SANATAN GAUDA

v.

BERHAMPUR UNIVERSITY AND ORS.

APRIL 2, 1990

[L.M. SHARMA AND P.B. SAWANT, JJ.]

Berhampur University Regulations-Regulation l. Chpater VIII

··and Regulation JO Chapter V-Jnterpretation of-Bache/or of Laws

Examination (Three Year Course)-Admi"ion to-Condition regard­

ing qualifying marks not applicable to post graduate students seeking

admission to

Law course.

After passing his M.A. examination securing more than

40 per

cent marks (364 out

of

900), the appellant secured admission in 1983 to

three-years law course in Ganjam Law College. Along with his form ·

seeking admission he had submitted the mark-sheet with his M.A. de­

gree certificate. He completed his first year course 'Pre-Law course' in

1984

and was promoted to the

"Intermediate Law course". In !985, he

appeared for the 'pre-law' and 'inter-law' examinations. He gave the

said examination and in the same year was admitted to the Final Law

course. However his results for the Pre-Law and Intermediate Law

course were not declared

by the University on the ground that in view of

the Regulations of the University, he was not qualified to be admitted to

the law course. His admission being improper, he was not eligible to sit

at the examinations aforesaid. The appellant made representations to

the Bar Council of India and the Administrator of the University but to

no avail. When his representations and even the communication from

the Chairman of the Board of Studies to the University did not yield the

desired result, the appellant approached the

Orissa High Court by

means of writ petition on 11.5.87 challenging the non-declaration of his

results and the University's refusal to permit the

appella_nt to appear in

the final examination. The writ petition having been dismissed by the

High Court, he bas filed this appeal by special leave. The question that

falls for determination by this Court

is whether the appellant was

eligi­

ble to be admitted to Law Course.

Allowing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: (Per Sawant, J.)

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

The requirement of 40 per cent marks in the aggregate, is meant H

273

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R

A only for graduates such as of Bachelor of Arts. etc. That requirement

does not apply to those candidates

who pass any higher degree

examina­

tion after graduation. For admission to the Law Course there is no

requirement of any particular marks for post-graduate students like the

appellant, and the appellant

is entitled to be admitted under Reg. 1 in

B

Chapter

VIIJ of the said Regulations. The appellant satisfies the other

qualification as well, viz.,

he has passed the M.A. examination with 36 ..

per cent marks in the aggregate deducting 13 marks in one of the papers and

is therefore, duly qualified to be admitted to the Law course. [277G; 278F-G]

Resolution No. 123/1984 of the Bar Council of India does not

speak of the requirement of marks for examination at post-graduate

C level. [279G]

D

The distinction between graduates and post-graduates made in

the matter of the qualifying marks is as it ought to be, since graduates

and post-graduates cannot be treated equally.

The appellant while securing his admission

in the Law College had

admittedly submitted his marks-sheet along with the application for

admission. The Law College had admitted him.

He had pursued his

studies for two years. The

University had also granted him the admis­

sion card for the Pre,law and Intermediate Law examinations. He was

E permitted to appear in 'the said examinations. He was also admitted to

the Final year of the course.

It is only at the stage of the declaration of

his results of the Pre-law and Inter-law examinations that the

Univer­

sity raised the objection to his so-called ineligibility to be admitted to

the Law course. The University is therefore clearly estopped from refus­

ing to declare the results of the appellant's examination or from pre­

venting him from pursuing his final year course. l280C-E]

F

(Per Sharma,!.)

From the letters of the University it is clear that it was not depend­

ing upon the opinion of the Principal and had decided to verify the

situation for itself. In that situation it cannot punish the student for the

G negligence of the Principal

or the

University authorities. It is important

to appreciate that the appellant cannot

be accused of making any false

statement

or suppressing any relevant fact before anybody. He had

produced his marks-sheet before the College authority with his appli­

cation for admission, and cannot be accused of any fraud or mis-

H representation. [28ID-F]

r-·

.,.._. -

>

S. GAUDA v. BERHAMPUR UNIVERSITY ISAWANT, J.] 275

Assuming the constructiou of the rule as contended hy the Uni·

versity is correct, the Principal cannot be condemned for recommend·

ing the candidature of the appellant for the examination in question. It

was the bonnden· duty of the University to have s~rutinised the matter

thoroughly before permitting the appellant

to appear at the examination

and not having done so, it cannot refuse to publish his results. [281F-G]

It is impressed upon the

University authorities to frame the rules

in such clear terms that it may not require great skill for understanding

them. In order to achieve clarity, it does not matter. if the rule, instead

of being concise, is elaborate and lengthy. U81H; 282Al

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 891 of

1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.7.1987 of the Orissa

High Court in O.J.C. No. 1621of1987.

Govind Das and J.R. Das for the Appellant.

P.N. Misra, A.K. Jha and P.K. Jena for the Respondents.

The following Judgments of the Court were delivered

SAW ANT, J. This is an appeal by special leave against the order

dated 30th July, 1987 of the High Court of Orissa.

2. The appellant passed his M.A. examination in July 1981

securing in the aggregate 364 marks out of 900 marks, i.e., more than

40 per cent of the total marks. In 1983, he secured admission in

Gan jam Law College for three-year Law Course. There is no dispute

that at the time he took admission, he had submitted his marks-sheet

along with his M.A. degree certificate. The appellant completed his

first year course known as the "Pre-Law Course" and in 1984 was

promoted to the second year course known as the "Intermediate Law

Course". In 1985, he appeared for the Pre-Law and Inter-Law exami­

nations held by the Berhampur University to which the Ganjam Law

College is affiliated. He gave the said examination and in the same

year he was admitted to the Final Law course

in the same College.

3.

It appears that although he was admitted to the Final Law

classes, his results for the Pre-Law and Inter-Law examinations were

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

not declared. The appellant made representations to the Bar Council H

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

of India and the Administrator of the Berhampur University, on

February

12, 1986.

On October 30, 1986, the University replied that

since the appellant had secured less than

39 .5 per cent marks in his

M.A. degree examination, he was not eligible for admission to the

Law Course.

On November 11, 1986, the appellant made a representa­

tion pointing out that he had secured more than 40 per cent marks in

the said examination and, therefore, he was entitled to be admitted to

the Law course. On November 14, 1986, the Chairman of the Board of

Studies also wrote to the Deputy Registrar of the University pointing

out that the Board of Studies in its meeting held on October 29, 1986

had recommended that those students who had passed their M.A.

examination and had secured more than 40 per cent of the total marks

should

be considered eligible for admission to the Law course even

though they had secured

Jess than

20 per cent marks in any one of the

papers in the said examinations.

4.

In spite of this, the

University did not take any step to

announce the appellant's results. Hence, the appellant approached the

Orissa High Court by a writ petition on May 11, 1987 challenging the

non-declaration of his results and the University's refusal to permit the

appellant to appear

in the Final Law examination. The writ petition

was dismissed

by the High Court by the impugned order of July

30,

1987. Against the said decision the present appeal was filed. By an

interim order of March

15, 1988, the appellant was permitted to con­

tinue his Final

Law course and to appear in the examination of the said

course.

It was also directed that the results of the examinations in

which the appellant had appeared should be declared in due course.

5.

On these facts, the question that falls for consideration is

whether the appellant was eligible to be admitted to the Law course.

The Unviersity has objected to the appellant's admission on the

ground that the University Regulation 1 in Chapter VIII relating to the

Bachelor of Laws Examination (Three-Year Course) read with Regu­

lation 10 in Chapter V of the University Regulations relating to the

Master's Degree Examination requires that if the student has secured

less than

25 per cent marks in any of the papers for M.A. examination,

he should have on the aggregate more than 39 .5 per cent marks in the

said examination. Admittedly, the appellant has obtained

in the aggre­

gate

364 marks out of

900 marks, i.e., more than 40 per cent marks,

but in one paper in Group-II, he has secured only 13 marks out of 100

which were less than 25 per cent. It is, therefore, the University's

contention that

in view of the said Regulations, he was not qualified to

be admitted to the Law course and since he was admitted wrongly, he

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J·

>·

S. GAUDA v. BERHAMPUR UNIVERSITY [SAWANT, J.] 277

was not entitled to appear for the examination and, therefore, for the A

' declaration of his results in the said examination.

6. Regulation 1 of Chapter VIII which lays down qualification

for admission to the Law course is as follows:

"1. Any registered candidate may be admitted to the

degree of Bachelor of Laws, if (a) he passes the examina­

tion for the d~gree of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of

Science, Bachelor of Commerce, Bachelor of Oriental

Learning, Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery,

Bachelor of Science (Engineering), Bachelor of Science

(Agriculture), Bachelor of Veterinary Science and Animal

Husbandary, B. Pharma or any other examination re­

cognised by the Bar Council of India and the Academic

Council as equivalent thereto securing 40% or more than

39 .5% of marks in the aggregate of such examination or

any other higher degree examination passed after

graduation.

Provided that relaxation to the extent of 5% of marks

in the qualifying examination be allowed to the Scheduled

Caste and Scheduled Tribe candidates.

Provided further that in case of physically or the

paedically handicaped candidates, relaxation upto 5% of

marks

in the qualifying examination may be given on pro­

duction

of a certificate of.disability from any Government

Medical Officer to the satisfaction of the authority con-

cerned ......

"

The first paragraph of Regulation 1 on which reliance is placed

by the University shows that the requirement of 40 per cent or more

than 39.5 per cent marks in the aggregate, is meant only for graduates

such as

of Bachelors of Arts etc. That requirement does not apply to

those candidates who pass any higher degree examination after gra­

duation. Therefore, on a plain reading of the said paragraph, a post­

graduate student like the appellant who has passed his M.A. examina­

tion is not required to satisfy further that

in

t!Je said post-graduate

examination he has secured 40 per cent or more than 39.5 per cent

marks in the aggregate.

It is enough if he has passed his post-graduate

examination.

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

D

E

F

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

7. What is further, Regulation 10 in Chapter V of the Regula­

tions which prescribes marks for passing M.A., M.Com. and M.Sc.

examinations states that the minimum marks required for a student to

pass the said examinations

is 36 per cent in the aggregate of all the

theory papers taken together

in case of M.A. and M.Com. examina­

tions, and in the case of

M.Sc. examination, 36 per cent in the aggre­

gate

of all the theory papers taken together and

40 percent in the

aggregate

of all the _practical papers taken together. I am not con­

cerned here with the marks of

M.Sc. examination. The proviso to the

said Regulation 10, further states that no minimum pass marks shall be

required in any paper. But if in any paper a candidate obtains less than

25 per cent of marks, those marks shall not be included in the aggre­

gate. In other words, in the case of the appellant, who has obtaind

364

marks out of

900 on the aggregate, his 13 marks in one of the papers

being less than

25 per cent have to be excluded. His aggregate marks,

therefore, come to

351 out of

900 marks according to this Regulation.

They are admittedly more than

36 per cent as required by the said

Regulation for passing the M.A. examination. I may reproduce the

said Regulation here:

"10. The minimum marks that a candidate shall obtain to

have passed shall be thirty six per cent in the aggregate of

all the theory papers taken together

in the case of M.A./

M.Com. and

in the case of

M.Sc. thirty six per cent in the

aggregate of all the theory papers taken together and forty

per cent in the aggregate of all the practical papers taken

together.

Provided further. that no minimum pass marks shall

be required in any paper but if

in any paper a candidate

obtains less than twenty

five per cent of marks then these

shall not be included in the

aggregate."

8. Even though, therefore, for admission to the Law course

there is no requirement of any particular marks for post-graduate

students like the appellant, and the appellant

is entitled to be admitted

G

under Regulation 1 in Chapter VIII of the said Regulations quoted

earlier, the appellant satisfies the other qualification

as well, viz., he

has passed the M.A. examination with

36 per cent in the aggregate

deducting

13 marks in one of the papers and is, therefore, duly qua­

lified to be admitted to the Law course.

H

9. Mr. Misra appearing for the responddnts, however, conten-

-y

_,

S. GAUDA v. BERHAMPUR UNIVERSITY (SAWANT, J.] 279

ded firstly that the qualifying marks for admission as ver Regulation 1

of Chapter VIII even for post-graduate students was 40 per cent or

more than

39 .5 per cent and since the appellant admittedly did not

secure more than 39.5 per cent marks after deducting from

tbe aggre­

gate

13 marks secured in one of the papers, he was not

elf ;ible for

being admitted to the Law course. I have pointed out hereinal>-t-e that

the plain reading of the said Regulation shows that the q uaiifying

marks laid down there do not apply to the post-graduates. They apply

only to graduates. As far as the post-graduates are concerned, it

is

enough that they have passed their examination. Secondly, he has also

obtained the marks as required by the said Regulation

10 of Chapter

V which

is applicable to the appellant, viz., 39 per cent when the

minimum marks laid down

by the said Regulation is only 36 per cent.

Mr. Misra then relied upon the prospectus of the Gan jam

Law College

which had laid down as follows:

''1.

····················

2 ................... ..

3. Eligibility for admission.

(1) Pre-law class.

(a)

An aggregate of

40 per cent and above, in the B.A.,

B.Sc, B.Com, or any other university Degree of Higher

University examination recognised by Berhampur Uni-

versity ..........

".

and contended that even if a candidate has a higher degree than B.A.,

B.Sc., B.Com., he has to have an aggregate of 40 per cent minimum

marks.

As I read the said prospectus, I find that it is on par with the

qualification for admission given in Unviersity Regulation

lin Chapter

VIII quoted above. The aggregate of 40 per cent and above marks is

required only for graduates and there is no requirement of any

percentage of marks prescribed for the post-graduates. Resolution

No. 123/1984 of the

Bar Council of India passed on October

30, 1984

and which is Annexure 'K' to the respondent-University's counter­

affidavit also shows that for admission to three-year Law course. the

qualification of minimum of 39.5 per cent marks

is meant only for

graduates. That Resolution does not speak of the requirement of

marks for examination at post-graduate level. I

am also of the view

that this distinction between graduates and post-graduates made in the

A

B

c

D

E

F

G

H

A

B

c

280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

matter of the qualifying marks is as it ought to be, since graduates and

post-graduates cannot be treated equally. A post-graduate student has

a minimum of two years more of academic pursuit to his credit than the

graduate before he seeks admission to the Law course. Obviously,

therefore, they cannot be treated equally, and that

is what the

Uni­

versity and the Bar Council of India have rightly done. It is the

interpretation placed

by the University on its own Regulations and the

Resolution of the Bar Council of India which

is at fault and not the

Regulations

or the Resolution.

10. This is apart from the fact that I find that in the present case

the appellant while securing his admission

in the Law College had

admittedly submitted his marks-sheet along with the application for

admission. The Law College had admitted him. He had pursued his

studies for two years. The University had also granted

him the

admis­

sion card for the Pre-Law and Intermediate Law examinations. He was

permitted to appear in the said examinations. He was also admitted to

the Final year of the course.

It is only at the stage of the declaration of

D his results of the Pre-Law and Inter-Law examinations that the

Uni­

~ersity raised the objection to his so-called ineligibility to be admitted

to the Law course. The University is, therefore, clearly estopped from

refusing to declare the results of the appellant's examination or from

preventing him from pursuing his final year course.

E

11. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the University is

not justified in refusing to declare the appellant's results of the

Pre­

Law and ,Intermediate Law examinations. The appeal, therefore,

succeeds. The respondent-University

is directed to declare the said

results as well as the result of the Final examination if the appellant has

appeared for the same. The appeal is allowed accordingly. In the

F circumstances of the case, there

will be no order as to costs.

G

SHARMA,J.:

12. I agree that the appeal should be allowed as indicated by my

learned Brother.

13. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the

respondent University having issued the admit card and permitted the

appellant to appear at parts I and II of Law.Examination, should not

have later refused to publish his result.

If there was any irregularity in

~

the admission of the appellant for the Law course, the University

H authorities ought to have scrutinised the position before permitting

-

S. GAUDA v. BERHAMPUR UNIVERSITY [SHARMA, J.J 281

him to take the examination. It was pointed out that in identical

circumstances the same High Court had earlier

in the same year

allowed the case of another candidate in O.J.C. No.

2619 of 1986 by a

judgment, which also

was by a Division Bench.

14. Mr. P .N. Misra, the learned counsel for the respondent,

contended that the

University had informed the Colleges about the

necessary condition for admission to the Law course which, it appears,

was not respected by the College. When the applications

by the candi­

dates for sitting at the examination were forwarded by the College, the

University asked the Principal to send the marks of the candidates for

the purpose of verification, but the Principal did not comply. The

letters Annexures

'F' and 'G' to the counter affidavit have been relied

upon for the purpose. The learned counsel pointed out that instead,

the Principal sent a letter Annexure

'I' stating that the marks-list

would

be sent in a few days for

"your kind reference and verification"

which was never sent. The Principal wrongly assured the University

authorities that he had verified the position and that all the candidates

were eligible.

In these circumstances, the argument is, that the appel­

lant cannot take advantage of the fact that the

University allowed him

to appear at the examination. I am afraid, the stand of the respondent

cannot be accepted as correct. From the letters of the University it is

clear that it was not. depending upon the opinion of the Principal and

had decided to verify the situation for itself. In that situation it cannot

punish the student for the negligence of the Principal or the University

-

~

authorities. It is important to appreciate that the appellant cannot be

accused

of making any false statement or suppressing any relevant fact

before anybody. He had produced his marks-sheet before the College

authority with his application for admission, and cannot be accused of

any fraud or misrepresentation. The interpretation of the rule on the

basis of which the

University asserts that the appellant was not eligible

for admission

is challenged by the appellant and is not accepted by the , ~ _ College and my learned Brother accepts the construction suggested by

· him as correct. In such a situation even assuming the construction of

the rule as attempted by the University as correct, the Principal cannot

be condemned for recommending the candidature of the appellant for

the examination in question. It was the bounden duty of the University

to have scrutinised the matter throughly before permitting the appel­

lant to appear at the examination and not having done

so it cannot

refuse to publish his results.

15. Before parting I would like to impress upon the

University

A

B

c

D

E

f

G

authorities to frame the rules in such clear terms that it may not H

A

B

282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1990] 2 S.C.R.

require great skill for understanding them.

It is a serious matter if a

student who acts upon one interpretation of a rule and spends a consi­

derable period of his youth,

is later threatened by a possible alterna­

tive construction, which may cost him several years of his life.

In order

to achieve clarity, it does not matter,

if the rule, instead of being

concise, is elaborate and lengthy.

Y. Lal Appeal allowed.

'