2026 INSC 336

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO S. 1831-1832 OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos.9971-9972 of 2025)

ROMA AHUJA …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE AND ANOTHER …RESPONDENT S

J U D G M E N T

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

2. These two appeals arise out of common order dated

30.01.2025, passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C.

No. 1170 of 2017 and Crl. M.A. No. 7270 of 2016. Thereby

the High Court allowed the petition filed by Respondent No.

2-the accused, under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

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Procedure, 1973

1

for quashing the First Information Report

2

No. 121 of 2011.

2.1 The said FIR was in respect of the commission of

offences under Sections 323 and 341 read with Section 34

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

3

, at P.S. Moti Nagar, lodged

by the appellant-complainant herein. The FIR came to be

quashed on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed on

29.05.2012, which was after a period of one year and 20

days from the date of incident and therefore the bar of

limitation under Section 468, Cr.PC, was attracted.

3. The incident, as per the FIR, took place on

09.05.2011, when the appellant, along with her brother and

father, had gone to the court of the Special Executive

Magistrate, Moti Nagar, in connection with a case filed under

Section 107 read with Section 150, Cr.PC at the behest of

the younger sister of the appellant. It was stated that when

the parties stepped out of the gate of court premises,

Respondent No. 2 - the accused named Ashutosh, who was

1

Hereinafter, “Cr.PC”.

2

Hereinafter, “FIR”.

3

Hereinafter, “IPC”.

Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 3 of 29

an advocate appearing for Shweta-sister of the complainant,

began abusing and beating the appellant.

3.1 The appellant suffered injuries on her head, right

eye, cheek and shoulder. Respondent No. 2 alleged that he

too was beaten by the appellant and her family. The incident

resulted in the filing of two cross-FIRs. FIR No. 120 of 2011

came to be filed by the respondent against the appellant. On

the same day, that is, on 09.05.2011, the complaint made

by the appellant against Respondent No. 2 in the form of FIR

No. 121 of 2011 was registered at the same P.S. Moti Nagar.

3.2 In FIR No. 121 of 2011, which is the subject matter

here, the offences under Sections 323 and 341, IPC were

alleged. The accused persons were arrested and released on

bail. In respect of FIR No. 120 of 2011, the Investigating

Officer filed the charge-sheet on 13.07.2011. The charge-

sheet came to be filed on 29.05.2012 in respect of FIR No.

121 of 2011. Based on the said FIR No. 121 of 2011, the

Court of Metropolitan Magistrate (West), Delhi

4

, took

4

Hereinafter, “trial court”.

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cognizance under Section 190(1)(b), Cr.PC for the offences

punishable under Sections 323, 343 and 34 IPC.

3.3 While in respect of FIR No. 120 of 2011, the charges

came to be framed against the appellant, her brother, and

her father under Sections 323 and 343 read with Section 34,

IPC, it appears that on 08.01.2014 and again on

22.09.2014, arguments were raised on behalf of respondent

No.2-accused in respect of FIR No. 121 of 2011 inter alia

that the cognizance of the offences was taken beyond the

period of limitation and, therefore, the accused was required

to be discharged. The trial court did not accept the same,

noting that the cognizance has attained finality and that the

order was not challenged by either of the accused. The trial

court further expressed itself that surprisingly, while the

cross-FIR No. 120 of 2011 arising out of the same incident

was charge-sheeted within limitation, the charge-sheet in

respect of FIR No. 121 of 2011 was belatedly filed and that

a party should not benefit from the negligence of the

Investigating Officer.

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3.4 Respondent No. 2 herein filed Criminal Revision

Petition No. 36 of 2014 before the Court of District &

Sessions Judge, Tis Hazari, Delhi wherein he challenged

order dated 22.09.2014, whereby the Court had issued

notices to the accused persons. On 16.02.2015, the Court of

learned Additional Sessions Judge dismissed the Revision

Petition, reasoning that the case involved cross-FIRs, where

the Investigating Officers were different and that the delay

in filing the charge-sheet in FIR No. 121 of 2011 was due to

the lackadaisical approach of the Investigating Officer.

3.5 Respondent No. 2 filed application on 07.05.2015

seeking discharge under Section 258, Cr.PC in respect of

FIR No. 121 of 2011, which was dismissed by the Trial Court

on 04.04.2016. Thereafter, Respondent No. 2 filed Writ

Petition (Criminal) No. 1407 of 2016, before the High Court

of Delhi on 28.04.2016, praying to quash the FIR No.121 of

2011 and all proceedings consequential thereto. The prayer

of quashing of FIR was based on the ground of limitation.

3.6 In respect of FIR No. 121 of 2011, charges came to

be framed on 17.12.2016 against Respondent No. 2 and

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another accused under Sections 323, 341 and 34, IPC. On

12.01.2017, Writ Petition (Criminal) No.1407 of 2016 filed

by Respondent No.2 before the High Court was renumbered

as Crl. M.C. No.1170 of 2017 and Crl. M.A. No.7270 of 2016.

The Delhi High Court allowed the Writ Petition as per the

impugned order dated 30.01.2025, taking the view that the

bar under Section 468, Cr.PC is absolute and that the date

when the charge-sheet was filed fell beyond the period of

limitation of one year.

4. Heard learned advocate Ms. Shivani Vij for the

appellant and learned Additional Solicitor General Mr.

Rajkumar Bhaskar Thakare with learned advocate on record

Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria for respondent No.1 -State and

learned advocate on record Mr. Praveen Swarup for

respondent No.2, at length.

5. Having noticed the factual sequence, the moot

question to be adverted to is what would be the relevant date

for computation of the period of limitation, whether it is the

date when the criminal complaint is filed or the date when

the Court/Magistrate takes cognizance.

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5.1 Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973 is in respect of provisions relating to ‘Limitation For

Taking Cognizance of Certain Offences’. Section 468, Cr.PC

provides for limitation for taking cognizance of the offences

and bars such cognizance beyond the period of limitation.

5.2 Section 468, Cr.PC reads as under,

‘468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of

the period of limitation.—(1) Except as otherwise

provided elsewhere in this Code, no court shall take

cognizance of an offence of the category specified in

sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of

limitation.

(2) The period of limitation shall be—

(a) six months, if the offence is

punishable with fine only;

(b) one year, if the offence is punishable

with imprisonment for a term not

exceeding one year;

(c) three years, if the offence is

punishable with imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year but not

exceeding three years.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of

limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried

together, shall be determined with reference to the

offence which is punishable with the more severe

punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe

punishment.’

5.2.1 Section 469, Cr.PC is in respect of commencement of

the period of limitation. It provides that the period of

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limitation, in relation to an offence, shall commence (a) on

the date of the offence, or (b) if the commission of the offence

was not known, the first day on which such offence comes

to the knowledge of the person aggrieved or to any police

officer, whichever is earlier, or (c) if it is unknown as to by

whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the

identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or

the police officer, whichever is earlier.

5.2.2 Section 470, Cr.PC deals with the exclusion of time

in certain cases, whereas as per Section 471, the date on

which the Court is closed is to be excluded. Section 472 says

that in case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of

limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time

during which the offence continues. As per Section 473,

notwithstanding anything contained in the other provisions,

the court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry

of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in

the circumstances of the case that the delay has been

explained properly.

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5.2.3 As per Section 468(2) as above, the period of

limitation will be six months if the offence is punishable with

fine only. The limitation will be one year where the offence

is punishable for a term not exceeding one year. Similarly,

in respect of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years, the

prescribed period of limitation is three years. As per sub-

section (3) of Section 468, Cr.PC, where the offences are tried

together, the limitation will be determined with reference to

the offence which is punishable with more severe

punishment.

5.2.4 In the present case, the FIR in question, which was

held barred by limitation by the High Court, was in respect

of offences under Sections 323 and 341 read with Section

34 IPC. The offence under Section 323 is the offence of

voluntarily causing hurt. It provides punishment of

imprisonment for a term extending to one year which is the

severest punishment amongst the offences charged in the

FIR. In that view, it attracts Section 468(2)(b), Cr.PC, for

which the period of limitation is provided to be one year.

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5.2.5 Whether the limitation period as above would be

reckoned from the date of filing of the complaint or from the

date of taking cognizance, is no longer res integra in view of

the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Sarah

Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases by its

Director Dr. K.M. Cherian and Others

5

.

5.3 Prior to the deliverance of the aforementioned

Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew (supra),

there prevailed a conflict of opinion on the issue. The two-

Judge Bench decisions of this Court in Bharat Damodar

Kale and Another v. State of A.P.

6

and in Japani Sahoo

v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty

7

, held that the date of filing of

the complaint is the relevant date for the purpose of

computation of the period of limitation. A previous decision

in Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran and Another

8

, a

judgment of a three-Judge Bench, had taken a view that the

date of taking cognizance by the Court is the material date

relevant for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation.

5 (2014) 2 SCC 62

6 (2003) 8 SCC 559

7 (2007) 7 SCC 394

8 1990 (Supp) SCC 121

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5.3.1 The two-Judge Bench passed an order in Sarah

Mathew vs. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases

9

and

referred the matter to a three-Judge Bench. The three-Judge

Bench of this Court in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio

Vascular Diseases and Others

10

took a view that as a

coordinate Bench, it cannot declare the decision in Krishna

Pillai (supra)

to be not laying down the correct law. In due

deference to the precedential discipline, the issue was

referred to the five-Judge Bench to examine the correctness

of the view in Krishna Pillai (supra). It culminated into the

Constitution Bench decision in Sarah Mathew (supra).

5.4 In order to understand the law clarified by the

Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew (supra), it

would be relevant to briefly refer to the decisions in Bharat

Kale (supra)

and in Japani Sahoo (supra), which were later

affirmed by the Constitution Bench, holding that the

decision in Krishna Pillai (supra), was not a good law. The

Bharat Kale (supra) involved the facts where the offence

under the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable

9 (2014) 2 SCC 102

10 (2014) 2 SCC 104

Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 12 of 29

Advertisements) Act, 1954 was involved. On detection of the

offence on 05.03.1999, the complaint came to be filed on

03.03.2000, which was within the period of limitation of one

year. The Magistrate, however, took cognizance thereof on

25.03.2000, which was the date after one year. The

argument was that since the cognizance was taken after one

year, the bar of limitation would operate.

5.4.1 The Court held in Bharat Kale (supra),

‘…that the limitation prescribed therein is only for

the filing of the complaint or initiation of the

prosecution and not for taking cognizance. It of

course prohibits the court from taking cognizance

of an offence where the complaint is filed before the

court after the expiry of the period mentioned in the

said Chapter.’

(Para 10)

5.4.2 It was reasoned that taking cognizance is an act of

the court over which the prosecuting agency or the

complainant had no control and that the complaint which

was otherwise filed within the period of limitation cannot be

made infructuous by an act of the court which will cause

prejudice to the complainant. The maxim actus curiae

neminem gravabit, which means that the act of the court

shall not prejudice anybody, was applied and relied upon.

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5.4.3 Similarly, in Japani Sahoo (supra), it was a

complaint filed in the Magistrate’s court in respect of the

alleged offences punishable under Sections 161, 294, 323

and 506, IPC. On the basis of statements of witnesses,

learned Magistrate issued summons on 08.08.1997, asking

the accused to appear. The accused surrendered on

23.11.1998 and thereafter filed a petition under Section

482, Cr.PC for quashing of the criminal proceedings, raising

contention that the cognizance could not have been taken

by the Court after the period of one year limitation

prescribed for the offence punishable under Sections 294

and 323, IPC.

5.4.4 The view taken by the High Court while quashing the

proceedings that the relevant date for deciding the bar of

limitation was the date of taking cognizance by the Court

and since the cognizance was taken beyond the period of one

year and that the delay was not condoned by the Court in

exercise of powers under Section 473, Cr.PC, came to be set

aside by this Court. Another legal maxim nullum tempus aut

locus occurrit regi, which means that the crime never dies,

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was taken resort to. After elaborately delineating the scheme

of Chapter XXXVI, Cr.PC, as well as following the law laid

down in Bharat Kale (supra), it was held by this Court that

the date of filing the complaint or the date on which the

criminal proceedings are initiated is the relevant date for the

purpose of counting the limitation.

5.5 The Constitution Bench opined that the law laid

down in Bharat Kale (supra) and Japani Sahoo (supra)

was

good law and that the decision in Krishna Pillai (supra)

stood not only confined to its own facts but the proposition

of law laid down therein was erroneous and could not hold

the field. In Krishna Pillai (supra), this Court dealt with

Section 9 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, which

is a special Act. It contains a provision that no court shall

take cognizance of any offence under the said Act after the

expiry of one year from the date on which the offence is

alleged to have been committed.

5.5.1 The Constitution Bench in terms observed that there

was no reference either to Section 468 or Section 473, Cr.PC

in the judgment in Krishna Pillai (supra), nor did it refer to

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Sections 4 and 5, Cr.PC, which carved out the exceptions for

the special Act. Accordingly, it was ruled by the Constitution

Bench that Krishna Pillai (supra) was not the authority for

deciding the question as to what is the relevant date for the

purpose of computing the period of limitation under Section

468 Cr.PC.

5.5.2 It is a matter of jurisprudential interest that while

upholding the law in Bharat Kale (supra) and Japani Sahoo

(supra)

and in discarding the proposition laid down in

Krishna Pillai (supra), the Constitution Bench underscored

the importance of legal maxims in the interpretational

process for which the criticism was sought to be levelled in

the decision in Bharat Kale (supra) and Japani Sahoo

(supra) that the ratio thereof heavily leaned towards the legal

maxims. The Bench dispelled the submission that legal

maxims could not have been utilised to expand and interpret

the statutory provisions.

5.5.3 It was aptly observed,

“It is true that in Bharat Kale and Japani Sahoo,

this Court has referred to two important legal

maxims. We may add that in [Vanka

Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, (1993) 3

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SCC 4 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 571] , to which our attention

has been drawn by the counsel, it is stated that the

general rule of limitation is based on the Latin

maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura

subveniunt, which means the vigilant and not the

sleepy, are assisted by laws. We are, however,

unable to accept the submission that reliance

placed on legal maxims was improper. We are

mindful of the fact that legal maxims are not

mandatory rules but their importance as guiding

principles can hardly be underestimated.”

(Para 17)

5.5.4 Referring to Herbert Broom's work ‘Broom’s Legal

Maxims’ (10th Edition, 1939), it was highlighted that the

importance of legal maxims has to be acknowledged in the

process of development of law. It was observed that in the

ruder ages, the majority of questions in relation to the rights,

remedies and liabilities of private individuals were

determined by an immediate reference to such maxims,

many of which are obtained in the Roman Law. It was

expressed that the legal maxims are manifestly founded in

reason, public convenience and necessity.

5.6 It has to be added that the legal maxims which trace

their origin and birth in the experience of the older times

and emerge in the progress of civilization, blend

reasonableness, wisdom, truthfulness and objectivity, to be

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much useful in developing the legal concepts out of the

codified law and in interpreting the statutory provisions.

They play role of enriching the interpretational contents and

adding to the jurisprudential stuff.

5.7 Without straying any further, it is to be noted that

the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew (supra) adverted

to the meaning of the expression 'taking cognizance', to

observe that the same has not been defined in the Code but

it is of definite import and signifies the stage where the

Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of

an offence, which indicates the point when a Court or

Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to

initiate proceedings in respect of such offence said to have

been committed by the alleged offender.

5.7.1 There is no gainsaying, as observed in S.K. Sinha,

Chief Enforcement Officer v . Videocon International

Ltd. and Others

11

that whether or not a Magistrate has

taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts and

circumstances of each case and no rule of universal

11 (2008) 2 SCC 492

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application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be

said to have taken the cognizance.

5.7.2 As observed by the Constitution Bench, the point of

time when cognizance is taken by the court or the magistrate

cannot supply certain, definitive or dependable criteria to

treat it relevant for the purpose of reckoning the limitation

period. There are inherent vagaries in such aversion,

‘…a Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies

his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with

a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence

which is said to have been committed. This is the

special connotation acquired by the term

“cognizance” and it has to be given the same

meaning wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI. It

bears repetition to state that taking cognizance is

entirely an act of the Magistrate. Taking cognizance

may be delayed because of several reasons. It may

be delayed because of systemic reasons. It may be

delayed because of the Magistrate's personal

reasons.’

(Para 34)

5.8 The justification drawn for the proposition is that it

is the date of filing of complaint which is relevant for the

purpose of applying limitation, with reference to the

provisions of Section 473, Cr.PC. The following observations

from the Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew

(supra) may be pertinently seen,

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‘The role of the court acting under Section 473 was

aptly described by this Court in Vanka

Radhamanohari [(1993) 3 SCC 4] where this Court

expressed that this section has a non obstante

clause, which means that it has an overriding effect

on Section 468. This Court further observed that :

(SCC p. 8, para 6)

“6. … There is a basic difference

between Section 5 of the Limitation Act

and Section 473 of the Criminal

Procedure Code. For exercise of power

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

the onus is on the appellant or the

applicant to satisfy the court that there

was sufficient cause for condonation of

the delay, whereas, Section 473 enjoins

a duty on the court to examine not only

whether such delay has been explained

but as to whether it is the requirement

of the justice to condone or ignore such

delay.”

These observations indicate the scope of Section

473 Cr.PC. Examined in the light of legislative

intent and meaning ascribed to the term

“cognizance” by this Court, it is clear that Section

473 Cr.PC postulates condonation of delay caused

by the complainant in filing the complaint. It is the

date of filing of the complaint which is material.’

(Para 36)

5.8.1 The Constitution Bench proceeded to explain

further,

‘…there has to be some amount of certainty or

definiteness in matters of limitation relating to

criminal offences. If, as stated by this Court, taking

cognizance is application of mind by the Magistrate

to the suspected offence, the subjective element

comes in. Whether a Magistrate has taken

cognizance or not will depend on facts and

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circumstances of each case. A diligent complainant

or the prosecuting agency which promptly files the

complaint or initiates prosecution would be

severely prejudiced if it is held that the relevant

point for computing limitation would be the date on

which the Magistrate takes cognizance. The

complainant or the prosecuting agency would be

entirely left at the mercy of the Magistrate, who may

take cognizance after the limitation period because

of several reasons; systemic or otherwise. It cannot

be the intention of the legislature to throw a diligent

complainant out of the court in this manner.’

(Para 37)

5.8.2 The following were further stated,

‘Besides, it must be noted that the complainant

approaches the court for redressal of his grievance.

He wants action to be taken against the

perpetrators of crime. The courts functioning under

the criminal justice system are created for this

purpose. It would be unreasonable to take a view

that delay caused by the court in taking cognizance

of a case would deny justice to a diligent

complainant. Such an interpretation of Section 468

Cr.PC would be unsustainable and would render it

unconstitutional.’

(Para 37)

5.8.3 It was further observed in Paragraph 45 that the

Court in interpreting and asserting the proposition of law

that the relevant date for the purpose of computing

limitation is the date of filing of complaint or initiation of

proceedings, and not the date when the court or magistrate

takes cognizance of the offence, did not mean supplying

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casus omissus, but was only amounted to carrying out the

intention of the legislature by ascertaining such intention.

Ascertaining the intention of legislature, opined the Court,

is the judicial function.

5.8.4 With such rich amount of reasoning, the

Constitution Bench propounded the law thus,

‘In view of the above, we hold that for the purpose

of computing the period of limitation under Section

468 Cr.PC the relevant date is the date of filing of

the complaint or the date of institution of

prosecution and not the date on which the

Magistrate takes cognizance. We further hold

that Bharat Kale, [(2003) 8 SCC 559], which is

followed in Japani Sahoo, [(2007) 7 SCC 394] lays

down the correct law. Krishna Pillai [Krishna

Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, [1990 Supp SCC 121] will

have to be restricted to its own facts and it is not

the authority for deciding the question as to what

is the relevant date for the purpose of computing

the period of limitation under Section 468 Cr.PC.’

(Para 51)

6. The more recent decision in Amritlal v. Shantilal

Soni and Others

12

reiterates the position of law. The facts

involved in the case were that the appellant filed a written

complaint on 10.07.2012 to the Superintendent of Police,

Khachrod, claiming that he had entrusted 33.139 kilograms

12 (2022) 13 SCC 128

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of silver to the respondent on 04.10.2009 and the

respondent refused to return the same when the demand

was made by the appellant. FIR No. 289 of 2012 came to be

registered. After investigation, the Police filed charge-sheet

on 13.11.2012 against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Thereafter,

the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Khachrod took

cognizance on 04.12.2012 and then framed charges on

12.09.2013.

6.1 The order framing of charges came to be challenged

by the respondent-accused by filing Revision Application

under Section 397, Cr.PC on the ground inter alia that

taking of cognizance by the Magistrate was barred by

limitation. When the plea was negatived and the orders were

challenged, the High Court took the view that taking of

cognizance on 04.12.2012 by the Magistrate was barred by

limitation, consequently, the High Court quashed the

proceedings.

6.2 The following view taken by the High Court came to

be disapproved in the decision of the Constitution Bench in

Sarah Mathew (supra),

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‘On cumulative consideration of the aforesaid

discussion, this Court is of the view that the date of

offence is very well known to the complainant i.e. 4-

10-2009 and he lodged F.I.R. on 19-7-2012 i.e.

after 2 years 9½ months of the alleged incident and

the Police has filed charge sheet on 4-12-2012 after

a period of three years of the alleged incident, on

which basis, the Magistrate has taken cognizance

of the offence against the petitioners on 4-12-2012

which was barred by limitation, therefore, the trial

court as well as Revisional Court have committed

error of law in rejecting the plea taken by the

petitioners regarding maintainability of the

prosecution on the ground of limitation.’

(Para 20)

6.3 The categorical law laid down by the Constitution

Bench in Sarah Mathew (supra)

was so applied in Amritlal

(supra) to hold that the complaint was filed on 10.07.2012,

which was within a period of three years with reference to

the date of commission of offence,

‘Therefore, the enunciations and declaration of law

by the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew case,

[(2014) 2 SCC 62], do not admit of any doubt that for

the purpose of computing the period of limitation

under Section 468 Cr.PC, the relevant date is the

date of filing of the complaint or the date of

institution of prosecution and not the date on which

the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence. The

High Court has made a fundamental error in

assuming that the date of taking cognizance i.e. 4-

12-2012 is decisive of the matter, while ignoring the

fact that the written complaint was indeed filed by

the appellant on 10-7-2012, well within the period of

limitation of 3 years with reference to the date of

commission of offence i.e. 4-10-2009.’

(Para 11)

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7. In the present case, learned counsel for the

respondents made a vain attempt by referring to the

definition of ‘complaint’ in Section 2(d) as well as definition

of ‘police report’ in Section 2(r), Cr.PC, and further taking

resort to the provisions of Section 173, which deals with the

‘Report to Police Officer on Completion of Investigation’, and

Section 190 under which the Magistrate takes cognizance of

the offences upon receiving a complaint of facts which

constitute the offence or upon a police report of such facts

or upon information received from any person other than

police, submitted that the Constitution Bench judgment in

Sarah Mathew (supra) was related to a case where the

complaint was filed before the Magistrate, whereas in the

instant case, the FIR was filed and subsequently, the

Magistrate took cognizance.

7.1 It was submitted that in view of the difference in

working of the provisions, especially under the provisions of

Section 173 onwards, and having regard to the distinction

between ‘complaint’ defined in Section 2(d) and the ‘police

report’ defined in Section 2(r), Cr.PC, and when the

Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 25 of 29

‘complaint’ in Section 2(d) does not include the police report,

the Constitution Bench judgment is distinguishable and the

instant being the complaint case, the principle laid down in

Sarah Mathew (supra) will not apply.

7.2 The above submission is stated to be rejected. The

computing point of limitation for the purpose of Section 468,

Cr.PC is held to be the date of filing complaint – the date of

initiation of criminal proceedings. Whether the case belongs

to one instituted before the Magistrate under Section 173 or

it is upon a complaint filed before the police, what matters

is the date of initiation of criminal proceedings.

7.3 The criminal proceedings can be said to have been

initiated in both categories of complaint when the complaint

is filed before the Magistrate or FIR is lodged before the

police, as the case may be. It remains a complaint made

either to the Magistrate or to the police to become the

starting point of initiation of criminal proceedings.

7.4 The relevant date as held by Sarah Mathew (supra)

would be the date of filing of complaint or, differently stated,

the date of initiation of criminal proceedings. Therefore, the

Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 26 of 29

submission on behalf of the respondents on this count falls

flat.

8. As disclosure of honest and full facts before the

Court is part of the fair conduct on the part of lawyers,

respecting the binding precedence of the judgments and

conceding its applicability in a case is also a duty in fairness

to be discharged by the advocates in conducting their case.

They are part of the system of administration of justice and

are not expected to breach the rules of the game to argue

against settled principles or contrary to well settled law, just

for the sake of doing it. Giving up an argument where a point

of law is already decided is a professional virtue. It is part of

ethics in professional conduct before the Court.

8.1 As the courts are bound by the law of precedent and

to follow the law laid down in the binding judgment of the

Constitution Bench, the lawyers are also expected to respect

the strong-operated precedent emanating from a judgment

holding the field unless exceptional grounds exist to

distinguish the decision are available. Merely for the

purpose of demonstrating the argumenta tive skill, the

Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 27 of 29

lawyers ought not to eat up the valuable public time of the

court by making the submissions, which are worthless

against binding precedent.

8.2 It is to be noticed that even in Amritlal (supra), a

failed contention was advanced seeking to submit that the

date of cognizance by the Magistrate was required to be

applied inasmuch as the decision in Sarah Mathew (supra)

needed reconsideration on the ground that several aspects

relating to the purpose of Chapter XXXVI, Cr.PC, have not

been taken into consideration and the Court had not

comprehensively dealt with the provisions relating to the bar

of limitation.

8.3 Rejecting such contention, the Court in Amritlal

(supra)

observed, and this Court reiterates the same,

‘A decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court

cannot be questioned on certain suggestions about

different interpretation of the provisions under

consideration. It remains trite that the binding

effect of a decision of this Court does not depend

upon whether a part icular argument was

considered or not, provided the point with reference

to which the argument is advanced, was actually

decided therein [ Vide Somawanti v. State of

Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 23 : AIR 1963 SC

151, para 22] . This is apart from the fact that a

bare reading of the decision in Sarah

Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl) No.9971-9972/2025 Page 28 of 29

Mathew, (2014) 2 SCC 62 would make it clear that

every relevant aspect concerning Chapter XXXVI

Cr.PC has been dilated upon by the Constitution

Bench in necessary details.’

(Para 13)

9. It has to be asserted that the Constitution Bench

judgment is a beckoning binding precedent and the courts

are bound by it. There cannot be any room to travel beyond

the four corners of the binding nature thereof by raising

spacious argument that the particular aspect was missed or

that the particular contentions was not canvassed. Such

stock contentions cannot dilute the law laid down by the

Constitution Bench and its unimpeachable precedential

value.

10. As a consequence of all the foregoing reasons and

discussion, it is to be held that the High Court committed a

patent error in quashing the FIR No. 121 of 2011 on the

ground of limitation, taking an erroneous view that the date

of taking cognizance by the Magistrate is relevant. As held

by the Constitution Bench in Sarah Mathew (supra), the

relevant date for the purpose of reckoning the limitation

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under Section 468, Cr.PC is the date of filing of complaint or

the date of initiation of criminal proceedings.

11. The impugned order dated 30.01.2025 in Crl. M.C.

No. 1170 of 2017 and Crl. M.A. No. 7270 of 2016 by the High

Court are hereby set aside. The Appeals stand allowed. The

trial shall expeditiously proceed in accordance with law.

Interlocutory application, if any pending, shall not

survive.

………..………………………….., J.

[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]

…………………….., J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 09, 2026.