordered for deposit

of  40% (Rs. 1,16,000) of the compensation amount awarded

by the learned trial Court, which is definitely on higher side.

9. Consequently, in view of the above, the present

petition  is allowed and impugned order dated 19.7.2019

passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge­I, Una, (Camp

at Amb)  District  Una,  H.P.,  is  modified  and accused is

directed   to   deposit   25%   of   the   compensation   amount

awarded by the learned trial Court, within a period of four

weeks. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed

of.

(Sandeep Sharma),

  Judge

19

th

 November, 2019

         (shankar)

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