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PETITIONER:

S.A. VENKATARAMAN

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

THE UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

30/03/1954

BENCH:

MUKHERJEA, B.K.

BENCH:

MUKHERJEA, B.K.

AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA

DAS, SUDHI RANJAN

BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H.

JAGANNADHADAS, B.

CITATION:

1954 AIR 375 1954 SCR 1150

CITATOR INFO :

F 1956 SC 66 (17,26)

F 1958 SC 36 (25)

R 1959 SC 375 (30)

R 1960 SC 493 (11)

RF 1961 SC 29 (22)

D 1961 SC 751 (24)

ACT:

Constitution of India, art. 20(2)--Enquiry made under

Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850-Whether amounts to

prosecution and punishment within the meaning of art. 20(2).

HEADNOTE:

Held that an enquiry made and concluded under -the Public

Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 (A-at XXXVII of 185O), does

not amount to prosecution and punishment for an offence as

contemplated by art. 20(2) of the Constitution.

Maqbool Hussain v. The State of Bombay ([1953] S.C.R.

703); Willis on Constitutional Law, p. 528; and Shenton v.

Smith ([18951 A.C. 229); Venkata Rao v. The Secretary of

State for India (64 I.A. 55); Government of India Act, 1935,

s. 240(3); referred to.

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL ORIGIINAL JURISDICTioN: Petition No. 72 of 1954.

Petition under article 32 of the Constitution for the

enforcement of fundamental rights.

A. K. Basu, K. S. Jayaram and C. B. Pattabhiraman (R.

Ganapathy and C. V. L. Narayan, with them) for the

petitioner.

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and C. K.

Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India (Porus A. Mehta and

P. G. Gokhate, with them) for respondent No. 1.

1954. March 30. The Judgment of the Court was delivered

by

MUKHMRJEA J.-This is a. petit ion under article 32 of the

Constitution, praying for a writ, in the nature of

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certiorari, for calling up the records of certain criminal

proceedings started against the petitioner by the Special,

judge. Sessions Court, Delhi, and for quashing the safe on

the ground that these proceedings are without jurisdiction,

having been commenced

1151

in violation of the fundamental right of the petitioner

guaranteed under article 20(2) of the Constitution.

The petitioner was a member of the Indian Civil Service

and till lately was employed as Secretary to the Ministry of

Commerce and Industries in the Government of India. Certain

imputations of misbehaviour by the petitioner, while holding

offices of various descriptions under the Government of

India, came to the notice of the Central Government and the

latter being satisfied that there were prima facie good

grounds for making an enquiry directed a formal and public

enquiry to be made as to the truth or falsity of the

allegations made Against the petitioner, in accordance with

the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of

1850. The substance of the imputations was drawn up in the

form of specific charges and Sir Arthur Trevor Harries, an

ex-Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court, was appointed

Commissioner under section 3 of the said Act to conduct the

enquiry and report to the Government, on the result of the

same, his opinion on the several articles of charge

formulated against the petitioner. The order of the Central

Government directing the enquiry is dated the 21st February,

1953. The charges were drawn up under six heads with

various sub-beads under each one of them. The first charge

alleged that the petitioner was guilty of misbehaviour

inasmuch as he showed undue favour to Messrs. Millars

Timber and Trading Company Limited in the matter of issue of

import and export licences, by abusing his position as a

public servant in the discharge of his duties, that is, by

accepting illegal gratification or valuable things for

import and export licences recommended or to be recommended

by him. The second charge was to the effect that the

petitioner accepted or obtained valuable things for himself

and other members of his family, without paying for them, on

different dates from Messrs. Millars Timber and Trading

Company Limited for recommending their applications for

import licences and export permits. The fourth and the

fifth charges

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were similar in nature to charges 1 and 2 except that they

related to the Petitioners dealings with another firm known

as Sunder Das Saw Mills.

The enquiry proceeded in the manner laid down in ,the

Public Servants (Inquiries) Act. The charges were read out

to the petitioner and his plea of "not guilty" was formally

recorded. Evidence was adduced both by the prosecute or and

the defence and the witnesses on both sides were examined on

oath and cross. examined and re-examined in the usual

manner. The Commissioner found, on a consideration of the

evidence, that four of the charges under various sub-heads

were proved against the petitioner and submitted a report to

that effect to the Government on the 4th of May, 1953. By a

letter dated the 15th of May, 1953, the Government informed

the -petitioner that, on careful consideration of the

report, the President accepted the opinion of the

Commissioner and in view of the findings on the several

charges arrived at by the latter was provisionally of

opinion that the petitioner should be dismissed.

Opportunity was given to the petitioner by this letter in

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terms of article 311(2) of the Constitution to show cause

against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and

it was stated that any representation, which he might desire

to make, would be taken into consideration before the final

order was passed. The petitioner, it seems, did make a

representation which was considered by the Government and

after consultation with the Union Public Service Commission

the President finally decided to impose the penalty of

dismissal upon the petitioner. The order of dismissal was

passed on the 17th of September, 1953. On the 23rd

February, 1954, the police submitted a charge-sheet against

the petitioner before the Special Judge, Sessions Court,

Delhi, charging him with offences under sections 161/165 of

the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act and upon that, summons were issued by the

learned Judge directing the petitioner to appear be-fore his

court on the 11th of March. 1954. , It is the legality of

this proceeding that has been challenged

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before us in this writ petition. The petitioner's case, in

substance, is that the proceedings that have been started

against him are without jurisdiction inasmuch as they amount

to fresh prosecution for offences for which he has been

prosecuted and punished already and this comes within the

prohibition of article 20(2) of the Constitution. The

sole.-point for our consideration is, whether in the events

that have happened in this case, there has been a violation

of the fundamental right of the petitioner under article

20(2) of the Constitution which would justify the issue of a

writ for enforcement of the same?

The scope and meaning of the guarantee implied in.

article 20(2) of the Constitution has been indicated with

sufficient fullness in the pronouncement of this court in

Maqbool Hussain Y. The State of Bombay(1). . The roots of

the principle, which this clause enacts, are to be found in

the well established rule of English law which finds

expression in the maxim "Nemo debet bis vexari"-a man must

not be put twice in peril for the same offence. If a man is

indicted again for the same offence in an English court, he

can plead, as a complete defence, his former acquittal or

conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea

of "autrefois acquit" or "autrefois convict". The

corresponding provision in the Federal Constitution of the

U.S.A. is contained in the Fifth Amendment, which provides

inter alia: "Nor shall any person be subjected for the same

offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb". This

principle has been recognised and adopted by the Indian

Legislature and is embodied in the provisions of section 26

of the General Clauses Act and section 403 of the Criminal

Procedure Code.

Although these were the materials which formed the

background of the guarantee of the fundamental right given

in article 20(2) of the Constitution, the ambit and contents

of the guarantee, as this court pointed out in the case

referred to above, are much narrower than those of the

common law rule in England or the doctrine of "double

jeopardy" in the American

(1) [1953] S.C.R- 703.

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Constitution. Article,20(2)of our Constitution,it is to be

noted, does not contain the principle of "autrefois acquit"

at all. It seems that our Constitution makers did not think

it necessary to raise one part of the common law rule to the

level of a fundamental right and thus make it immune from

legislative interference. This has been left to be

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regulated by the general law of the land. In order to

enable a citizen to invoke the protection of clause (2) of

article 20 of the Constitution, there must have been both

prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence.

The words prosecuted and punished" are to be taken not

district butively so as to mean prosecuted or punished.

Both the factors must co-exist in order that the operation

of the clause may be attracted. The position is also

different under the American Constitution. There the

prohibition is not against a second punishment but against

the peril in which a person may be placed by reason of a

valid indictment being presented against him, before a

competent court, followed by proper arraignment and plea and

a lawful impanelling of the jury. It is not necessary to

have a verdict at all(1).

It has also been held by this court in Maqbool Hussain's

case(2) that the language of article 20 and the words

actually used in it afford a clear indication that the

proceedings in connection with the prosecution and

punishment of a person must be in the nature of a criminal

proceeding, before a court of law or judicial tribunal, and

not before a tribunal which entertains a departmental or an

administrative enquiry even though set up by a statute, but

which is not required by law to try a matter judicially and

on legal evidence. In that case the proceedings were taken

under the Sea Customs Act before a Customs authority who

ordered confiscation of goods. It was held that such

proceedings were not "Prosecution", nor the order of

confiscation a "punishment" within the meaning of article

20(2) inasmuch as the Customs authority was not a court or a

judicial tribunal and merely exercised administrative powers

vested in him for revenue purposes.

(1) Vide Wills on Constitutional Law, p. 528.

(2) [1953] S.C.R.- 703.

1155

The facts of this case are no doubt different and the

point that requires determination is, whether the petitioner

can be said to have, satisfied all the conditions that are

necessary to enable him to claim the protection of article

20(2) The charges, upon which the petitioner is being

prosecuted now, are charges under sections 161 and 165 of

the Indian Penal Code and section 5(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act. We will assume for our present purpose that

the allegations upon which these charges are based are

substantially the same which formed the subject matter of

enquiry under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850.

The question narrows down to this : whether the petitioner

had already been (1) prosecuted and (2) punished for these

offences ?

Mr. Basu, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, contends

that his client was, in fact, prosecuted for these identical

offences before the Commissioner appointed under Act XXXVII.

of 1850. This, it is argued, was not a mere departmental

enquiry of the type referred to in Maqbool Hussain's

case(1). The Commissioner was a judicial tribunal in the

proper sense of the expression. He had to adjudicate on the

charges judicially, on evidence, recorded on oath, which he

was authorised by law to administer. The prosecution was

conducted by a prosecutor appointed under the Act, charges

were read out to the accused person and his plea was taken;

witnesses on both sides were examined on oath and they were

cross-examined and re-examined. The Commissioner had all

the powers of a court; he could summon witnesses, compel

production of relevant documents and punish people for

contempt. At the close of the enquiry, the Commissioner did

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record his finding against the petitioner on some of the

charges. He had undoubtedly no power to impose any

punishment and had only to forward his report to the

Government. Under section 22 of the Act, however, the

Government was entitled to pass such orders within its

authority, as it considered proper and in exercise of this

authority the President did impose upon the petitioner the

penalty of dismissal.

(1) [1953] S.C. R. 7o3.

1156

It is immaterial, it is argued, for the purPose of article

20(2) of the.constitution that the -prosecution was before

one authority and punishment was inflicted by another. The

petitioner was both prosecuted and punished and he is

sought to be prosecuted on the same chages over again. This

constitutes, according to the learned counsel, a clear

violation of the guarantee implied in article 20(2) of the

constitution. The questions raised are undoubetdly of

some importance and require to be carefully exaimined.

It is true that the Commissioner appointed to make an

enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 is invested with some of

the powers of a court, particularly in the matter of

summoning witnesses and compelling the production of

documents and the report, which he has to make has to be

made on legal evidence adduced under sanction of oath and

tested by cross-examination. But from these facts alone the

conclusion does not necessarily follow that an enquiry made

and concluded under Act XXXVII of 1850 amounts to

prosecution and punishment for an offence as contemplated.

by article 20(2) of the Constitution. In order to arrive at

a proper decision on this point, it is necessary to examine

the entire background-of the provisions relating to enquiry

into the conduct of public servants and to ascertain the

exact scope and purpose of the enquiry as is contemplated by

Act XXXVII of 1850 and the ultimate result that flows from

it.

It is a well established principle of English law that,

except where it is otherwise provided by a statute, all

public officers and servants of the Crown hold their

appointments at the pleasure of the Crown. Their services

can be terminated without assigning any reason and even if

any public servant considers that he has been unjustly

dismissed, his remedy is not by way of a law suit but by an

appeal of an official or political character(1). This

principle of law was applied in lndia ever since the advent

of British rule in this country and the servants in the

employ, of the East India Company also came within the

purview of this

(1) Vide Shenton v. Smith [1895) A.C. 229.

1157

rule. It is to be remembered that it was during the period

of the East India Company that the Public Servants

(Inquiries) Act was passed in 1850. The object of the Act,

as stated in the preamble, was to regulate enquiry into the

behaviour of public servants, not removal from service

without the sanction of the Government. The enquiry was

quite optional with the Government and did not affect in any

way the powers of the Government to dismiss its servants at

pleasure and this was expressly provided by section 25 of

the Act, the wording of which is as follows:

" Nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect the

authority of the Government to. suspending or removing any

public servant for any cause without an enquiry under the

Act. "

After assumption of the Government of India by the Crown,

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this rule of English common law continued unaltered till

1919 when section 96B was introduced by the amended

Government of India Act of that year. Sub-section (1) of

section 96B of the Government- of India Act, 1919, runs as

follows:

" Subject to the provisions of this Act and of rules

made thereunder, every person in the civil service of the

Crown in India holds office during His Majesty's pleasure

and may be employed in any manner required by a proper

authority within the scope of his duty, but no person in

that service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate

to that by which he was appointed ....................."

Thus one restriction imposed by this section upon the

unfettered right of the Government to dismiss its servants

at its pleasure, was that no servant could be dismissed by

any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

The section by its opening words also makes the exercise of

the power subject to the rules made under the Act and it was

in pursuance of the provision of section 96-B(2) that the

Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules

were framed which with the later amendments are in force

even now. Part XII of these rules deal with Conduct and

]Discipline of Civil Servants and rule 49 of this part lays

down that the different penalties provided,

1l58

by the different clauses of the rule may, for good and

sufficient reasons, be imposed upon members of the services

comprised in clauses (1) to (5) in rule 14. These penalties

include, amongst others, censure, withholding of increment,

dismissal, reduction in rank and removal. Rule 55, which

finds a place in the same chapter, lays down the procedure

to be followed before passing an order of dismissal, removal

or reduction in rank against any member of the service. No

such order shall be passed unless the person concerned has

been informed,, in writing, of the grounds on which it is

proposed to take action against him and has been afforded an

adequate opportunity of defending himself. An enquiry has

to be made regarding his conduct and this may be done either

in accordance with. the provisions of the Public Servants

(Inquiries) Act of 1850 or in a less formal and less public

manner as is provided for in the rule itself.

These rules have no statutory force and it was held by the

Privy Council that when an officer was dismissed from

service without complying with the provisions of these

rules, he had no right of action against: the Crown(1). In

other words, the rules, which were not incorporated in a

statute, did not impose any legal restriction upon the right

of the Crown to dismiss its servants at pleasure.

The position was altered to some extent in the Government

of India Act, 1935, and in addition to the restriction

imposed by section 96-B(1) of the Government of India Act,

1919, that a civil servant could not be dismissed by an

authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, a

further statutory provision was made(2), that a civil

servant could not be dismissed or reduced in rank unless the

person concerned was given a reasonable opportunity of

showing cause against the action proposed to be taken

against him. Article 311(2) of the present Constitution has

further added the word " removal " after " dismissal " and

(1) Vide Vankata Rao v. The Secretary of State for India,

64 I.A. 55.

(2) Vide section 240(3) Of the Government of India Act,

1935.

1159

before reduction in rank " and thus in all the three cases

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which are covered by rule 55 of the Civil Services Rules, a

civil servant has now a constitutional right to claim a -

reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action

proposed to be taken in regard to him.

As the law stands at present, the only purpose, for which

an enquiry under Act XXXVII of 1850 could be made, is to

help the Government to come to a definite conclusion

regarding the misbehaviour of a public servant and thus

enable it to determine provisionary the punishment which

should be imposed upon him prior to giving him a reasonable

opportunity of showing cause, as is required under article

311(2) of the Constitution. An enquiry under this Act is

not at all compulsory and it is quite open to the Government

to adopt any other method if it so chooses. It is a matter

of convenience merely and nothing else. It is against this

background that we will have to examine the material

provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries),Act of 1850

and see whether from the. nature and result of the enquiry

which the Act contemplates it is at all possible to say that

the proceedings taken or concluded under the Act amount to

prosecution and punishment for a criminal offence.

It may be pointed out that the words "prosecution" and

"punishment" have no fixed connotation and they, are

susceptible of both a wider and a narrower meaning; but in

article 20(2) both these words have been used with reference

to an "offence" and the word "offence" has to be taken in

the sense in which it is used in the General Clauses Act as

meaning I an act or omission made punishable by any law for

the time being in force." It follows that the prosecution

must be in reference to, the law which creates the offence

and the punishment must also be in accordance with what that

law prescribed The acts alleged to have been committed by,

the petitioner in the present case and on the basis of which

the charges have been framed against him do come within the

definition of "offences" described in sections 161 and 165

of the Indian Penal Code and

150

1160

section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The

Public Servants (Inquiries) Act does not itself create any

offence nor does it provide any, punishment for it. Rule 49

of the Civil Services Rules mentioned above merely speaks of

imposing certain penalties upon public servants for good and

sufficient reasons. The rule does not mention any

particular offence and obviously can create none. It is to

enable the Government to come to the conclusion as to

whether good and sufficient reasons exist, within the

meaning of rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules, for imposing

the penalties of removal, dismissal or reduction in rank

upon a public servant that an enquiry may be directed under

Act XXXVII of 1850. A Commissioner appointed under this Act

has no duty to investigate any offence which is punishable

under the Indian Penal. Code or the Prevention of

Corruption Act and he has absolutely no jurisdiction to do

so. The subject-matter of investigation by him is the truth

or otherwise of the imputation of misbehaviour made against

a public servant and it is only as instances of misbehaviour

that the several articles of charge are investigated, upon

which disciplinary action might be taken by the Government

if it so chooses. The mere fact that the word-"prosecution"

has been used, would not make the proceeding before the

Commissioner one for prosecution of an offence. As the

Commissioner has to form his opinion upon legal evidence, he

has been given the power to summon witnesses, administer

oath to then and also to compel production of relevant

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documents. These, may be some of the trappings of a

judicial tribunal, but they cannot make the proceeding any-

thing more than a mere fact finding enquiry. This is

concluisively established by the provisions of section 21

and 22 of the Act. At the close of the enquiry, the

Commissioner has to submit a report to the Government

regarding his finding on each one of the charges made: This

is a mere expression of opinion and it lacks both finality

and authoritativeness which are ,he essential tests of a

judicial pronouncement. The )pinion is not even binding on

the Government Under section 22 of the Act, the Government

can, after

1161

receipt of the report, call upon the Commissioner to take,

further evidence or give further explanation of his

opinion. When Special Commissioners are appointed, their

report could be referred to the court or other authority to

which the officer concerned is subordinate for further

advice and after taking -the opinion of the different

authorities and persons, the Government has to decide

finally what action it should take.

Then again neither section 21 nor section 22 of the Act

says anything about punishrment. There is no to express any

power in the Commissioner even opinion about punishment and

section 22 only contemplates such order as the Government

can pass in its capacity as employer in respect to servants

employed by it. As has been said already, an order of

dismissal of a servant cannot be regarded as a punishment

for an offence punishable under particular sections of the

Indian Penal Code or of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A

somewhat analogous case would be that of a member of the Bar

whose name is struck off the rolls on grounds of

professional misconduct, in exercise of disciplinary

jurisdiction by the proper authority. The professional

misconduct might amount to a criminal offence, but if we are

to accept the petitioner's contention as correct, the man

cannot be prosecuted for it, even though the authority

inflicting the penalty of removal was not a competent court

to investigate any criminal charge nor was the punishment

imposed in exercise of disciplinary jurisdiction a

punishment for an offence.

In our opinion, therefore, in an enquiry under the Public

Servants (Inquiries) Act of 1850, there is neither any

question of investigating an offence in the sense of an act

or omission punishable by any law for the time being in

force, nor is there any question of imposing punishment

prescribed by the law which makes that act or omission an

offence. The learned Attorney General raised a point before

us that the test of the guarantee under article 20(2) is

whether the person has been tried and punished, not for the

same act, but

1162

for the same offence and his contention is that the

offences here are different, though they may arise -out of

the same acts. In the view that we have taken this question

does not arise for consideration at all. It is also not

necessary to express any opinion on the question raised by

the learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether for the

purpose of attracting the operation of article 20(2) the

punishment must be imposed by the same authority before

which the prosecution was conducted. The result is that, in

our opinion, the petition fails and in dismissed.

Petition dismissed.

APPENDIX

PROCEEDINGS AT THE SITTING

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OF THE

SUPREME COURT ON NOVEMBER 5,1954.

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.,

BIJN KUMAR. MUKHERJEA,

S. R. DAS,

VIVIAN BOSE

N. H. BHAGWATI,

B. JAGANNADHADAS,

T. L. VEMNKATARAMA AYYAR, JJ.

MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J.-We are meeting here this morning

on a very sad occasion to mourn the death of our brother,

Mr. Justice Ghulam Hasan, who suddenly collapsed this

morning at about 1 A.m. During my absence from Delhi to

Patiala, where I had gone to visit the High Court of Pepsu,

he was taken ill and was absent from Court on Monday last.

On my- return I made enquiries from him and he told me that

he had slight congestion in the lungs but that he was

feeling much better and would in all likelihood attend Court

on Friday. I saw him myself on Wednesday evening. He was

quite cheerful and looked well, and he told me that he was

feeling much better and would in all likelihood attend Court

on Friday, failing that on Monday. On Thursday morning his

condition had much improved, but late in the evening he

felt uncomfortable and was removed to hospital,, where he

suddenly collapsed. This is the short story of the

termination of a successful career on the Bench and at the

Bar of a very devoted and patriotic citizen of India.

Shri Ghulam Hasan was born on the 3rd July, 1891. After

a distinguished University career and an equally

1164

distinguished career at the Bar, he was raised to the Bench

of the Oudh Chief Court in 1940 and became its Chief Judge

in 1946. He was appointed Senior Judge of the Allahabad

High Court in 1948 on the amalgamation of the two High

Courts in the United Provinces. On retirement from the High

Court, he was appointed a member of the Labour Appellate

Tribunal and on the 8th September, 1952, he became a Judge

of this Court. Prior to his appointment as a Judge, he was

a Member of the U. P. Legislative Assembly for two years.

He war, also Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Red

Cross and St. John Ambulance Association, U. P. Branch,

since 1942. He received the honour of Knighthood of the

Order of St. John in 1947 in recognition of his humanitarian

services. He was interested in educational activities and

was a member of the Court of the Aligarh University and a

member of the Executive Committee of that University. He

had varied social and cultural interests which are quite

well known and it is hardly necessary to refer to them.

Both as a Member of the Bar and the Bench, Shri Ghulam

Hasan distinguished himself by his vast learning, his sense

of detachment and high judicial integrity. He was always

courteous and patient in his relations with the Bar, as in

his relations with his colleagues. If I may say so,

courtesy was writ large on his face. His full grasp of

facts, his thorough knowledge of law and his quick prception

of the real points in a case were of great assistance to us

in dealing with the many complicated questions that arose

for determination in this Court. He had a singularly

equable and gentle temperament. His simple and unaffected

manner attracted friends in every sphere and he will be very

much missed not only by me and his colleagues in this Court

but also in the social life of this city, which would be

distinctly poorer for his loss.

We have lost an esteemed colleague and a learned, just and

upright Judge, and the country has lost a patriotic and

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great citizen. He leaves behind his widow, a son, and a

daughter. We all mourn his loss with the members of his

family and offer condolence to all of them,

1165

I am sure gentlemen of the Bar will desire to associate

themselves with the Bench in conveying an expression of

heart-felt sympathy and condolence to the bereaved family.

May his soul rest in peace.

The Court will remain closed today as a mark of respect to

the deceased.

M.C. SETALVAD, ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR INDIA.--My Lords, the

Bar respectfully associates itself with deep regret in your

Lordships expression of grief and sympathy. I recall how

about three years ago this Court assembled to mourn the

death of its first Chief Justice. The hand of fate has

smitten with equal suddenness on this occasion.

It is a little over two years ago that his Lordship became

a member of your Lordship Court. His affable personality,

his genial and his uniform courtesy made a deep impression

on all those who came into contact with him. Members of the

Bar will never forget the keen practical sense which he

brought to bear on all questions that came before him, the

patience with which he heard them, and the invariable

kindness he showed to them.

The Bar tenders its deep and heart-felt sympathy to those

near and dear to him in their great, sudden and irreparable

loss.

END OF VOL. V.