CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -1-

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRA-S-1944-2023 

RESERVED ON: 06.03.2025

PRONOUNCED ON:29.05.2025

SUKHWINDER SINGH AND ANR.                 .....APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                   .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-2460-2024 (O&M)

RITIK CHOUDHARY                .....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                .....RESPONDENTS

 CRA-S-2313-2024 

PANKAJ                 .....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

 CRA-S-3722-2024 (O&M)

JAGDISH AND OTHERS                

.....APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-2303-2024

SUMIT KUMAR                

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -2-

CRA-S-1696-2024

RANJOT SINGH ALIAS RANJODH SINGH ALIAS JODHA                 

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                      

                 .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-1382-2024

SADASHIV OZA @ SADASHIV OHZA                 

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                      

                 .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-4178-2024 (O&M)

BABU RAM               .....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-4096-2024

AMIT               

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-349-2024

RAMPAL              

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-3972-2024

ARUN CHAUHAN                

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -3-

CRA-S-2100-2024

ANUP SINGH DAHIYA                

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

   CRA-S-1025-2024 (O&M)

KIRTAN SINGH AND ANR.               

.....APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

    CRA-S-2072-2024

NAR SINGH           

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-2012-2024

JASWANT SINGH               

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CRA-S-318-2025

SAGAR                

.....APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA AND ANOTHER                     

        .....RESPONDENTS

CORAM:   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP MOUDGIL

Present: Mr. Jagjeet Singh Cheema, Advocate

for the appellants in CRA-S-1944-2023

Mr. H.S. Rakhra, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S-1025-2024.

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -4-

Dr. S.K. Bhar, Advocate with

Mr. Johan Kumar, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S-2313-2024.

Mr. Ashok Kumar Sharma (Bhana), Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S-4096-2024.

Mr. Naveen Bawa, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S-1382-2024.

Mr. Amit Khatkar, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S-349-2024.

Mr. Karan Singh, Advocate for

Mr. Bhisham Kumar Majoka, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S-2460-2024.

Mr. Pawan Kumar Hooda, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S Nos.2012, 2072, 2100 of 2024.

Mr. Ashwani Verma, Advocate

for the appellant(s) in CRA-S Nos.3722 & 4178 of 2024.

Mr. R.K. Chaudhary, Advocate for

the appellant(s) in CRA-S-3972-2024.

Mr. Sandeep, Advocate for

the appellant(s) in CRA-S-2303-2024.

Ms. Pallavi Babbar, Advocate

for the appellant in CRA-S-318-2025.

Mr. Jaspal Singh Guru, AAG Punjab

Mr. Chetan Sharma, DAG Haryana

Mr. Baljinder Singh Virk, Senior DAG Haryana

Mr. Nikhil Mittal, Advocate

for respondent No.2/complainant in CRA-S-349-2024.

Mr. Amrik Singh, Advocate for

respondent No.2 in CRA-S-1944-2023.

Mr. Vikas Lochab, Advocate and

Mr. Gaurav Jain, Advocate for the complainant.

*****

SANDEEP MOUDGIL, J

1. The instant bunch of appeals is being adjudicated by a common

order, wherein a common question of law emerged during the course of

hearing though on different dates but to decide the same all the appeals were

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -5-

clubbed together and were heard on 06.03.2025 and the verdict was kept

reserved. 

2. Though   the   counsel   for   appellants  submitted   the   version   of

complaint at first to demonstrate that even as per the complaint filed before

Chief Judicial Magistrate SAS Nagar under Section 3 & 4 of the  The

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,

1989   (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and referred to the order dated

11.01.2023 (Annexure A-2), whereby he has been summoned under Section

3(vii) of the Act and vide order dated 15.04.2023, he has been declined the

concession of anticipatory bail. 

3. It is against the order dated 15.04.2023, the present appeal came

to be filed with the urge that the complainant is wife of one Deepak Pathania,

who is an accused in FIR No.41 dated 08.04.2019 lodged by sister of appellant

No.2, who is also wife of appellant No.1. The sister of appellant No.2 namely

Ranjana has alleged the offences under Sections 376 and 420 of IPC against

appellant No.1 in that FIR dated 08.04.2019, wherein the appellant No.2 is

stated to be a witness as well. The present complainant being wife of Deepak

Pathania accused in the aforesaid FIR has registered the instant complaint as a

counter-blast to the aforesaid FIR particularly against appellant No.2 and

appellant No.1 has also been dragged herein with false allegation and Mr.

Jagjit Singh Cheema, learned Advocate has stressed much on the fact that the

complainant is not even personally known to appellants as well as about her

caste. Mr. Cheema would further submit that earlier a complaint was moved

by the complainant before the National Commission for Scheduled Caste,

which was forwarded to Senior Superintendent of Police, SAS Nagar, Mohali

and in that complaint the appellants were found innocent after investigation,

which was consigned to record vide order dated  27.05.2019 (Annexure A-3). 

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -6-

4. Mr. Cheema has argued false implication in the instant complaint

also   stating   that   according   to   the   allegations   and  narrated   facts   of   the

complaint the appellants used foul language in front of a showroom which is a

public place but there is no iota of evidence that anybody heard about such

alleged utterances, if any made by the appellants since there is no independent

witness available to support the version. Mr. Cheema would also submit that

to the alleged place of occurrence police station is nearby but no such

complaint was ever made qua the incident to the police authorities and

straightway the complaint under Sections 3 & 4 of the Act was filed before the

Chief Judicial Magistrate, SAS Nagar Mohali. It is also the case on behalf of

the appellant that according to the complaint the admitted date of alleged

occurrence   is   04.09.2018,   whereas   the   complaint   came   to   be   filed   on

17.12.2011 (Annexure P-2) bearing Criminal Complaint No.335 of 2021,

which suffers from inordinate and unexplained delay, which is sufficient to

make out the case of false implication against the appellants.

5. It is also undertaken before this Court that in case the appellants

are admitted to anticipatory bail, they are ready to join the investigation and

undertook to abide by any terms and conditions as deemed appropriate by this

Court. 

6. Mr. Jaspal Singh Guru, AAG Punjab would though ra ises a

preliminary objection before answering to the merits to the effect that the

instant appeals are not maintainable inasmuch as the remedy would lie under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS, 2023’). 

7. At the outset, learned State counsel submits that the present

appeal, purportedly filed under Section 14-A of the Act is not maintainable in

law, inasmuch as the same seeks appellate intervention in a matter concerning

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -7-

anticipatory bail, which stands specifically barred by virtue of Section 18 of

the Act.

8. He further submits that Section 18 of the Act categorically bars

the application of Section 438 of the Cr.P.C. (now Section 482 BNSS) thereby

ousting   the   jurisdiction   of   any   Court   to   entertain  an   application   for

anticipatory bail in cases involving offences under the SC/ST Act, where a

prima facie case is made out. The Hon’ble Apex Court has consistently held

that this bar is to be interpreted strictly and must be given full effect, reflecting

the  legislative   intent  to  provide  effective  protection  to   members  of  the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

9. He   asserts   that  Section   14-A  of   the  Act,   inserted  by   the

Amendment Act of 2015 (w.e.f. 26.01.2016), provides for an appeal against

any judgment, sentence, or order passed by a Special Court or the Exclusive

Special Court, and is intended to cover orders pertaining to trial proceedings

or regular bail. However, the said provision does not dilute or override the

specific bar under Section 18, which remains intact and continues to operate

with full force.

10. He further asserts that the filing of an appeal under Section 14-A

of the Act against the dismissal of an  anticipatory bail application  by the

Special Court is, therefore, misconceived and not tenable in law. The appeal

jurisdiction cannot be invoked to circumvent a statutory bar created by the

Legislature through Section 18 of the Act.

11. It is further argued that the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in its catena

of judgments, including but not limited to Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of

India [(2020) 4 SCC 727], has held that where no prima facie case is made

out, the Courts may exercise their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 BNSS) and in exceptional circumstances, grant

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -8-

anticipatory  bail,  notwithstanding  the  bar  under  Section   18  of   the  Act.

However, the proper remedy in such a scenario lies  not in appeal, but by

invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court under Section

482 Cr.P.C. (now Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023).

12. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the present appeal

is maintainable under Section 14-A of the Act is based on an  erroneous

reading and misinterpretation of the provision. The bar under Section 18 of the

Act is  substantive  and has not been repealed or rendered otiose by the

insertion   of   Section   14-A  of   the  Act.   In   fact,   the  legislative   intent  is

abundantly   clear   that   Section   18   of   the   Act   was   meant   to   operate

independently and restrictively, so as to exclude anticipatory bail in such

cases, unless no prima facie case is disclosed.

13. In the light of above, he prays for dismissal of all the appeals

being not maintainable. 

14. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties.

15. This Court deems it appropriate to adjudicate the preliminary

objection before adverting to the merits of these appeals on which Mr. Guru

assisted to the Court while arguing that there is specific bar under Section 18

of the Act for the grant of anticipatory bail in an offence under the Act and

insertion of Section 14-A by the Amendment of 2015 does not itself mean that

anticipatory bail is maintainable before this Court. It would be useful to

reproduce Sections 14-A and 18 of SC/ST Act, 1989 as both are to be read in

consonance with each other and the same read as under:-

“[14A. Appeals.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code of CriminalProcedure,1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie,

from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory

order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the

High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -9-

anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to

the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the

Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3)

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time

being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred

within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment,

sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court

may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of

ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause

for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days:

Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the

expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every

appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible,

be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of

admission of the appeal.]

18. Section 438 of the Code not to apply to persons committing

an offence under the Act.— Nothing in section 438 of the Code

shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any

person on an accusation of having committed an offence under

this Act.”

16. On a careful examination of the relevant statutory provisions, this

Court is of the considered view that Section 18 of the Act imposes an absolute

bar on the grant of anticipatory bail in cases involving offences under the Act.

The subsequent insertion of Section 14-A of the Act was intended solely to

provide a statutory right of appeal against any judgment, sentence, or order

passed by a Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, particularly in the

context of trial proceedings or regular bail. It was not intended to extend

appellate   jurisdiction   to   the   matters   concerning   anticipatory   bail,   which

continue to remain expressly barred under Section 18 of the Act.

17. The Apex Court in   Dr. Subhash Kashinath Mahajan vs The

State Of Maharashtra and another (2018) 6 SCC 454 observed as under:-

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -10-

“There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled

Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as

a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper

Castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false

report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It

is due to the human failing and not due to the caste factor. Caste

is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness

hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information

report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be

false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or

for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of

caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that

can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot

be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be

taken care in proceeding under section 482 of the Cr.PC.

18. Earlier to the above in Shakuntla Devi vs Baljinder Singh (2014)

15 SCC 521, the Apex Court has observed as under:-

Concerning the provisions contained in section 18A, suffice it to

observe that with respect to preliminary inquiry for registration

of FIR, we have already recalled the general directions (iii) and

(iv) issued in Dr. Subhash Kashinath’s case (supra). A

preliminary inquiry is permissible only in the circumstances as

per the law laid down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in

Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, shall hold

good as explained in the order passed by this Court in the review

petitions on 1.10.2019 and the amended provisions of section 18A

have to be interpreted accordingly.

9. The section 18A(i) was inserted owing to the decision of this

Court in Dr. Subhash Kashinath (supra), which made it necessary

to obtain the approval of the appointing authority concerning a

public servant and the SSP in the case of arrest of accused

persons. This Court has also recalled that direction on Review

Petition (Crl.) No.228 of 2018 decided on 1.10.2019. Thus, the

provisions which have been made in section 18A are rendered of

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -11-

academic use as they were enacted to take care of mandate issued

in Dr. Subhash Kashinath (supra) which no more prevails. The

provisions were already in section 18 of the Act with respect to

anticipatory bail.

10. Concerning the applicability of provisions of section 438

Cr.PC, it shall not apply to the cases under Act of 1989. However,

if the complaint does not make out a prima facie case for

applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1989, the bar created

by section 18 and 18A (i) shall not apply. We have clarified this

aspect while deciding the review petitions.”

19. It is also recorded in the judgment by the Apex Court that in

exceptional cases for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of the provisions

on settled parameters power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., (now Section 528

BNSS) can be exercised by the Court. 

20. Taking note of the fact that even where other offences of IPC are

mentioned in the FIR alongwith Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. Section 18 of the

Act do not entitle the accused for anticipatory bail in view of the absolute bar

created under Section 18 of the Act, which categorically states that Section

438 Cr.P.C., do not apply to the persons committing an offence under the Act.

There cannot be any iota of doubt that Section 438 Cr.P.C., deals only in a

situation where the accused is soliciting anticipatory bail. 

21. The intent of legislation is thus very clear and in fact there is no

second thought rather to make the proposition more explicit Section 14-A was

inserted w.e.f. 26.01.2016 vide Act No.1 of 2016 simpliciter providing an

appeal against any judgment sentence or which is not interlocutory order of a

Special Court to be filed before the High Court both on factual as well as on

legal grounds. 

22. Now posing a question on the proposition under test before this

Court i.e. whether Section 14-A would be applicable in case of denial of

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -12-

anticipatory bail by a Special Court or an exclusive Special Court, the primary

objection was raised by the State on maintainability of the instant appeals. 

23. The argument raised by the State bears weight with the plain and

clinical reading of Section 14-A of the Act that the necessity, object and

purpose of inserting the new provision is only to elaborate the procedure in

case bail is sought by an accused for an offence under the SC & ST Act. 

24. The word ‘bail’ would mean regular bail only since there is

specific absolute bar for grant of anticipatory bail by way of non-applicability

of Section 438 Cr.P.C. (now Section 482 BNSS 2023) for an offence under the

Act, meaning thereby Section 14-A of the Act by no means can be read as a

provision inserted to facilitate seeking anticipatory bail and filing of instant

appeal after rejection of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C., (now

Section 482 BNSS 2023) in itself would not be maintainable before the

Special Court. 

25. A cumulative reading of Sections 18, 18-A and 14-A of the Act,

which is actually the essence to understand the remedial measures provided to

an accused makes it crystal clear that a petition under Section 438 Cr.P.C.

(now Section 482 BNSS, 2023) would not lie at all even before a Special

Court or an exclusive Special Court or even before the High Court. 

26. It is also worth mention here that Section 14-A is in addition to

already existing Sections 18 & 18-A in the Act and not in derogation or in

separation to these two provisions. 

27. Hon’ble Justice Arun Mishra while speaking for the Larger Bench

of the Apex Court in “Prithvi Raj Chauhan vs. Union of India and Ors.

2020(4) SCC 727” went further examining the issue that there may be certain

cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court,

but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -13-

be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C., (now Section 528

BNSS, 2023) and concluded with the finding that the Court can, in exceptional

cases go to the extent of exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., (now

Section 528 BNSS, 2023) for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of

provisions on settled parameters if it found prima facie no case is made out. 

28. Further the view of this Court gets strengthened from another

judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Vilas Pandurang Pawar

& Anr vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors, 2012 AIR SCW 4852. The relevant

part of the said judgment read as under:-

“9) The scope of Section 18 of the SC/ST Act read with Section

438 of the Code is such that it creates a specific bar in the grant

of anticipatory bail. When an offence is registered against a

person under the provisions of the SC/ST Act, no Court shall

entertain application for anticipatory bail, unless it prima facie

finds that such an offence is not made out. Moreover, while

considering the application for bail, scope for appreciation of

evidence and other material on record is limited. Court is not

expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record.

When a provision has been enacted in the Special Act to protect

the persons who belong to the Scheduled Castes and the

Scheduled Tribes and a bar has been imposed in granting bail

under Section 438 of the Code, the provision in the Special Act

cannot be easily brushed aside by elaborate discussion on the

evidence.

10) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relying on the

decisions of the Delhi High Court in Dr. R.K. Sangwan & Anr. vs.

State, 2009 (112) DRJ 473 (DB) and in Crl. M.C. No. 3866/2008

and Crl.M.C. No. 1222/2009 titled M.A. Rashid vs. Gopal

Chandra decided on 23.03.2012 and a decision of the Orissa

High Court in Ramesh Prasad Bhanja & Ors. vs. State of Orissa,

1996 Cri. L.J. 2743, submitted that in spite of the specific bar

under Section 438 of the Code, the Courts have granted

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -14-

anticipatory bail to the accused who were charged under Section

3(1) of the SC/ST Act.

11) In view of the specific statutory bar provided under Section

18 of the SC/ST Act, the above decisions relied on by the

petitioners cannot be taken as a precedent and as discussed

above, it depends upon the nature of the averments made in the

complaint.

12) In view of the above discussion and in the light of the specific

averments in the complaint made by the complainant-respondent

No.3 herein, we are of the view that Section 18 of the SC/ST Act is

applicable to the case on hand and in view of the same, the

petitioners are not entitled to anticipatory bail under Section 438

of the Code. Accordingly, the special leave petition is dismissed.

However, it is made clear that the present conclusion is confined

only to the disposal of this petition and the trial Court is free to

decide the case on merits.”

29. In light of the foregoing discussion, this Court is bound to adhere

to the statutory scheme and the clear mandate of the Legislature. The Hon’ble

Supreme   Court   has   consistently   held   that   while   exercising   appellate   or

inherent jurisdiction, the High Courts cannot traverse beyond the provisions of

the statute, and must confine their adjudication within the legal framework

established by the Legislature.

30. The above-said principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court in

the case of State Of Jharkhand & Ors vs Ambay Cements & Anr 

AIR 2005

Supreme Court 4168. The relevant extract of the same reads as under:-

“Whenever the statute prescribes that a particular act is to be

done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to

comply with the said requirement leads to severe consequences,

such requirement would be mandatory. It is the cardinal rule of

the interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular

thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed

and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation

that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly

construed and followed. Since the requirement, in the instant

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -15-

case, of obtaining prior permission is mandatory, therefore, non-

compliance of the same must result in canceling the concession

made in favour of the grantee-the respondent herein.”

31. Further dependence can be placed upon Jaishri Laxmanrao Patil

vs The Chief Minister And Ors.  AIR online 2021 SC 240.  The relevant

extract of the same reads as under:-

“12. It is a recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that the

expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a

sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute,

and which effectuate the object of the legislature21. However, the

object-oriented approach cannot be carried to the extent of doing

violence to the plain language used by rewriting the section or

structure words in place of the actual words used by the

legislature. The logical corollary that flows from the judicial

pronouncements and opinion of reputed authors is that the

primary rule of construction is literal construction. If there is no

ambiguity in the provision which is being construed there is no

need to look beyond. Legislative intent which is crucial for

understanding the object and purpose of a provision should be

gathered from the language. The purpose can be gathered from

external sources but any meaning inconsistent with the explicit or

implicit language cannot be given.”

32. In the present case, the legislative intent is unequivocal Section

18   of   the   Scheduled   Castes   and   the   Scheduled   Tribes  (Prevention   of

Atrocities) Act, 1989, which bars the grant of anticipatory bail where even if a

prima facie case is made out, has not been repealed, amended, or diluted by

the subsequent insertion of Section 14-A. The said provision [Section 14-A]

merely provides a statutory right of appeal against orders passed by the

Special or Exclusive Special Courts, primarily in the context of regular bail,

conviction, or trial-related orders, and cannot be interpreted to override or

nullify the specific bar contained in Section 18.

CRA-S-1944-2023 and other connected cases -16-

33. Having elaborated as above in the discussions supported by

enunciated case law, I hereby have no hesitation to hold that the present

appeals are not maintainable under Section 14-A of the Act. This Court would

go a step further even to decide that a petition under Section 482 BNSS, 2023

(Section 438 Cr.P.C.) would not lie, in view of the absolute bar created vide

Section 18 of the Act and since that provision is binding, mandatory and not

directive. In case the arrest of the accused is found to be illegal or is

challenging the quashing of FIR being illegal may seek stay of arrest or get the

arrest declared illegal and violative of constitutional law. The appropriate

relief can be sought under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier Section 482 Cr.P.C.,). 

34. Without adverting to the merits of the case on facts, the appeals

challenging the order vide which anticipatory bail to the appellants was

rejected are held to be not maintainable and hereby ordered to be dismissed. 

35. However, the appellants would be at liberty to avail appropriate

remedy as provided under law by way of petition under Section 528 BNSS,

2023, if so advised. 

36. Ordered accordingly.

(SANDEEP MOUDGIL)

29.05.2025               JUDGE

Meenu

1. Whether speaking/ reasoned : Yes /No

2. Whether reportable : Yes /No