2025 INSC 1339 Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 1 of 46

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 10130 OF 2025)

ROBERT LALCHUNGNUNGA

CHONGTHU @ R L CHONGTHU

… APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF BIHAR …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

For convenience the judgment is divided into the following parts:

INDEX

The Appeal .................................................................................. 2

Factual Aspects ........................................................................... 2

The Impugned Judgment ...........................................................11

The Case Of The Parties ........................................................... 12

Analysis .................................................................................... 14

Conclusion and Directions ....................................................... 43

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 2 of 46

SANJAY KAROL J.,

Leave granted.

THE APPEAL

2. The Appellant is aggrieved by the High Court of Judicature

at Patna’s refusal in exercising its inherent powers under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

1

in terms of

judgment and order dated 9

th

May 2025

2

passed in Criminal

Miscellaneous No. 62048 of 2023, wherein the prayer was to

quash and order taking cognizance dated 1

st

June 2022 passed by

the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sahasra in connection with

Sahasra Sadar P.S Case No. 112 of 2005 dated 24

th

April 2005.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

3. As can be seen, the genesis of this case is over twenty years

old. It is necessary to recapitulate past events in order to

appreciate the context in which the impugned judgement is under

challenge before us.

I. The Appellant is an officer of the Indian

Administrative Services, Bihar Cadre. He was posted as

District Magistrate-cum-Licensing Authority, Sahasra,

1

Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC

2

Impugned judgement

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 3 of 46

Bihar, on 24 December 2002 and remained in the possession

till his transfer to Banka on 11

th

April 2005.

II. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

passed an order vide letter No. 11026/76/2004, directed

further streamlining of the procedure of issuance of arms

licences. The said letter is extracted hereinunder:

“29

th

October, 2004

Sub : Streamlining the procedure of issuing Arms

license.

Sir,

I am directed to state that large scale issue of licenses

has been reported in certain States. In many cases the

licences have been issued to non-resident without

proper verification and in some cases the licenses

have not been issued by the licensing authority. I order

to plug the loopholes in the existing procedure of

issuing Arms Licence that have come to light, it has

been decided to take the stesp indicated in the

succeeding paragraphs.

All arms licences issued between 1994-98 from J&K

and between September 1998 to February 2001 from

Ferojpur district (Punjab) and submitted at the office

of District Collector all over the country for re-

registration, reissuance or for any other purpose

should be verified to ascertain the bonafide of the

licenses and genuineness of the license documents.

Under the provisions of Section 13(2A) the licensing

authority can make such other enquiry as it considers

necessary. Necessary instruction may be issued to the

District Magistrate to conduct police verification at

the place of his stay during the last 3 years, preceding

the date of application.

Arms license for the categories of weapons specified

in Schedule-II of the Arms Rules 1962, for which

D.M. is the licensing authority and not the officers

subordinate to him. It may be stated that there is no

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 4 of 46

provision in the Arms Act, 1959, for delegation of

such authority to others for granting arms license.

The licensing authority in the states should be advised

to furnish return on the licenses issued on a quarterly

basis to the State Home Department for scrutiny on

quarterly basis to the State Home Department for

scrutiny/Secretary of the Home Department.

A very strict departmental action should be taken

wherever any instances of lapse in issuance of arms

license comes to the notice of the State Government.

The records of all the licenses issued by the licensing

authority in the States should be computerized and a

mechanism should be put in the place for early

warning wherever there is an unprecedent spur in

issue of arms license in a particular district.

Action taken in the matters may kindly be intimated

to the Ministry.

Yours Faithfully

Director, Security.”

III. For compliance of the directions issued in the above

quoted extract, one Bal Krishna Jha, ASI was deputed to

collect information and during such gathering of

information, it was found that 7 persons to whom arms

licences had been issued were unverified. The details of

these persons as given in the FIR, lodged upon the

statement of the Station House Officer, PS Saharsa, are as

under:

1. Omprakash Tiwari S/o Jagtanand Tiwari, R/o

patna, presently R/o Chitragupt Nagar, Kayasth Tola,

Saharsa.

2. Smt. Rani Durgawati, W/o OmprakashTiwari,

R/o Patna, presently R/o Chitragupt Nagar, Kayasth

Tola, Saharsa.

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 5 of 46

3. Hariom Kumar S/o Jago Singh, Ward No. 15,

Bokaro Shankarwar Tola, P.S. Mokama, District-

Patna, presently at Shankar Chowk, Saharsa.

4. Abhishek Tripathi, S/o Vishwajeevan Tripathi,

Village- Rajendra Tola, Balwa Tal, Motihari, at

present Kayasth Tola.

5. Uday Shankar Tiwari S/o Jagtanand Tiwari, R/o

Patna, at present Chitragupt Nagar, Kayasth Tola,

Saharsa.

6. Rajesh Kumar, S/o Keshav Prasad, Village-

Chitragupt Nagar, Parmaveer Albert kka Institute &

Cultural Arts Center, Saharsa.

7. Madhup Kumar Singh, S/o Shambhu Nath

Singh, R/o Rajapatti, Dumra Road, Sitamarhi, at

present Gangjala, Saharsa.”

The statement in the FIR was that some of these licences

had been issued to persons who were not physically capable;

the same had been issued in violation of Section 13(2), Arms

Act, 1959, with intent to give undue benefit to the

applicants, by the appellant, who, at the relevant point in

time was District Magistrate-cum-licensing Authority,

Sahasra, Bihar. As such, ‘the then licensing authority’ was

also named as an accused therein. It was stated that the

same had been done in furtherance of a criminal conspiracy

and abetment at a large scale.

IV. After investigation, chargesheet dated 9

th

July 2005

was entered wherein one of the accused persons, namely

Omprakash Tiwari was sent up for trial whereas

investigation against other persons was continued. A

supplementary chargesheet dated 13

th

April 2006 was then

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 6 of 46

filed, wherein, qua the appellant it was observed that no

offence was made out under the Arms Act against him, and

the allegations levelled were termed ‘false’. The

complainant recorded his ‘no objection’ to such closure

report. The relevant extract of the charge sheet is as under :-

“…Resultantly, he could not have been verified and no

Offence under Arms Act is made out against FIR

accused Sh. R. L. Chongthu, the then District

Magistrate, Saharsa. Therefore, the allegation against

him have been found to be false. Rest of all the

abovenamed Accused persons are on bail from the

court. Therefore, the investigation is completing on all

points in this case. Therefore, in the present case, I

submit Supplementary Chargesheet No. 118/06 dated

13

th

April, 2006…..”

V. The Sub-Divisional Officer of Police, Sadar,

Saharsa by letter dated 26

th

November 2007 addressed to the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa submitted as follows:

“1. The then District Magistrate, Saharsa- Sh.

R.L. Chongthu issued Arms License without getting

done verification of name and address of named

Accused Sh.Abhishek Tripathi, S/o Vishwajeevan

Tripathi, Permanent Address - Shailendra Gupta-

Balua Taal, Motihari, District - Champaran. The

enquiry of name and permanent address of Abhishek

Tripathi was conducted through Superintendent of

Police, Motihari. After enquiry, it was found no

person in the name of Abhishek Tripathi resides on

this address, in whose favour Arms License was

issued by the then District Magistrate Sh. Chongthu.

Meaning thereby is that the matter of issuing Arms

License in favour of a fake person in deliberate

manner and by hatching criminal conspiracy without

getting done the verification of temporary/ permanent

address, has come into the light, in which, the

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 7 of 46

criminal involvement of the then District Magistrate,

Saharsa Sh. Chongthu clearly appears.

2. The then Superintendent of Police, Saharsa in

his Report No. 3 issued vide his Office Memorandum

No. 920/ C.R. dated 11.04.2005, has found the

allegation against the then District Magistrate Sh.

Chongthu to be false, whereas, in the same Report, it

is mentioned to not to verify the alleged Licensee

Abhishek Tripathi.

3. Also in Report-3, the Investigating Officer

has been ordered to submit chargesheet also against

those named accused prsons, whose’ permanent/

temporary addresses have been found to be correct,

which are not as per Rules.

In the light of aforesaid order, the then SDPO, Saharsa

Sh.Ashok Kumar Sinha vide Memo No.2558/07

dated 19.09.2007 of this Office, had requested to pass

orders for conducting re-investigation on the

aforesaid points in the present case, but, the order

could not have been received yet. Again, vide Memo

No.3547/C.R. dated 24.11.2007 of the Superintendent

of Police, Saharsa, it has been directed to conduct

investigation on aforesaid points after obtaining order

from the Court.

Therefore, it is requested that in the light of aforesaid

order, kindly issue order to conduct re-investigation

of case on the aforesaid points.

For your kind information.”

On the aforesaid aspects, a request for the re-investigation

was resubmitted by letter dated 5

th

October 2008.

VI. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa in an order

dated 19

th

June 2009 observed that an order for re-

investigation could not be granted but further investigation

was permitted in law, and as such, permitted further

investigation under Section 173(8), CrPC.

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 8 of 46

VII. The General Administration Department,

Government of Bihar

3

by letter dated 10

th

December 2015

asked the Appellant to show cause regarding the issuance

of arms licences to a total of 16 accused persons. The

Response is as under:

“Letter No. 242

Office of the Divisional Commission

Bhagalpur Division, Bhagalpur (Bihar)

From:

ROBERT L. CHONGTHU

Divisional Commissioner,

Bhagalpur Division Bhagalpur

To Ashwlal Dattatraya Thakare

Additional Secretary

Central Administration Department,

Govt, of Bihar, Patna

Bhagalpur dated 23.12.2015

Sub: Allegation against the then District Magistrate, Sarsa

relating to irregularly in issuance of Arms License.

Ref: General Administration Department's Letter No.

17049 dt. 10.12.2015.

Sir,

I, with reference to the subject mentioned above I have to

say that vide letter No. 17049 dated 10.12.2015, I am

asked to submit explanation regarding all 16 persons. It is

requested to kindly provide the documents related to

sanctioning of arms licences of all 16 persons on the

ground that the matter has become old one and I am not

able no recollect all the facts and circumstances related to

the sanctioning of arms licenses to these 16 persons. It

would be really helpful if the above said documents are

supplied to me so that I can explain things in proper

manner otherwise in absence of these required documents,

my explanation would not be proper and complete.

3

The Department

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 9 of 46

2. That as regards to the earlier papers supplied to me and

after perusing the same, it seems to me that various office

orders issued from the Ministry of Home Affairs,

Government of India are meant for streamlining the

procedure of issuing arms licenses which inter alia, state

that a decision has been taken to take steps, such as, all

arms licenses issued for a period in Jammu Kashmir and

Punjab be verified, the District Magistrate should delegate

his powers of issuance of license to another officer, the

licensing authority be advised to furnish Return on the

licenses issues on quarterly basis, the records of licenses

should be computerized, licensing authority is required to

obtain report from the officer in charge of the nearest

police station and if lapses took place then strict

departmental proceeding should be taken.

3. That another office order talks about scam occurred in

the State of Jammu & Kashmir highlighting the

connivance of the District Magistrate, Jammu with some

gun dealers.

4. That support to the circular/office order issued by the

Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, also

categorically serving that while issuance of licenses during

my tenure, I have called for the police verification report

from the nearest police station in all the cases. Not only

this, even reminder was sent to the Sahrsa police station

for sending the verification report vide letter no. 667-

2/General dated 8.7.2004.

5. That it is further to state that during my tenure,

parliamentary election said bye-elections were held in the

district which also necessitated the requirement of police

verification for all the license no such verification report

was ever served or submitted to my office.

6. That from period of proviso of section 13 of Arms Act,

1959, it is apparent that where the officer of the nearest

police station does not send his report on the application

within the prescribed time, the licensing authority may, if

deems, fit, make such order, after the expiry of the

prescribed time, without further waiting for that report.

7. That when the officer in charge of the concerned police

station failed to submit the required report then I have

issued the licenses to these persons and my action is

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 10 of 46

protected under the provisions of the Arms Act, 1959 as

stated hereinabove.

8. That it is pertinent to mention here that my action of

issuing was not irreversible and the licenses issued by me

have been revoked. Further, the entire circular/office order

insists upon the streamlining of the procedure for

prevention of misuse of such licenses. There is nothing on

the record nor there is any material on record to show that

any person having been granted the license, had misused

the same during the period of subsistence of licence.

9. That the Arms Act, 1959 provides the safeguard against

irregular issuance of license if it is learnt that the license

has been obtained by suppressing material information or

by providing wrong information. The moment I came to

know that there was suppression of material information

then immediately. I proceeded to cancel the licenses and

the licenses were accordingly cancelled by me hence, there

is no residue effect to such licenses.

10. That in terms of sections 13 & 14 of the Arms Act,

1959 and Rules 51,51-A, 52 and 53 of the Arms Rules,

1962 which deal with grant of arms licenses and police

verification is not since qua non for issuance of license.

11. That it is pertinent to mention here that owing to many

a reasons, it necessitated the Ministry of Home Affairs to

issue circular/office order for streamlining the procedure

of issuing arms Licenses vide letter dated 29.10.2004. It is

mentioned therein that in order to plug the loopholes in the

existing procedure of issuing arms licenses, it has been

decided to take steps indicated in the succeeding

paragraphs and thereafter, few steps and guidelines have

been provided. The humble submission is that the

guidelines contained in the said circular would be

prospectively used and there cannot be any retrospective

effect of the said guidelines. Therefore, the very seeking

of explanation on the basis of the guidelines which call for

taking strict departmental proceeding would not be

applicable in the present case as the licenses have been

issued before the issuance of the guidelines.

12. That it is humbly requested to kindly provide the

documents related to all 15 persons so that I may be able

to give proper reply/explanation as required by your

goodself. It is further prayed to your goodself not to treat

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 11 of 46

this explanation as final explanation and I reserve the right

to file proper explanation expeditiously within a week

from the date of receipt of the entire documents related to

grant of arms licenses of all these 16 persons.

Yours Faithfully

Sd/- (Robert L. Chonghtu)

Divisional Commissioner,

Bhagalpur Division, Bhagalpur”

VIII. The explanation was accepted and the Department

discharged the Appellant on 25

th

February 2016 putting

an end to the disciplinary proceedings. Hence, the

chargesheet No.834/2020, after completion of further

investigation, was submitted on 31

st

August 2020.

IX. The State granted sanction under Section 197 CrPC

on 27

th

April 2022. Cognizance of the chargesheet was taken

on 1

st

June 2022. It is against this order that the appellant

had approached the High Court, and which resulted in the

impugned judgment.

THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT

4. The High Court rejected the application under Section 482,

CrPC observing that various illegalities and irregularities

pervaded the issuance of licenses by the appellant, in as much as

certain persons who were physically unfit, were issued licenses;

in some of the applications approved, the bodyguard of the

appellant was listed in the “column of care”; in yet others licenses

were issued a mere 2 days after calling for the police report, in

which time the said report was obviously not furnished.

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 12 of 46

Regarding the departmental proceedings, it was observed that

while discharging the appellant, the department had asked him to

remain careful in the future which, cannot be equated to

exoneration in departmental proceedings. Further, on the aspect

of power vested in the authority as per section 13(2A) of the

Arms Act, it was held that the power cannot be used and arbitrary

and unjust manner. The Court did observe that the Trial Court,

keeping in view the many years that had passed since the

inception of the case, ought to conclude the trial expeditiously by

conducting the same on day-to-day basis.

THE CASE OF THE PARTIES

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The

mainstay of the argument on behalf of the appellant is that

Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act vested within him the discretion

to grant an arms license even without police verification and all

that he did was exercise such discretion in a bona fide manner.

Secondly, it is submitted that none of the chargesheets even as

much as remotely suggest, conspiracy between the appellant and

the licensees or any act of corruption on part of the former. This

reinforces the bona fide exercise of power. Since the alleged

misuse of this power under the Arms Act is the standalone charge

against the appellant, the fact that he has been discharged in the

departmental proceedings acquires importance, as the same is

fatal to criminal prosecution on the same facts, is the third limb

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 13 of 46

of the submissions. Fourthly, it is submitted that the chargesheet

in which the appellant has eventually been named has been

submitted after an inordinate delay of 15 years that too in the

absence of any fresh material/evidence. Fifthly, some of the

accused licensees have been acquitted by the High Court by

orders dated 5

th

February 2020 and 23

rd

February 2024 passed in

Criminal Misc No.5536 of 2016, Criminal Misc No. 29456 of

2016 and Criminal Misc No. 63786 of 2021. Next it is urged that

the order granting sanction against the appellant is a non-

speaking order and defeats the object of Section 197 CrPC which

is to protect an officer against vexatious prosecution. In the end,

it is submitted that all the points above make out a case,

affirmatively in the appellant’s favour as per the grounds

mentioned in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

4

.

6. On the other hand, the case of the State is that the exercise

of power by the appellant was abuse of power vested in him since

he did not wait for the police verification report and issued

licenses to persons of questionable integrity as also those who are

physically unfit and even fictitious. About the acquittal of other

persons connected to the sequence of events, it is submitted that

the case of the appellant is distinct and no benefit on ground of

parity can be accorded to him. Regarding the discharge in the

departmental proceedings, it is urged that the same is the

4

1992 Supp. (1) 335

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 14 of 46

demonstration of influence of the appellant on two grounds, one,

that it is inconceivable that an SHO would ignore the orders of

the higher officer and thereby not submit such verification report

and two, that the SHO concerned denied having received any

request from the office of the appellant for conducting

verification.

ANALYSIS

7. The first argument for us to consider is the scope of Section

13(2A) of the Arms Act. It reads as under:

13. Grant of licences.―(1) An application for the grant of a

licence under Chapter II shall be made to the licensing authority

and shall be in such form, contain such particulars and be

accompanied by such fee, if any, as may be prescribed.

(2) On receipt of an application, the licensing authority shall call

for the report of the officer in charge of the nearest police station

on that application, and such officer shall send his report within

the prescribed time.

(2A) The licensing authority, after such inquiry, if any, as it may

consider necessary, and after considering the report received

under sub-section (2), shall, subject to the other provisions of

this Chapter, by order in writing either grant the licence or refuse

to grant the same:

Provided that where the officer in charge of the nearest police

station does not send his report on the application within the

prescribed time, the licensing authority may, if it deems fit, make

such order, after the expiry of the prescribed time, without

further waiting for that report.

(emphasis supplied)

It flows from the above that calling for a police verification

report is mandatory and the same is to be sent to the licensing

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 15 of 46

authority within a prescribed time. What is meant by prescribed

has been clarified by Section 2 (g) which defines prescribed to

be that which has been described in the rules made under the

Arms Act. The rules in vogue at the relevant point in time i.e.,

2002-2004 were the Arms Rules 1962. A perusal thereof reveals

that the rules did not prescribe a timeline within which the police

was to submit a report or the licensing authority is to either grant

or deny a license.

8. It is a generally understood position in law that when a

legislation or a rule does not provide for limitation/time limit for

a particular aspect, the same is to be governed by the standard

of reasonable time. [See: Collector v. D. Narsing Rao

5

.] We may

also refer to an earlier decision given by this Court in Collector

v. P. Mangamma

6

, as follows:

5. A reasonable period would depend upon the factual

circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any

empirical formula to determine that question. The

court/authority considering the question whether the period is

reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding

circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question.

6. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha [(1969) 2 SCC

187 : AIR 1969 SC 1297] it was observed that when even no

period of limitation was prescribed, the power is to be

exercised within a reasonable time and the limit of the

reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case

and the nature of the order which was sought to be varied.

…It would be hard to give an exact definition of the word

5

(2015) 3 SCC 695

6

(2003) 4 SCC 488

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 16 of 46

“reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to

the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and

circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built

up the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a

child's toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the

reasonableness within reach; and in cases not covered by

authority, the decision of the Judge usually determines what

is “reasonable” in each particular case; but frequently

reasonableness “belongs to the knowledge of the law, and

therefore to be decided by the courts”. It was illuminatingly

stated by a learned author that an attempt to give a specific

meaning to the word “reasonable” is trying to count what is

not a number and measure what is not space. It means prima

facie in law reasonable in regard to those circumstances of

which the actor, called upon to act reasonably, knows or ought

to know. [See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok

Kumar [(1987) 4 SCC 497 : AIR 1987 SC 2316] and Gujarat

Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors

(Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [(1989) 1 SCC 532 : AIR 1989 SC 973] ]

As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v. Dawson

[(1872) LR 13 Eq Ca 322, 325 : 41 LJ Ch 472 : 25 LT 894] it

is impossible a priori to state what is reasonable as such in all

cases. You must have the particular facts of each case

established before you can ascertain what is reasonable under

the circumstances. Reasonable, being a relative term is

essentially what is rational according to the dictates of reason

and not excessive or immoderate on the facts and

circumstances of the particular case.”

(emphasis supplied)

[See: Telangana Housing Board v. Azamunnisa Begum

7

,]

9. Given that at the relevant point in time, no time limit stood

prescribed, an alternate interpretation to ‘prescribed time’ can be

the time specified by the authority seeking the police report in

7

(2018) 7 SCC 346

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 17 of 46

such letter itself. This too, is absent from the record before us.

The State and the learned Single Judge have chosen to focus on

only one instance. Be whatsoever the contours of the application

of doctrine of reasonable time, it only stands to reason that when

no time stands clarified it is expected that the Authority may act

appropriately within a logically sound period of time. In

question are the appellant’s actions in so far as 16 licenses are

concerned. However, the record only speaks, to perhaps one

instance, where a mere two days after the request for the report

of police was made, that the license was issued, and the papers

in that regard and do not specify the time granted by the

appellant/the appellant’s office to furnish the report. It cannot be

doubted that the particular instance of application by Kanhaiya

Kumar Singh and Chandan Kumar Singh would not be

justified as a proper exercise of discretion when licenses have

been granted after only two days, but given that the State has

remained silent as to the timeline in other cases, we close

consideration of this issue having recorded as above.

10. Next, let us turn our attention to the sanction issued

against the appellant. As already recorded, it is his case that the

sanction is vitiated because it is a non-speaking order. The

sanction is reproduced below:

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 18 of 46

“GOVERNMENT OF BIHAR

LAW DEPARTMENT

(Under Rule 53(1)(c) and 32(a) XIX of Executive

Rules)

ORDER

Order No. S.P.02/2016-164/J.

Patna, dated

27.04.2022

Whereas, on perusal of the documents and evidences mentioned

in Case Diary available in the File No. 06/Aarop-03/2016 of

General Administration Department, Bihar, Patna addressed to

the Secretary, Law Department, the State Government is satisfied

that prima facie offence of issuance of Arms License in favour of

a fake person deliberately under a criminal conspiracy without

conducting verification of his permanent/ temporary address,

appears to be made out against the Accused of P.S. Saharsa

(Sadar) Crime No. 112/2005 dated 26.04.20055 namely Sh.

R.L.Chongthu, IAS (1997), the then District Magistrate-cum-

Licensing Authority, Saharsa, due to which, the prima facie case

for prosecuting him under Section 109, 419, 420, 467, 468,471,

120(B) IPC and Section 30 of Arms Act, is made out against him.

And whereas, according to Section 197 of the Cr.P.C., 1973(Act

No.2 of 1973), when any person who is a public servant not

removable from his officer save by or with the sanction of the

Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been

committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of

such offence except with the previous sanction.

And Whereas, Sh. R. L. Chongthu, IAS (1997), the then District

Magistrate-cum-Licensing Authority, Saharsa is such a public

servant and it is alleged that he has committed such an offence

while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duty.

And now therefore, the State Government do hereby grant

Prosecution Sanction against him under the provisions of Section

197 of Cr.P.C. for prosecuting him u/s 109, 419, 420, 467,

468,420, 471,120(B) IPC and Section 30 of Arms Act.

By the orders of Governor of Bihar

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 19 of 46

Sd/-

(Jyoti Swaroop Shrivastava)

Incharge Secretary to the Government,

Law Department, Bihar.

Memo No. SP -02/2016/164/J. Patna,

Dt.27.04.2022”

11. Section 197 which mandates the grant of sanction before

commencement of prosecution for public servants, reads:

“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.—(1) When any

person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant

not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the

Government is accused of any offence alleged to have been

committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the

discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of

such offence except with the previous sanction 6 [save as

otherwise provided in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (1

of 2014)]—

(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may

be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence

employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the

Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may

be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence

employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State

Government:…”

The ambit of this Section has been discussed in various

judgments of this Court. It will be necessary to refer to them as

under:

11.1 In Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta

8

through B.V.

Nagarathna, J., this Court observed:

8

(2025) 5 SCC 481

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 20 of 46

“25. As already noted, the object and purpose of the

said provision is to protect officers and officials of the

State from unjustified criminal prosecution while they

discharge their duties within the scope and ambit of

their powers entrusted to them. A reading of Section

197CrPC would indicate that there is a bar for a court

to take cognizance of such offences which are

mentioned in the said provision except with the

previous sanction of the appropriate Government when

the allegations are made against, inter alia, a public

servant.

26. There is no doubt that in the instant case the

appellant herein was a public servant but the question

is, whether, while discharging her duty as a public

servant on the relevant date, there was any excess in the

discharge of the said duty which did not require the first

respondent herein to take a prior sanction for

prosecuting the appellant herein…”

11.2 The factors to be borne in mind when dealing with

a case involving sanction under this section has been, after

consideration of number of previous pronouncements

crystallised as follows in Devinder Singh v. State of

Punjab

9

:

39. The principles emerging from the aforesaid

decisions are summarised hereunder:

39.1. Protection of sanction is an assurance to an

honest and sincere officer to perform his duty honestly

and to the best of his ability to further public duty.

However, authority cannot be camouflaged to commit

crime.

39.2. Once act or omission has been found to have

been committed by public servant in discharging his

9

(2016) 12 SCC 87

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 21 of 46

duty it must be given liberal and wide construction so

far its official nature is concerned. Public servant is

not entitled to indulge in criminal activities. To that

extent Section 197 CrPC has to be construed narrowly

and in a restricted manner.

39.3. Even in facts of a case when public servant has

exceeded in his duty, if there is reasonable connection

it will not deprive him of protection under Section 197

CrPC. There cannot be a universal rule to determine

whether there is reasonable nexus between the act

done and official duty nor is it possible to lay down

such rule.

39.4. In case the assault made is intrinsically

connected with or related to performance of official

duties, sanction would be necessary under Section 197

CrPC, but such relation to duty should not be

pretended or fanciful claim. The offence must be

directly and reasonably connected with official duty

to require sanction. It is no part of official duty to

commit offence. In case offence was incomplete

without proving, the official act, ordinarily the

provisions of Section 197 CrPC would apply.

39.5. In case sanction is necessary, it has to be decided

by competent authority and sanction has to be issued

on the basis of sound objective assessment. The court

is not to be a sanctioning authority.

39.6. Ordinarily, question of sanction should be dealt

with at the stage of taking cognizance, but if the

cognizance is taken erroneously and the same comes

to the notice of court at a later stage, finding to that

effect is permissible and such a plea can be taken first

time before the appellate court. It may arise at

inception itself. There is no requirement that the

accused must wait till charges are framed.

39.7. Question of sanction can be raised at the time of

framing of charge and it can be decided prima facie on

the basis of accusation. It is open to decide it afresh in

light of evidence adduced after conclusion of trial or

at other appropriate stage.

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 22 of 46

39.8. Question of sanction may arise at any stage of

proceedings. On a police or judicial inquiry or in

course of evidence during trial. Whether sanction is

necessary or not may have to be determined from

stage to stage and material brought on record

depending upon facts of each case. Question of

sanction can be considered at any stage of the

proceedings. Necessity for sanction may reveal itself

in the course of the progress of the case and it would

be open to the accused to place material during the

course of trial for showing what his duty was. The

accused has the right to lead evidence in support of his

case on merits.

39.9. In some cases it may not be possible to decide

the question effectively and finally without giving

opportunity to the defence to adduce evidence.

Question of good faith or bad faith may be decided on

conclusion of trial.”

11.3 A Bench of three Learned Judges in P.K. Pradhan

v. State of Sikkim

10

held thus:

“5. The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1)

of Section 197 debarring a court from taking

cognizance of an offence except with the previous

sanction of the Government concerned in a case where

the acts complained of are alleged to have been

committed by a public servant in discharge of his

official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his

official duty and such public servant is not removable

from office save by or with the sanction of the

Government, touches the jurisdiction of the court itself.

It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking

cognizance. Different tests have been laid down in

decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the

relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code:

“any offence alleged to have been committed by him

while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his

10

(2001) 6 SCC 704

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 23 of 46

official duty”. The offence alleged to have been

committed must have something to do, or must be

related in some manner, with the discharge of official

duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section

197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only

point for determination is whether it was committed in

the discharge of official duty.”

12. The avowed object of sanctions being granted before

cognizance is to ensure that the threat of criminal prosecution

does not hang over the heads of the officials in discharge of their

public duty. At the same time, it is not intended to protect

officers who have transgressed the boundaries of their duty for

some act/benefit which otherwise would not be termed

acceptable. An aspect connected with this object, is that the

authority granting sanction does not do so mechanically. This is

a layer of protection envisioned by this Section. In other words,

when allegations are made, it is not for the authorities to grant

sanction simply on the basis of the allegations but it is also that

they should examine the materials placed by the investigating

agency and come to a prima facie satisfaction thereon, about the

officer having some or the other involvement in the alleged

offence/crime. In Mansukhlal Vitthaldas Chauhan v. State of

Gujarat

11

, this Court held that the order of granting or refusing

sanction must show application of mind. The relevant

paragraphs thereof are extracted hereunder:

11

(1997) 7 SCC 622

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 24 of 46

“17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of

sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise

but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to

government servants against frivolous prosecutions.

(See Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 172 :

1979 SCC (Cri) 926 : AIR 1979 SC 677] ) Sanction is a

weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious

prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent but not a

shield for the guilty.

18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend

upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and

the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have

been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration

implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex

facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered

the evidence and other material placed before it…”

19. Since the validity of “sanction” depends on the

applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts

of the case as also the material and evidence collected during

investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning

authority has to apply its own independent mind for the

generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to

be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority

should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any

external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or

the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction

vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion

should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous

consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was

unable to apply its independent mind for any reason

whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or

constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the

reason that the discretion of the authority “not to sanction”

was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to

sanction the prosecution.”

Not much more needs to be said. The sanction awarded against

the appellant which we have extracted in toto (supra) can in our

considered view, in no way be said to be reflecting application

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 25 of 46

of mind by the authorities. If sanction is based on what can at

best be described as vague statements such as “on perusal of the

documents and evidences mentioned in Case Diary available”,

this protection would be obliterated. The remainder of the

sanction order touches upon the essence of Section 197 CrPC

and the fact that the appellant is a public servant who would be

covered thereby. The substance of why a sanction is required

was however entirely missed by the sanctioning authority. The

same is bad in law and must be, set aside. All consequential

actions including the order taking cognizance, therefore would

be quashed.

13. There is another ground which needs detailed

consideration. The permission for further investigation was

given in 2009 and the chargesheet that was submitted as a result

thereof was dated 31

st

August 2020 that is after a period of 11

years. This is after the fact that in the second chargesheet, the

investigating authorities have concluded the charges against the

appellant to be false. In 2024, the impugned judgment records

that even after the cognizance was taken nearly two years ago in

2022, the trial had not moved forward. As we approach the end

of 2025, the question to be considered is as to how long this can

continue.

14. Various judgments of this Court have emphasised the

right to speedy trial as being an important facet of Article 21 of

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 26 of 46

the Constitution. Timely completion of investigation is inherent

thereto.

14.1 A Constitution Bench of this Court in Abdul

Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak

12

, observed:

“81. Article 21 declares that no person shall be

deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with

the procedure prescribed by law. The main procedural

law in this country is the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973. Several other enactments too contain many a

procedural provision. After Maneka Gandhi [Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR

1978 SC 597] , it can hardly be disputed that the ‘law’

[which has to be understood in the sense the expression

has been defined in clause (3)(a) of Article 13 of the

Constitution] in Article 21 has to answer the test of

reasonableness and fairness inherent in Articles 19 and

14. In other words, such law should provide a procedure

which is fair, reasonable and just. Then alone, would it

be in consonance with the command of Article 21.

Indeed, wherever necessary, such fairness must be read

into such law. Now, can it be said that a law which does

not provide for a reasonably prompt investigation, trial

and conclusion of a criminal case is fair, just and

reasonable? It is both in the interest of the accused as

well as the society that a criminal case is concluded

soon. If the accused is guilty, he ought to be declared

so. Social interest lies in punishing the guilty and

exoneration of the innocent but this determination (of

guilt or innocence) must be arrived at with reasonable

despatch — reasonable in all the circumstances of the

case. Since it is the accused who is charged with the

offence and is also the person whose life and/or liberty

is at peril, it is but fair to say that he has a right to be

tried speedily. Correspondingly, it is the obligation of

the State to respect and ensure this right. It needs no

emphasis to say, the very fact of being accused of a

12

(1992) 1 SCC 225

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 27 of 46

crime is cause for concern. It affects the reputation and

the standing of the person among his colleagues and in

the society. It is a cause for worry and expense. It is

more so, if he is arrested. If it is a serious offence, the

man may stand to lose his life, liberty, career and all that

he cherishes.

82. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure

are consistent with and indeed illustrate this principle.

They provide for an early investigation and for a speedy

and fair trial. The learned Attorney General is right in

saying that if only the provisions of the Code are

followed in their letter and spirit, there would be little

room for any grievance. The fact however, remains

unpleasant as it is, that in many cases, these provisions

are honoured more in breach. Be that as it may, it is

sufficient to say that the constitutional guarantee of

speedy trial emanating from Article 21 is properly

reflected in the provisions of the Code.”

The Court laid down guidelines regarding fair trial. Regarding

investigation, which is the relevant facet here, the direction

issued is as under:

“…

(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21

encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of

investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial.

That is how, this Court has understood this right and

there is no reason to take a restricted view.

(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial

from the point of view of the accused are:

(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention

should be as short as possible. In other words, the

accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or

unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his

vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged

investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 28 of 46

(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the

ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on

account of death, disappearance or non-availability of

witnesses or otherwise.

…”

14.2 A Bench of seven judges in P. Ramachandra Rao

v. State of Karnataka

13

, while disapproving of setting up

of strict timelines by this Court for completion of

investigation etc observed:

“…The mental agony, expense and strain which a

person proceeded against in criminal law has to

undergo and which, coupled with delay, may result in

impairing the capability or ability of the accused to

defend himself have persuaded the constitutional courts

of the country in holding the right to speedy trial a

manifestation of fair, just and reasonable procedure

enshrined in Article 21. Speedy trial, again, would

encompass within its sweep all its stages including

investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial

— in short everything commencing with an accusation

and expiring with the final verdict — the two being

respectively the terminus a quo and terminus ad

quem — of the journey which an accused must

necessarily undertake once faced with an implication.

The constitutional philosophy propounded as right to

speedy trial has though grown in age by almost two and

a half decades, the goal sought to be achieved is yet a

far-off peak. Myriad fact situations bearing testimony

to denial of such fundamental right to the accused

persons, on account of failure on the part of prosecuting

agencies and the executive to act, and their turning an

almost blind eye at securing expeditious and speedy

trial so as to satisfy the mandate of Article 21 of the

Constitution….”

13

(2002) 4 SCC 578

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 29 of 46

14.3 Just recently, a bench of three Judges of this Court

in Sovaran Singh Prajapati v. State of U.P.

14

, (including

one of us, Sanjay Karol J.) after considering number of

pronouncements, culled out the features of fair trial. The

third point mentioned therein is important here. It reads,

“Process of investigation and trial must be completed with

promptitude.”.

14.4 Another recent instance was in the case CBI v. Mir

Usman

15

wherein this Court held:

“31. The right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 of

the Constitution of India. The first written articulation of

the right to speedy trial appeared in 1215 in the Magna

Carta: “We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer

to any man either justice or right.” Article 21 of the Indian

constitution declares that “no person shall be deprived of

his life or personal liberty except according to the

procedure laid by law.” Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Babu

Singh v. State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579 : AIR 1978 SC

527 remarked, “Our justice system even in grave cases,

suffers from slow motion syndrome which is lethal to “fair

trial” whatever the ultimate decision. Speedy justice is a

component of social justice since the community, as a

whole, is concerned in the criminal being condignly and

finally punished within a reasonable time and the innocent

being absolved from the inordinate ordeal of criminal

proceedings.” In the case of Sheela Barse v. Union of

India, (1986) 3 SCC 632 : (1986) 3 SCR 562, this Court

has held that the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right.

Further it was stated by this Court that the consequence of

violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be

14

2025 SCC OnLine SC 351

15

2025 SCC OnLine SC 2066

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 30 of 46

that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on

the ground that it is in breach of fundamental right.”

15. Moving further, it is to be noted that this aspect of prompt

investigation has received statutory recognition as well in the

CrPC, which of course, is the comprehensive code laying down

detailed procedure is for stages of investigation, trial and appeal

among other things. It must be stated that statutory recognition

of prompt investigation is a pre-constitutional stipulation.

During the colonial period, the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1861, and its immediate successor, the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1872, conceived the process of criminal

investigation as a domain of exclusive police competence,

characterized by minimal judicial supervision. These early

procedural frameworks vested extensive autonomy in the police

establishment, leaving investigations largely beyond the reach

of magisterial control, and notably omitted any statutory

timelines for their completion. The institutional foundation for

this arrangement lay in the Police Act, 1861, which served as the

principal legal instrument governing investigative powers and

responsibilities. Although the police operated nominally under

the “general control and direction” of the District Magistrate, in

practice, the investigation of offences was conducted

independently within the police hierarchy, reflecting the colonial

state’s preference for an executive, rather than judicially

mediated, model of law enforcement.

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 31 of 46

This design is made explicit in the text of the Police Act

itself. Reference may made to Section 5 which granted the police

authorities a power of the magistrate and 23 which delineated

the core duties of police officers in notably broad terms. Sections

25. 26 and 27 establish that the rule of the Magistrate was limited

to certain spheres only, for instance dealing with property.

Read together, these provisions reveal a conception of

policing that was investigative, preventive, and executive in

nature, with the judiciary occupying a passive and peripheral

role. The Magistrate’s function under the Codes of 1861 and

1872 was confined largely to receiving police reports or taking

cognizance of completed investigations, rather than directing or

monitoring their course. It was only with the advent of later

reforms – first, through the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,

and subsequently under the Code of 1973 - that the architecture

of criminal procedure began to incorporate judicial control and

procedural accountability, through provisions such as Sections

61, 167 and 173(1) of the 1898 Code and 156(3), 167, and

173(1), 173(2) of the 1973 Code, which introduced oversight

mechanisms (in Section 156(3) and 167) and prescribed

reasonable limits (in Section 173(1), 173(2)) for the duration of

investigations. In its latest avatar, the legislation codifying

criminal procedure i.e. BNSS 2023, also provides similar

timelines under Sections 187, 193, 230, 250, 251,262, 263 etc.

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 32 of 46

16. At this juncture, we would not be out of place to refer as

to how other jurisdictions provide for and deal with speedy trial,

in same and similar terms as has been held by this Court.

16.1 In the United States of America, the Sixth

Amendment to the Constitution

16

, introduced by the Bill

of Rights, 1791 provides:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall

have been committed, which district shall have been

previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation; to be

confronted with the witnesses against him; to have

compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his

favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

defence.”

The following cases demonstrate the application of this

constitutional enshrinement-

16.1.1 Earl Warren, CJ wrote for a unanimous

Court in Klopfer v United States

17

as under:

“We hold here that the right to a speedy trial

is as fundamental as any of the rights

secured by the Sixth Amendment. That

right has its roots at the very foundation of

our English law heritage. Its first

articulation in modern jurisprudence

appears to have been made in Magna Carta

(1215), wherein it was written, "We will

sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to

16

https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-6/

17

386 U.S. 213 (1967)

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 33 of 46

any man either justice or right"; ' but

evidence of recognition of the right to

speedy justice in even earlier times is found

in the Assize of Clarendon (1166).' By the

late thirteenth century, justices, armed with

commissions of gaol delivery and/or oyer

and terminer " were visiting the countryside

three times a year." These justices, Sir

Edward Coke wrote in Part II of his

Institutes, "have not suffered the prisoner to

be long detained, but at their next coming

have given the prisoner full and speedy

justice, . . . without detaining him long in

prison." 12 To Coke, prolonged detention

without trial would have been contrary to

the law and custom of England; " but he

also believed that the delay in trial, by itself,

would be an improper denial of justice. In

his explication of Chapter 29 of the Magna

Carta, he wrote that the words "We will sell

to no man, we will not deny or defer to any

man either justice or right" had the

following effect:

"And therefore, every subject of this

realme, for injury done to him in bonis,

terris, vel persona, by any other subject, be

he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or

bond, man, or woman, old, or young, or be

he outlawed, excommunicated, or any

other without exception, may take his

remedy by the course of the law, and have

justice, and right for the injury done to him,

freely without sale, fully without any

deniall, and speedily without delay."

16.1.2 In Baker v Wingo

18

, the Court,

consolidating the tests that were already in

application by the lower courts, laid down a four-

18

407 US 514 (1972)

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 34 of 46

pronged test, commonly known as the Baker Test.

The Court is to consider-the length of the delay,

the reason for the delay, when the defendant

asserted his right to speedy trial, and the prejudice

suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay.

16.1.3 In Doggett v. United States

19

, the Court

was concerned with the case in which an alleged

drug peddler was indicted for conspiracy to

distribute cocaine. The accused had apparently

fled the jurisdiction of the United States. Even

though the information of the outstanding arrest

warrant had been sent to all posts of the United

States Customs, he could only be arrested 6 years

after his return to the country, and in total, 8 ½

years after his indictment. Souter J., for the

majority held:

“…We have observed in prior cases that

unreasonable delay between formal

accusation and trial threatens to produce

more than one sort of harm, including

“oppressive pretrial incarceration,”

“anxiety and concern of the accused,” and

“the possibility that the [accused's] defense

will be impaired” by dimming memories

and loss of exculpatory evidence. Barker,

407 U. S., at 532; see also Smith v. Hooey,

393 U. S. 374, 377–379 (1969); United

19

1992 SCC OnLine US SC 94

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 35 of 46

States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966).

Of these forms of prejudice, “the most

serious is the last, because the inability of a

defendant adequately to prepare his case

skews the fairness of the entire system.”

407 U. S., at 532. Doggett claims this kind

of prejudice, and there is probably no other

kind that he can claim, since he was

subjected neither to pretrial detention nor,

he has successfully contended, to

awareness of unresolved charges against

him.”

…Our speedy trial standards recognize that

pretrial delay is often both inevitable and

wholly justifiable. The government may

need time to collect witnesses against the

accused, oppose his pretrial motions, or, if

he goes into hiding, track him down. We

attach great weight to such considerations

when balancing them against the costs of

going forward with a trial whose probative

accuracy the passage of time has begun by

degrees to throw into question. See Loud

Hawk, supra, at 315–317. Thus, in this

case, if the Government had pursued

Doggett with reasonable diligence from his

indictment to his arrest, his speedy trial

claim would fail. Indeed, that conclusion

would generally follow as a matter of

course however great the delay, so long as

Doggett could not show specific prejudice

to his defense.”

16.2 Next, we turn our attention to Canada. Section 11

under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

houses a total of nine rights. For the instant purposes, (a)

and (b) are relevant-

“11. Any person charged with an offence has

the right-

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 36 of 46

(a) to be informed without

unreasonable delay of the specific

offence;

(b) to be tried within a reasonable

time”

16.2.1 The case of R. v. Askov

20

saw the Supreme

Court of Canada holding that:

“ The court should consider a number of factors

in determining whether the delay in bringing

the accused to trial has been unreasonable: (1)

the length of the delay; (2) the explanation for

the delay; (3) waiver; and (4) prejudice to the

accused. The longer the delay, the more

difficult it should be for a court to excuse it, and

very lengthy delays may be such that they

cannot be justified for any reason. Delays

attributable to the Crown will weigh in favour

of the accused. Complex cases, however, will

justify delays longer than those acceptable in

simple cases. Systemic or institutional delays

will also weigh against the Crown. When

considering delays occasioned by inadequate

institutional resources, the question of how long

a delay is too long may be resolved by

comparing the questioned jurisdiction to others

in the country. The comparison of similar and

thus comparable districts must always be made

with the better districts, not the worst. The

comparison need not be too precise or

exact; rather, it should look to the appropriate

ranges of delay in determining what is a

reasonable limit. In all cases it will be

incumbent upon the Crown to show that the

institutional delay in question is

justifiable. Certain actions of the accused, on

the other hand, will justify delays. A waiver by

the accused of his rights will justify delay, but

20

[1990] 2 SCR 1199

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 37 of 46

the waiver must be informed, unequivocal and

freely given to be valid.

16.2.2 Just two years later, the Court in R v.

Morin

21

in an attempt to refine the holding in Askov,

(supra) held that institutional delays would not on

their own, constitute a violation of section 11 (b) of

the Charter. The factors to be considered were

expanded as hereinbelow, and then came to be

known as the Morin Framework:

“The general approach to a determination of

whether the s. 11(b) right has been denied is not

by the application of a mathematical or

administrative formula but rather by a judicial

determination balancing the interests which the

section is designed to protect against factors

which inevitably lead to delay. The factors to be

considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2)

waiver of time periods; (3) the reasons for the

delay, including (a) inherent time requirements

of the case, (b) actions of the accused, (c)

actions of the Crown, (d) limits on institutional

resources and (e) other reasons for delay; and

(4) prejudice to the accused.”

16.2.3 In R v. Jordan

22

which is a case almost a

quarter-century after the Morin Framework, the

Court recognised various issues with

implementation thereof in the following terms

“The Morin framework for applying s. 11(b) has

given rise to both doctrinal and practical

21

[1992] 1 SCR 771

22

[2016] 1 SCR 631

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 38 of 46

problems, contributing to a culture of delay and

complacency towards it. Doctrinally,

the Morin framework is too unpredictable, too

confusing, and too complex. It has itself become

a burden on already over-burdened trial courts.

From a practical perspective,

the Morin framework’s after -the-fact

rationalization of delay does not encourage

participants in the justice system to take

preventative measures to address inefficient

practices and resourcing problems.”

Keeping these issues in view, the Court then

directed:

“At the heart of this new framework is a

presumptive ceiling beyond which delay — from

the charge to the actual or anticipated end of trial

— is presumed to be unreasonable, unless

exceptional circumstances justify it. The

presumptive ceiling is 18 months for cases tried

in the provincial court, and 30 months for cases

in the superior court (or cases tried in the

provincial court after a preliminary inquiry).

Delay attributable to or waived by the defence

does not count towards the presumptive ceiling.

Once the presumptive ceiling is exceeded, the

burden is on the Crown to rebut

the presumption of unreasonableness on the basis

of exceptional circumstances. If the Crown

cannot do so, a stay will follow. Exceptional

circumstances lie outside the Crown’s control in

that (1) they are reasonably unforeseen or

reasonably unavoidable, and (2) they cannot

reasonably be remedied.

It is obviously impossible to identify in advance

all circumstances that may qualify as exceptional

for the purposes of adjudicating a s. 11(b)

application. Ultimately, the determination of

whether circumstances are exceptional will

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 39 of 46

depend on the trial judge’s good sense and

experience. The list is not closed. However, in

general, exceptional circumstances fall under two

categories: discrete events and particularly

complex cases.

If the exceptional circumstance relates to a

discrete event (such as an illness or unexpected

event at trial), the delay reasonably attributable to

that event is subtracted from the total delay. If the

exceptional circumstance arises from the case’s

complexity, the delay is reasonable and no further

analysis is required.

An exceptional circumstance is the only basis

upon which the Crown can discharge its burden

to justify a delay that exceeds the ceiling. The

seriousness or gravity of the offence cannot be

relied on, nor can chronic institutional delay.

Most significantly, the absence of prejudice can

in no circumstances be used to justify delays after

the presumptive ceiling is breached. Once so

much time has elapsed, only circumstances that

are genuinely outside the Crown’s control and

ability to remedy may furnish a sufficient excuse

for the prolonged delay.”

s

16.3 The next example we take is from the Republic of

South Africa

23

. Article 35 of its Constitution is titled

“Arrested, detained and accused persons”. Article 35(1)

enshrines, among other things, what are famously known

as the Miranda Rights after the decision of the US

Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona

24

. Thereafter,

Article 35(2) provides for prisoners’ rights and relevant

23

The Constitution OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1996-

https://www.justice.gov.za/constitution/SAConstitution-web-eng.pdf

24

384 U.S. 436 (1966)

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 40 of 46

for the present discussion, Article 35(3) provides for ‘fair

trial’. Therein, it is stipulated as hereunder:

“(d) to have their trial begin and conclude without

unreasonable delay”

16.3.1 In Ptrue Bothma v. Petrus Arnoldus Els

25

the

constitutional court held as under:

“ [32] Major pre-trial abuses by the state are

now firmly prohibited by the Constitution.

It is no accident that section 35 of the

Constitution, which deals with arrested,

detained and accused persons, is by far the

longest section in the Bill of Rights. It sets out

precise protections against treating people in

arbitrary ways after they have been placed

under arrest. One that becomes operative as

soon as someone becomes an accused person

is the right to have the trial begin and conclude

without unreasonable delay.

[33] Although section 35(3) does not deal

expressly with pre-trial delay, it must be

construed and understood in the light of the

value accorded to human dignity and freedom

in our Constitution.22 Freedom is protected by

section 12 of the Constitution.”

17. The inescapable conclusion arrived at from the above

discussion in the Indian context, is that there has been an

evolution in legislative wisdom over the years and the criminal

procedure have moved from a period of no timelines and

minimal judicial interventions/oversight to progressively more

oversight and recognition of the need to conclude investigations

25

[2009] ZACC 27

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 41 of 46

in time. It may be true that no strict timelines are provided in the

CrPC, but it is equally so that investigations are to be completed

in reasonable time.

18. The discussion regarding other countries also leads us to

a similar conclusion. The Supreme Court of Canada has

although given timelines, it has also recognised that the

possibility of extension of the said timeline is open. The four-

prong test as in Baker, the Askov - Morin framework that we

have discussed above, has a subjective element, which keeping

in view the realities of the Indian judicial system, is the only

option that can be practically applied. Strict timelines, if laid

down would be in ignorance of ground realities.

19. Coming back to the present case, why the investigation in

this case took more than a decade to be completed is lost on us.

Apparently, it was found that the licenses issued by the appellant

were also issued to a fictitious person even at the time when the

order for further investigation was taken. Out of the 16 accused

persons one person stood charge-sheeted in terms of the first

chargesheet and the remaining, excluding the appellant and one

Abhishek, were charge-sheeted by way of the second

chargesheet. When only the actions of the appellant were subject

matter of investigation by the time permission was taken as

above - 11 years is quite obviously a timeline afflicted by delay.

No reason is forthcoming for this extended period either in the

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 42 of 46

chargesheet or at the instance of the Court having taken

cognizance of such chargesheet. In other words, the appellant

has had the cloud of a criminal investigation hanging over him

for all these years. The judgments above referred to supra hold

unequivocally that investigation is covered under the right to

speedy trial and it is also held therein, that violation of this right

can strike at the root of the investigation itself, leading it to be

quashed. At the same time, it must be said that timelines cannot

be set in stone for an investigation to be completed nor can outer

limit be prescribed within which necessarily, an investigation

must be drawn to a close. This is evidenced by the fact that

further investigation or rather permission therefor, can be

granted even after commencement of trial. [See: Rampal

Gautam v The State

26

] Where though, Article 21 would be

impacted would be a situation where, like in the present matter,

no reason justifiable in nature, can be understood from record

for the investigation having taken a large amount of time. The

accused cannot be made to suffer endlessly with this threat of

continuing investigation and eventual trial proceedings bearing

over their everyday existence.

26

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) 7968 of 2016

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 43 of 46

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS

20. On this count, prosecution against the appellant is liable

to be quashed. The conclusion is that even though, in the one

case that has been consistently highlighted by the State, it cannot

be said that the appellant acted within the scope of authority as

given by Section 13(2A) of the Arms Act, but given that the

administrative authorities have already discharged him, that

issue need not be taken further. On the issue of sanction being

improper and large delay in filing of chargesheet as also

consequent action, we have decided in favour of the appellant.

The appeal is accordingly allowed.

21. Before parting with this matter, we deem it fit to issue the

following directions:

(i) In view of Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali

27

, it can be

seen that the ‘leave of the court’ to file a supplementary

chargesheet, is a part of Section 173(8) CrPC. That being

the position, in our considered view, the Court is not

rendered functus officio having granted such permission.

Since the further investigation is being made with the

leave of the Court, judicial stewardship/control thereof,

is a function which the court must perform.

27

(2013) 5 SCC 762- See para 49

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 44 of 46

(ii) Reasons are indispensable to the proper

functioning of the machinery of criminal law. They form

the bedrock of fairness, transparency, and accountability

in the justice system. If the Court finds or the accused

alleges (obviously with proof and reason to substantiate

the allegation) that there is a large gap between the first

information report and the culminating chargesheet, it

is bound to seek an explanation from the investigating

agency and satisfy itself to the propriety of the

explanation so furnished.

The direction above does not come based on this case

alone. This Court has noticed on many unfortunate

occasions that there is massive delay in filing

chargesheet/taking cognizance etc. This Court has time

and again, in its pronouncements underscored the

necessity of speedy investigation and trial as being

important for the accused, victim and the society.

However, for a variety of reasons there is still a lag in the

translation of this recognition into a reality.

(iii) While it is well acknowledged and recognised that

the process of investigation has many moving parts and is

therefore impractical to have strict timelines in place, at

the same time, the discussion made in the earlier part of

this judgement, clearly establishes that investigations

Crl.Appeal @SLP(Crl)No.10130 of 2025 Page 45 of 46

cannot continue endlessly. The accused is not out of place

to expect, after a certain point in time, certainty- about the

charges against him, giving him ample time to preparing

plead his defence. If investigation into a particular

offence has continued for a period that appears to be

unduly long, that too without adequate justification,

such as in this case, the accused or the complainant

both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court

under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update

on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court

have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is

clarified that delay in completion of investigation will

only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in

its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other

grounds will also have to be considered.

(iv) Reasons are not only important in the judicial

sphere, but they are equally essential in administrative

matters particularly in matters such as sanction for they

open the gateway to greater consequences. Application of

mind by the authorities granting or denying sanction must

be easily visible including consideration of the evidence

placed before it in arriving at the conclusion.

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Pending application(s) if any, shall stand(s) disposed of.

………………………………… ……….…J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

………..…………………………………….J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH )

New Delhi;

November 20, 2025.