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PETITIONER:

S. GANAPATHY AND ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

AIR INDIA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/06/1993

BENCH:

PUNCHHI, M.M.

BENCH:

PUNCHHI, M.M.

AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:

1993 AIR 2430 1993 SCR (3)1006

1993 SCC (3) 429 JT 1993 (4) 10

1993 SCALE (3)19

ACT:

%

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Section 33(2) (b) read with Section 2(rr)-Statutory wage-

Computation of amount of one month's wages to be paid to

discharged/dismissed workmen-Whether employer justified in

reducing the amount by statutory tax deductions-Whether

approval applications liable to be rejected on ground that

deduction of tax resulted in payment of less than one

month's wages-Order of discharge/termination requiring

approval of competent authority-Nature and effect of order

till approval.

HEADNOTE:

The appellants, employees of the respondent Air India, who

were awarded penalties of removal or dismissal by the

respondent, as a result of the disciplinary proceedings,

were paid one month's salary or, wages, reducing it by a sum

of Rs. 10 or 15, as deductible on account of monthly payment

of tax on employment, imposed on salary and wage earners,

under the provisions of the West Bengal State Tax on

professions,. Trades, Callings and Employments Act,1979.The

respondent-Air India sought approval of its action from the

National Industrial Tribunal, under Section 33(2) (b) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, which was opposed by the appellants

on the ground that there was short payment and accordingly

it was not in terms of the mandatory provisions of Section

33(2) (b) of the Act. The Tribunal upheld the objection and

rejected the approval applications.

In writ petitions preferred by the respondents, a Single

Judge of the High Court held that the Tribunal was in error

in refusing approval on the ground of short payment and

remanded the matter to the Tribunal for decision on merits'

Letters Patent Appeals preferred by the appellants- were

dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court affirming

the view of the Single Judge.

In the appeals preferred by the employees, on behalf of the

appellants it was contended that one month's wage

statutorily required to he paid in terms

1007

of Section 33(2) (1)) was a payment which did not pay take

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the character of salary or wage as the appellants were not

salary or wage earners while getting that one month's "-age,

and therefore, not being salary or wage earners in that

month, order (if dismissal or termination of service having

been passed against them, they were not in employment and

hence not liable to pay tax, that the very basis of tax

stood displaced and hence the deduction of tax at the

snapped source rendered the payment or deposit of one

month's wage deficient, contravening the mandatory

provisions of Section 33(2) (b) of the Act.

It was contended on. behalf of the respondent Air India

that the statutory deduction of tax payable under the Tax

Act inhered in the payment of one month's wage. and in any

case, the difference had been tendered before the Tribunal

for payment to the workman, on objection raised, during the

pendency of the approval proceedings.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1. When an order of discharge or dismissal of a

workman is incomplete and inchoate until it,-; approval is

obtained from the Tribunal, there is no effective

termination of the relationship of the employer and the

employee. Not only in a limited way that the relationship

is snapped factually and one month's wage is given to the

employee to soften the rigour of his factual unemployment

but the content and character of the wage would extendedly

tend to remain the same so far as subjection to statutory

tax deduction is concerned, being remuneration paid as

understood in Section 2 (rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

on the supposition that the terms of employment, expressed

or implied, were fulfilled and the same was due as wages

payable to the workman in respect of his employment,or of

work done in such employment, even though he was not put to

work.

2.1.Bare-facedly the inclusions and exclusions provided in

Section 2(rr) do not refer to tax dues. Rather the

provision is silent about statutory tax deductions. But it

goes without saving; if there is a statutory compulsion to

deduct, that compulsion would have an intrusive role to

play, getting a proper fitment, as the law may warrant its

effect, Section 33(2) (b) apart. The matter has to be

viewed in this light.

2.2.In the instant case, the appellants were salary or wage

earners, getting salaries or wages per month and from their

wages, prior to their order

1008

of removal or dismissal, tax deductions under the West

Bengal State Tax on Professions, Trades, Ceilings. and

Employments Act, 1979. were being made. It was the

employer' liability to deduct and pay the tax on behalf if

the employee under Section 4 of the Act. Failure to comply

with the provisions of the Section exposed the respondent to

penalties and prosecution under other provisions of the Act.

3.1.The proviso to Section 33(2) (b) mandates two steps,

that unless workman is paid wages for one month and an

application as contemplated is made by the employer to the

Tribunal for approval of his action, no such workman van he

discharged or dismissed. The intention of the legislature

in providing for such a contingency was to soften. the

rigour of unemployment that will face the workman, against

whom an order of discharge or dismissal. has been passed.

3.2.By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de-facto

relationship of employer and employee is ended, but not de-

jure, for that could happen when the Tribunal accords its

approval. The employee. thus gets factually unemployed from

the date of the approval application in the sense that he is

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not called to work and is paid only a month's wage

representing the succeeding month of his unemployment. The

relationship of employer and employee is legally not

terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given

by the Tribunal. And this state of affairs was required to

he ended within a period of three months; from the date of

receipt of such application in terms of sub-section (5) of

Section 33, though the lapse of such period Would not end

the proceeding and such time was extendable by the Tribunal

for reasons to be recorded in writing.

3.3.In this fluid state of affairs, the legal character of

one month's wage would undergo a change depending (on the

result of the approval application. If the Tribunal were to

refuse the approval, the inchoate and incomplete order of

discharge or dismissal would end and the legal character of

one month's wages would transform to be the same as In-fore,

from which statutory tax deduction could legitimately be

made by the employer. In the event of approval of the

application by the Tribunal, the legal character of one

month's wage would, on the other hand, be a wage without

employment. In the given situation, if the Tribunal were to

refuse approval solely on the ground that statutory tax

deduction stands in its way to the grant of approval, it

could legitimately make its order conditional on making good

such payment. This is a field in which the interest of both

parties has to be kept in view,

1009

for the situation would be precarious for the employer if he

were not to deduct tax under section 4 of the Tax Act and

exposing him to the dangers of penalties and prosecution.

If approval was to be rejected on merit and otherwise to be

rejected for not making complete payment of one month wage,

it would thus be just and proper to let the. employer deduct

the statutory tax deduction from that one month wage, since

the relationship of employer and an employee has effectively

not been terminated, to meet the eventuality, lest the

approval application be dismissed on merit. On the other

hand, it would be just and proper either for the employer on

his own or on the asking of the Tribunal to let the sum

representing statutory tax deduction be deposited in the

Tribunal for payment to the workman in the event of the

approval application being allowed. If these two situations

can he saved in this manner there would, in no event, he a

dismissal of the approval application for payment of wage

subjected to statutory tax deduction.

3.4 Distinction would have to be drawn between statutory

deductions like tax deductions and other deductions which

the employer considers he can make. In either event, he

takes the risk when making a deduction. In the case of

statutory tax deductions, his justificatory burden is less,

for he has the shelter of the tax law. The case of the

other deductions would obviously be on different footing for

he may not have any thrust of law. Those may purely be

contractual. Those deductions may not be compulsive under

any law. The employer makes the deduction in such cases at

his peril.

3.5 In the instant case, there definitely arose a genuine

claim to make the tax deduction and doing so the employer

projected its case before the Tribunal in that angle. Not a

paisa otherwise was kept back. Thus, in the facts and

circumstances of the case the respondent was able to

establish that its deliberate deduction representing the tax

from one month's wage was not to shorten the wage and cause

infraction of Section 33 (2) (b), but a compulsive'

deduction to fulfil a statutory obligation by the thrust of

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the Tax Act.

Syndicate Bank Lid. v. Rain Nath Bhat, (1967-68) (XXXII)

F.J.R. 490; Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.N. Modak,

[1963] 3 S.C.R. 411 and Bharat Electronics Ltd., Bangalore

v. Industrial Tribunal, Karnatak, Bangalore and Anr., [1990]

1 S.C.R. 971, relied on.

Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. v. S.K. Dutta, (1970) LLJ

Vol.2 p.547; Dinesh Khare v. Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan,

(1982) LAD I.C. 517 and Balmer- Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v.

Waman B. More, [1981] 42 F.L.R. 272, distinguished.

1010

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3134-36 of

1993.

From the Judgment and Order dated 12.7.91 of the Bombay High

Court ill Appeal Nos. 1309, 1309 and 1311 of' 1997.

M. K. Ramamurthy. Ms. Chandan Ramamurthi and M.A. Krishna

Moorthy for the Appellants.

F.S. Nariman, Arun Jaitly, Lalit Bhasin, J.K. Das, Viplay

Sharma and vineet Kumar for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PUNCHHI, J. leave to appeal granted.

The question which falls for determination in these Appeals

is whether in Computing the amount of one month's wages, to

be paid Under section 33(2) (h) of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, (hereafter referred to as the 'Act') the employer

is justified in reducing, the amount by statutory tax

deductions'?

The three appellants herein, in the period 1979-80 were in

the employment of the respondent-Air India, and stationed at

Calcutta. They individually suffered disciplinary

proceedings on the charges of some mis-conducts and ha%-in,,

been found guilty were awarded penalties of removal or

dismissal by the Air India, as, due to each. It is common

ground that the respondent-Air India, statutorily bound,

Applied to the National Industrial Tribunal. Bombay by

means of separate approval applications under section 33(2)

(b) of the Act to have its action approved. In terms of the

said provision it paid to the appellants one month's salary

or wages reducing it by sum of Rs. 10 or 15, as deductible

on account of monthly payment of tax on employment imposed

on salary And wage earners, under the provisions of' the

West Bengal State Tax on Professions Trades, Callings and

Employments Act, 1979 (hereafter referred to as 'the Tax

Act). The approval sought by the respondent-management was

opposed by the appellants before the Tribunal. and though

initially not part of the defence taken in the written

statement defence was later set up by them that they had not

been paid wages in terms of the mandatory provisions of

section 33(2) (b) of the Act, as there was short payment.

This put the respondent management to Alert and it laid

before the Tribunal account which, had gone on to work out

the month's wages. It is common ground that the payment

otherwise was proper but since it was short by 10 or 15

rupees, as respectively due on account of taxable under the

Tax Act, the payment was termed as invalid.

1011

The Tribunal sustaining the objection rejected the approval

applications on that score alone and not on merits. In

separate writ petitions by the respondents, the Bombay High

Court interfered in the matter taking the view that the

Tribunal was in error in refusing-approval on the around of

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the suggested short payment and hence breach of section 33

(2) (b) of the Act. The matter could not be finalised by

the learned Single Judge and. remand to the Tribunal was

made for decision on merits. Letters Patent Appeals

preferred by the respective appellants were dismissed by a

division bench of the Bombay High Court affirming the view

of the learned Single Judge. That is why the instant

appeals.

The issue, on the face of it, is extremely narrow. But

before we get into grips with it, let us take stock of the

statutory provisions which come into action leading to the

answer. The first in priority are the two provisions of the

Act being section 2 (rr) defining 'wages' and section 33(2)

(b) imposing the discipline, which are reproduced hereafter:

"2. IN THIS ACT, UNLESS THERE IS ANYTHING

REPUGNANT IN THE SUBJECT OR CONTEXT, -

(rr) 'wages' means all remuneration capable of

being expressed in terms of money, which

would, if the terms of employment, expressed

or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a

workman in respect of his employment, of work

done in such employment, and includes -

(i)Such allowances including dearness

allowances as the workman is for the time

being entitled to;

(ii)the, value of any house accommodation. or

of supply of light, water, medical attendance

or other amenity or of any service or of any

concessional supply of food-rains or-other

articles,

(iii) any travelling concession;

(iv) any commission payable on the Promotion

of sales or business

or both;

but does not include-

(a) any bonus;

1012

(b) any contribution paid or payable by the

employer to any pension fund or provident fund

or for the benefit of the workman under any

law for the time being in force;

(c) "any gratuity payable on the termination

of his service"

"SECTION 33 - CONDITIONS OF SERVICE, ETC. TO

REMAIN UNC HANGED UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES

DURING PENDENCY OF PROCEEDINGS

(1)xxxxxxxxxxx

(2) During the pendency of any such

proceeding in respect of an industrial

dispute, the employer may, in accordance with

the standing orders applicable to a workman

concerned in such dispute or. where there are

no such standing orders, in accordance with

the terms of the contract, whether express or

implied, between him and the workman,

(a)xxxxxxxxx

(b) for any misconduct not connected with

the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by

dismissal or otherwise, that workman

PROVIDED that no such workman shall be

discharged or dismissed, unless he has been

paid waves for one. month and an application

has been made by the employer to the authority

before which the proceeding is pending for-

approval of the action taken by the employer."

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Bare-facedly the inclusions and exclusions provided in

section 2(rr) do not refer to tax dues. Rather the

provision is silent-about statutory tax deductions. But it

goes without saying, if there is a statutory compulsion to

deduct, that compulsion would have an intrusive role to play

getting a proper fitment, as the law may warrant its effect,

section 33 (2) (b) apart. The matter has to be viewed in

this light.

That the appellants were salary or wage earners, getting

salaries or wages per month is not in dispute. It is also

not in dispute that from their wages, prior to their order

of removal or dismissal, tax deductions under the Tax Act

were being made. There was no objection by the appellants

to such deductions at that point of time. That it was the

employers liability to deduct and pay the tax on behalf of

the. employee under section 4 of the Act is also beyond

dispute. Section 4 of the Tax

1013

Act pointedly enjoins upon the employer to deduct the tax

payable under the Act from the salary or wages payable to

any person earning a salary or wage, before such salary or

wage is paid to him and the employer has also been foisted

with the liability to pay tax on behalf of salary or wage

earner irrespective of the fact whether such deduction has

been made or not when the salary or wage was paid to such

person. In other words, the tax payable by the wage earner

is deductible from his wage irrespective of the fact whether

such deduction has been made or not, but the liability to

pay tax is on the employer. Thus it cannot be denied that

while the appellants were salary or wage earners, their

wages or salary had to suffer & deduction of payment of tax

at the hands of the respondent-employer. Failure to comply

the provisions of section 4 of the Tax Act exposed the

respondent to penalties and prosecution under other

provisions, of the Act, details of which need not be brought

herein.

It was canvassed on behalf of the appellants that one

month's wage statutorily required to be paid in terms of

section 33(2) (b) is a payment which does not partake the

character of salary or wage as the appellants were not

salary or age earners while getting that one month's wage

Sequelly it was canvassed that not being salary or wage

earners in that month, orders of dismissal or termination of

service having been passed against them, they were not in

employment and hence not liable to pay tax. It was asserted

that the very basis of tax stood displaced and hence the

deduction of tax at the snapped source rendered the payment

or deposit of one month's wage deficient. contravening the

mandatory provisions of section 33(2) (b) of the Act. On

the other hand, it was contended inter alia on behalf of

the respondent that the statutory deduction of tax payable

under the Tax Act inhered in the payment of one month's

wave, and in any case the difference had been tendered

before the Tribunal for payment to the workmen, on objection

raised. during the pendency of the approval proceedings.

These are the contours of the dispute.

The proviso to section 33(2) (b) mandates two steps, that

unless the workman is paid wages for one month and an

application as contemplated is made by the employer to the

Tribunal for approval of his action, no such workman can be

discharged or dismissed. The intention of the legislature

in providing for such a contingency is not far to seek and

as was pointed out by this Court in the case of Syndicate

Bank Limited v. Rain Nath Bhat 11 967-681 (XXXII) FJR 490 at

497 was "to soften the rigour of unemployment that will face

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the workman, against whom an order of discharge or dismissal

has been passed."

A three-judge bench decision, authored by Gajendragadkar,

C.J. of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S.N.

Modak [1963] 3 SCR 411 a page 418,

1014

had the occasion to spell out the nature of the order of

discharge or dismissal. It was ruled that-such order being

incomplete and inchoate until the approval is obtained.

could not effectively terminate the relationship of the

employer and the employee, as the question of the validity

of the order would have to be gone into, and if approval is

not accorded by the Tribunal the employer would be bound to

treat the workmen concerned as its employee and pay him all

the wages for the period even though the employer

subsequently could proceed to terminate the employee's

services. Thus this Court's view always has been that

relationship of employer and employee is not effectively

terminated by the passing of the order of discharge or

dismissal until approval thereto in terms of section 33(2)

(b) is accorded by tile Tribunal.

A three-judge bench of this Court in Bharat Electronic

Limited, Bangalore v. Industrial Tribunal, Karnatak,

Bangalore and another, [1990] 1 SCR 971 at pages 976-977

observed as follows

"One month's wages as thought and provided to

be given are conceptually for the month to

follow, the month of unemployment and in the

context wages for the month following the date

of dismissal and not a repetitive wage of the

month previous to the date of dismissal. If

the converse is read in the context of the

proviso to section 32(b), it inevitably would

have to be read ,is double the wages earned in

the month previous to the date of dismissal

and that would, in our view be, reading in the

provision something which is not there, either

expressly or impliedly."

Bharat Electronics was a case in which wages had been paid

or offered to the workman in terms of section 33(2) (b).

short of the night shift allowance, and this Court took the

view that from the date of dismissal or removal (factual

though), the occasion to earn night shift allowance could

not and did not arise. In order to earn night shift

allowance the workman had to actually work in the night

shift and for the purpose had to report for duty on being

put to that shift. It was in this situation held that night

shift allowance automatically did not form part of his wage

as it was not such an allowance which flowed to him as

entitlement not restricted to his service.

In this extreme situation, the employee, in one sense, gets

unemployed as he stands deprived of work with effect from

the date of the application for approval, on which date

his discharge of dismissal is factually effective. He

stands paid his months, wage from such date and this is a

wage conceptually for the month

1015

following not double the wage for the month previous to the

date of the application. This is the dicta of Bharat

Electronics case (supra). In the other sense the order of

discharge or dismissal is incomplete and inchoate, unless

approved by the Tribunal and till approval is granted there

is no effective break of the employer's and employee

relationship. This is the dictum of Tata Iron & Steel

Company's case. So if these two features are grasped.

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appreciated and blended, it would lead us to the

understanding that by passing the order of discharge or

dismissal de-facto' relationship of employer and employee is

ended, but dot de-jure, for that could happen when the

Tribunal accords its approval. The employee thus gets

factually unemployed from the date of the approval

application in the sense that he is not called to work and

is paid only a month's wage representing the succeeding

month of his unemployment. The relationship of employer and

employee is legally not terminated till approval of

discharge or dismissal is given by the tribunal. And this

state of affairs was required to be ended within a period of

three months from the date of receipt of such application in

terms of subsection (5) of section 33, though the lapse of

such period would not and the proceeding and such time was

extendable by the Tribunal for reasons to be recorded in

writing. Now in this fluid state of affairs, the legal

character of one, month's wage would undergo a change

depending, on the result of the approval application. If

the Tribunal were to refuse the approval, the inchoate and

incomplete order of discharge or dismissal would end and the

legal character of one month's wales would transform to be

the same as before, from which statutory tax deduction could

legitimately be made by the employer. In the event of

approval of the application by the Tribunal, the legal

character of one month's wage would on tile other, hand be a

wage without employment. In the given situation, if the

Tribunal were to refuse approval solely on the ground that

statutory tax deduction stands in its way to the grant of

approval, it could legitimately make its order conditional

on making food such payment. This is a field in which the

interest of- both parties has to be kept in view, for the

situation would be precarious for the employer if he were

not to deduct tax under section 4 of the Tax Act and

exposing him to the dangers, of penalties and prosecution.

If approval was to be rejected on merit and otherwise to be

rejected for not making complete payment of one month wage,

it would thus be just and proper to let the employer deduct

the statutory tax deduction from that one month wage, since

the relationship of employer and an employee has effectively

not been terminated, to meet the eventuality, lest the

approval application be dismissed on merit On the other hand

it would be just and proper either for the employer on his

own or on the asking of the Tribunal to let the sum

representing statutory tax deduction be deposited in the

Tribunal for payment to tile workman in the,event of the

approval application being allowed. If these two situations

can be saved in this manner there would, in no event be a

dismissal of the approval application for payment of wage

subjected to statutory tax deduction. Taken in this tight

one is to

1016

view the deduction and the subsequent offer of the

respondent to pay the tax deducted, and later deposited

before the Tribunal, for payment to the workman. This

payment was offered and deposited before the decision of the

approval application at a time when the relationship of

employer and employee had effectively not been terminated.

Here distinction would have to he drawn between statutory

deductions like tax deductions and other deductions which

the employer considers he can make. In either event, he

takes the risk when making a deduction. In the case of

statutory tax deductions his justificatory burden is less.

for he has the shelter of the tax law. The case of the

other deductions would obviously be on different footing for

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lie may not have any thrust of law. Those may purely be

contractual. Those deductions may not be compulsive under

any law. The employer makes the deduction in such cases at

his peril. But here, in the present situation, there

definitely arose a genuine claim to make the tax deduction

and doing so the employer projected.its case before the

tribunal in that angle. Not a paisa otherwise was kept

back. Thus in the facts and circumstances it appears to us

that the respondent was able to establish that its

deliberate deduction representing the tax from one month's

wage was not to shorten the wage and cause infraction. of

section 33(2) (b) but a compulsive deduction to fulfill a

statutory obligation by the thrust of the Tax Act.

On this analysis and understanding the case of the Patna

High Court in Muzaffarpur Electric Supply Co. v. S.K.

Dutta(1990) LLJ Vol.2 page 547 where when the loan and

money-order commission was deducted from one month's wages,

it was held to be violative of section 33(2) (b) of the Act

and the case Rajasthan High Court in Dinesh Khare v.

Industrial Tribunal, Rajasthan(1982) LAB I.C. 517, decided

by S.C. Agrawal, then on that bench, and who is happily now

a member of this bench, disapproving, the deduction of

provident fund on the finding, that those did not represent

"emoluments carried by the workman concerned while on duty

within the meaning of section 2(rr) of the- Employees

Provident Fund Act. being, cases clearly distinguishable

would not further the case of the appellants. Conversely a

single bench decision of the Bombay flesh Court in Balmer

Lawrie and Co. Ltd. v. Waman B. More [1981] 42 F.L.R.

272275 would also not further the case of the respondent

because instantly no difficulty or inability to make the

necessary calculations at a particular point of time arose

which difficulty or inability get removed subsequently. The

claim to tax deduction was there to begin,with and could

subsist till the grant of the approval application and such

grant could be conditional on the payment back of the tax

deduction. All option of this method should settle the

question. We do not wish to enter upon other questions

cropping up to determine the tax liability of the employer

or the employee in that period of one month.

1017

At this juncture, it would add to our understanding if we

reproduce a passage from Bharat Electronics case supra).

It is:

"Before concluding the judgment the

observations in Syndicate Bank's case, afore-

quoted, are again to he borne in mind. In the

facts and circumstances of this case the

management paid to the workman a sum of

Rs.607.90 as a month's salary "to soften the

rigour of unemployment that will face the

workman". Flow could a short payment of Rs.

12 he said to have lessened the softening of

such rigour is thought stirring. Viewed in

the context, there could genuinely be a

dispute, as in the present case, as to whether

a particular sum was due as wages. It is, of

course, risky for the management to raise it

as to pay even a paise less than the month's

wages due under section 33(2) (b), would he

fatal to its permission sought. But at the

same time it needs to be clarified that it is

for the management to establish, when

questioned, that the sum paid to the workman

under section 33(2) (b) represented full wages

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of the month following the date of discharge

or dismissal, as conceived of in the provision

and as interpreted by us in entwining the

ratios in Bennett Coleman's case (supra) and

Dilbagh Rai Jarry's case (supra) and adding

something ourselves thereto."

Thus on principle and percept we go on to hold that when an

order of discharge or dismissal of a workman is incomplete

and in choate until it's approval is obtained from the

Tribunal, there is no effective termination of the

relationship of the employer and the employee. Not only in

a limited way that the relationship is snapped factually and

one month's wage is given to the employee to soften the

rigour of his factual unemployment, but the content and

character of the wage would extendidly tend to remain the.

same so far as subjection to statutory tax deduction is

concerned, being remuneration paid as understood in section

2(rr) of the Act, on the supposition that the terms of

employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled and the

same was due as wages payable to the workman in respect of

his employment, or of work done in such employment, even

though he was not put to work.

Thus as a result, we find no cause to interfere in the

judgment and order of the High Court. Accordingly we

dismiss these appeals but leave the parties to bear their

own costs.

N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.'

1018