No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
358
SALIGRAM RUPLAL KHANNA & ANR
v.
KANWAR RAJNATH
May, I, 1974
[H. R.
KHANNA, M. H. BEG, AND Y. V.
CHANDRACHUD, JJ.j
A
Indian Partnership Act. ss. 42 and 47-Scope of-Dissolution of a finn B
constituted for a fixed
term-Mutual
rights and obligations of partners after
dissolution suit for rendition of aCC'o1111f's-Lin1!tation.
A partnership consisting of the appellants and the respondent had entered
into a lease agreement· with the Custodian of Evacuee Property in respect of
a mill and took possession of the mill on 31st August, 1952. The period of
partnership was for 5 years being tne period of the said lease. The partners
having failed to pay one instalment of rent the Custodian served on the C
partners a show cause notice on 12-2-54 why thi; lease should not be terminat-
ed. On account of certain financial difficulties the parties entered into · a
second agreement on February
24,
1954.
Disputes having arisen between appellants and the respondent, the appellants
filed a suit on De~ember 20. 1960 alleging lhat after the termination of' the
lease by the Custodian on May 25, 1954 the two appellants and the respon
dent had orally agreed not to dissolve the partnership in spite of the termina-
tion
of the lease and prayed for a declaration that the partnership between D
them and the respondent
, was still subsisting on the tern1s and conditions set
out in the partnership deed dated 24th February, 1954. They also prayed
for rendition of the partnership accounts. The respondent on. the other hand
alleged that there was no oral agreement between the parties and that the
claim for rendition ·of accountS was barred by limitation.
The trial court held that the appellants had failed to prove that there
was an oral agreement between the parties and that the
clai.m for rendition
of accounts was barred by limitation. E
On appeal the High Court upheld the findings of the trial court.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD :-( 1) No inference of' implied agreement can be drawn from the
rnaterial on record.
[371 E]
According to section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act. subject to a con
tract between the partners a firm
is dissolved if constituted for a fixed term
by the expiry of that term. This provision makes it clear that unless some
contract between the partners
to the contrary is proved, the
firm, if constituted
for a
fixed te.rm
\VOu\J be dissolved by the expiry of that tern1. [371G-Ji]
In the instant case
it was indicated in the
agreement of partnership· that
the period of partnership had been fixed at
5 years
bei.:ause that was the
period of the lease of the mills and the lease
was _terminated on
bi1ay 25, J 954.
[372B-C]
According to s. 47 of the Tndian Partnership Act after the dissolution
of the firm the authority of each partner
to. bind the firm and the other mutual
rights
and obligations of the pa1tr.·~rs continue notwithstanding the dis·solution
so far as may be necessary to win.d up the affairs of the firm and to com
plete transactions begun but unfinished. at the time of dissolution but not
otherwise. The· word 'transaction' in section 47 refers not merely to a com
mercial transaction
of purchase and sale but would include also all other
matters relating
to the affairs of the partnership. The completion of a tran
saction would cover also the taking of necessary
steps in connection with the
adjudicati'on of a dispute t~ whic? the firm before. its dis~olution was a party.
In the instant case after dissolution. the partnership subsisted merely for the
purpose of completing pending transactions, winding up the business and
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s. R. KHANNA v. RAJNATH (Khanna, J.) 359
adjusting the rights of partners anQ for these purposes and. these only the
authority, rights <ind obligations of the partners continued. [374B·D, F-G]
(3) The suit i'or rendition of accounts brought by the appellants on De
cember 20, 1960 was barred by limitation. In the absence of a contract to
the contrary there could be no survival. of the firm after August 30, 1957
when the period
of partnership expired. [373D-F]
CIVIL
APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 143 of 1969 .
(Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment & Decree dated
the 22nd March, 1968 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Appeal
'.'Jo. 23 of 1963).
S. T. Desai, K. L. Hathi and P. C. Kapur for the appellants.
K. S. Cooper, A. B. Diwan, Vasant Kotwal and I. N. Shroff for
the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHANNA, J.-This appeal by special leave is
d[rected against the
judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court affirming
on appeal the decision of the learned single Judge whereby a suit for
dissolution of partnership and rendition
of accounts filed by the two
piaintiff-appellants,
Saligram Ruplal Khanna and Pessumal \Atalrai
Shahani, against Kanwar Rajnath defendant-respondent was dismissed.
The partnership which was sought to be dissolved carried on business
under the name and style of "Shri Ambernath Mills Corporation"
(hereinafter referred to as SAMCO). The property which according
to the appellants belonged to the partnership co1isistcd of three mills
at Ambernath. One of them was a woollen mill, the other was a
silk mill and the third was an oil and leather cloth factory with land,
bungalows and chawls attached thereto.
In addition to that, there
was a bobbin factory at Taradeo with offices at Bombay, Ahmedabad
and other places. For the sake of convenience the above property
may be described,
as it was done in the High Court, as
"Ambernath
Mills". Although the case involves a tangled skein of facts, the points
which survive for determination
in appeal are rather simple.
The Ambernath
Mills originally belonged to a company called
Ahmed Abdul Karim Bros. Private
Ltd. The
mills were declared
to be evacuee property in September 1951 and the Custodian took
over the management of the mills
in pursuance of the provisions of
the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
It was then
decided that the mills should be managed by displaced persons who
had been industrialists in Pakistan. A private limited company was
formed of
31 persons for taking over the management of the mills.
Rs.
25,000 were contribnted by each one of those persons in that
connection. The appellants and the respondent too were members of
the company. Appellant No.
1 and the resoondent had migrated at
the time of oartition from Gujarat in West Punjab. The respondent
was a big industrialist and left behind extensive properties in Pakistan.
He
~eld verified claim of rupees 23 lakhs in lieu of property left bv
him in . West Pakistan. The first appellant had a verified claim of
5-L177SupCl/75
360
~UPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] l s.c.R.
Rs. 22,000 in respect of residential property left in Pakistan. In
addition to that he had a disputed claim in respect of industrial pro
perties. The ;econd appellant had a verified claim of about
Rs. 80,000. The two appellants and the respondent were associated
by the Custodian with the management of the Ambemath Mills. By
August 1952 all the members of the private limited company dropped
out. It was accordin,gly decided by the Custodian to grant a lease
of the Ambernath
Mills to the respondent and the two appellants.
On
August 30, 1952 two documents were executed. One of the docu
ments
was an agreement of partnership between the two appellants
and the respondent for carrying on the business
of
A01bernath Mills
under the lease in the name and style of Shri Ambernath Mills Cor
poration. The other document
was the agreement of lease executed
by the Custodian of Evacuee
Property as lessor and the appellants and
the respondent carrying on business in partnership under the name
and style
of
SAMCO as lessees. The subject-matter of the lease was
Ambernath Mills. It was stated in the lease that the lessees had
appointed the respondent
as their chief representative with fnll powers
of control, management and administration of the entire demised pre
mises. The lease
was to be for a period of five years to be computed
from the date
on which the possession of the demised premises was
handed over to the lessees, subject to sooner determination thereof
on any of the contingencies provided in clause
21 or on the breach
of any condition on the part of the lessees or in the event of any
dispnte among the lessees resnlting in the closure
of the mills. It was
also provided that the lessees would purchase and the lessor wonld
sell to the lessees at an agreed
pdce the stocks of raw materials, un
sold finished goods, consumer's stores, spare parts, cars and trucks
and other movables which had alreadv been vested in the lessor,
as
well as three diesel generating sets purchased by the lessor. In the
event of any difference
on the question of the price, the same was to
be fixed through one or more experts. The sale was to be completed
within a period of three months from the date of the agreement. The
lessees were authorised to take
as partner one or more clisplaced per
sons who had
filed claims under the Displaced
Persons Qaims Act,
1950 subject to the prior approval of the Government. The agree
ment also contained a provision for reference of any dispute arising
out of the agreement of lease to arbitrators chosen by the parties by
m'utual consent. The annual rent payable by the lessees was fixed
at Rs. 6,00,000 payable in four quarterly instalments of Rs. 1,50.000
each on or before 30th day of each quarter. The lessees also under
took to deposit or fnrnish bank guarantee in the sum of Rs. 7.00,000
as security for the payment of the value of raw material, unsold finish
ed goods, stores. spare parts and other articles. Clauses 17 to 21 of
the agreement of lease read as under :
"17. It is agreed between the Lessor and the Lessees
that when the entire claims of the lessees
filed by them under
the Displaced
Persons Oaims Act, 1950, for all their pro
perties are determined and the compensation payable to them
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s. R. KHANNA v. RAJNATH (Khanna, J.) 361
by the Government of India is ascertained, the market value
of the entire demised premises shall be determined by an
expert appointed
in that behalf by the Government of India,
Ministry
of Rehabilitation, and such value as is
determine<j
shall be taken as price for acquisition by th·3 lessees ot the
full proprietary interest in the demised premises in the man
ner shown in the next succeeding paragraph.
18. The Lessees, being all displaced persons from
Pakistan
and having left large properties in Pakistan, have all
of them put in claims in
resp3ct of their properties and other
assets left by them in Pakistan under the Displaced Persons
Claims Act, 1950. When the claims under the said Act of the
Lessees are verified and determined and compensation pay
able in respect thereof has been ascertained the compensa
tion payable to the Lessees shall be taken into consideration,
and it has been agreed as a term of this Agreement between
the parties hereto with
the concurrence of Govt. of India,
Ministry of Rehabilitation, that on such total compensation
being arrived at the Lessees shall be allotted proprietary
rights in the demised premises, in the manner shown
viz., in
case the value of the aggregate compensation payable
tq the
Lessees
is equivalent to the value of the demised premises
as assessed, the Lessor shall convey the demised premises
absolutely to them
as full proprietors thereof, their interest in
the demised premises being in proportion
to the compensatim
payable to each of the Lessees and the respective shares in
the proprietary interest shall be adjusted according to the
amount
of compensation payable to each as finally deter
mined.
19.
In case the aggregate amount
cff compensation pay
able by the Government
of India to the Lessees exceeds the
F value of the demised premises as determined, the demised
premises
will be conveyed to the Lessees, their share inter
se being in the proportion of the amount of compensation
payable to each.
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20. It is further agreed that in case the aggregate amount
of compensation payable to the Lessees falls short of the
value fixed for the demised premises, the Lessor shall be
entitled to associate with the Lessees in the ownership of the
proprietarv interest
lei be allotted as aforesaid other displaced
persons who have left industrial concerns in
Pakistan, so that
the total compensation payable to the Lessees and the others
thus associated
is equivalent to the total value of the demised
premises and the said demised premises shall then become
the absolute prciperty of
the Lessees and others thus asso
ciated in proportion to
the total compensation payable to
each
as finally determined.
362
SUPREME COURT (EPORTS [1975] ! S.C.R.
21. The lease to be granted pursuance hereto shall be
liable
to determination earlier on the settlement of the claims
of the Lessees and the
allc~ment and transfer of the full pro
prietary interest in the demised premises
as provided in
clauses
17 to
20 hereof; provided that if the value of the full
proprietary interest in the demised premises exceeds the
amount of compensation payable to the Lessees and part of
such proprietary interest
is allotted to
c~her persons as pro·
vided in clause 20 hereof, the Lessees shall be at liberty to
continue the lease for the unexpired residue of the term on
the terms and conditions and yearly rent prescribed here
under, the yearly rent being adjusted proportionately to the
extent of the prc1prietary interest allotted and transferred to
the Lessees."
According to the partnership agreement executed by the two appellants
and the respondent on August 30, 1952, each partner had agreed to
contribute a capital of Rs. 1,00,000. The amount of Rs. 25,000 al
ready paid by each partner to the Custodian
was regarded as part
payment
of the capital of rupees one lakh. Each partner had one
third share in the partnership, but it
was provided that the shares
would he adjusted by
tile respondent if fresh partners were taken in
the partnership. The respondent
was to be the managing partner and
was entitled to assign work in the partnership to the
two appellants.
It was agreed that the appellants were not to interfere directly or in
directly in
any manner with the management and
contrd of the busi-
ness
by the respondent. The respondent was also authorized
tu form
a limited liability company
for running the business of the partnership
with the consent of the Custodian and the appellants agreed to join the
company
as
sharehclders on such terms and conditions as might be
agreed when such company was formed. The period of the partnership
was
five years
"being the period of said lease".
The partnership took possession of Ambernath Mills on August 31,
1952. The respondent directed the first appellant to be incharge of
the administraticirr of the mills at Ambernath, while the second appel
lant, being an engineer, was placed incharge of the properties, machi
nery and stores of the mills. The respondent was in overall charge of
the concerned.
It appears that the partnership made
SClffie progress in the first few
months. The stocks of raw material, finished goods, stores and ctther
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under the terms of the agreement of lease were in the meantime valued
by an auditor appointed
by the Custodian at rupees 3() lakhs. The
Custodian called upon the partnership in April 1953 to pay a sum
cf
rupees 7 lakhs or to furnish a bank guarantee for the said amount as
provided in the agreement of lease. This payment could not be made by
the partnership. There was also difficulty in paying the sixth instal
ment of the rent. A cheque for Rs. 1,50,000 was issued but the same H
was cjishonourcd. Subsequently, arrangements were made tci pay
Rs. 1,00,000. An amount of Rs. 50,000 out of the sixth instalment
remained unpaid.
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On February 12, 1954 the Custodian served a notice on the res·
pendent and the two appellants to show cause why the agreement of
lease should not be cancelled cin account of breach of conditions in
the matter of the payment of the sixth quarterly instalment of rent and
the failure to deposit or furnish bank guarantee for the amount of
Rs. 7,00,000. A writ petition was thereupon filed by the partnership
on February 16, 1954 in the Bombay High Court fc~ quashing the
notice issued
by the Custodian ..
In the meantime, the second appellant sent letter dated February
8, 1954 to the respondent suggesting that his share in the partnership
be reduced to 1
'}nna in a rupee or to such other fraction as the res"
pendent thought fit. A similar letter was addressed by the first appel
lant. On February 24, 1954 the parties entered into a secqnd agree
ment of partnership. It was agreed in the new partnership agreement
that the share
of the first appellant would be 3 annas and that of. the
second appellant 1 anna in a rupee. The respondent was to have the
remaining
12 annas share. It was also agreed that the two appellants
would not have the right, title and interest in the name, capital, assets
and
goodwill of the partnership. It was provided that the new
part
nership wc!llld be deemed to have been· formed as from October . 1 ,
1953. Accounts for the period from August 30, 1952 to September
30, 1953 were to be made up on the basis of the partnership agceement
dated August 30, 1952 and the profits and losses for that period were
to be distributed accordingly. The capital of the partnership was
agreed to be arranged by the respcl!l.dent and he was to be the manag
ing partner in control of the entire affairs of the partnership. He was
also to get interest at 6 per cent on all finances arranged by him. The
appellants agreed to carry on snch dntics in the concern
as might be
assigned to them
by the respondent. The period of the partnership
was to be
"the c111tstanding period of the lease".
The writ petition referred to above filed by the partnership to quash
the notice
of the Custodian was allowed by a single Judge of the
Bom
bay High Court on March 31, 1954. On appeal filed by the Cus
todian, a Division Bench of the High Cciurt as per judgment dated
April
13, 1954 set aside the order of the
sing!e Judge and dismisser!
the writ petition. Certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court was
granted by the High Court on May 5, 1954. Stay Nder was also
issued on that day restraining the Custodian
frcim dispossessing the
respondent and the appellants from Ambernath
Mills. Appeal against
the decision of the Division Bench of Bombay High Court
was then
filed in this Court. The Custodian of Evacuee Property made an order
on May 25, 1954 cancelling the agreement
c~ lease of Amberanth
Mills dated August 30, 1952. The possession of the mills was volun
tarily delivered by the partnership to the Custodian on June 30
1954. ,
Representations
were made on behalf of
SAMCO to the Minister
of Rehabilitation during the later half of 1954 for being allciWed to
retam Ambernath
Mills. A communication was also addressed on D~cember 14, 1954 to the Minister of Rehabilitation suggesting, inter
aha, that the claim of the Custodian against the partnership in respect
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 1 s.c.R.
of arrears of rent and the value of raw material and c~her goods should
be referred to arbitration.
The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act,
1954 came into force on October 9, 1954.
On March
10, 1955 the
Central Government issued notification under sectiqn
12 of that
Act
acquiring the Ambernath Mills. An advertisement was then issued by
the Central Government for the sale of Ambernath Mills. Tenders for
the purchase of the mills were required to be submitted by July
9,
1955.
On June 7, 1955 a representation was made by SAMCO that
in view of the· pendency of its appeal in the Supreme Court in respect
of the Custodian's notice for cancellation of the lease, the Ambernath
Mills should not be sold.
On July 7, 1955 the partnership submitted
a tender for the purchase of the mills in accordance with the
Govern
ment advertisement. The offer was for an aggregate amount of
Rs. 55,55,555. On October 14, 1955 the partnership made another
ct1Ier to purchase the mills for an aggregate amount of Rs. 75,00,000
on terms and oonditions to be mutually agreed upon.· The offer of
October 14, 1955
was made after the last date for the receipt of
tenders. The appeal referred to above filed by the partnership in this
Court against the judgment of the Bqmbay
High
Court was dismissed
by this Court on November 10, 1955 vide reported case Rai Bahadur
Kanwar Raj Nath
&
Ors. v. Pramod C. Bhatt, Custodian of Evacuee
Property(').
This
Court held that the Custodian had the power of
cancelling the lease under section 12 of the Administraticlll of Evacuee
Property Act and that the notice issued by the Custodian was valid.
This Court, however, left open the question whether the partnership
had any right to purchase the mills under the agreement of lease.
Notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Prcl:edure was issued
to the Custodian and the Central Gove~nment on No_vember 9, ~9.55
intimating the intention of the partnership to file a su~t for restrammg
the Custodian and the Central Government from sellmg Ambernath
Mills. The Central Government on
Decemb.er
30, 1955 informed the
partnership that its offer to purchase the mills for Rs. 55,55,555 was
rejected. The partnership thereafter withdrew its subsequent offer ~f
purchase of the mills for Rs. 75,00,000. On January 31, 1956 a smt
was filed on behalf of the partnership against the Custodian and the
Central Government few permanent injunction restraining them from
selling Ambernath Mills to any perso~ .other than the partners. The
said suit was dismissed by the City Cm! Cc1Urt Bombay on Octo~r. 8,
1956. An appeal was thereupon filed by SAMCO ~gamst the d~c~s~on
of the City Civil Court. This appeal too was dismissed by a Div1S1on
Bench of the Bombay High Cciurt as per. judgment dat~ January 14,
1957. This judgment
is reported as
Shri Ambernath Mills Co~pora
tion v. G. B. Godbole, Custodian of Evacuee Property & Anr.(-) It
was held by the Division Bench that the agreement ~f purchase co~
taining clauses 17 to 21 of the lease deed was indefimte and vague Ill
varicius particulars and that the agreement of sale was not capable of
--------
(1) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 977. (2) A.I.R. [1957] Born. 119.
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specific performance. The Division Bench further held that the Central
Government by 'irtue of notification dated March 10, 1955 acquired
. the
mills
free from ·ail encumbrances and that such right as SAMCO
might have had of sp::cific performance of agreement of sale was in
the nature of an encumbrance. The Central Government, according
to the Division· Bench, must be deemed tq have acquired the mills
free from that encumbrance. . No appeal was filed· against the abov~
decision of the Bombay High. Court ..
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.. The respondent, it would appear, started making efforts from the
middle of 1957 to get the Ambemath
Mills for himself .. He was' . in
Delhi
fotr several months from June 1957 onwards. On August 14, ·
1957 an agreement for sale of Ambemath Mills to the respondent was
executed by the respondent and the President. The price of the mills
was fixed at Rs. 50,11,000. Out of this amount, a sum of Rs. 2,00.000
was to be paid on the execution of the agreement as earnest money
·and in part payment of the purchase price. This amount cc;.ild be
paid either iii cash or by adjustment of net compensation payable to
tlie respondent
or to other displaced persons who might assign their
verified
c!aim in favour of the respcmdent A . further sum of
Rs. 28,00,000 was to be paid within three months from the date of
the agreement either
in cash or by adjustment of the net compensation
payable to displaced persons who assigned their verified
claims .in
favour of the respondent. The balance
ci. Rs; 20,11,000 was to be
paid
in seven equal instalments. It was provided that if the
respon
dent failed to pay the amount of Rs. 28,00,000 within three months
from the date 'of agreement the earnest money of Rs. 2,00,000 paid by'
him was to be· forfeited. In addition to the above, the respondent
undertook to mortgage the mills for a sum not exceeding Rs,:~0,00,000
to secure the payment of such amount as SAMCO might· be found
liable to pay to the CuStodian in respect of the claim referred to arbi
tration. On September 20, 1957 the first appellant executed an agree
ment for the transfer of his compensation claim amountin,g to Rs. 6,994.
The amount was to
be repaid to the first appellant
··within three
years with interest at the rate of 6 per .cent per annum.
It
was stated
in the agreement that the respondent was contemplating to . foqn · a
joint stock company to own, run and manage the
mills. The
resporule!lt.
agreed that in the event of such a company being · fcaned the first
appellant would have the option
to purchase shares of the said company
to
the extent of 50 per cent of the amount of his
claim compensation.
On August 12, 1957 the dispute between the Custodian on one
side and the two appellants
and the respondent.on the other, which
had been referred earlier
in accordance with
the· arbitration clause in
the agreement
of lease to the
arbitration of other arbitrators, ·was
referred to the arbitration of :Mr. Morarji Desai. On November 13,
1957 the respondent and the Custodian agreed before ·the arbitrator
that the dues
of the Custodian
·against the partnership be settled at
Rs. 18,00,000. A consent award .awarding Rs. 18,00,000 in favour cf
the Custodian against the partnership was made by Mr. Morarji Desai
on .the fdlowing day, viz., November 14, 1957. The award was made
a rule of the court
ori May 1, 1958.
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366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] 1.s.c.R.
The respondent was unable to submit to the Central Government
compensatiqn claims to the extent of Rs. 30,00,000 within three months
of the agreement dated August 14, 1957.
By April 1959 he submitted
compensation claims to
tuc extent of Rs. 20,0U,000. A supplememal
agreement
was executed by the
respondont and tile !'rec.ide:ir on April
29, 1959.
In this agreement the President acknowledged the receipt
from the respondent of the sum
df Rs. 20,00",000 by way of adjust
ment of compensation
c1a1ms. The respondent undertook to pay the
remaining amount of
Rs.
30,11,000 and Rs. 18,00,000 under the
award of Mr. Morarji Desai,
in all, Rs.
48,11,000. It was agreed that
the aforesaid amount would be paid by the respondent in seven annual
instalments. A second supplemental agreement
was executed by the
President and the respondent
on April 6,
1960, but we are not con
cerned with that. On April 21, 1960 the grant of the Ambernatli
Mills was made
by the President
tel the respondent. The same day the
respondent executed in favour of the President a mort
gage of the Ambernath Mills for the payment of Rs. 48,11,000. The
sum was payable in seven equal annual instalments. On April 22,
1960 the respondent took possessiqn of Ambernath Mills which had
been lying idle for nearly six years since June 30, 1954. On May 7,
1960 the respondent sent a circular letter to all displaced persons
whose compensation claim had been transferred to him informing them
that possession of the mills had been handed c1Ver to him by the Cent-
ral Government. They were also informed that statement of their
accounts was being prepared. One suc)l letter was sent to the first
appellant.
He
also received a statement of account and in September
1960 a cheque for Rs. 204 was sent to him by way of interest.
On October 7, 1960 the first appellant sent a letter tc1 the respon
dent complaining that his property had been attached in execution of
a decree for Rs. 271.44 which had been obtained by a creditor against
SAMCO. In this letter the first appellant hinted that he was a partner
of the respondent. The respondent in response sent to the first appel-
lant a cheque for Rs. 271.44.
It is also stated that the respondent in
formed the first appellant on telephone that he did not regard the
latter
as his partner. On December
20, 1960 the two appellants filed
the present suit.
· It was alleged in the plaint that after the termination of the agree
ment of lease by the Custodian on
May 25, 1954 the two appellants
and the respondent assembled and orally agreed not
to dissolve the
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partnership in spite of the termination of the lease. The agreement G
between the parties was further stated to be that
"the partnership should
be continued for the purpose of acquiring on behalf and for the bene-
fit of the said partnership the properties Ex.
1 (Ambernath Mills)
hereto and to exploit the said
industries". The respondent was stated
to have made a representation that he
was acquiring the Ambernath
Mills on behalf
c~ the partnership and that the agreement had been
executed in the respondent's name because the Central Government H
desired to deal with only one individual. It was also stated that the
respondent had admitted utilisation of a sum of Rs. 2,00,000 out of
the partnership fund for payment of earnest money. The respcl!ldent
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being a partner, according to the appellants, stood in a fiduciary charac
ter
vis-a-vis the appellants and was bound to protect their interest. He
could not gain for himself pecuniary advantage by entering into
deal
ings under circumstances in which. his interests were adverse to those
c& the appellants. The properties and profits acquired by the respon
dent were stated to be for the benefit of the partnership
also. In the
plaint,
as it was initially filed, the appellants prayed for a declaration
that the partnership between them and the respondent
was still sub
sisting on the terms and conditions set out in partnership deed dated
February 24, 1954 excepting the terms relating to the period of part
nership. Prayer
was made for a declaration that the Ambernath Mills
belonged to the partnership and for rendition
of the partnership ac
oounts.
By a subsequent amendment prayer was added that the part
nership be dissolved from the date
of the filing of the suit.
The respondent in his written statement denied the alleged oral
agreement between the parties on or about May
25, 1954. According
to the respondent, the partnership stood dissolved
cin March 10, 1955
when the Central Government acquired the Ambernath Mills. Ac
cording further to the respondent, the funds of the partnership were
utilized for the payment of various creditors of the partnership and
after those payments were made the partnership did not have sufficient
funds to pay to the remaining creditors. With regard to the negotia-·
tions for the acquisition of the mills, the respondent stated that the
first appellant
was aware that Ambernath Mills were being acquired by
the respondent for himself
alon·o. The respondent denied that he ever
told the first appellant that the amount of earnest money of Rs. 2,00,000
for the purchase of the Ambernath Mills had been paid out of funds
belonging to the partnership. Allegation
was also made by the
r~s
pondent that the first appellant had requested that he might be given
some benefit in the nature of appointment or agency in the business
of Ambernath Mills. The claim c~ the appellant for rendition of the
accounts
was stated to be barred by limitation. In an affidavit filed on
January
11, 1961 the respondent stated that in case it was held that
there
was an oral agreement of partnership between the parties, the
same should be taken to have been dissolved.
Learned trial judge held that the appellants had failed to prove that
there
was an oral agreement between the parties on or abcfllt May 25,
1954.
It was further held
that' there was no agreement, express or
G implied, to form a partnership for acquiring the mills and for carrying
on the business thereon. The appellants were held not entitled tc1 have
the mills treated
as partnership assets by invoking principles enun
ciated
in section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act, to which reference had
been made on behalf of the appellants. The learned judge also held
the appellants claim for
renditic1n of accounts to be barred by limita
tion because in his view the partnership had stood dissolved on May
H 25, 1954 when the agreement
of lease was cancelled. Jn any case, 2ccordiM to the learned judge, the partnership must be deemed to have
been dissolved either on January 14, 1957 when the suit filed by the
two appellants and the respondent against the Custodian and the Cent-
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1975] J S.C.R.
ral Government for permanent injunction was finally dismissed in appeal A
by a Division Bench
of the Bombay High
Court or on August 30 1957
when the period of the lease came to an end. '
In appeal before the Division Bench the following four contenticns
were advanced on behalf of the appellants :
"(I) that on 25th May 1954 the parties expressly agreed
to continue their partnership for acquiring the Mills and ex
ploiting them, that a partnership at will thus came into exis
tence between them, and that therefore the Mills acquired
by the defendant cir his agreement with the President of
India dated 14th August 1957 and the subsequent grant by
the President
of
India on 21st April 1960 must be held to
be
an asset of the said partnership;
(2) that if such
an express agreement is held not to have
been proved, an implied agreement to the same effect should
be inferred from the conduct of the parties and the corres
pondence between them;
(3) that, even supposing that there
was no express
c~
·implied agreement as stated above, the rights acquired by the
defendant
as a result of his agreement with the President of
India dated 14th August 1957 and the subsequent
Presi
dential grant are impressed with a trust in favour of the part
nership under section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act; and
(
4) that, even if it is held that the Mills are no longer
an asset of the partnership, the plaintiffs are still entitled to
accounts of the partnership
which admittcdlv
existed between
them and the defendant for wc~king the Mills under Agree-
ment of lease dated 30th August 1952."
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contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants and substantially
agreed with the findings of the trial
judge. On the question of the
limitation, the learned judges held that the partnershlp had been
dis
solved at the latest on November 10, 1955 when all the attempts of
the partr.ers tc1 get the Custodian's order dated May 25, 1954 set aside
came to an end with the decision of the Supreme Court. The present
suit for rendition of accounts brought on December 20, 1960 more G
than three years after the date
of the dissolution of the partnership
was held to be barred by limitaticin. Tu the result the appeal was
dismissed.
Tu appeal before us Mr.
S.T. Desai on behalf of the appellants has
frankly conceded that he
is not in a position to challenge the concur-
rent
findings of the trial judge and the appellate bench that the appel-H
lants had failed to prove that on May 25, 1954 the parties had ex
pressly agreed to continue the partnership for acquiring the mills and
exploiting them. Although Mr. Desai indicated at the commencement
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of the arguments that he would challenge the finding of the appellate
bench that the rights acquired
by the respcndent as per agreement
dated August
14, 1957 with the President and the subsequent
Presi
dential grant are impressed with trust in favour of the partnership ·
under section 88 of the Indian Trusts Act, no arguments were ulti
mately advanced by him on that score. Mr. Desai has, hcrwever,
challenged the finding of the trial judge and the appellate bench that
no implied agreement
as alleged by the appellants could be inferred
from the material on record. The main burden of the arguments
elf
Mr. Desai, however, has been that the appellants were entitled to the
accuunts of the partnership which admittedly existed between the
parties
as per partnership agreements dated August 30, 1952 and
February 24, 1954. According to
Mr. Desai, there had been nq
dis
solution of the firm prior to the institution of the suit and the appe
lants' suit for the rendition of accounts was not barred by limitation.
The High Court, it
is urged, was in errcir in holding to the contrary. The above contentions have been controverted by Mr. Cooper on be
half of the respondent and, in our opinion, are not well-founded.
We may first deal with the questicin as to whether the implied agree
ment as alleged by the appellants can be inferred from the material on
record. In this respect Mr. Desai has submitted that the appellants no
longer claim
any interest in the ownership of Ambernath Miils which
now vest in the respondent. 1t is, however, urged that an agreement
can
be inferred from the conduct of the parties that Ambernath Mills.
were to be run by the respondent in partnership with the appellants,
even though the crwnership of the same might vest in the respondent.
In this connection
we find that no case of such an implied agreement
was set
up in the trial court, either in the plaint or otherwise, nor was.
such a case set up iu appeal before the Division Bench. What was
actually contended was that the agreement was for acquiring the mills
as an asset of the partnership. The above stand of the appellants
cciuld plainly be not accepted when one keeps in view the· agreement of
lease dated August 30, 1952 as well as other documents on record.
The said agreement
of lease shows that Ambernath Mills wou
Id be
come the absolute property not only of the appellants and the respon
dent but of all persons whet were to be associated with the lessees in
the crNnership of the proprietary interest in proportion to the total
compensation payable to each
of them. The agreement of lease
further
contemplated that the lessee rights c~ the two appellants and the res
pond~nt were to be distinct from the proprietary interest in the demised.
premises and that the lessees
were at liberty, in spite of the transfer
of proprietary interest, to continue the lease for the unexpired residue
of
the te~ on the terms and conditions of the lease and payment cd' .
rent prescnbed thereunder. The respondent submitted representation
on August 9, 1954 on behalf of SAMCO to the Custodian for the
restart of the mills and along with it the respondent sent ccipies of
letter of auth.on.ty ~~ ~articulars of veri~ed claims of 30 displaced
per~ons. It is 1mphc1t m the representat10n that in case Ambernath
Milis was transferred, the same would vest in all the 30 displaced
per,ons whose claims were submitted.
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] l s.c.R.
There are two documents which run counter to the stand taken on
behalf of the appellants in this Court that there
was an implied argec
ment that in case the respondent acquired the ownership of the mills,
the mills would
be. worked by the respondent in partnership with the
appellants.
One of those documents is agreement dated September 20,
1957 which was signed by the first appellant and the respondent a day
before the respondent executed bond in favour of th_at appellant in
view of the fact that the first appellant agreed to have
his claim com
pensation amounting
to Rs. 6,994 adjusted towards the price of
Ambernath Mills.
It was stated in the agreement dated September
20,
1957 that the respondent was contemplating the formation of a joint
stock company
to own, ruh and manage the mills and it was agreed bttween the parties that in the event of such company being formed,
the first appellant would have the option to purchase shares of the
said company to the extent of 50 per cent of the amount of the adjusted
daim compensation. In case the option was exercised in favour of the
purchase of the shares of the company, the respondent
was to ensure
that the said shares would be allotted to the first appellant at par.
It
was further agreed that if the shares applied for or any proportion
thereof were not allotted to the first appellant by the said company, the
respondent would not in any
way be liable to the first appellant on
that account.
In the bond the respondent agreed to pay to the first
appellant interest at the rate of 6 per cent on the amount of compen
sation from the date of the adjustment of the
first appellant's claim
compensation. Had the first appellant any interest in the Ambernath
Mills which were being acquired by the respondent, there could arise
no occasion for the execution of the agreement dated September 20,
1957 and the bond dated September 21, 1957. All that was agreed
by the respondent in those two documents
was that in case he pro
moted a company for owning, running and managing of the Ambernath
Mills, the first appellant would get a share of the value of half of his
claim compensation of Rs. 6,994. The said amount when compared
to the price of Ambernath Mills
was wholly insignificant. No question
could arise for the respondent borrowing money from the first appel
lant for payment of price of the mills in case the acquisition of the
mills
was for the benefit of the respondent as well as the appellant. It
may also be stated_ that the interest on account of the above compen
sat10n was duly paid by the respondent to the first appellant.
Another document which has a bearing in the above context
is
letter dated December 18, 1959 which was addressed by the first appel
lant to the Collector of Bombay in connection
with the recovery of
arrears of sales tax. The first apJ)ellant in that letter stated that the
responsibility for the payment of such arrears of sales tax
was that of
the respondent and the first appellant
was no more in picture. The
above letter shows that the first appellant repudiated his liability for
the payment of the sales tax by disclaiming his connection with the
business in question.
Our attention has been invited by Mr. Desai to the following
observations contained
in the judgment of the appellate bench :
"There is no dispute between the parties that the part
ners met on 25th May 1954, after ·the Custodian's order
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371
terminating the Agreement of Lease and decided that they
should try to have the Custodian's order set aside by pur~u
ing the appeal in the Sul?r~me Court as w~~ a.s by makmg
representations to the
Mirustry of Rehab1htatton m the
Central Government.
It is also not disputed that either on
25th
May 1954 or soon thereafter the parties decided that
they should also try
to acquire the proprietary interests in
the Mills
by relying on clauses 17 to 21 of the Agreement
of Lease. What is disputed is whether it was agreed between
the parties that, after acquiring the
proprietary interest in the
Mills, the business of the Mills should be carried on in
partnership between the parties.
It is the defendant's case
that
the proprietary interest in the Mills was sought to be
acquired
by the partners for certain incidental advantages but
that it
was never intended that the Mills after acquisition
should be run in partnership under the terms agreed in the
partnership deed
of 24th February
1954."
The above.observations may have some bearing on the question of
the express agreement, but so far as such an agreement is concerned,
it has already been pointed out above that the concurrent findings of the
trial judge and the appellate bench have not been challenged before
us. No inference of implied agreement mentioned by the learned
counsel
for the appellants can be drawn from the above observations.
We are, therefore, of the view that no inference of the implied
agreement referred
to by Mr. Desai can be drawn from the material
on record.
So far as the question is concerned as to whether the claim for
rendition
of accounts was within time, we find that according to clause
16 of the partnership deed dated August
30, 1952 the period of
partnership
was fixed at five years, being the period of the lease.
Clause
17 of the deed of partnership dated February 24, 1954 pro
vided that
the "period of partnership shall be the outstanding period of
such lease". The possession of Ambernath Mills under the agreement
of lease was delivered on August 31, 1952. The period of five years
of the lease was thus to expire on August 30, 1957. As the partner
ship was for a fixed period, firm would in normal cour'e dissolve
on the expiry of the period of five years on August 30, 1957. No agree
ment between the partners to keep the firm in existence after the ex
piry of the fixed term of five years has been proved'. Accordin~ to sec
tion 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, subject to contract bet;een the
partners a
firm is dissolved-
" (a) if constituted for a fixed term, by the expiry of that
term;
(b) if constituted to carry out one or more adventures or
undertakings
by the completion thereof;
( c)
by the death of a partner; and
!d) by the adjudication of a partner as an insolvent."
The
above provision makes it clear that unless some contract
between!
.3 72
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 197 5] 1 s.c.R.
the partners to the contrary is proved, the firm if constituted for a
fixed term would
be dissolved by the expiry of that term. If the firm
is constituted
to carry out one or more adventnres
()f undertakings, the
firm, subject
to a contract between the
partner~, would be dissolved
.by the completion of the adventures or undertakings. Clauses ( c) ~nd
( d) deal with dissolution of firm on death of a partner or his bemg
.adjudicated insolvent. '
It was indicated in the agreement of partnership that the period of
partnership had been fixed
at five years because that was the period .of the lease of Ambernath Mills. The lease, however, ran into rough
weather.
On February 12,
19~4 the Custodian served notice on the
respondent and the two appellants to show cause why the agreement
of lease should not be cancelled in accordance with the terms of that
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.agreement on account of the breach of conditions in the matter of pay-C
ment of instalment of rent and the failure of the respondent and the
.appellants to deposit
or furnish bank guarantee for the amount of
Rs.
7,00,000. The respondent and the appellants challenged the validity
of the above notice by means of a writ petition and, though they suc
ceeded before a single judge, the appellate bench of the Bombay High
Court upheld the validity of the notice.
On May 25, 1954 the Custo-
dian cancelled the lease
of Ambernath Mills and on June
30, 1954 got D
possession of the mills. The respondent and the appellants assailed the
decision of the appellate bench of the Bombay High Court in this
Court, but this Court also took the view as
per judgment dated Novem-
ber
10, 1955 that there was no legal infirmity in the notice for the
termination
of the lease issued by the Custodian. After the above
judgment of this Court, whatever hope
or
expectation the partners of
SAMCO had of running Ambernath Mills on lease under the agree-E
men! of lease dated August 30, 1952 came to an end and were
extinguished.
In the meantime, as already stated earlier, the possession of
Ambernath Mills was handed over by the partners of
SAMCO to the
Custodian on June 30, 1954. On March 10, 1955 the Central Govern
ment issued notification under section 12
of the Displaced Persons
(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 for acquiring the Mills.
The mills were then advertised for sale. The partners
of
SAM CO having
been thwarted for good in their efforts to get back the mills
on lease now
made an effort
to acquire the ownership of the mills in accordance
with clauses 17
to 21 of the agreement of lease. Snit was accordingly
brought by the respondent and the appellants for permanent injunc
tion restraining the Central Government and the Custodian from selling
· the Ambernath Mills to any person other than the partners of SAMCO.
The suit was dismissed by the City Civil Court and the appeal filed by
the partners
of
SAMCO too was dismissed by a Division Bench of the
Bombay High Court
on January 14, 1957. The Division Bench held
that the agreement of purchase contained in clauses 17 to 21 of the
agreement of lease was indefinite and vague and such agreement
of
sale was not capable of specific performance. It was further held that
in view of notification dated March
10, 1955 the Central Government
acquired the mills frt;e from an encumbrances. The rights of the part
ners of SAMCO which were m the nature of an encumbrance were
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held to be no longer enforceable. No appeal was filed against t~e
above decision of the Bombay High Court. As such, the aforesaid
judgment becaine final. Any expectation which the partners of SAMCO
could have of acquiring the ownership of Ambernath Mills under
clauses
17 to 21 of the agreement of lease was also thus dashed to the
ground.
View was expressed by the learned trial
judge that the firm of
SAMCO stood dissolved on May 25, 1954 when the lease was cancel
led. Another date cf dissolution, according to the learned judge, could
be January 14, 1957 when the suit filed by the partners of that firm
against the Custodian and the Central Government for permanent
injunction
was finally dismissed by the High Court. The appellate
bench expressed the
view that the firm of
SAMCO stood dissolved on
November 10, 1955 when the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
regarding the validity of notice.
It is, in our opinion, not necessary to
dilate upon this aspect
of the matter because in any case there can
be
no manner of doubt that the firm of SAMCO got dissolved and was
not subsisting after August 30, 19_?7 which was the date on which the
period of
five years for which the partnership
l.!_ad been formed came
to an end. The question as to whether the firm got dissolved earlier
than August 30, 1957
is purely academic and is not of much
signi
ficance, because in any event in the absence of a contract to the
contrary there could be no survival of the firm after August 30, 1957
when the period of partnership expired. Calculating the period of
limitation even from that date, the suit for rendition of accounts brought
by the appellants on December 20, 1960 was barred by limitation. It
is not disputed that the period of limitation for such a suit is three
years from the date of dissolution.
Mr. Desai has referred to letter dated November 17, 1955 addres
sed by the respondent on behalf of SAMCO to the National Bank of
India Bombay requesting for the despatch of thrne bales of wool tops
to Ludhiana. In this letter an assurance
was held to the Bank of cordial
relations for the future expected business. Reference has also been
made by
Mr. Desai to the statement of the respondent in
cross-exaini
~ation that. up to ~e end of ~cember 1956 the firm was actively
interested m acqmrmg the mills. The above letter and statement in
our opinion, would not militate against the inference that the firm st~od
subsequently dissolved on August 30, 1957. As already mentioned
above, no agreement to keep the firm in existence after the expiry of
the fixed period of partnership has been proved on the record.
Reference has also bem made on behalf of the appellants to the
consent given by the respondent on behalf of SAMCO on November
13, 1957 to the awai:d of ~· 18,00,000 by Mr. Morarji Desai in
favour of the Custodian agamst SAMCO. It is urged that this docu
ment would go to show that the firm of SAMCO had not been . dis
s.olv~d before that date. We are unable to agree. The arbitration pro
ceedmgs h~d b~en started .as a result of application under section 20
of.the Arb1trat10n Act filed. on April 21, 1955 when SAMCO was in
existence and was a running concern. The arbitration proceedings
rel.ated to a claim of the Custodian of Rs. 30,00,000 on account of the
pnce of stocks of raw material, stores and other movables
as well as
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1975] I s.c.R.
about the arrears of rent. Counter-claim had also been made by SAMCO
against the Custodian for a sum of Rs. 17 ,67 ,080 as per written state
ment dated December 18, 1956 filed in arbitration proceedings. The
consent which
was given by the respondent on November 13, 1957
was with a
view to get the dispute between
SAMCO with the Cu'todian
finally settled. This was a necessary step for the purpose of winding up
the affairs of SAMCO and to comylete transaction of arbitration pro
ceedings which had been begun but ~mained unfinished at the time
of dissolution. According to section 4 7 of the Indian Partnership Act,
after the dissolution of a firm the authority of each partner to bind
the firm, and the other mn!t1al rights and obligations of the partners,
continue notwithstanding the dissolution, so far as may be necessary
to wind np the affairs of the
firm and to complete transactions begun
but unfinished at the time of the dissolution, but not otherwise. The
word
"transaction" in section 4 7 refers not merely to commercial trans
action of purchase and sale but would include also all other matters
relating to the affairs of the partnership. The completion of a transac
tion would cover also the taking of necessary steps in connection with
the adjudication of a dispute to which a
firm before its dissolution is
a party. The legal position in this respect has been stated on page 251
of Lindley on Partnership (Thirteenth Edition) as under :
"Notwithstanding a dissolution each partner can pay,
or receive payment of, a partnership debt; for it is clearly
settled that payment by one of several joint debtors, or to
one of several joint creditors, extinguishes the debt irrespec
tive of any question of partnership. So, again, it has been
held that a continuing or snrviying partner may issue a bank
ruptcy notice in the firm name in respect of a judgment
obtained before the dissolution, and that notice to him of the
dishonour of a _bill of exchange is sufficient, and that he can
withdraw a deposit or sell the partnership assets, or pledge
them for the purpose of completing a transaction already
commenced, or of secnrin!'! a debt already incurred, or the
over-draft on the partnership current account at the bank."
The proposition, in our opinion, cannot be disputed that after dissolu
tion, the partnership subsists merely for the purpose of completing
pending transactions, winding
up the business, and adjusting the rights
of the partners; and for these purposes, and those only, the authority.
rights, and obligations of the partners continue
(see page 573 of
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28). We
would, there-G
fore, hold that the consent given by the respondent on November
13,
1957
to the award of Mr. Desai
would not detract from the. conclusion
that the
firm of the parties stood dissolved on the expiry of the fixed
period of partnership,
viz., August 30, 1957.
The proposition of law referred to by Mr. Desai that a dissolution
does not necessarily follow because a partnership has ceased to do H
business would not be of any material help to the appellants because
we are not basing our conclusion of the dissolution of the firm of the
parties upon the fact that the partnership had ceased to do business.
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Oa tpe contrary, we have arrived at the above conclusion in accor
dance with the principle of law that a firm constituted for a fixed term
shall stand dissolved, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, on
too expiry of that term. likewise, the appellants can derive no help
from the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sathappa Chetty &
Ors. v. S. N. Subrahnianyan Chetty & Ors.(') The said case did not
relate to a firm constituted for a fixed term and no question arose in
that case of a firm dissolving on the expiry of the fixed term of part
nership.
Our attention has also been invited to the correspondence between
tbc first appellant and the respondent during the period from June to
September, 1957. These letters reveal that the first appellant enter
tained hopes and expectation of deriving some benefit in case the
respondent succeeded in acquiring the Ambemath Mills. The exact
nature of the benefit
was not, however, specified in the letters. The
respondent in his replies while not belying those hopes and
expecta
tions took care not to make any commitment. After, however, the
respondent succeeded in acquiring the mills, there developed a cool
ness in his attitude towards the first appellant. This circumstance must
necessarily have caused disappointni'ent and disillusionment to the first
appellant. The respondent, it s~s, kept some kind of carrot dangling
before the first appellant during the delicate stage of his negotiations
with the Government for the acquisition of the
mills lest the first
appellant did something to sabotage those efforts. After acquisition of
the
mills by the respondent, his attitude changed and he gave a
cold
rebl!ff to the first appellant. The above conduct of the respondent may
have a bearing on the question of the award of costs, but it cannot affect
our decision on the point
as to whether the suit is within limitation er
not.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances without
costs.
P.B.R.
Appeal dismissed .
(Ii AIR 1927 P.C. 70.
6-177SupCl/75
The Supreme Court of India's judgment in Saligram Ruplal Khanna & Anr v. Kanwar Rajnath stands as a landmark ruling on the principles governing the Dissolution of a Partnership Firm and the statutory Limitation for Rendition of Accounts. This pivotal case, extensively documented on CaseOn, clarifies the automatic dissolution of a partnership constituted for a fixed term under the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, and establishes the strict timeline within which partners can seek legal recourse for account settlement.
The dispute arose from a partnership formed to manage the Ambernath Mills. Let's trace the key events that led to the legal battle.
The appellants and the respondent entered into a partnership, known as SAMCO, to take over the lease of Ambernath Mills from the Custodian of Evacuee Property. The partnership agreement, dated August 30, 1952, explicitly stated that the partnership period was for five years, coinciding with the duration of the mill's lease. However, the venture soon ran into financial trouble, leading to a failure to pay rent installments to the Custodian.
On February 12, 1954, the Custodian issued a show-cause notice to terminate the lease due to default. Although a new partnership agreement was signed on February 24, 1954, to adjust partner shares, the partnership's term remained linked to the lease. The partners' legal challenges against the notice failed, and the Custodian officially cancelled the lease on May 25, 1954. The partnership relinquished possession of the mills on June 30, 1954. Subsequent appeals and suits to either restore the lease or enforce a purchase agreement for the mills were dismissed, with the final attempt to acquire the mills being rejected by the Bombay High Court on January 14, 1957.
Despite these collective failures, the respondent, Kanwar Rajnath, successfully negotiated to acquire the Ambernath Mills in his personal capacity, finalizing the agreement in 1957 and taking possession in 1960. Believing the partnership was still active for the purpose of this acquisition, the appellants filed a suit on December 20, 1960. They alleged an oral agreement to continue the partnership beyond the lease termination to acquire the mills and sought a rendition of accounts.
The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the case, focusing on the core legal questions surrounding the partnership's existence and the timeliness of the suit.
The primary legal issues before the Supreme Court were:
The Court's decision hinged on two crucial sections of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932:
The limitation period for filing a suit for rendition of accounts of a dissolved partnership is three years from the date of dissolution.
Understanding the nuances of Section 42 and 47 is crucial for any corporate law practitioner. For those needing a quick refresher, the 2-minute audio briefs on CaseOn.in offer a concise analysis of rulings like this, perfect for busy professionals seeking to grasp complex legal precedents on the go.
The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court, providing a clear and methodical analysis.
The Supreme Court concluded that the partnership stood dissolved on August 30, 1957, by the expiry of its fixed term. The subsequent suit for rendition of accounts was filed beyond the three-year limitation period and was correctly dismissed by the lower courts. The appeal was dismissed.
In Saligram Ruplal Khanna & Anr v. Kanwar Rajnath, the Supreme Court affirmed that a partnership formed for a fixed duration dissolves automatically upon the expiry of that term as per Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, unless a specific agreement to continue exists. The Court clarified that post-dissolution activities related to winding up the firm’s affairs under Section 47 do not postpone the date of dissolution or extend the three-year limitation period for filing a suit for rendition of accounts.
The information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on any specific legal problem, you should consult with a qualified attorney.
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