As per case facts, Petitioners were promoted as Assistant Engineers based on a 2006 notification that required "5 years service as JE/Civil." They received further promotions. In 2021, the Respondent-Nigam ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
CWP
IN THE
1. Raj Kumar
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited
2. Ajay
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited
3. Virender Kumar
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited
4. Daljeet Kumar
The State of Haryana
1
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Pronounced on:
Raj Kumar and another
VERSUS
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited and
VERSUS
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited and
Virender Kumar
VERSUS
Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited and
Daljeet Kumar
VERSUS
The State of Haryana and others
2022 and others connected matters
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Reserved on:-09.10.2025
Pronounced on: October 15, 2025
CWP-2832-2022
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
and another
.....Respondents
CWP-31655-2024
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
and others
.....Respondents
CWP-4942-2023
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
and others
.....Respondents
CWP-4154-2022
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
.....Respondents
, 2025
2022
.....Petitioners
.....Respondents
2024
.....Petitioner
.....Respondents
2023
.....Petitioners
.....Respondents
2022
.....Petitioner
.....Respondents
CWP
5. Sanjeev Kumar
State of Haryana
CORAM:
Present :
2
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
Sanjeev Kumar
VERSUS
State of Haryana and others
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Mr. R.K. Malik, Sr. Advocate with Mr.Varunveer Chauhan,
Advocate for the petitioner in CWP
Mr. Sanjiv Gupta, Advocate for petitioner in
Mr. Sajjan Singh, Advocate for the petitioner(s) in CWP
2022.
Mr. Sardavinder Goyal with Mr.Nishant Sindhu, Advocate for
the petitioner in CWP-4942-2023.
Mr. Bhim Kumar Bagri, Advocate for petitioner in CWP
31655-2024.
Mr. Prince Singh, Advocate for respondents No.1 and 2 in
CWP-31655-2024.
Mr. R.S. Longia, Advocate for the respondents No.2 and 3 in
CWP-4154-2022.
Mr. Gaurav Jindal, Advocate for respondent No.4 in CWP
4154-2022.
Mr. Hitesh Pandit, Advocate for respondent
2832-2022,CWP-4942-2023 and CWP
****
2022 and others connected matters
CWP-7253-2023
.....Petitioner
VERSUS
.....Respondents
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Mr. R.K. Malik, Sr. Advocate with Mr.Varunveer Chauhan,
Advocate for the petitioner in CWP-2832-2022.
Mr. Sanjiv Gupta, Advocate for petitioner in CWP-7253-2023.
Mr. Sajjan Singh, Advocate for the petitioner(s) in CWP-4154-
Mr. Sardavinder Goyal with Mr.Nishant Sindhu, Advocate for
2023.
Mr. Bhim Kumar Bagri, Advocate for petitioner in CWP-
ingh, Advocate for respondents No.1 and 2 in
Mr. R.S. Longia, Advocate for the respondents No.2 and 3 in
Mr. Gaurav Jindal, Advocate for respondent No.4 in CWP-
Mr. Hitesh Pandit, Advocate for respondent-HVPNL in CWP-
2023 and CWP-7253-2023.
****
2023
.....Petitioner
.....Respondents
2023.
-
Mr. Sardavinder Goyal with Mr.Nishant Sindhu, Advocate for
CWP
HARPREET SINGH BRAR
1.
writ petitions as they arise from a similar factual matrix. However, for the
sake of brevity, the facts are taken from
2.
of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ
Certiorari to quash the Final Ranking List dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure P
11) of JE/Civil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota and to
further restrain the Respondents from reverting the Petitioners from their
present promoted posts.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
3.
Prasaran Nigam Limited (hereinafter, ‘HVPNL’). Petitioner No. 1 joined as
a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 25.07.2008, and Petitioner No. 2 joined on
23.07.2008. The Petitioners subsequently acqui
Engineering on 20.03.2013 and 21.09.2015, respectively.
4.
Regulation 9 of the PSEB Service of Engineers (Civil) Recruitment
Regulations, 1965 (as applicable
Regulations’). Vide a notification dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P
Respondent
regulation for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) under the
18% quota for
3
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
HARPREET SINGH BRAR , J. (Oral)
This common order shall dispose of the aforementioned civil
petitions as they arise from a similar factual matrix. However, for the
sake of brevity, the facts are taken from CWP
The present civil writ petition has been filed under Article 226
of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ
to quash the Final Ranking List dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure P
11) of JE/Civil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota and to
further restrain the Respondents from reverting the Petitioners from their
present promoted posts.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Briefly stated, the Petitioners are employees of Haryana Vidyut
Prasaran Nigam Limited (hereinafter, ‘HVPNL’). Petitioner No. 1 joined as
a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 25.07.2008, and Petitioner No. 2 joined on
23.07.2008. The Petitioners subsequently acqui
Engineering on 20.03.2013 and 21.09.2015, respectively.
The genesis of the present dispute lies in the interpretation of
Regulation 9 of the PSEB Service of Engineers (Civil) Recruitment
Regulations, 1965 (as applicable to HVPNL) (hereinafter ‘1965
Regulations’). Vide a notification dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P
Respondent-Nigam amended Regulation 9. The relevant part of the
regulation for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) under the
18% quota for degree-holders is reproduced as under:
2022 and others connected matters
This common order shall dispose of the aforementioned civil
petitions as they arise from a similar factual matrix. However, for the
CWP-2832-2022.
The present civil writ petition has been filed under Article 226
of the Constitution of India for the issuance of a writ in the nature of
to quash the Final Ranking List dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure P
11) of JE/Civil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota and to
further restrain the Respondents from reverting the Petitioners from their
Briefly stated, the Petitioners are employees of Haryana Vidyut
Prasaran Nigam Limited (hereinafter, ‘HVPNL’). Petitioner No. 1 joined as
a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 25.07.2008, and Petitioner No. 2 joined on
23.07.2008. The Petitioners subsequently acquired their BE degrees in Civil
Engineering on 20.03.2013 and 21.09.2015, respectively.
The genesis of the present dispute lies in the interpretation of
Regulation 9 of the PSEB Service of Engineers (Civil) Recruitment
to HVPNL) (hereinafter ‘1965
Regulations’). Vide a notification dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P-1), the
Nigam amended Regulation 9. The relevant part of the
regulation for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) under the
holders is reproduced as under:
This common order shall dispose of the aforementioned civil
petitions as they arise from a similar factual matrix. However, for the
The present civil writ petition has been filed under Article 226
in the nature of
to quash the Final Ranking List dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure P-
11) of JE/Civil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota and to
further restrain the Respondents from reverting the Petitioners from their
Briefly stated, the Petitioners are employees of Haryana Vidyut
Prasaran Nigam Limited (hereinafter, ‘HVPNL’). Petitioner No. 1 joined as
a Junior Engineer (Civil) on 25.07.2008, and Petitioner No. 2 joined on
red their BE degrees in Civil
The genesis of the present dispute lies in the interpretation of
Regulation 9 of the PSEB Service of Engineers (Civil) Recruitment
to HVPNL) (hereinafter ‘1965
1), the
Nigam amended Regulation 9. The relevant part of the
regulation for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) under the
CWP
“(ii) From amongst Engineering Subordinates as defined in
Regulation
service
5.
as a JE whether before or after acquiring the qualification of AMIE/BE, the
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) on 05.12.2013
(Annexure P
(Civil) on 23.01.2
further promotions based on their service in the cadre of Assistant Engineer.
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil) on
11.05.2016 (Annexure P
on 10.07.2018 (Annexure P
Executive Engineer (Civil) on 01.03.2019 (Annexure P
6.
order dated 30.06.2021 (Annexure P
notification (Annexure P
asserted that the intent of the rule
years service
JE/Civil.” Consequently, a “correction” was issued vide office order dated
13.05.2021, replacing the words “as JE/Civil” with “as such” and making
this change e
7.
Ranking List (Annexure P
representations (Annexures P
4
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
(ii) From amongst Engineering Subordinates as defined in
Regulation -2(g) possessing AMIE/BE qualification with 5 years
service as JE/Civil.” (Emphasis supplied)
Relying on this notification, which required 5
as a JE whether before or after acquiring the qualification of AMIE/BE, the
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) on 05.12.2013
(Annexure P-2) and Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Assistant Engineer
(Civil) on 23.01.2017 (Annexure P-3). Thereafter, both Petitioners received
further promotions based on their service in the cadre of Assistant Engineer.
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil) on
11.05.2016 (Annexure P-4) and subsequently as E
on 10.07.2018 (Annexure P-6). Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Assistant
Executive Engineer (Civil) on 01.03.2019 (Annexure P
In 2021, the Respondent-Nigam took a decision, vide office
order dated 30.06.2021 (Annexure P-7), stating that the original 2006
notification (Annexure P-1) contained an “inadvertent mistake.” It was
asserted that the intent of the rule-making authority wa
years service as such” (i.e., after acquiring the BE degree) and not “as
JE/Civil.” Consequently, a “correction” was issued vide office order dated
13.05.2021, replacing the words “as JE/Civil” with “as such” and making
this change effective retrospectively from 14.11.2006.
Based on this retrospectively applied “correction,” a Tentative
Ranking List (Annexure P-8) was issued. The Petitioners filed detailed
representations (Annexures P-9 & P-10) objecting to this list, contending
2022 and others connected matters
(ii) From amongst Engineering Subordinates as defined in
2(g) possessing AMIE/BE qualification with 5 years
(Emphasis supplied)
Relying on this notification, which required 5 years of service
as a JE whether before or after acquiring the qualification of AMIE/BE, the
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) on 05.12.2013
2) and Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Assistant Engineer
3). Thereafter, both Petitioners received
further promotions based on their service in the cadre of Assistant Engineer.
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil) on
4) and subsequently as Executive Engineer (Civil)
6). Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Assistant
Executive Engineer (Civil) on 01.03.2019 (Annexure P-5).
Nigam took a decision, vide office
7), stating that the original 2006
1) contained an “inadvertent mistake.” It was
making authority was always to require “5
” (i.e., after acquiring the BE degree) and not “as
JE/Civil.” Consequently, a “correction” was issued vide office order dated
13.05.2021, replacing the words “as JE/Civil” with “as such” and making
ffective retrospectively from 14.11.2006.
Based on this retrospectively applied “correction,” a Tentative
8) was issued. The Petitioners filed detailed
10) objecting to this list, contending
(ii) From amongst Engineering Subordinates as defined in
2(g) possessing AMIE/BE qualification with 5 years
years of service
as a JE whether before or after acquiring the qualification of AMIE/BE, the
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) on 05.12.2013
2) and Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Assistant Engineer
3). Thereafter, both Petitioners received
further promotions based on their service in the cadre of Assistant Engineer.
Petitioner No. 1 was promoted as Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil) on
xecutive Engineer (Civil)
6). Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Assistant
Nigam took a decision, vide office
7), stating that the original 2006
1) contained an “inadvertent mistake.” It was
s always to require “5
” (i.e., after acquiring the BE degree) and not “as
JE/Civil.” Consequently, a “correction” was issued vide office order dated
13.05.2021, replacing the words “as JE/Civil” with “as such” and making
Based on this retrospectively applied “correction,” a Tentative
8) was issued. The Petitioners filed detailed
10) objecting to this list, contending
CWP
that their accrued rights and past promotions could not be unsettled.
However, the Respondents issued the impugned Final Ranking List on
14.01.2022 (Annexure P
junior position, making them liable for r
held promotional posts. Aggrieved by this retrospective alteration of their
seniority, the Petitioners have approached this Court.
CONTENTIONS
8.
the Petitioners were promoted as Assistant Engineers strictly in accordance
with the unambiguous language of the notification dated 14.11.2006
(Annexure P
Their further promotions to the posts of Assista
Executive Engineer were based on this valid initial promotion and their
subsequent service, and do not suffer from any infirmity.
9.
cannot be applied with retrospec
having received multiple promotions over several years have acquired an
accrued right to those posts. Such vested rights cannot be taken away by a
subsequent amendment or “correction” applied retrospectively. A
new interpretation could only apply prospectively from the date of the
decision. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence, as
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments, that accrued
rights cannot be exting
5
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
that their accrued rights and past promotions could not be unsettled.
However, the Respondents issued the impugned Final Ranking List on
14.01.2022 (Annexure P-11). This list effectively places the Petitioners at a
junior position, making them liable for reversion from their current, long
held promotional posts. Aggrieved by this retrospective alteration of their
seniority, the Petitioners have approached this Court.
CONTENTIONS
Learned counsel for the petitioner(s)
oners were promoted as Assistant Engineers strictly in accordance
with the unambiguous language of the notification dated 14.11.2006
(Annexure P-1), which explicitly prescribed “5 years service as JE/Civil.”
Their further promotions to the posts of Assista
Executive Engineer were based on this valid initial promotion and their
subsequent service, and do not suffer from any infirmity.
It is argued that the decision dated 30.06.2021 (Annexure P
cannot be applied with retrospective effect from 14.11.2006. The Petitioners,
having received multiple promotions over several years have acquired an
accrued right to those posts. Such vested rights cannot be taken away by a
subsequent amendment or “correction” applied retrospectively. A
new interpretation could only apply prospectively from the date of the
decision. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence, as
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments, that accrued
rights cannot be extinguished by a retrospective amendment. In this context,
2022 and others connected matters
that their accrued rights and past promotions could not be unsettled.
However, the Respondents issued the impugned Final Ranking List on
11). This list effectively places the Petitioners at a
eversion from their current, long
held promotional posts. Aggrieved by this retrospective alteration of their
seniority, the Petitioners have approached this Court.
Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) inter alia contended that
oners were promoted as Assistant Engineers strictly in accordance
with the unambiguous language of the notification dated 14.11.2006
1), which explicitly prescribed “5 years service as JE/Civil.”
Their further promotions to the posts of Assistant Executive Engineer and
Executive Engineer were based on this valid initial promotion and their
subsequent service, and do not suffer from any infirmity.
It is argued that the decision dated 30.06.2021 (Annexure P-7)
tive effect from 14.11.2006. The Petitioners,
having received multiple promotions over several years have acquired an
accrued right to those posts. Such vested rights cannot be taken away by a
subsequent amendment or “correction” applied retrospectively. At best, the
new interpretation could only apply prospectively from the date of the
decision. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence, as
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments, that accrued
uished by a retrospective amendment. In this context,
that their accrued rights and past promotions could not be unsettled.
However, the Respondents issued the impugned Final Ranking List on
11). This list effectively places the Petitioners at a
eversion from their current, long-
held promotional posts. Aggrieved by this retrospective alteration of their
contended that
oners were promoted as Assistant Engineers strictly in accordance
with the unambiguous language of the notification dated 14.11.2006
1), which explicitly prescribed “5 years service as JE/Civil.”
nt Executive Engineer and
Executive Engineer were based on this valid initial promotion and their
7)
tive effect from 14.11.2006. The Petitioners,
having received multiple promotions over several years have acquired an
accrued right to those posts. Such vested rights cannot be taken away by a
t best, the
new interpretation could only apply prospectively from the date of the
decision. Furthermore, it is a settled principle of service jurisprudence, as
upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in numerous judgments, that accrued
uished by a retrospective amendment. In this context,
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reliance was placed on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
of Madhya Pradesh v. Yogendra Shrivastava 2010(1) SCT 434
10.
submitted that the original office order dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P
contained an “inadvertent mistake.” The proposal approved by the Board of
Directors on 27.10.2006 intended to use the phrase “5 years service as
such.” The use of “as JE/Civil” in the p
error. The office order dated 13.05.2021 was, therefore, a correction of this
typographical mistake.
11.
always relates back to the date of its incepti
intended to read “as such” in 2006, the 2021 correction rightly applies
retrospectively from 14.11.2006. This is not a fresh amendment but a
rectification of an error to reflect the true intent of the framers. Learned
counsel placed reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
S.S. Garewal Vs. State of Punjab 1993 (3) SCT 503
OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS
12.
perused the record with their able assistance. This Court is of the opinion
that the issue involved in the present is no longer
settled by the judgements of the Hon’ble Apex C
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
(1993) Supp. (2) SCC 419
6
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
reliance was placed on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
of Madhya Pradesh v. Yogendra Shrivastava 2010(1) SCT 434
Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents
bmitted that the original office order dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P
contained an “inadvertent mistake.” The proposal approved by the Board of
Directors on 27.10.2006 intended to use the phrase “5 years service as
such.” The use of “as JE/Civil” in the published notification was a clerical
error. The office order dated 13.05.2021 was, therefore, a correction of this
typographical mistake.
It is further argued that a clarification or correction in a rule
always relates back to the date of its incepti
intended to read “as such” in 2006, the 2021 correction rightly applies
retrospectively from 14.11.2006. This is not a fresh amendment but a
rectification of an error to reflect the true intent of the framers. Learned
sel placed reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
S.S. Garewal Vs. State of Punjab 1993 (3) SCT 503
OBSERVATION & ANALYSIS
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the record with their able assistance. This Court is of the opinion
that the issue involved in the present is no longer
settled by the judgements of the Hon’ble Apex C
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.B. Joshi v. Satish Kumar Pandey
(1993) Supp. (2) SCC 419 has held that where
2022 and others connected matters
reliance was placed on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Yogendra Shrivastava 2010(1) SCT 434.
learned counsel for the respondents inter alia
bmitted that the original office order dated 14.11.2006 (Annexure P-1)
contained an “inadvertent mistake.” The proposal approved by the Board of
Directors on 27.10.2006 intended to use the phrase “5 years service as
ublished notification was a clerical
error. The office order dated 13.05.2021 was, therefore, a correction of this
It is further argued that a clarification or correction in a rule
always relates back to the date of its inception. Since the rule was originally
intended to read “as such” in 2006, the 2021 correction rightly applies
retrospectively from 14.11.2006. This is not a fresh amendment but a
rectification of an error to reflect the true intent of the framers. Learned
sel placed reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
S.S. Garewal Vs. State of Punjab 1993 (3) SCT 503.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the record with their able assistance. This Court is of the opinion
that the issue involved in the present is no longer Res integra and stands
settled by the judgements of the Hon’ble Apex Court. A Two-Judge Bench
M.B. Joshi v. Satish Kumar Pandey
where the rules provide that the
State
inter alia
1)
contained an “inadvertent mistake.” The proposal approved by the Board of
Directors on 27.10.2006 intended to use the phrase “5 years service as
ublished notification was a clerical
error. The office order dated 13.05.2021 was, therefore, a correction of this
It is further argued that a clarification or correction in a rule
on. Since the rule was originally
intended to read “as such” in 2006, the 2021 correction rightly applies
retrospectively from 14.11.2006. This is not a fresh amendment but a
rectification of an error to reflect the true intent of the framers. Learned
sel placed reliance on the judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the record with their able assistance. This Court is of the opinion
and stands
Judge Bench
M.B. Joshi v. Satish Kumar Pandey
the rules provide that the
CWP
diploma-holders having obtained a degree of engineering working as Sub
Engineers shall be elig
years experience and 10% posts are reserved for that category, then once the
person while working as sub
entitled for the incentive of acceleration in promotion. If
counted from the date of acquiring qualifications the whole purpose of
prescribing incentive is defeated. Further, as per the well settled principle of
service jurisprudence, in the absence of specific rule the seniority amongst
persons holdi
basis of length of service not from the date of acquiring degree or from any
other fortuitous circumstance. The Hon’ble Court speaking through Justice
N.M. Kasliwal observed as follows:
“13. If
the very scheme and the purpose of giving incentive of adding
educational qualification by diploma
service in case the period of 8 years is counted from the date of
obtaining graduate degree in engineering. It may be noted that no
such argument was raised even from the side of the respondents
before the Tribunal. If such interpretation as now sought to be
advanced by Mr. Ashok Sen, learned senior counsel is accepted, no
relief could have been granted to the respondent Satish Kumar
Pandey. We would illustrate the above position on admitted facts
that Shri Satish Kumar Pandey had joined as Sub
23.8.1980, but had acquired the degree of engineering in May, 1987.
In that situation, Mr Satish Kumar becomes eligible only in May,
1995 and he could not be considered as eligible in December 1989
when these Sub
Assistant Engineers. Even otherwise, if this period of 8 years is
counted from the date of acquiring degree then this incentive of
adding the qualification during the continuation of service and
7
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
holders having obtained a degree of engineering working as Sub
Engineers shall be eligible for promotion as Assistant Engineers after 8
years experience and 10% posts are reserved for that category, then once the
person while working as sub-engineer acquires the degree, he becomes
entitled for the incentive of acceleration in promotion. If
counted from the date of acquiring qualifications the whole purpose of
prescribing incentive is defeated. Further, as per the well settled principle of
service jurisprudence, in the absence of specific rule the seniority amongst
persons holding similar posts in the same cadre has to be determined on the
basis of length of service not from the date of acquiring degree or from any
other fortuitous circumstance. The Hon’ble Court speaking through Justice
N.M. Kasliwal observed as follows:
If we accept the contention of Mr. Ashok Sen, it would defeat
the very scheme and the purpose of giving incentive of adding
educational qualification by diploma
service in case the period of 8 years is counted from the date of
aining graduate degree in engineering. It may be noted that no
such argument was raised even from the side of the respondents
before the Tribunal. If such interpretation as now sought to be
advanced by Mr. Ashok Sen, learned senior counsel is accepted, no
relief could have been granted to the respondent Satish Kumar
Pandey. We would illustrate the above position on admitted facts
that Shri Satish Kumar Pandey had joined as Sub
23.8.1980, but had acquired the degree of engineering in May, 1987.
In that situation, Mr Satish Kumar becomes eligible only in May,
1995 and he could not be considered as eligible in December 1989
when these Sub-Engineers were considered for promotion as
Assistant Engineers. Even otherwise, if this period of 8 years is
unted from the date of acquiring degree then this incentive of
adding the qualification during the continuation of service and
2022 and others connected matters
holders having obtained a degree of engineering working as Sub
ible for promotion as Assistant Engineers after 8
years experience and 10% posts are reserved for that category, then once the
engineer acquires the degree, he becomes
entitled for the incentive of acceleration in promotion. If these 8 years
counted from the date of acquiring qualifications the whole purpose of
prescribing incentive is defeated. Further, as per the well settled principle of
service jurisprudence, in the absence of specific rule the seniority amongst
ng similar posts in the same cadre has to be determined on the
basis of length of service not from the date of acquiring degree or from any
other fortuitous circumstance. The Hon’ble Court speaking through Justice
we accept the contention of Mr. Ashok Sen, it would defeat
the very scheme and the purpose of giving incentive of adding
educational qualification by diploma-holders while continuing in
service in case the period of 8 years is counted from the date of
aining graduate degree in engineering. It may be noted that no
such argument was raised even from the side of the respondents
before the Tribunal. If such interpretation as now sought to be
advanced by Mr. Ashok Sen, learned senior counsel is accepted, no
relief could have been granted to the respondent Satish Kumar
Pandey. We would illustrate the above position on admitted facts
that Shri Satish Kumar Pandey had joined as Sub- Engineer on
23.8.1980, but had acquired the degree of engineering in May, 1987.
In that situation, Mr Satish Kumar becomes eligible only in May,
1995 and he could not be considered as eligible in December 1989
Engineers were considered for promotion as
Assistant Engineers. Even otherwise, if this period of 8 years is
unted from the date of acquiring degree then this incentive of
adding the qualification during the continuation of service and
holders having obtained a degree of engineering working as Sub-
ible for promotion as Assistant Engineers after 8
years experience and 10% posts are reserved for that category, then once the
engineer acquires the degree, he becomes
these 8 years
counted from the date of acquiring qualifications the whole purpose of
prescribing incentive is defeated. Further, as per the well settled principle of
service jurisprudence, in the absence of specific rule the seniority amongst
ng similar posts in the same cadre has to be determined on the
basis of length of service not from the date of acquiring degree or from any
other fortuitous circumstance. The Hon’ble Court speaking through Justice
we accept the contention of Mr. Ashok Sen, it would defeat
the very scheme and the purpose of giving incentive of adding
holders while continuing in
service in case the period of 8 years is counted from the date of
aining graduate degree in engineering. It may be noted that no
such argument was raised even from the side of the respondents
before the Tribunal. If such interpretation as now sought to be
advanced by Mr. Ashok Sen, learned senior counsel is accepted, no
relief could have been granted to the respondent Satish Kumar
Pandey. We would illustrate the above position on admitted facts
Engineer on
23.8.1980, but had acquired the degree of engineering in May, 1987.
In that situation, Mr Satish Kumar becomes eligible only in May,
1995 and he could not be considered as eligible in December 1989
Engineers were considered for promotion as
Assistant Engineers. Even otherwise, if this period of 8 years is
unted from the date of acquiring degree then this incentive of
adding the qualification during the continuation of service and
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getting the advantage of acceleration in promotion in 8 years would
for all practical purposes become nugatory and of no benefit
14. It is further important to note that in the cases before us, the
Government itself has been adopting the practice and making
promotion as contended by the appellants and we are upholding
such practice. In N. Suresh Nathan's case also this Court had
upheld the practice followed by the Government. It is also well
settled principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any
specific rule, the seniority amongst persons holding similar posts in
the same cadre has to be determined on the basis of
service and not on any other fortuitous circumstance
xx xx xx
16. In these circumstances mentioned above, we are clearly of the
view that the Tribunal was wrong in determining the seniority from
the date of acquiring degree of engineering an
determined on the basis of length of service on the post of Sub
Engineer and the State Government was right in doing so and there
was no infirmity in the orders passed by the Government….”
(Emphasis supplied)
13.
Two-Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 753
the Hon’ble Court in
(2000) 1 SCC 128
(2004) 3 SCC 734
14.
Hon’ble Apex Court in
wherein the Rules initially provided that 80
Engineer were to be filled by promotion and 20% by direct recruitment.
8
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
getting the advantage of acceleration in promotion in 8 years would
for all practical purposes become nugatory and of no benefit
It is further important to note that in the cases before us, the
Government itself has been adopting the practice and making
promotion as contended by the appellants and we are upholding
such practice. In N. Suresh Nathan's case also this Court had
upheld the practice followed by the Government. It is also well
settled principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any
specific rule, the seniority amongst persons holding similar posts in
the same cadre has to be determined on the basis of
service and not on any other fortuitous circumstance
xx xx xx
16. In these circumstances mentioned above, we are clearly of the
view that the Tribunal was wrong in determining the seniority from
the date of acquiring degree of engineering an
determined on the basis of length of service on the post of Sub
Engineer and the State Government was right in doing so and there
was no infirmity in the orders passed by the Government….”
(Emphasis supplied)
The judgement in M.B. Joshi (supra)
Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Union of India & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 753 and the Three
the Hon’ble Court in Anil Kumar Gupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
0) 1 SCC 128 and Chandravathi P.K. & Ors. v. C.K. Saji & Ors.
(2004) 3 SCC 734.
The issue was examined again by a Three
Hon’ble Apex Court in T. Valsan v. K. Kanagaraj 2023 (7) SCC 614
wherein the Rules initially provided that 80
Engineer were to be filled by promotion and 20% by direct recruitment.
2022 and others connected matters
getting the advantage of acceleration in promotion in 8 years would
for all practical purposes become nugatory and of no benefit.
It is further important to note that in the cases before us, the
Government itself has been adopting the practice and making
promotion as contended by the appellants and we are upholding
such practice. In N. Suresh Nathan's case also this Court had
upheld the practice followed by the Government. It is also well
settled principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any
specific rule, the seniority amongst persons holding similar posts in
the same cadre has to be determined on the basis of the length of
service and not on any other fortuitous circumstance.
16. In these circumstances mentioned above, we are clearly of the
view that the Tribunal was wrong in determining the seniority from
the date of acquiring degree of engineering and it ought to have been
determined on the basis of length of service on the post of Sub
Engineer and the State Government was right in doing so and there
was no infirmity in the orders passed by the Government….”
M.B. Joshi (supra) was followed by the
Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D. Stephen Joseph v.
and the Three-Judges Benches of
Anil Kumar Gupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Chandravathi P.K. & Ors. v. C.K. Saji & Ors.
The issue was examined again by a Three-Judge Bench of the
T. Valsan v. K. Kanagaraj 2023 (7) SCC 614
wherein the Rules initially provided that 80% of the vacancies for Assistant
Engineer were to be filled by promotion and 20% by direct recruitment.
getting the advantage of acceleration in promotion in 8 years would
It is further important to note that in the cases before us, the
Government itself has been adopting the practice and making
promotion as contended by the appellants and we are upholding
such practice. In N. Suresh Nathan's case also this Court had
upheld the practice followed by the Government. It is also well
settled principle of service jurisprudence that in the absence of any
specific rule, the seniority amongst persons holding similar posts in
the length of
16. In these circumstances mentioned above, we are clearly of the
view that the Tribunal was wrong in determining the seniority from
d it ought to have been
determined on the basis of length of service on the post of Sub-
Engineer and the State Government was right in doing so and there
was no infirmity in the orders passed by the Government….”
was followed by the
D. Stephen Joseph v.
Judges Benches of
Anil Kumar Gupta v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi
Chandravathi P.K. & Ors. v. C.K. Saji & Ors.
Judge Bench of the
T. Valsan v. K. Kanagaraj 2023 (7) SCC 614,
% of the vacancies for Assistant
Engineer were to be filled by promotion and 20% by direct recruitment.
CWP
Promotion was open to Junior Engineers with three years’ service if holding
a Degree in Electrical Engineering, and seven years’ service if holding only
a Diploma. A subsequent amendment earmarked 50% of promotional posts
for Degree
remaining 50% for Diploma
significance of this scheme was that Degree holders
service for promotion, whereas Diploma holders required more. The issue
before the Court was whether a Diploma
during service, could count his pre
period for promo
judgments, the Hon’ble Court held that no distinction can be drawn between
the period of service rendered before or after the acquisition of the degree,
so long as the degree is acquired and is the
promotion. Accordingly, for the Department concerned, the view taken in
Stephen Joseph (supra)
Apex Court speaking through Justice S.K. Kaul has held as follows:
“19. On
urged and the judicial precedents, we can say that actually, the issue
is no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in C.
Chakkaravarthy & Ors. v. M. Satyavathy, IAS & Ors. (2015) 16
SCC 652.
been examined, which is really sought to be debated before us. It was
observed in para 10 as under:
9
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
Promotion was open to Junior Engineers with three years’ service if holding
a Degree in Electrical Engineering, and seven years’ service if holding only
a Diploma. A subsequent amendment earmarked 50% of promotional posts
for Degree-holder Junior Engineers with three years’ service, and the
remaining 50% for Diploma-holders with seven years’ service. The
significance of this scheme was that Degree holders
service for promotion, whereas Diploma holders required more. The issue
before the Court was whether a Diploma-
during service, could count his pre-degree service towards the qualifying
period for promotion to Assistant Engineer. After examining the aforesaid
judgments, the Hon’ble Court held that no distinction can be drawn between
the period of service rendered before or after the acquisition of the degree,
so long as the degree is acquired and is the
promotion. Accordingly, for the Department concerned, the view taken in
Stephen Joseph (supra) was declared to be the applicable law. The Hon’ble
Apex Court speaking through Justice S.K. Kaul has held as follows:
On examining the controversy in the context of the arguments
urged and the judicial precedents, we can say that actually, the issue
is no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in C.
Chakkaravarthy & Ors. v. M. Satyavathy, IAS & Ors. (2015) 16
SCC 652. Though it is a two-Judges Bench view, the very issue has
been examined, which is really sought to be debated before us. It was
observed in para 10 as under:
"There is, in our opinion, considerable merit in that submission
of the petitioners. There is no gainsaying that this Court has
unequivocally declared that promotion to the post of Assistant
2022 and others connected matters
Promotion was open to Junior Engineers with three years’ service if holding
a Degree in Electrical Engineering, and seven years’ service if holding only
a Diploma. A subsequent amendment earmarked 50% of promotional posts
holder Junior Engineers with three years’ service, and the
holders with seven years’ service. The
significance of this scheme was that Degree holders required fewer years of
service for promotion, whereas Diploma holders required more. The issue
-holder, who acquired a Degree
degree service towards the qualifying
tion to Assistant Engineer. After examining the aforesaid
judgments, the Hon’ble Court held that no distinction can be drawn between
the period of service rendered before or after the acquisition of the degree,
so long as the degree is acquired and is the basis for consideration of the
promotion. Accordingly, for the Department concerned, the view taken in D.
was declared to be the applicable law. The Hon’ble
Apex Court speaking through Justice S.K. Kaul has held as follows:
examining the controversy in the context of the arguments
urged and the judicial precedents, we can say that actually, the issue
is no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in C.
Chakkaravarthy & Ors. v. M. Satyavathy, IAS & Ors. (2015) 16
Judges Bench view, the very issue has
been examined, which is really sought to be debated before us. It was
"There is, in our opinion, considerable merit in that submission
There is no gainsaying that this Court has
unequivocally declared that promotion to the post of Assistant
Promotion was open to Junior Engineers with three years’ service if holding
a Degree in Electrical Engineering, and seven years’ service if holding only
a Diploma. A subsequent amendment earmarked 50% of promotional posts
holder Junior Engineers with three years’ service, and the
holders with seven years’ service. The
required fewer years of
service for promotion, whereas Diploma holders required more. The issue
holder, who acquired a Degree
degree service towards the qualifying
tion to Assistant Engineer. After examining the aforesaid
judgments, the Hon’ble Court held that no distinction can be drawn between
the period of service rendered before or after the acquisition of the degree,
basis for consideration of the
D.
was declared to be the applicable law. The Hon’ble
examining the controversy in the context of the arguments
urged and the judicial precedents, we can say that actually, the issue
is no more res integra in view of the judgment of this Court in C.
Chakkaravarthy & Ors. v. M. Satyavathy, IAS & Ors. (2015) 16
Judges Bench view, the very issue has
been examined, which is really sought to be debated before us. It was
"There is, in our opinion, considerable merit in that submission
There is no gainsaying that this Court has
unequivocally declared that promotion to the post of Assistant
CWP
20. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph shows that the promotion to
the post of Assistant Engineer was to be based on m
alone. The seniority of candidates could not be taken into account for
determining such merit.
qualifying prescription to be so considered on merits. The time
period spent in the service as Junior E
dependent on whether the person had a qualifying Degree or a
qualifying Diploma. There was no necessity for a Degree to perform
10
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
Engineers in the service shall be on the basis of merit and
merit alone and that seniority of the candidates cannot be
taken as an input for determini
also very clearly rejected the procedure followed by the
Government whereby the date on which the candidate had
acquired his degree qualification was taken as a determining
factor. That being so, and given the large number of
candidates eligible for consideration the Government was
entitled to adopt the method of restricting the zone of
consideration based on the number of vacancies.
the Government relied upon the DoPT guidelines for achieving
that objective it committed no fault.
whether the Government could draw
candidates not by reference to the length of service in the
cadre but by reference to the date on which the candidates
acquired the eligibility which, as noti
dependent upon the date on which the candidate acquired the
degree qualification. Since, however, the acquisition of a
degree qualification itself was not based on any consistently
uniform criterion, test or procedure, the date on w
qualification was acquired and resultantly the date on which
the candidate attained their eligibility was also bound to be
anything but uniform and nondiscriminatory. As between the
date of acquiring eligibility and the date of entering service
a Section Officer/Junior Engineer the latter was, in our
opinion, a more intelligible, fair and reasonable yardstick to
be applied for drawing-up the list of eligible candidates by the
review DPC. Inasmuch as the review DPC relied upon the
date of acquiring eligibility as the basis for preparation of the
list of eligible candidates, it committed a mistake which needs
to be corrected."
20. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph shows that the promotion to
the post of Assistant Engineer was to be based on m
alone. The seniority of candidates could not be taken into account for
determining such merit. In this merit
qualifying prescription to be so considered on merits. The time
period spent in the service as Junior E
dependent on whether the person had a qualifying Degree or a
qualifying Diploma. There was no necessity for a Degree to perform
2022 and others connected matters
Engineers in the service shall be on the basis of merit and
merit alone and that seniority of the candidates cannot be
taken as an input for determining such merit. This Court has
also very clearly rejected the procedure followed by the
Government whereby the date on which the candidate had
acquired his degree qualification was taken as a determining
factor. That being so, and given the large number of
candidates eligible for consideration the Government was
entitled to adopt the method of restricting the zone of
consideration based on the number of vacancies. Inasmuch as
the Government relied upon the DoPT guidelines for achieving
itted no fault. The question, however, is
whether the Government could draw-up a list of eligible
candidates not by reference to the length of service in the
cadre but by reference to the date on which the candidates
acquired the eligibility which, as noticed earlier, was itself
dependent upon the date on which the candidate acquired the
degree qualification. Since, however, the acquisition of a
degree qualification itself was not based on any consistently
uniform criterion, test or procedure, the date on which such a
qualification was acquired and resultantly the date on which
the candidate attained their eligibility was also bound to be
anything but uniform and nondiscriminatory. As between the
date of acquiring eligibility and the date of entering service as
a Section Officer/Junior Engineer the latter was, in our
opinion, a more intelligible, fair and reasonable yardstick to
up the list of eligible candidates by the
review DPC. Inasmuch as the review DPC relied upon the
iring eligibility as the basis for preparation of the
list of eligible candidates, it committed a mistake which needs
20. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph shows that the promotion to
the post of Assistant Engineer was to be based on merit and merit
alone. The seniority of candidates could not be taken into account for
In this merit-based selection, there was a
qualifying prescription to be so considered on merits. The time
period spent in the service as Junior Engineer was at variance
dependent on whether the person had a qualifying Degree or a
qualifying Diploma. There was no necessity for a Degree to perform
Engineers in the service shall be on the basis of merit and
merit alone and that seniority of the candidates cannot be
ng such merit. This Court has
also very clearly rejected the procedure followed by the
Government whereby the date on which the candidate had
acquired his degree qualification was taken as a determining
factor. That being so, and given the large number of
candidates eligible for consideration the Government was
entitled to adopt the method of restricting the zone of
Inasmuch as
the Government relied upon the DoPT guidelines for achieving
The question, however, is
up a list of eligible
candidates not by reference to the length of service in the
cadre but by reference to the date on which the candidates
ced earlier, was itself
dependent upon the date on which the candidate acquired the
degree qualification. Since, however, the acquisition of a
degree qualification itself was not based on any consistently
hich such a
qualification was acquired and resultantly the date on which
the candidate attained their eligibility was also bound to be
anything but uniform and nondiscriminatory. As between the
as
a Section Officer/Junior Engineer the latter was, in our
opinion, a more intelligible, fair and reasonable yardstick to
up the list of eligible candidates by the
review DPC. Inasmuch as the review DPC relied upon the
iring eligibility as the basis for preparation of the
list of eligible candidates, it committed a mistake which needs
20. A reading of the aforesaid paragraph shows that the promotion to
erit and merit
alone. The seniority of candidates could not be taken into account for
based selection, there was a
qualifying prescription to be so considered on merits. The time
ngineer was at variance
dependent on whether the person had a qualifying Degree or a
qualifying Diploma. There was no necessity for a Degree to perform
CWP
the job of a Junior Engineer, and all persons were alike. The
distinction only came into play when the m
to take effect. Thus, as to when the person obtained the degree as a
method of advancement of his knowledge and entitling him to an
earlier consideration in the time period would not be relevant
xx xx xx
22. A three Judges Bench o
(supra) referred to a number of earlier judgments on the issue,
including D. Stephen Joseph (supra), Satpal Antil v. Union of India
(1995) 4 SCC 419, Anil Kumar Gupta (supra), A.K. Raghumani Singh
v. Gopal Chandra N
State of Bihar (2004) 3 SCC 723 and quoted with approval of the last
of these judgments.
any statutory provision or rule made thereunder or under the
proviso appe
an incumbent is appointed to the post according to rules, their
seniority has to be counted from the date of appointment
23.In Shailendra Dania & Ors. (supra) case, it was noticed in para
36 that the
the service rule. The aforementioned judgment distinguished itself
from D. Stephen Joseph (supra) case on the ground that the
interpretation of the rules would be determined on a case
basis
important criteria. Similarly, in the present case, the Electricity
Department has a past practice of considering the years of service
prior to the acquisition of the degree
24. The principle o
noticed in M.B. Joshi (supra) case. This judgment also discusses the
aspect where there are two channels for promotion (as in the
present case) and illustrates that if the total time period of service
was
incentive to acquire the higher degree except as an academic
pursuit. The incentive is that if you acquire a higher degree as
compared to a diploma, you come into a channel which entitles
considera
years of service required in the cadre
11
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
the job of a Junior Engineer, and all persons were alike. The
distinction only came into play when the m
to take effect. Thus, as to when the person obtained the degree as a
method of advancement of his knowledge and entitling him to an
earlier consideration in the time period would not be relevant
xx xx xx
22. A three Judges Bench of this Court in Chandravathi P.K. & Ors.
(supra) referred to a number of earlier judgments on the issue,
including D. Stephen Joseph (supra), Satpal Antil v. Union of India
(1995) 4 SCC 419, Anil Kumar Gupta (supra), A.K. Raghumani Singh
v. Gopal Chandra Nath (2000) 4 SCC 30 and Pramod K. Pankaj v.
State of Bihar (2004) 3 SCC 723 and quoted with approval of the last
of these judgments. The principle laid down is that in the absence of
any statutory provision or rule made thereunder or under the
proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, once
an incumbent is appointed to the post according to rules, their
seniority has to be counted from the date of appointment
In Shailendra Dania & Ors. (supra) case, it was noticed in para
36 that the past practice would be a relevant aspect while construing
the service rule. The aforementioned judgment distinguished itself
from D. Stephen Joseph (supra) case on the ground that the
interpretation of the rules would be determined on a case
basis, and the wordings of the rules as well as past practices are
important criteria. Similarly, in the present case, the Electricity
Department has a past practice of considering the years of service
prior to the acquisition of the degree
The principle of past practice being of significance has also been
noticed in M.B. Joshi (supra) case. This judgment also discusses the
aspect where there are two channels for promotion (as in the
present case) and illustrates that if the total time period of service
not to be counted, then there could not be said to be any
incentive to acquire the higher degree except as an academic
pursuit. The incentive is that if you acquire a higher degree as
compared to a diploma, you come into a channel which entitles
consideration, albeit on merit, in a fast lane with less number of
years of service required in the cadre
2022 and others connected matters
the job of a Junior Engineer, and all persons were alike. The
distinction only came into play when the merit-based promotion had
to take effect. Thus, as to when the person obtained the degree as a
method of advancement of his knowledge and entitling him to an
earlier consideration in the time period would not be relevant.
f this Court in Chandravathi P.K. & Ors.
(supra) referred to a number of earlier judgments on the issue,
including D. Stephen Joseph (supra), Satpal Antil v. Union of India
(1995) 4 SCC 419, Anil Kumar Gupta (supra), A.K. Raghumani Singh
ath (2000) 4 SCC 30 and Pramod K. Pankaj v.
State of Bihar (2004) 3 SCC 723 and quoted with approval of the last
The principle laid down is that in the absence of
any statutory provision or rule made thereunder or under the
nded to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, once
an incumbent is appointed to the post according to rules, their
seniority has to be counted from the date of appointment.
In Shailendra Dania & Ors. (supra) case, it was noticed in para
past practice would be a relevant aspect while construing
the service rule. The aforementioned judgment distinguished itself
from D. Stephen Joseph (supra) case on the ground that the
interpretation of the rules would be determined on a case-to-case
, and the wordings of the rules as well as past practices are
important criteria. Similarly, in the present case, the Electricity
Department has a past practice of considering the years of service
prior to the acquisition of the degree.
f past practice being of significance has also been
noticed in M.B. Joshi (supra) case. This judgment also discusses the
aspect where there are two channels for promotion (as in the
present case) and illustrates that if the total time period of service
not to be counted, then there could not be said to be any
incentive to acquire the higher degree except as an academic
pursuit. The incentive is that if you acquire a higher degree as
compared to a diploma, you come into a channel which entitles
tion, albeit on merit, in a fast lane with less number of
years of service required in the cadre.
the job of a Junior Engineer, and all persons were alike. The
based promotion had
to take effect. Thus, as to when the person obtained the degree as a
method of advancement of his knowledge and entitling him to an
f this Court in Chandravathi P.K. & Ors.
(supra) referred to a number of earlier judgments on the issue,
including D. Stephen Joseph (supra), Satpal Antil v. Union of India
(1995) 4 SCC 419, Anil Kumar Gupta (supra), A.K. Raghumani Singh
ath (2000) 4 SCC 30 and Pramod K. Pankaj v.
State of Bihar (2004) 3 SCC 723 and quoted with approval of the last
The principle laid down is that in the absence of
any statutory provision or rule made thereunder or under the
nded to Article 309 of the Constitution of India, once
an incumbent is appointed to the post according to rules, their
In Shailendra Dania & Ors. (supra) case, it was noticed in para
past practice would be a relevant aspect while construing
the service rule. The aforementioned judgment distinguished itself
from D. Stephen Joseph (supra) case on the ground that the
case
, and the wordings of the rules as well as past practices are
important criteria. Similarly, in the present case, the Electricity
Department has a past practice of considering the years of service
f past practice being of significance has also been
noticed in M.B. Joshi (supra) case. This judgment also discusses the
aspect where there are two channels for promotion (as in the
present case) and illustrates that if the total time period of service
not to be counted, then there could not be said to be any
incentive to acquire the higher degree except as an academic
pursuit. The incentive is that if you acquire a higher degree as
compared to a diploma, you come into a channel which entitles
tion, albeit on merit, in a fast lane with less number of
CWP
25. In our view, one of the important aspects is the wording of the
Rule itself. According to the Rules, 50 percent of the promotion
quota is from Junior Eng
in the grade "and" possessing a degree in Electrical Engineering.
The Rule does not say from which date the time period of regular
service has to be counted, but there is a twin requirement of three
years of regul
scheme of 50 percent promotion from Junior Engineers uses the
word "with" seven years of regular service in the grade and
possessing a diploma in Electrical Engineering. Thus, the
distinction is betw
the period of service rendered as a Junior Engineer without any
distinction between the years served prior to or after having
obtained the degree.
amount to insertio
stipulated. Further, this is how the Rule has been understood by the
Department, the framers of the Rules, and accordingly, the Rules have
been uniformly implemented in the Electricity Department over a
period of time. In view of the above, due weightage must be given to
the view of the framers of the Rules.”
15.
2015, titled as ‘
Income Tax, Haryana and Ors
of the petitioners in that case, holding that it is not necessary to acquire the
prescribed experience only after obtaining the educational qualification. The
Bench placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble
Stephen Joseph (supra)
and A.K. Raghumani Singh & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Nath & Ors., (2000)
4 SCC 30. Importantly, the Court distinguished the facts of that case from
those in K.K. Dixit V
12
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
In our view, one of the important aspects is the wording of the
Rule itself. According to the Rules, 50 percent of the promotion
quota is from Junior Engineers with three years of regular service
in the grade "and" possessing a degree in Electrical Engineering.
The Rule does not say from which date the time period of regular
service has to be counted, but there is a twin requirement of three
years of regular service as also a degree. As against this, the second
scheme of 50 percent promotion from Junior Engineers uses the
word "with" seven years of regular service in the grade and
possessing a diploma in Electrical Engineering. Thus, the
distinction is between the diploma holder and the degree holder and
the period of service rendered as a Junior Engineer without any
distinction between the years served prior to or after having
obtained the degree. Accepting the plea of the Appellant would
amount to insertion into the requirement of the Rules, which is not
stipulated. Further, this is how the Rule has been understood by the
Department, the framers of the Rules, and accordingly, the Rules have
been uniformly implemented in the Electricity Department over a
iod of time. In view of the above, due weightage must be given to
the view of the framers of the Rules.”
Further, a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2784 of
2015, titled as ‘Jai Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. Chief Commissione
Income Tax, Haryana and Ors.’ (decided on 01.10.2015), ruled in favour
of the petitioners in that case, holding that it is not necessary to acquire the
prescribed experience only after obtaining the educational qualification. The
Bench placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble
Stephen Joseph (supra), M.B. Joshi (supra)
A.K. Raghumani Singh & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Nath & Ors., (2000)
. Importantly, the Court distinguished the facts of that case from
K.K. Dixit Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board (2015) 1 SCC 474
2022 and others connected matters
In our view, one of the important aspects is the wording of the
Rule itself. According to the Rules, 50 percent of the promotion
ineers with three years of regular service
in the grade "and" possessing a degree in Electrical Engineering.
The Rule does not say from which date the time period of regular
service has to be counted, but there is a twin requirement of three
ar service as also a degree. As against this, the second
scheme of 50 percent promotion from Junior Engineers uses the
word "with" seven years of regular service in the grade and
possessing a diploma in Electrical Engineering. Thus, the
een the diploma holder and the degree holder and
the period of service rendered as a Junior Engineer without any
distinction between the years served prior to or after having
Accepting the plea of the Appellant would
n into the requirement of the Rules, which is not
stipulated. Further, this is how the Rule has been understood by the
Department, the framers of the Rules, and accordingly, the Rules have
been uniformly implemented in the Electricity Department over a
iod of time. In view of the above, due weightage must be given to
the view of the framers of the Rules.” (Emphasis supplied)
Further, a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2784 of
Jai Prakash Sharma and Ors. v. Chief Commissioner of
.’ (decided on 01.10.2015), ruled in favour
of the petitioners in that case, holding that it is not necessary to acquire the
prescribed experience only after obtaining the educational qualification. The
Bench placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.
M.B. Joshi (supra), Anil Kumar Gupta (supra)
A.K. Raghumani Singh & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Nath & Ors., (2000)
. Importantly, the Court distinguished the facts of that case from
s. Rajasthan Housing Board (2015) 1 SCC 474
In our view, one of the important aspects is the wording of the
Rule itself. According to the Rules, 50 percent of the promotion
ineers with three years of regular service
in the grade "and" possessing a degree in Electrical Engineering.
The Rule does not say from which date the time period of regular
service has to be counted, but there is a twin requirement of three
ar service as also a degree. As against this, the second
scheme of 50 percent promotion from Junior Engineers uses the
word "with" seven years of regular service in the grade and
possessing a diploma in Electrical Engineering. Thus, the
een the diploma holder and the degree holder and
the period of service rendered as a Junior Engineer without any
distinction between the years served prior to or after having
Accepting the plea of the Appellant would
n into the requirement of the Rules, which is not
stipulated. Further, this is how the Rule has been understood by the
Department, the framers of the Rules, and accordingly, the Rules have
been uniformly implemented in the Electricity Department over a
iod of time. In view of the above, due weightage must be given to
Further, a Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2784 of
r of
.’ (decided on 01.10.2015), ruled in favour
of the petitioners in that case, holding that it is not necessary to acquire the
prescribed experience only after obtaining the educational qualification. The
D.
Anil Kumar Gupta (supra),
A.K. Raghumani Singh & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Nath & Ors., (2000)
. Importantly, the Court distinguished the facts of that case from
s. Rajasthan Housing Board (2015) 1 SCC 474,
CWP
observing that the issue before it did not concern any dispute
Diploma holders and Degree holders. Relevant paragraphs of the judgement
of the Division Bench are reproduced as under:
13
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
observing that the issue before it did not concern any dispute
Diploma holders and Degree holders. Relevant paragraphs of the judgement
of the Division Bench are reproduced as under:
“Very recently, the same issue again came up before the Apex
Court in K.K.Dixit Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & others
2014 (4) SCT 219 wherein the promotions were to the posts of
Project Engineer (Senior) from amongst the Project Engineer
(Juniors) who were Diploma holder
experience of service. The dispute was again between
Diploma holders and the Degree holders. Accordingly, it was
held that the qualifications of AIME and the experience of
service had to be post the acquisition of the degree. In the
present case, as noticed, the issue is not of any dispute inter se
the Diploma holders and Degree holders.
that a person has to be a graduate in Civil Engineering and he
must have the experience of working either under Government,
private employment or on the academic side. In the alternative,
the experience as a Consulting Engineer, Valuer of not less
than 10 years, has been made mandatory, subject to certain
conditions.
The observations made by the Apex Court in the case of
A.K.Raghumani Singh (supra) and Anil Kumar Gupta
(supra) would squarely apply and the respondents were not
justified in reading the qualification into the conjective word
and implying that experience had to be subsequent to the
acquisition of the degree.
In such circumstances, the question of law is answered in
favour of the writ petitioners that it is not necessary to gain
the experience under the Rules, after the acquisition of the
educational qualifications and accordingly, the order dated
31.12.2014 (Annexure P11), is quashed and the writ petition is
allowed…”
2022 and others connected matters
observing that the issue before it did not concern any dispute inter se the
Diploma holders and Degree holders. Relevant paragraphs of the judgement
of the Division Bench are reproduced as under:
the same issue again came up before the Apex
Court in K.K.Dixit Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & others
2014 (4) SCT 219 wherein the promotions were to the posts of
Project Engineer (Senior) from amongst the Project Engineer
(Juniors) who were Diploma holders with 7 years total
experience of service. The dispute was again between
Diploma holders and the Degree holders. Accordingly, it was
held that the qualifications of AIME and the experience of
service had to be post the acquisition of the degree. In the
esent case, as noticed, the issue is not of any dispute inter se
the Diploma holders and Degree holders. The Rules provide
that a person has to be a graduate in Civil Engineering and he
must have the experience of working either under Government,
mployment or on the academic side. In the alternative,
the experience as a Consulting Engineer, Valuer of not less
than 10 years, has been made mandatory, subject to certain
The observations made by the Apex Court in the case of
ingh (supra) and Anil Kumar Gupta
(supra) would squarely apply and the respondents were not
justified in reading the qualification into the conjective word
and implying that experience had to be subsequent to the
tances, the question of law is answered in
favour of the writ petitioners that it is not necessary to gain
the experience under the Rules, after the acquisition of the
and accordingly, the order dated
s quashed and the writ petition is
(Emphasis supplied)
the
Diploma holders and Degree holders. Relevant paragraphs of the judgement
the same issue again came up before the Apex
Court in K.K.Dixit Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & others
2014 (4) SCT 219 wherein the promotions were to the posts of
Project Engineer (Senior) from amongst the Project Engineer
s with 7 years total
experience of service. The dispute was again between
Diploma holders and the Degree holders. Accordingly, it was
held that the qualifications of AIME and the experience of
service had to be post the acquisition of the degree. In the
esent case, as noticed, the issue is not of any dispute inter se
The Rules provide
that a person has to be a graduate in Civil Engineering and he
must have the experience of working either under Government,
mployment or on the academic side. In the alternative,
the experience as a Consulting Engineer, Valuer of not less
than 10 years, has been made mandatory, subject to certain
The observations made by the Apex Court in the case of
ingh (supra) and Anil Kumar Gupta
(supra) would squarely apply and the respondents were not
justified in reading the qualification into the conjective word
and implying that experience had to be subsequent to the
tances, the question of law is answered in
favour of the writ petitioners that it is not necessary to gain
the experience under the Rules, after the acquisition of the
and accordingly, the order dated
s quashed and the writ petition is
(Emphasis supplied)
CWP
16.
squarely covered by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Stephen Joseph (supra)
(supra). As emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the principle of past
practice assumes significance in construing service rules. Regulation 9 of the
1965 Regulations provided that 18% of the posts of Assistant Engineer are
reserved for E
with 5 years of service ‘
consistent practice of the respondent
distinction between service rendered before or
AMIE/Degree. It was in this manner that the regulation was understood and
applied, and on that basis, the petitioners were promoted. Thus, even if the
use of the words ‘
‘inadvertent error’, it is not disputed that the respondent
considered service rendered before the acquisition of AMIE/degree as
qualifying service for promotion under the 18% quota.
17.
emphasized that it is a well
the absence of any specific rule, seniority among persons holding similar
posts in the same cadre must be determined on the basis of length of service
and not on any other fort
considered view that the principles laid down in
14
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
This Court is of the considered opinion that the present case is
squarely covered by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Stephen Joseph (supra), M.B. Joshi (supra)
. As emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the principle of past
practice assumes significance in construing service rules. Regulation 9 of the
1965 Regulations provided that 18% of the posts of Assistant Engineer are
reserved for Engineering Subordinates possessing AMIE/BE qualification
with 5 years of service ‘as JE/Civil’. Prior to the correction/clarification, the
consistent practice of the respondent-Nigam since 2006 was to draw no
distinction between service rendered before or
AMIE/Degree. It was in this manner that the regulation was understood and
applied, and on that basis, the petitioners were promoted. Thus, even if the
use of the words ‘as JE/Civil’ instead of ‘
rtent error’, it is not disputed that the respondent
considered service rendered before the acquisition of AMIE/degree as
qualifying service for promotion under the 18% quota.
As noted earlier, the Hon’ble Apex Court in
mphasized that it is a well-settled principle of service jurisprudence that, in
the absence of any specific rule, seniority among persons holding similar
posts in the same cadre must be determined on the basis of length of service
and not on any other fortuitous circumstance. Therefore, this Court is of the
considered view that the principles laid down in
2022 and others connected matters
This Court is of the considered opinion that the present case is
squarely covered by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.
M.B. Joshi (supra), and Anil Kumar Gupta
. As emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the principle of past
practice assumes significance in construing service rules. Regulation 9 of the
1965 Regulations provided that 18% of the posts of Assistant Engineer are
ngineering Subordinates possessing AMIE/BE qualification
. Prior to the correction/clarification, the
Nigam since 2006 was to draw no
distinction between service rendered before or after acquisition of the
AMIE/Degree. It was in this manner that the regulation was understood and
applied, and on that basis, the petitioners were promoted. Thus, even if the
instead of ‘as such’ was the result of an
rtent error’, it is not disputed that the respondent-Nigam has
considered service rendered before the acquisition of AMIE/degree as
qualifying service for promotion under the 18% quota.
As noted earlier, the Hon’ble Apex Court in M.B. Joshi (supra)
settled principle of service jurisprudence that, in
the absence of any specific rule, seniority among persons holding similar
posts in the same cadre must be determined on the basis of length of service
uitous circumstance. Therefore, this Court is of the
considered view that the principles laid down in D. Stephen Joseph (supra)
This Court is of the considered opinion that the present case is
D.
Anil Kumar Gupta
. As emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the principle of past
practice assumes significance in construing service rules. Regulation 9 of the
1965 Regulations provided that 18% of the posts of Assistant Engineer are
ngineering Subordinates possessing AMIE/BE qualification
. Prior to the correction/clarification, the
Nigam since 2006 was to draw no
after acquisition of the
AMIE/Degree. It was in this manner that the regulation was understood and
applied, and on that basis, the petitioners were promoted. Thus, even if the
’ was the result of an
Nigam has
considered service rendered before the acquisition of AMIE/degree as
M.B. Joshi (supra)
settled principle of service jurisprudence that, in
the absence of any specific rule, seniority among persons holding similar
posts in the same cadre must be determined on the basis of length of service
uitous circumstance. Therefore, this Court is of the
D. Stephen Joseph (supra),
CWP
M.B. Joshi (supra)
issue at hand.
18.
the correction/clarification, a Two
Court, in Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr.
Manu and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 640
B.V. Nagarathna, has
“38. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be
culled out:
i)
law, retrospective operation thereof may be permitted
ii)
considered as clarificatory of the previous law, the pre
law ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it
would be impossible to reasonably interpret a provision unless
an amendment is read into it, tha
to be a clarification or a declaration of the previous law and
therefore applied retrospectively.
iii)
scope of the original provision
iv)
clarification/explanation, the Court is not bound by the said
statement in the statute itself, but must proceed to analyse the
nature of the amendment and then conclude whether it is in
reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or
substantive amendment which is intended to change the law and
which would apply prospectively
39. Applying the law as discussed hereinabove to the facts of the
present case, we are of the view that the subsequent Government
15
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
M.B. Joshi (supra), and Anil Kumar Gupta (supra)
issue at hand.
Furthermore, with regards to the ret
the correction/clarification, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr.
Manu and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 640
B.V. Nagarathna, has held as follows:
38. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be
culled out:
i) If a statute is curative or merely clarificatory of the previous
law, retrospective operation thereof may be permitted
ii) In order for a subsequent order/provision/amendment to be
considered as clarificatory of the previous law, the pre
law ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it
would be impossible to reasonably interpret a provision unless
an amendment is read into it, tha
to be a clarification or a declaration of the previous law and
therefore applied retrospectively.
iii) An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter the
scope of the original provision.
iv) Merely because a provision
clarification/explanation, the Court is not bound by the said
statement in the statute itself, but must proceed to analyse the
nature of the amendment and then conclude whether it is in
reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or
substantive amendment which is intended to change the law and
which would apply prospectively.
Applying the law as discussed hereinabove to the facts of the
present case, we are of the view that the subsequent Government
2022 and others connected matters
Anil Kumar Gupta (supra) squarely govern the
Furthermore, with regards to the retrospective applicability of
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr.
Manu and Another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 640, speaking through Justice
38. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be
If a statute is curative or merely clarificatory of the previous
law, retrospective operation thereof may be permitted.
order/provision/amendment to be
considered as clarificatory of the previous law, the pre-amended
law ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it
would be impossible to reasonably interpret a provision unless
an amendment is read into it, that the amendment is considered
to be a clarification or a declaration of the previous law and
therefore applied retrospectively.
An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter the
Merely because a provision is described as a
clarification/explanation, the Court is not bound by the said
statement in the statute itself, but must proceed to analyse the
nature of the amendment and then conclude whether it is in
reality a clarificatory or declaratory provision or whether it is a
substantive amendment which is intended to change the law and
.
Applying the law as discussed hereinabove to the facts of the
present case, we are of the view that the subsequent Government
squarely govern the
rospective applicability of
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit and Others v. Dr.
, speaking through Justice
38. From the aforesaid authorities, the following principles could be
If a statute is curative or merely clarificatory of the previous
order/provision/amendment to be
amended
law ought to have been vague or ambiguous. It is only when it
would be impossible to reasonably interpret a provision unless
t the amendment is considered
to be a clarification or a declaration of the previous law and
An explanation/clarification may not expand or alter the
is described as a
clarification/explanation, the Court is not bound by the said
statement in the statute itself, but must proceed to analyse the
nature of the amendment and then conclude whether it is in
whether it is a
substantive amendment which is intended to change the law and
Applying the law as discussed hereinabove to the facts of the
present case, we are of the view that the subsequent Government
CWP
Order dated 29
therefore be made applicable retrospectively. The said order has
substantively modified the Government Order dated 21
the extent of stating that teachers who had already got the benefit of
advance
for advance increments at the time of their placement in the
selection grade. As noted above, the law provides that a clarification
must not have the effect of saddling any party with an unanticipa
burden or withdrawing from any party an anticipated benefit.
However, the Government Order dated 29
eligibility of Lecturers for advance increments at the time of
placement in the selection grade, only to those who do not have
PhD degree at the time of recruitment and subsequently acquire the
same.
xx xx xx
42. Further, merely because the subsequent Government Order has
been described as a clarification/explanation or is said to have been
issued following a clarification that
Court is not bound to accept that the said order is only clarificatory
in nature. On an analysis of the true nature and purport of the
subsequent Government Order dated 29
that it is not merely cla
which seeks to withdraw the benefit of two advance increments in
favour of a certain category of Lecturers. The benefit withdrawn
was not anticipated under the previously existing scheme.
Therefore, such an amendm
effect.
19.
Two-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
v. Union of India 2024 SCC Online SC 2642
through Justice Sandeep Mehta has held as follows:
“43.
clarification of an earlier Government Order, it may be made
16
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
Order dated 29-3-2001 cannot be declared as a clarification and
therefore be made applicable retrospectively. The said order has
substantively modified the Government Order dated 21
the extent of stating that teachers who had already got the benefit of
advance increments for having a PhD degree, would not be eligible
for advance increments at the time of their placement in the
selection grade. As noted above, the law provides that a clarification
must not have the effect of saddling any party with an unanticipa
burden or withdrawing from any party an anticipated benefit.
However, the Government Order dated 29
eligibility of Lecturers for advance increments at the time of
placement in the selection grade, only to those who do not have
PhD degree at the time of recruitment and subsequently acquire the
same.
xx xx xx
Further, merely because the subsequent Government Order has
been described as a clarification/explanation or is said to have been
issued following a clarification that
Court is not bound to accept that the said order is only clarificatory
in nature. On an analysis of the true nature and purport of the
subsequent Government Order dated 29
that it is not merely clarificatory, but is a substantial amendment
which seeks to withdraw the benefit of two advance increments in
favour of a certain category of Lecturers. The benefit withdrawn
was not anticipated under the previously existing scheme.
Therefore, such an amendment cannot be given retrospective
effect.” (Emphasis supplied)
The aforementioned observations were recently upheld by a
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
v. Union of India 2024 SCC Online SC 2642
through Justice Sandeep Mehta has held as follows:
43. If a Government Order is treated to be in the nature of a
clarification of an earlier Government Order, it may be made
2022 and others connected matters
2001 cannot be declared as a clarification and
therefore be made applicable retrospectively. The said order has
substantively modified the Government Order dated 21-12-1999 to
the extent of stating that teachers who had already got the benefit of
increments for having a PhD degree, would not be eligible
for advance increments at the time of their placement in the
selection grade. As noted above, the law provides that a clarification
must not have the effect of saddling any party with an unanticipated
burden or withdrawing from any party an anticipated benefit.
However, the Government Order dated 29-3-2001 has restricted the
eligibility of Lecturers for advance increments at the time of
placement in the selection grade, only to those who do not have
PhD degree at the time of recruitment and subsequently acquire the
Further, merely because the subsequent Government Order has
been described as a clarification/explanation or is said to have been
issued following a clarification that was sought in that regard, the
Court is not bound to accept that the said order is only clarificatory
in nature. On an analysis of the true nature and purport of the
subsequent Government Order dated 29-3-2001, we are of the view
rificatory, but is a substantial amendment
which seeks to withdraw the benefit of two advance increments in
favour of a certain category of Lecturers. The benefit withdrawn
was not anticipated under the previously existing scheme.
ent cannot be given retrospective
The aforementioned observations were recently upheld by a
Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V. Vincent Velankanni
v. Union of India 2024 SCC Online SC 2642 wherein the Court speaking
through Justice Sandeep Mehta has held as follows:
If a Government Order is treated to be in the nature of a
clarification of an earlier Government Order, it may be made
2001 cannot be declared as a clarification and
therefore be made applicable retrospectively. The said order has
1999 to
the extent of stating that teachers who had already got the benefit of
increments for having a PhD degree, would not be eligible
for advance increments at the time of their placement in the
selection grade. As noted above, the law provides that a clarification
ted
burden or withdrawing from any party an anticipated benefit.
2001 has restricted the
eligibility of Lecturers for advance increments at the time of
a
PhD degree at the time of recruitment and subsequently acquire the
Further, merely because the subsequent Government Order has
been described as a clarification/explanation or is said to have been
was sought in that regard, the
Court is not bound to accept that the said order is only clarificatory
in nature. On an analysis of the true nature and purport of the
2001, we are of the view
rificatory, but is a substantial amendment
which seeks to withdraw the benefit of two advance increments in
favour of a certain category of Lecturers. The benefit withdrawn
was not anticipated under the previously existing scheme.
ent cannot be given retrospective
The aforementioned observations were recently upheld by a
V. Vincent Velankanni
wherein the Court speaking
If a Government Order is treated to be in the nature of a
clarification of an earlier Government Order, it may be made
CWP
applicable retrospectively. Conversely, if a subseque
Order is held to be a modification/amendment of the earlier
Government Order, its application would be prospective as
retrospective application thereof would result in withdrawal of
vested rights which is impermissible in law and the same may
entail recoveries to be made.
culled out by this Court in a recent judgment of Sree Sankaracharya
University of Sanskrit v. Dr. Manu in the following terms...
xx xx xx
44. Applying these principles to the case at ha
that the subsequent GO dated 4th August, 2015 cannot be read
simply as a clarification and therefore cannot be made applicable
retrospectively. The said GO has substantively modified the position
governing seniority in the Industrial
earlier OM dated 4th November, 1992, and supersedes the
orders/circulars dated 24th December, 2002 and 13th January,
2003, which were holding the field over more than a decade.
Therefore, giving retrospective effect to the G
2015 would have catastrophic effect on the seniority of the entire
cadre.
20.
in the pre-
provision was incapable of reasonable interpretation without the subsequent
correction/clarification. As noted earlier, prior to its insertion, the
respondent-
or after acquisition of the AMIE/Degree. The regulation was consistently
understood and applied in this manner, and on that basis, the petitioners
were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer. The so
has, in effect,
17
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
applicable retrospectively. Conversely, if a subseque
Order is held to be a modification/amendment of the earlier
Government Order, its application would be prospective as
retrospective application thereof would result in withdrawal of
vested rights which is impermissible in law and the same may
entail recoveries to be made. The principles in this regard were
culled out by this Court in a recent judgment of Sree Sankaracharya
University of Sanskrit v. Dr. Manu in the following terms...
xx xx xx
Applying these principles to the case at ha
that the subsequent GO dated 4th August, 2015 cannot be read
simply as a clarification and therefore cannot be made applicable
retrospectively. The said GO has substantively modified the position
governing seniority in the Industrial
earlier OM dated 4th November, 1992, and supersedes the
orders/circulars dated 24th December, 2002 and 13th January,
2003, which were holding the field over more than a decade.
Therefore, giving retrospective effect to the G
2015 would have catastrophic effect on the seniority of the entire
cadre.”
In the present case, there was neither ambiguity nor vagueness
-amended Regulation 9, and it cannot be contended that the
provision was incapable of reasonable interpretation without the subsequent
correction/clarification. As noted earlier, prior to its insertion, the
-corporation made no distinction between service rendered before
or after acquisition of the AMIE/Degree. The regulation was consistently
understood and applied in this manner, and on that basis, the petitioners
were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer. The so
has, in effect, substantively altered the scope of the original Regulation by
2022 and others connected matters
applicable retrospectively. Conversely, if a subsequent Government
Order is held to be a modification/amendment of the earlier
Government Order, its application would be prospective as
retrospective application thereof would result in withdrawal of
vested rights which is impermissible in law and the same may also
The principles in this regard were
culled out by this Court in a recent judgment of Sree Sankaracharya
University of Sanskrit v. Dr. Manu in the following terms...
Applying these principles to the case at hand, we are of the view
that the subsequent GO dated 4th August, 2015 cannot be read
simply as a clarification and therefore cannot be made applicable
retrospectively. The said GO has substantively modified the position
governing seniority in the Industrial Establishments by reviving the
earlier OM dated 4th November, 1992, and supersedes the
orders/circulars dated 24th December, 2002 and 13th January,
2003, which were holding the field over more than a decade.
Therefore, giving retrospective effect to the GO dated 4th August,
2015 would have catastrophic effect on the seniority of the entire
(Emphasis supplied)
neither ambiguity nor vagueness
amended Regulation 9, and it cannot be contended that the
provision was incapable of reasonable interpretation without the subsequent
correction/clarification. As noted earlier, prior to its insertion, the
tion between service rendered before
or after acquisition of the AMIE/Degree. The regulation was consistently
understood and applied in this manner, and on that basis, the petitioners
were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer. The so-called correctio
the scope of the original Regulation by
nt Government
Order is held to be a modification/amendment of the earlier
Government Order, its application would be prospective as
retrospective application thereof would result in withdrawal of
also
The principles in this regard were
culled out by this Court in a recent judgment of Sree Sankaracharya
nd, we are of the view
that the subsequent GO dated 4th August, 2015 cannot be read
simply as a clarification and therefore cannot be made applicable
retrospectively. The said GO has substantively modified the position
Establishments by reviving the
earlier OM dated 4th November, 1992, and supersedes the
orders/circulars dated 24th December, 2002 and 13th January,
2003, which were holding the field over more than a decade.
O dated 4th August,
2015 would have catastrophic effect on the seniority of the entire
(Emphasis supplied)
neither ambiguity nor vagueness
amended Regulation 9, and it cannot be contended that the
provision was incapable of reasonable interpretation without the subsequent
correction/clarification. As noted earlier, prior to its insertion, the
tion between service rendered before
or after acquisition of the AMIE/Degree. The regulation was consistently
understood and applied in this manner, and on that basis, the petitioners
called correction
the scope of the original Regulation by
CWP
mandating that the requisite five years of service for promotion be reckoned
only from the date of acquisition of the AMIE/degree, rather than from the
date of initial appointm
held that a clarification cannot impose an unanticipated burden or deprive
any party of an anticipated benefit.
21.
resulted in withdrawal of
description of a provision as a ‘correction’ or ‘clarification’ does not bind
the Court. It is incumbent upon the Court to examine the true nature of the
amendment and determine whether it is genuinely clarif
declaratory, or whether it is in fact a substantive amendment altering the
law, which can only operate prospectively. Accordingly, in view of the
above, this Court holds that the so
substance, a substanti
recast the seniority of the petitioners.
CONCLUSION
22.
are allowed
JE/Civil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota hereby stands
quashed insofar as it retrospectively recasts the seniority of the petitioners.
While the Respondent
regulations, the amendment to Regulation 9 vid
18
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
mandating that the requisite five years of service for promotion be reckoned
only from the date of acquisition of the AMIE/degree, rather than from the
date of initial appointment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically
held that a clarification cannot impose an unanticipated burden or deprive
any party of an anticipated benefit.
Furthermore, the insertion of the ‘correction’ has effectively
resulted in withdrawal of the vested rights of the petitioners. The mere
description of a provision as a ‘correction’ or ‘clarification’ does not bind
the Court. It is incumbent upon the Court to examine the true nature of the
amendment and determine whether it is genuinely clarif
declaratory, or whether it is in fact a substantive amendment altering the
law, which can only operate prospectively. Accordingly, in view of the
above, this Court holds that the so-called correction in Regulation 9 is, in
substance, a substantive amendment and cannot be applied retrospectively to
recast the seniority of the petitioners.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing discussions, the present writ petition(s)
allowed. The Final Ranking List dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure P
vil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota hereby stands
quashed insofar as it retrospectively recasts the seniority of the petitioners.
While the Respondent-Nigam has the competence to amend its service
regulations, the amendment to Regulation 9 vid
2022 and others connected matters
mandating that the requisite five years of service for promotion be reckoned
only from the date of acquisition of the AMIE/degree, rather than from the
ent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically
held that a clarification cannot impose an unanticipated burden or deprive
Furthermore, the insertion of the ‘correction’ has effectively
the vested rights of the petitioners. The mere
description of a provision as a ‘correction’ or ‘clarification’ does not bind
the Court. It is incumbent upon the Court to examine the true nature of the
amendment and determine whether it is genuinely clarificatory or
declaratory, or whether it is in fact a substantive amendment altering the
law, which can only operate prospectively. Accordingly, in view of the
called correction in Regulation 9 is, in
ve amendment and cannot be applied retrospectively to
In view of the foregoing discussions, the present writ petition(s)
. The Final Ranking List dated 14.01.2022 (Annexure P-11) of
vil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota hereby stands
quashed insofar as it retrospectively recasts the seniority of the petitioners.
Nigam has the competence to amend its service
regulations, the amendment to Regulation 9 vide office order dated
mandating that the requisite five years of service for promotion be reckoned
only from the date of acquisition of the AMIE/degree, rather than from the
ent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically
held that a clarification cannot impose an unanticipated burden or deprive
Furthermore, the insertion of the ‘correction’ has effectively
the vested rights of the petitioners. The mere
description of a provision as a ‘correction’ or ‘clarification’ does not bind
the Court. It is incumbent upon the Court to examine the true nature of the
icatory or
declaratory, or whether it is in fact a substantive amendment altering the
law, which can only operate prospectively. Accordingly, in view of the
called correction in Regulation 9 is, in
ve amendment and cannot be applied retrospectively to
In view of the foregoing discussions, the present writ petition(s)
11) of
vil under the 18% Degree Holders Promotion Quota hereby stands
quashed insofar as it retrospectively recasts the seniority of the petitioners.
Nigam has the competence to amend its service
e office order dated
CWP
30.06.2021 (Annexure P
Respondents are directed to determine the seniority of the petitioner(s)
accordingly and are further restrained from reverting them from their
existing promoted posts.
23.
disposed of.
24.
cases.
October 15
P.C
19
CWP-2832-2022 and others connected matters
30.06.2021 (Annexure P-7) shall operate only prospectively. The
Respondents are directed to determine the seniority of the petitioner(s)
accordingly and are further restrained from reverting them from their
existing promoted posts.
All the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
Photocopy of this order be placed on the files of the connected
15, 2025
Whether speaking/reasoned. :
Whether Reportable. :
2022 and others connected matters
7) shall operate only prospectively. The
Respondents are directed to determine the seniority of the petitioner(s)
accordingly and are further restrained from reverting them from their
All the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
Photocopy of this order be placed on the files of the connected
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
Yes/No
Yes/No
7) shall operate only prospectively. The
Respondents are directed to determine the seniority of the petitioner(s)
accordingly and are further restrained from reverting them from their
All the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall stand
Photocopy of this order be placed on the files of the connected
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
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