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PETITIONER:

S. SURJIT SINGH KALRA ETC.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/02/1991

BENCH:

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

BENCH:

SHETTY, K.J. (J)

SHARMA, L.M. (J)

SAWANT, P.B.

CITATION:

1991 SCR (1) 364 1991 SCC (2) 87

JT 1991 (1) 417 1991 SCALE (1)179

ACT:

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958- Sections 14B to 14D;

14(1)(e), 14(6) & 7 and 25C(2)-Classified Landlords-

Landlord's right to evict tenant-Tenant's right to resist

eviction-Scope of-Whether landlord has to prove his bona

fide requirement.

Section 25B: Introduction of Sections 14B to 14D in

sub-section (1) of Section 25B-Absence of corresponding

amendments to subsections (4) and (5) as also to the form of

summons specified in the Third Schedule-Whether allows a

tenant to take up defence under Section 14 (1) (e) as

against an application under Sections 14B to 14D.

Sections 25B(5) is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3,

CPC has no role there-CPC, 1908, Order 37 Rule 3.

Interpretation of statutes-Reading words in a

statute-When permissible-Harmonious construction--Purposive

approach to be adopted by Courts.

HEADNOTE:

The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was amended by Act 57

of 1988 which introduced Sections 14B to 14D to the Act

carving out thereby classified landlords from the general

class of landlords with specified rights to recover

immediate possession of the premises let out by them if

these are required for their own residence. The released or

retired persons from armed forces or the dependents of the

member of armed forces killed in action are covered by

Section 14B, the retired employees of the Central Government

and of the Delhi Administration are covered by Section 14C,

and the landlords who are widows are covered by Section

14D. These classified landlords are also given the benefit

of summary trial under Chapter IIIA by introducing Sections

14B to 14D in Sub-section (1) of Section 25B, but there are

no corresponding amendments to sub-sections (2) to (5) of

Section 25B.

The two petitioners, who are tenants, were in

occupation of the premises belonging to two Army Officers

(respondent-landlords). In the

365

action for eviction brought by the landlords on the ground

that they needed the premises for their occupation, the

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tenants sought leave to contest the application which the

Rent Controller being not satisfied with the facts disclosed

by the tenants in their affidavits denied. The Rent

Controller accepted the case of the landlords and ordered

eviction of the tenants. The two tenants challenged the

eviction orders by filing separate revision petitions in the

High Court. They also challenged the validity of Section 14B

of the Act before the High Court by means of two separate

writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. The

High Court dismissed the writ petition and the revision

petition filed by one of the tenants who being aggrieved

moved this Court by way of special Leave Petition Nos. 7146

JUDGMENT:

Court following its decision in the first case dismissed the

writ petition filed by him, though the revision petition

filed by him was still pending. The tenant challenged the

decision of the High Court by preferring Special Leave

Petition No. 7364 of 1990 to this Court.

It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the

tenant's right to contest the application for eviction on

the grounds specified in Section 14(l)(e) cannot be denied

even as against the classified landlords falling under

Sections 14B to 14D. The tenant is entitled to leave to

contest the application by disclosing such facts in the

affidavit as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an

order of eviction under Section 14(l)(e). This is because of

retention of sub-section (5) of Section 25B without any

amendment and absence of amendment to Section 25C(2).

It was also contended that sub-sections (4) and (5) of

Section 25B are a composite scheme and since that scheme

has been left untouched the tenant's right thereunder

cannot be denied. It was further contended that sub-

section (6) of Section 14 is attracted to applications under

Sections 14B to 14D.

Dismissing the Petitions, the Court,

HELD: 1. Section 14B is a special provision made by the

legislature conferring certain rights to persons belonging

to Armed Forces to recover from their tenants immediate

possession of the premises for their occupation. [369E]

2.1 The Tenant cannot claim right to contest an

application for eviction on the grounds specified in Section

14(l)(e) against the classified landlords falling under

Sections 14B to 14D. Acceptance of such a claim would

practically obliterate the purpose and object of

classification of landlords under Sections 14B to 14D who

are carved out from

366

the general landlords; indeed it would render the whole

exercise of creating special classes of landlords with

specified rights to recover immediate of the premises let

out by them nugatory. [371H-372C]

2.2 The remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is available only

to landlords in general or the landlords who are not

classified landlords under Sections 14B to 14D. The

classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights

which are different from and independent of the rights under

Section 14(l)(e). [372E-F]

2.3 Sections 14B to 14D are markedly different from

Section 14(1)(e).[375E-F]

3.1 The argument that the absence of amendments to sub-

sections (4) and (5) of Section 25B preserves the tenant's

right to contest the application of even a classified

landlord on the grounds specified under Section 14(l)(e) is

not sustainable. Sub-section (4) of Section 25B provides

that the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller "as

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hereinafter provided", which in the contest means as

provided under sub-section-(5). This is the only sub-section

under which the Controller could give leave to the tenant to

contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant

discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from

obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the

premises. [376G, F]

3.2 The form specified in the Third Schedule refers

only to application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section

14A. Therefore, when an application is filed under Section

14B, a copy of the application should be sent to the tenant

by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and

omitting the other references which are not relevant and the

summons should state that the application is filed under

Section 14B and not under Section 14(l)(e) or 14A. Likewise

if the applications are under Sections 14C to 14D, the

summons should state accordingly. That would indicate the

scope of defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred

to in sub-section (5) of Section 25B. [377G-378A]

3.3 Under sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the

application by obtaining leave with reference to the

particular claim in the application of the landlord

depending upon whether it is under Sections 14A, 14B, 14C or

14D or under Section 14(l)(e). [378B]

The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under

Section 14(l)(e) as against an application under Section

14B. There cannot be

367

any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or

right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against

our jurisprudence and would be a mechanical interpretation

of the enactment defeating its purpose. The courts have

always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation

of statutes. [378C-D]

3.4 Section 14B and other allied provisions ought to

receive a purposeful construction and sub-section (5) of

Section 25B should be so construed as to implement the

object and purpose of Sections 14B to 14D. It is the duty of

the Court to give effect to the intention of the legislature

as expressed in Sections 148 to 14D. [378E]

4. The tenant is entitled to raise all relevant

contentions as against the claim of the classified

landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word

bona fide requirement in Sections 14B to 14D do not absolve

the landlord from proving that the requirement is bona fide

or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact

every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona

fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this

construction from the title of section 25B which states

"special procedure for the disposal of applications for

eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement". [378H-379B]

5. Section 14B and other allied provisions refer to the

premises let out and not acquired by transfer. One may

become an owner of the premises by transfer but the tenant

in occupation of the transferred property cannot be evicted

by resorting to Sections 14B to 14D. If the transferee wants

to evict the tenant he must take action only under Section

14(l)(e). Equally Sub-section (7) of Section 14 has no

application to eviction under Sections 14B to 14D, nor the

amended provisions under Section 25C(2). But that does not

mean that the tenants covered under Sections 14B to 14D are

not entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the

premises. It is always left to the Controller who is a

quasi-judicial authority to exercise his discretion having

regard to the facts and circumstances of each case and grant

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a reasonable time to the tenant. [379E-G]

6. The Controller's power to give leave to contest the

application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14A is

cribbed by the condition that the 'affidavit filed by the

tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord

from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of

the premises on the ground specified' in the respective

sections. Therefore, if an application is filed under

Section 14B or 14C or 14D, the tenant's right to contest

the application is narrowed down

368

and is restricted to the parameters of the respective

Sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by

relying upon Section 14(l)(e). Subsection (5) of Section 25B

is self-contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no part to

play there. [38OB-C]

Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani &

Anr.,[1977] 2 SCC 835, affirmed and reiterated.

Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prem

Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, [1982] 3 SCC 270, harmonised.

7. The landlord in SLP No. 11425/90 is living in a

rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000 p.m. and

requires the premises for himself and the members of his

family. The landlord cannot be denied possession of his own

premises under section 14B when he is residing in a rented

premises. [38OD-E]

8. The contention that the concerned landlord has taken

voluntary retirement long earlier and has become a part of

the Society just like any other landlord and Section 14B was

not intended to confer such landlord the special right to

recover immediate possession of the premises is not

maintainable because Section 14B(l) states that the persons

who have already retired may within one year from the date

of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or,

within a period of one year from the date of introduction of

Section 14B, whichever is later, apply to the controller for

recovering the immediate possession of their premises. That

is the legislative wisdom. [38OF-G]

9. True it is not permissible to read words in a

statute which are not there, but "where the alternative lies

between either supplying by implication words which appear

to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a

construction which deprives certain existing words of all

meanings, it is permissible to supply the words". Having

regard to the context in which a provision appears and, the

object of the statute in which the said provision is

enacted, the court should construe it in a harmonious way to

make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made so to

reconcile the relevant provisions as to advance the remedy

intended by the statute. [378E-G]

Craies Statute Law, 7th Edition, P. 109; Hameedia Hardware

Stores V. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [1988] 2 SCC 513 at 524-25,

and Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of

Waqf, [1959].1 SCR 1287 at 1299, relied upon.

369

&

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 837. 838

and 839 of 1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.5-1990 of the

Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1381, 2994 of

1989 and C.R. No. 954 of 1989.

Soli J. Sorabjee, Attorney General, Kapil Sibal,

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Additional Solicitor General, G.L. Sanghi, Dr. Y.S. Chitale,

Harish N. Salve, H.K. Puri, Rajeev Sharma, Ravinder Nath,

V.B. Saharya, P.K- Jain, Krishna Moorthy Iyer, Prem

Malhotra, A.C. Sehgal, Mrs. Urmila Sirur, R.L. Jain, S.K.

Tredal, Ms. kitty Kumarmanglam, R.P. Dave, Mrs. Sushma

Suri, Ms. M. Biswas and Ashok Mathur for the appearing

parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. Leave granted.

These appeals from the decision of the Delhi High Court

raise the question with regard to landlord's right to evict

the tenant under Section 14-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act,

1958 ('The Act') and the corresponding right of the tenant

to resist the eviction proceedings. Section 14-B is a

special provision made by the Legislature conferring certain

rights to persons belonging to Armed Forces to recover from

their tenants immediate possession of the premises for their

occupation.

Mahendra Raj, the common petitioner in S.L.P. Nos. 7146

and 11425/90, is a tenant occupying the premises of the

respondent Col. Ashok Puri. The petitioner in SLP No. 7364

is also a tenant, but occupying the premises belonging to

the respondent Brig. V.N. Channa. In the action for

eviction brought by the respondents on the ground that they

need the premises for their occupation, the tenants sought

leave to contest the application. But the Rent Controller

was not satisfied with the facts disclosed by the tenants in

their affidavits and therefore, denied leave to contest the

application for eviction. He considered the affidavits of

the parties and accepted the case of the landlord and

directed that the tenants shall be evicted. In the case of

Mahendra Raj, the Rent Controller made an order dated 2

September, 1989 inter alia, observing that the landlord is

living in a rented house, that he is paying rent of Rs.2,000

p.m., and that he requires the premises for himself and the

members of his family. The eviction order was challenged by

the tenant by means of revision petition before the Delhi

High Court. Almost simultaneously, the tenant also filed a

writ

370

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging

the validity of Section 14-B. On 10 May 1990, the High Court

dismissed the revision as well as the writ petition. Against

the judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition,

the tenant has preferred SLP No. 7146 of 1990. Against the

order dismissing the revision petition, the tenant has

preferred SLP No. 11425 of 1990.

The tenant in SLP No. 7364 of 1990 has also challenged

the order of eviction in a revision petition before the High

Court and we are told that the revision is still pending.

Like the other tenant, he has also questioned the validity

of Section 14-B before the High Court under Article 226. The

High Court dismissed that petition following the decision in

Mahendra Raj's case.

It would be convenient to refer to the relevant

provisions of the Act 'before dealing with the points raised

in these cases. The Act applies to premises which are

defined by Section 2(i) as meaning, inter alia, any building

or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let

separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or

for any or other purpose. Section 14 provides that

notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any

other law or contract, no decree or order for the recovery

of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court

or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant.

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This provision is, however, subject to the exceptions

provided under several clauses of the proviso. Section

14(l)(e) allows a decree for ejectment to be passed if the

Court or Controller is satisfied that the premises let for

residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord

for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member

of his family dependent on him, provided that the landlord

is the owner of the premises and he has no other reasonably

suitable residential accommodation. The explanation

thereunder states that for the purpose of the clause

14(1)(e) "premises let for residential purposes" include any

premises which having been let for use as a residence are,

without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for

commercial or other purposes. Section 14(l)(e) is further

restricted by sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 14. Sub-

section (6) imposes a restriction on the landlord, who has

acquired any premises by transfer, not to evict the tenant

under Section 14(l)(e) within the period of five years from

the date of acquisition. Sub-section (7) imposes an

obligation on the Court where an order for eviction is made

on the ground specified in Section 14(l)(e) to give the

tenant the minimum period of six months for delivery of

possession to the landlord.

371

By Act 18 of 1976 the Legislature has introduced certain

changes in the Act with effect from 1 December, 1975.

Section 14-A was introduced in Chapter Ill providing certain

rights to a person occupying residential premises allotted

to him by the Central Government or any other local

authority. If he is required to vacate such residential

accommodation on the ground that he owns in the Union

Territory of Delhi, a house in his name or in the name of

his spouse or dependent children, he could recover immediate

possession of his premises let out by him notwithstanding

anything contained elsewhere in the Act or any other

law for the time being in force. Simultaneously, Chapter

III-A was introduced containing Section 25-A to 25-C

providing summary trial of the applications filed landlords

classified under Section 14-A and also applications filed by

any other landlord for bona fide requirement of their

premises under Section 14(l)(e).

By the Amending Act 57 of 1988 some more classes of

landlords were carved out from the class of general

landlords. Section 14-B to Section 14-D are the provisions.

The released or retired persons from armed forces or the

dependents of the member of armed forces who had been

killed in action are covered by Section 14-B. They could

recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them

if they are required for their own residence. The retired

employees of the Central Government and of the Delhi

Administration are covered by Section 14-C. They could

recover immediate possession of the premises let out by them

if they are needed for their own residence. The landlords

who are widows are covered by Section 14-D with similar

right to recover immediate possession of the premises let

out by them or by their husband. These classified landlords

are also given the benefit of the summary trial under

Chapter III-A, by introducing Sections 14-B to 14-D in sub-

section (1) of Section 25-B. The sub-section (1) of Section

25-B as it stands provides that every application by a

landlord for recovery of possession of any premises on the

ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section

(1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A or under Section

14-B or under Section 14-C or under Section 14-D shall be

dealt with in accordance with the procedure specified in

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this Section. There are however, no corresponding amendments

to sub-sections 2 to 5 of Section 25-B.

Omission to make corresponding amendments

particularly, to sub-sections 4 & 5 of Section 25 B has

given rise to the arguments for the petitioners that the

tenant's right to contest the application for eviction on

the grounds specified in Section 14(1)(e) cannot be denied

even as against the classified landlords falling under

Sections 14-B to 14-D. It

372

was also argued that the classified landlords may prove the

facts stated in their respective provisions, but the tenant

is entitled to contest the application by disclosing such

facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an

order of eviction on the grounds specified under Section

14(l)(e).

The acceptance of the submissions urged for petitioners

would practically obliterate the purpose and object of

classification of landlords under Sections 14-B to 14-D who

are carved out from the general landlords. Indeed, it would

render the whole exercise of creating special classes of

landlords with specified rights to recover immediate

possession of the premises let out by them nugatory.

Before the introduction of Sections 14-B to 14-

D, Section 14(l)(e) was the only remedy available to all

landlords except those covered under Section 14-A to

recover possession of their premises. The Controller

shall give the tenant leave to contest the applications, if

the tenant in his affidavit discloses such facts as would

disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order for

recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds

specified under Section 14(l)(e). It is but natural when

the landlord brings an action for recovery of possession of

the premises covered under Section 14(l)(e), the tenant

has the legitimate right to show that the landlord does not

qualify under or satisfy the requirements of Section

14(l)(e). But today the remedy under Section 14(l)(e) is

available only to landlords in general or the landlords who

are not classified landlords under Sections 14-B to 14-

D. The classified landlords have been conferred with certain

rights which are different from and independent of the

rights under Section 14( 1)(e). For a proper understanding,

we may set out Section 14(l)(e), side by side with Section

14-B.

Section 14 (1) (e) Section 14-B

14. Protection of tenant 14. B Right to recover

against eviction. immediate possession of

premises to accrue to members

of the armed forces etc.

(1) Notwithstanding anything (1) Where the landlord:-

to the contrary contained in

any other law or contract, (a) is a released or retired

no order or decree for person from any armed

the recovery of possession forces and the premises let

of any premises shall be out by him are required for

made by any Court on his own residence; or

373

Controller in favour of the (b) is a dependent of a

landlord against a tenant: member of any armed forces

who had been killed in

action and the premises let

Provided that the Controller out by such member are

may, on an application made required for the residence

to him in the prescribed of the family of such

manner make an order for the member,

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recovery of possession of

the premises on one or more

of the following grounds Such person or, as the case

only, namely- may be, the dependent may,

within one year from the

xxx xxx xxx date of his release or

retirement from such armed

(e) that the premises let forces or, as the case may

for residential purposes are be, the date of death of

required bona fide by the such member, or within a

landlord for occupation as a period of one year from the

residence for himself or for date of commencement of the

any member of his family Delhi Rent Control

dependent on him, if he is (Amendment) Act, 1988,

the owner thereof, or for whichever is later, apply to

any person for whose benefit the Controller for

the premises are held and recovering the immediate

that the landlord or such possession of such premises.

person has no other (2) Where the landlord is a

reasonably suitable residen- member of any of the armed

tial accommodation : forces and has a period of

less than one year preceding

the date of his retirement

and the premises let out by

him are required for his own

residence after his

retirement, he may, at any

Explanation: For the time, within a period of one

purposes of this clause, year before the date of his

'premises let for retirement, apply to the

residential purposes' Controller for recovering

include any premises which the immediate possession of

having been let for use as a such premises.

residence are, without the

consent of the landlord, (2) Where the landlord is a

used incidentally for member of any of the armed

commercial or other forces and has a period of

purposes." less than one year preceding

the date of his retirement

and the premises let out by

him are required for his own

residence after his

retirement, he may, at any

time, within a period of one

year before the date of his

retirement, apply to the

Controller for recovering

the immediate possession of

such premises.

(3) Where the landlord

referred to in sub-section

(1) or sub-section (2) has

let out more than one

premises, it shall be open to

him to make an application

under that sub-section in

respect of only one of the

premises chosen by him.

Explanation: For the purposes

of this Section `armed forces'

means an armed force of the

Union constituted under an

Act of Parliament and

includes a member of the

police force constituted

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under Section 3 of the Delhi

Police Act, 1978 (34 of

1978)."

374

To make the picture complete we may also read sub-

sections 6 & 7 of Section 14.

"14(6) Where a landlord has acquired any premises

transfer, no application for the recovery of

possession of such premises shall lie under sub-

section (1) on the ground specified in clause (e)

of the proviso thereto, unless a period of five

years has elapsed from the date of the

acquisition.

14(7) Where an order for recovery of possession of

any premises is made on the ground specified in

clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) the

landlord shall not be entitled to obtain

possession thereof before the expiration of a

period of six months from the date of the order."

Under Section 14(l)(e), the premises let out for

residence could be recovered from the tenant, if the

landlord requires the premises bona fide for his own

occupation or for any member of his family dependent on him.

The eviction could also be sought for any person for whose

benefit the premises are held. The condition being apart

from the requirement must be bona fide, there shall be no

other reasonably suitable residential accommodation for the

landlord or for whose benefit the premises are held. The

explanation to Section 14(1)(e) provides "premises let for

residential purposes" include any premises which having been

let for use as a residence are without the consent of the

landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other

purposes. That means if with the consent of the landlord the

premises let for residential purposes are used for

commercial or other purposes, the landlord will have

difficult task to evict such tenant. Sub-section (6) of

Section 14 provides protection to the tenant from being

evicted from the premises which are transferred to third

parties.The transferee landlord must wait for five years

from the date of the transfer or acquisition before he moves

the Court for eviction of the tenant already in occupation

of the premises. Sub-section (7) is again a protection to

the tenant requiring the Court or the Controller to give a

minimum period of six months to vacate from the date of

order of eviction. This is a complete code governing the

disposal of application filed under Section 14(1)(e).

Under Section 14-B the right to evict the tenant is

available to two categories of persons, (i) The person who

has let out the premises and, (ii) the dependent of a member

of any armed forces who had let

375

out the premises but killed in action. In the former case,

the premises must be required for his own residence and in

the latter, for the residence of the family of such member.

It may be noted that Section 14(l)(e) requires that the

premises should have been let for residential purposes but

the landlord who seeks eviction need not be the person who

has let out. But Section 14-B narrows down such right. It is

he who has let out alone could evict or the dependent of the

person who has let out but since killed in action. Secondly,

Section 14-B uses the expression "the premises let out by

him" unlike the expression used in Section 14(l)(e) "the

premises let out for residential purposes". The definition

of "premises" under sub-section (2)(i) means "any building

or part of a building which is or intended to be let,

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separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or

for any other purpose . . .". It is clear that Section 14-B

does not require that the premises should have been let out

for residential purposes and the purpose of letting out

seems to be irrelevant. But he who has let out alone could

seek eviction of his tenant or the dependent of , member of

any armed forces who had let out but since killed in action.

Section 14-B also provides the period of limitation for

claiming possession of such premises, but no such limitation

is provided under Section 14(l)(e). Sub-section (3) of

Section 14-B imposes further restriction on the landlord who

is having more than one premises. Such a landlord cannot ask

for possession of more than one of the premises but he can

choose any one of the premises which he has let out. Here

again we find that there is no such restriction to a

landlord covered under Section 14(l)(e) provided the

requirement of the landlord is bona fide and he has no other

reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Section

14(l)(e) does not preclude the landlord from seeking

eviction of more than one premises provided he establishes

the need.

Similar are the provisions in allied Sections 14-C and

14-D.

It will be thus seen that Sections 14-B to 14-D are

markedly different from Section 14(1)(e).

Notwithstanding these two independent provisions with

specified rights to landlords in general and the classified

landlords, Counsel for the tenants argued that Section

14(l)(e) is the weapon of defence for the tenant even

against the applications under Sections 14-B or 14-C or 14-

D. The tenant is entitled to leave to contest the

application by disclosing such facts in his affidavit which

would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of

eviction under Section 14(l)(e). This contention is sought

to be supported first, by the retention of sub-section

376

(5) of Section 25-B without any amendment, second, absence

of amendment to SeCtion 25(C)(2). It was also

contended that sub-sections 4 & 5 of Section 25-B are a

composite scheme and since that scheme has been left

untouched the tenant's right thereunder cannot be

denied.

The submission if taken to logical conclusion leads

to obvious anomaly which will be indicated presently. But

before we do that it will be necessary to deal with one

other contention. Sub-section (1) of Section 25-B provides

that every application for the recovery of possession of any

premises belonging to persons referred to in sub-section (1)

of Section 25-B shall be dealt with in accordance with the

procedure prescribed "in this Section" meaning thereby

entire Section 25-B. It was also the submission of Dr.

Chitale counsel for one of the tenants in these cases. Mr.

Krishna Moorthy Iyer counsel for the Union of India,

however, argued that the procedure contemplated under

sub-section (5) of Section 25-B need not be followed by the

Controller with regard to applications filed under

Sections 14-B to 14-D. According to counsel when the

tenant is duly served of the application filed under

Sections 14-B, 14-C or 14-D he has no right to contest the

application unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds

on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction

and obtains leave from the Controller. It is said that

sub-section (4) itself authorises the Controller to refuse

leave if he is satisfied that the grounds set out in the

affidavit of the tenant would not disentitle the landlord to

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seek eviction. We do not think that this contention could

be accepted. Indeed, sub-section (4) itself provides that

the tenant has to obtain leave from the Controller, "as

hereinafter provided", which in the context means as

provided under sub-section (5) the meaning and scope of

which will be presently considered. This is the only sub-

section under which the Controller could give leave to

the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed

by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the

landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of

possession of the premises.

The argument that the absence of amendments to sub-

sections 4 and 5 of Section 25-B preserves the tenant's

right to contest the application of even a classified

landlord on the grounds specified under section 14(l)(e)

would be basically faulty. If such argument is available in

respect of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 25-B, it must

be equally available to sub-section (2) of Section 25-B.

There is also no corresponding amendment to the summons to

be issued under subsection (2) and the form specified in the

Third Schedule after the introduction of Section 14-B to 14-

D. Third Schedule is in these terms:

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"The Third Schedule

Form of Summons in a case where recovery of

possession of Premises is Prayed for on the

ground of bona fide requirement or under Section

14-A.

To

(Name, description and place of residence of the

tenant)

Whereas Shri _________________________________has

filed an application (a copy of which is annexed)

for your eviction from (here insert the

particulars of the premises) on the ground

specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-

section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A;

You are hereby summoned to appear before the

Controller within fifteen days of the service

hereof and to obtain the leave of the Controller

to contest the application for eviction on the

ground aforesaid; in default whereof, the

applicant will be entitled at any time after the

expiry of the said period of fifteen days to

obtain an order for your eviction from the said

premises.

Leave to appear and contest the application

may be obtained or an application to the

Controller supported by an affidavit as if

referred to in sub-section (5) of Section 25-B.

Given under my hand and seal.

This_________________ day of_____________________

19_______

Controller"

This form specified in the Third Schedule refers only

to applications filed under Section 14(l)(e) or under

Section.14A. Does it mean that the unamended form should be

used to issue notice to the tenant even in case where

application for eviction is not made under Section 14(l)(e)

or 14-A? Is the tenant entitled to claim that he must

receive the notice in the unamended form only, since there

is no corresponding amendment to the form after introduction

of Sections 14-B to 14-D? A wooden reading may furnish him

positive answers, but it would be ridiculous. When an

application is filed under Section 14-B, a copy of the

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application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary

amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other

378

references which are not relevant. If the application is

filed under Section 14-B, the summons should state that the

application is filed under Section 14-B and not under

Section 14(l)(e) or 14-A. Likewise if the applications are

under Sections 14-C to 14-D, the summons should state

accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defence of

the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub-section

(5) of Section 25-B. Under sub-section (5), the tenant could

contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to

the particular claim in the application of the landlord

depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C

or 14-D or under Section 14(l)(e). The tenant can not be

allowed to take up defence under Section 14(l)(e) as against

an application under Section 14-B. There cannot be any

defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right

of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our

jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended

the result for which the counsel for the tenant contended.

It will be a mechanical interpretation of the enactment

defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never

found favour with the Courts which have always adopted a

purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes.

Section 14-B and other allied provisions ought to receive a

purposeful construction and subsection (5) of Section 25-B

should be so construed as to implement the object and

purpose of Section 14-B to 14-D. It is the duty of the Court

to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as

expressed in Section 14-B to 14-D.

True it is not permissible to read words in a statute

which are not there, but "where the alternative lies between

either supplying by implication words which appear to have

been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which

deprives certain existing words of all meanings, it is

permissible to supply the words" (Craies Statute Law, 7th

Edition, p. 109). Similar are the observations in Hameedia

Hardware Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, [ 1988] 2 SCC 513 at

524-25 where it was observed that the court construing a

provision should not easily read into it words which have

not been expressly enacted but having regard to the context

in which a provision appears and the object of the statute

in which the said provision is enacted the court should

construe it in a harmonious way to make it meaningful. An

attempt must always be made so to reconcile the relevant

provisions as to advance the remedy intended by the statute.

(See: Sirajul Haq Khan & Ors. v. The Sunni Central Board of

Waqf, [ 1959] SCR 1287 at 1299).

The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant

contentions as against the claim of the classified

landlords. The fact that there is no

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reference to the word bona fide requirement in sections 14-

B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that

his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that

it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction of a

tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough

indication in support of this construction from the title of

Section 25(B) which states "special procedure for the

disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona

fide requirement.

It was next urged that sub-section (6) of Section 14 is

also attracted to applications under Section 14-B to 14-D.

This contention overlooks the express wordings of sub-

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section (6). It refers to premises acquired by transfer and

thereby the transferee becoming the landlord. Such a

landlord cannot bring an action for eviction of tenant in

possession of the acquired premises within a period of five

years from the date of acquisition. After five years such a

landlord can ask for eviction of the tenant under section

14(i)(e). This is indeed, as we said earlier, a protection

to the tenant. The original landlord who cannot evict the

tenant since he has got many houses under his occupation

cannot use the device by transferring one of the houses to a

third party who could easily evict such a tenant. The tenant

in occupation of the transferred premises gets a protection

from eviction for a minimum period of five years. Section

14-B and other allied provisions refer to the premises let

out and not acquired by transfer. One may become an owner

of the premises by transfer but the tenant in occupation of

the transferred property cannot be evicted by resorting to

sections 14-B to 14-D. If the transferee wants to evict the

tenant of such premises he must take action only under

Section 14(l)(e). Equally, sub-section (7) of Section 14 has

no application to eviction under Sections 14-B to 14-D. Nor

the amended provisions under Section 25(c)(2) would be

attracted since it applies exclusively to tenants of the

landlords covered under Section 14-A. But that does not mean

that the tenants covered under Sections 14-B to 14-D are not

entitled to any time for surrendering possession of the

premises. it is always left to the Controller who is a

quasi-judicial authority to exercise his discretion having

regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. The

Controller must exercise his judicial discretion in every

case of eviction and grant a reasonable time to the tenant.

There is one other aspect which requires elucidation.

In Busching Schmitz Private Limited v. P. T. Meighani and

Anr., [1977] 2 SCC 835 this Court while dealing with the

scope of Section 14-A and the corresponding right of the

tenant to resist the application thereunder, has inter-alia,

observed that sub-section (5) of Section 25-B cannot be

equated with Order 37 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. The

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social setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature of

the subject-matter and, above all, the legislative diction

which has been deliberately designed, differ in the two

provisions. The Controller's power to give leave to contest

the application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14-A

is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the

tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord

from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of

the premises on the ground specified in the respective

sections. Needless to state, therefore if an application is

filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant's right

to contest the application is narrowed down and is

restricted to the parameters of the respective sections. He

cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon

Section 14(l)(e). We find nothing contrary to our view in

Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prem Deva

Niranjan Deva Tayal, [ 1982] 3 SCC 270. Subsection (5) of

Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no

part to play there. We, therefore, reiterate the views

expressed in Basching Schmitz Private Limited case.

The tenant, who is petitioner in SLP No. 11425/90 has

suffered an order of eviction which has been confirmed by

the High Court in revision. It is found that his landlord is

living in a rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000

p.m. and he requires the premises for himself and the

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members of his family. We concur with the view taken by the

Controller as affirmed by the High Court. The landlord

cannot be denied possession of his own premises under

Section 14-B when he is residing in a rented premises.

Before parting with the case, we have to deal with one

other contention which has been specifically raised by Mr.

Sanghi. The counsel argued that the concerned landlord has

taken voluntary retirement long earlier and he has become a

part of the society just like any other landlord and Section

14-B was not intended to confer such landlord, the special

right to recover immediate possession of the premises.

Obvious answer to this contention is found in Section 14-

B(1) which states that the persons who have already retired

may within one year from the date of their release or

retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one

year from the date of introduction of Section 14-B,

whichever is later apply to the Controller for recovering

the immediate possession of their premises. That is the

legislative wisdom.

In this view of the matter, the appeals stand disposed

without an order as to costs.

D.R.L. Appeals disposed of.

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