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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT

SHIMLA

Cr. MP(M) No. 80 of 2026

Reserved on : 24.3.2026

Decided on : 31.3.2026

Sant Prakash Sharma

…Applicant

Versus

State of H.P.

…Respondent

_______________________________________________________

Coram

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge

Whether approved for reporting?

________________________________________________

For the Applicant :Mr. Ajay Kochhar, Senior

Advocate with Ms. Swati

Sharma, Advocate.

For the Respondent :Mr. Tejasvi Sharma, Mr.

Mohinder Zharaick, Additional

Advocates General with Mr.

Rohit Sharma, Dy. A.G.

Virender Singh, Judge

Applicant Sant Prakash Sharma has filed the

present application, under Section 483 of Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (hereinafter referred to as

‘the BNSS’) for releasing him, on bail, during the

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pendency of the trial, arising out of FIR No. 313 of

2023, dated 12.12.2023, registered under Sections

302 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the IPC’) and Section

25 of the Arms Act, registered with Police Station,

Haroli, District Una, H.P.

2. According to the applicant, he is

innocent and has falsely been implicated, in

this case, as no legal evidence could be

collected by the prosecution to connect him,

with the alleged offence.

3. Apart from this, he has also put

forward his ill health, as, one of the grounds,

to release him on bail, by pleading that he is

suffering from spinal injury and the Doctor

has advised him to take home remedies,

painkillers and physio- therapy. The Doctor is

also stated to have advised that in case, the

proper precaution is not taken, the problem

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may aggravate. Due to said problem, he

allegedly could not follow daily pursuits.

4. According to the applicant, thereafter,

he was referred to PGI, Chandigarh, on

27.2.2024, and the Doctor gave a

comprehensive opinion. The applicant had

also remained hospitalized, in Regional

Hospital, Una, w.e.f. 20.9.2024 to 3.10.2024.

Thereafter, the Doctor has advised the

applicant the physio-therapy, for about 25

days, at PGI, Chandigarh. The applicant has

also given the chronology of his medical

treatment at various stages, in order to

support his case.

5. The applicant has relied upon the

advise of the Doctors at PGI, Chandigarh,

according to which, he should avoid travelling

and difficult postures.

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6. According to the further stand of the

applicant, investigation, in the present case, is

complete and the matter is now pending

before the learned trial Court. All these facts

have been highlighted to show that custodial

interrogation of the applicant, is no longer

required by the Police. Alongwith the

application,he has also annexed the medical

record.

7. The delay in the trial has also been

made a ground for seeking the relief of bail by

pleading that the chances of conclusion of the

trial against him, in near future, are not so

bright, as, there are as many as 47 witnesses

and till date only three PWs have been

examined.

8. The applicant, through his counsel,

has given certain undertakings, for which he

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is ready to abide by, in case, ordered to be

released on bail.

9. On all these submissions, Mr. Ajay

Kochhar, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms.

Swati Sharma, has prayed that the bail

application may kindly be allowed, as prayed

for.

10. When, put to notice, Police filed

status report, disclosing therein that on

12.12.2023, at about 1:20 a.m., a telephonic

message was received in Police Station,

Tahliwal that Sant Prakash (applicant) had

shot down labourer Ghoora, upon which,

Inspector Ashok Kumar, Incharge Police Post,

Tahliwal, alongwith other police officials,

reached at the spot, i.e. Sant Rice Mill, where

they noticed the blood stains near Sheller.

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10.1.In order to preserve the spot, HHC

Paramjeet was deputed there. When,

Inspector Ashok Kumar alongwith police

officials was present, in the factory, then, Raj

Kumar disclosed that the injured had been

taken for treatment at Naya Nangal, upon

which, the I.O. reached at RK Hospital, Naya

Nangal, where the Doctor had declared the

injured as ‘brought dead’. His dead body was

stated to be lying in vehicle No. HP-10B-

8896, on the side of the road. The dead body

was taken into possession and the same

was sent to RH, Una.

10.2On the spot, Santosh Kumar, S/o

Lala Sahu has made statement under Section

154 Cr. P.C., disclosing therein that he is

working in the Sant Rice Mill J.K. Food, for

the last 7-8 years. As per him, at about 12:30

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a.m., in midnight, when, he was present in

the factory, then, he heard noise towards

Sheller and when, he reached at the spot, he

noticed that owner of the Sant Rice Mill and

the deceased were quarreling with each other

and Sant Prakash (applicant) was beating

Ghoora with the fist and kick blows, alleging

that he is not working properly. At that time,

Ritesh Kumar, Heera Ram and Munshi

Rakesh Kumar were also present. All the

aforesaid persons, alongwith the

complainant, were trying to save Ghoora from

Sant Prakash (applicant), and, in their

presence, Sant Prakash (applicant) had shot

down Ghoora. In the meanwhile, labourer Raj

Kumar allegedly reached at the spot.

Thereafter, Sant Prakash (applicant) had

gone to his room in the factory and came

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back alongwith keys of the vehicle. Thereafter,

this witness, Rakesh Kumar and Sant

Prakash (applicant) took Ghoora in the said

vehicle, for treatment to the hospital. The

Doctor had allegedly checked Ghoora in the

car and declared him ‘brought dead’.

10.3According to the complainant, death

of Ghoora had occurred due to gun fire shot.

As such, he has prayed that action be taken

against applicant Sant Prakash, upon which,

the Police registered a case under Section

302 IPC and Section 25-54-59 of Arms Act.

10.4Thereafter, investigation started.

During investigation, when, the I.O. reached

at the spot, he came to know about the fact

that accused had gone towards Naya Nangal.

Consequently, I.O. alongwith labourer Raj

Kumar had reached Naya Nangal. Thereafter,

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the Cyber Cell was requested to ascertain the

location of the mobile phone of Sant Prakash

(applicant) and Rakesh Kumar. Thereafter,

Medical Officer of RK Hospital handed over

slip OPD No. 7284, dated 12.12.2023 to the

Police, containing the following description:

“Pt. Brought by Mr. Sant Prakash alongwith two

persons at 01:25 am (Approx) c C/o Fall from ht 20

mins ago, Pt examined outside the hospital in the car.

O/E Pt. Is uncounscious Gcs-Fz-1, V-I, M-I pupils-

Dilated No reflection towards light HR-Nil, Perepheral

pulses-Nil, BP & PR-Nil Brought dead.”

10.5 When, the I.O, inquired from the

persons, who were present outside the

hospital, then, one of the persons, disclosed

his name as Sant Prakash (applicant) and

when, he was inquired about the said injured

person, he tried to evade the questions asked

by the Police and got perplexed. He has

disclosed that he had sent the injured

persons, for further treatment to PGI,

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Chandigarh. When, the other person was

inquired, about the said person, who has

disclosed his name as Rakesh Kumar, he also

tried to evade the questions asked by the

police. The third person disclosed his name

as Santosh Kumar and on inquiry, he

disclosed that injured Ghoora has already

expired and his dead body was taken

somewhere by Sant Prakash (applicant) and

Rakesh Kumar, upon which, Rakesh Kumar

disclosed that vehicle No. HP-10B-8896 was

parked, underneath the fly over, near railway

line. The vehicle was, thereafter, searched and

blood stains were found in the vehicle. In the

said vehicle, dead body was found, which was

taken into possession.

10.6During investigation, spot map was

prepared, where dead body and the vehicle

were found. The vehicle in question was also

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taken into possession. During investigation,

record from RK Hospital was obtained and as

per the record, the cause of the injury on the

person of the deceased was stated to be “fall

from height” by the accused persons. As

such, accused persons, according to the

Police has misled the Medical Officer, as well

as, the Police, so that they could dispose off

the body.

10.7The post-mortem examination of the

dead body was conducted at RPGMC, Tanda,

District Kangra, HP. Thereafter, blood was

preserved from the spot.

10.8During search of the residential

house of the applicant Sant Prakash, a pistol

of 0.32 calibre, alongwith the live cartridges,

was found, which was also taken into

possession. During search of his residential

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house, another double barrel country made

pistol was found, alongwith live cartridges,

which was also taken into possession.

10.9.It is further case of the Police that in

the intervening night of 11-12/12/2023, a

quarrel had taken place and thereafter,

applicant Sant Prakash had called his

Clerk/Munshi at the spot. Thereafter, he got

his licensed pistol, from his residence and

shot him with two gunshots, which were also

found, during post-mortem examination of

the dead body.

10.10 Thereafter, on the request of other

labourers, applicant Sant Prakash and

Rakesh Kumar, took the injured to RK

Hospital, where he was declared “brought

dead”. Thereafter, they took the dead body, in

their vehicle, and parked the vehicle, at a

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distance of about 2 kms., at a secluded place.

They had also misled the Police by disclosing

that the injured was sent to PGI, Chandigarh,

for treatment. As per the post-mortem

examination, deceased was found to have

consumed liquor, prior to his death. The

cause of death has been mentioned as under:

“The cause of death in this case in our opinion is

the hemorrhagic shock due to injury to abdominal

and thoracic contents as a consequence of

ftrearm injury which is sufficient to cause death

in ordinary course of nature.”

10.11Investigation is stated to be complete

and charge-sheet has been filed in the Court

of CJM, Una. Thereafter, the same has been

committed to the Court of Sessions and the

case is now stated to be pending before the

learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Una,

H.P., and fixed for consideration on charge,

on 8.1.2025.

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11. On the basis of above facts, a prayer

has been made to dismiss the application.

12. Bail application of the applicant has

earlier been dismissed by this Court on

10.1.2025. As per the status report, there are

total 47 witnesses, out of which, three have

been examined, till date.

13. The case is now fixed for recording

evidence of PWs 6 to 8 on 6.5.2026, PWs 9 to

11 on 7.5.2026, PWs 12 to 14 on 8.5.2026,

PWs 15, 17, 19 and 20 on 15.5.2026 and PWs

16, 18 and 21 on 16.5.2026.

14.The applicant is seeking the relief of bail

on the ground of undue delay in the trial by

highlighting the snail pace of trial, as discussed

above. Right to speedy trial has been held to be

fundamental right by the Constitutional Bench

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in a case titled as

Abdul Rehman Antulay and others versus R.S.

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Nayak and another , reported in (1992) 1

Supreme Court Cases 225. In the said case, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the

accused has right to speedy trial, which flows

from Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Relevant paragraph 86 of the said judgment, is

reproduced, as under:

“86. In view of the above discussion, the following

propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We

must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive.

It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to

lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:

(1)Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article

21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused

to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of

the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in

public interest or that it serves the social interest

also, does not make it any the less the right of the

accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the

guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as

quickly as possible in the circumstances.

(2)Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21

encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of

investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-

trial. That is how, this Court has understood this

right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.

(3)The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from

the point of view of the accused are:

(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention

should be as short as possible. In other words, the

accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or

unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his

vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly

prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be

minimal; and

(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the

ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on

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account of death, disappearance or non-availability of

witnesses or otherwise.

(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is

usually the accused who is interested in delaying the

proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a

known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving

the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution,

delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-

availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by

lapse of time really work against the interest of the

prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the

prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the

proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the right

to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the

first question to be put and answered is — who is

responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either

party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and

interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as

delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing

such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes

without saying that frivolous proceedings or

proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of

reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in

good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition

is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior

court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not

frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained on ex

parte representation.

(5) While determining whether undue delay has occurred

(resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one

must have regard to all the attendant circumstances,

including nature of offence, number of accused and

witnesses, the workload of the court concerned,

prevailing local conditions and so on — what is called,

the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation

of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State

includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical

approach should be adopted in such matters instead

of a pedantic one.

(6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice

the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his

advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in

Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] “it cannot be said how long a

delay is too long in a system where justice is

supposed to be swift but deliberate”. The same idea

has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell [15 L Ed

2d 627] in the following words:

‘… the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is

necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has

orderly expedition, rather than mere speed, as its

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essential ingredients; and whether delay in

completing a prosecution amounts to an

unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon

all the circumstances.’

However, inordinately long delay may be taken as

presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the

fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant

fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become

a persecution. But when does the prosecution become

persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given

case.

(7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called

the ‘demand’ rule. An accused cannot try himself; he

is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution.

Hence, an accused's plea of denial of speedy trial

cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at

no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he

did make such a demand and yet he was not tried

speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but

the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put

against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of

demand rule has been substantially watered down in

Barker [33 L Ed 2d 101] and other succeeding cases.

(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the

several relevant factors — ‘balancing test’ or

‘balancing process’ — and determine in each case

whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a

given case.

(9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the

conclusion that right to speedy trial of an accused has

been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the

case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the

only course open. The nature of the offence and other

circumstances in a given case may be such that

quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of

justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make

such other appropriate order — including an order to

conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is

not concluded or reducing the sentence where the

trial has concluded — as may be deemed just and

equitable in the circumstances of the case.

(10) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-

limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be

qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely

to shift the burden of proving justification on to the

shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of

complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is

primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the

delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to

weigh all the circumstances of a given case before

pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court

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of USA too has repeatedly refused to fix any such

outer time-limit in spite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor

do we think that not fixing any such outer limit

ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.

(11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial

and for relief on that account, should first be

addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court

entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay

the proceedings, except in a case of grave and

exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court

must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.”

(self emphasis supplied)

15. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, in another case, titled as Raj Deo Sharma

versus State of Bihar, reported in (1998) 7 Supreme

Court Cases 507, has supplemented the decision of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman

Antulay’s case (supra), by issuing the additional

directions. Relevant paragraph 13 of the judgment in

Raj Deo Sharma’s case (supra), is reproduced as

under:

“17. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed

to supplement the propositions laid down by the

Constitution Bench in Antulay case [(1992) 1 SCC

225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] with the following directions:

(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable

with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven

years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court

shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a

period of two years from the date of recording the plea

of the accused on the charges framed whether the

prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not

within the said period and the court can proceed to the

next step provided by law for the trial of the case.

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(ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused

has been in jail for a period of not less than one-half of

the maximum period of punishment prescribed for the

offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail

forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit.

(iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with

imprisonment for a period exceeding 7 years, whether

the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close the

prosecution evidence on completion of three years from

the date of recording the plea of the accused on the

charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined

all the witnesses or not within the said period and the

court can proceed to the next step provided by law for

the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons

to be recorded and in the interest of justice the court

considers it necessary to grant further time to the

prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid

time-limit.

(iv) But if the inability for completing the prosecution

within the aforesaid period is attributable to the

conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, no court

is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the

aforesaid period in any of the cases covered by clauses

(i) to (iii).

(v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of the

court or by operation of law, such time during which

the stay was in force shall be excluded from the

aforesaid period for closing the prosecution evidence.

The above directions will be in addition to and without

prejudice to the directions issued by this Court in

“Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India

[(1996) 4 SCC 33 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 589] as modified by

the same Bench through the order reported in

“Common Cause” A Registered Society v. Union of India

[(1996) 6 SCC 775 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 42] .”

16. In a case, titled as Dharmendra Kirthal

versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in

(2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases 368 , the Hon’ble

Supreme Court has held the right to speedy and fair

trial to be an integral part of very soul of Article 21 of

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the Constitution of India. Relevant paragraphs 30 to 33

of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:

“30. Keeping the aforesaid enunciation in view, we shall

presently proceed to deal with the stand and stance of

both the sides. The first submission which pertains to

the denial of speedy trial has been interpreted to be a

facet of Article 21 of the Constitution. In Kartar Singh

[Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 :

1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , the majority, speaking through

Pandian, J., has expressed thus: (SCC p. 638, paras

85-86)

“85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important

safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive

incarceration, to minimise anxiety and concern

accompanying the accusation and to limit the

possibility of impairing the ability of an accused to

defend himself but also there is a societal interest in

providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated

in the recent past and the courts have laid down a

series of decisions opening up new vistas of

fundamental rights. In fact, lot of cases are coming

before the courts for quashing of proceedings on the

ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the

invocation of this right even need not await formal

indictment or charge.

86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as

an essential part of the fundamental right to life and

liberty guaranteed and preserved under our

Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the

actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent

incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the

stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision

so that any possible prejudice that may result from

impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the

commission of the offence till it consummates into a

finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted

that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is

properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.”

31. Be it noted, the Court also referred to the

pronouncements in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of

Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] , Sunil

Batra v. Delhi Admn. [(1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC

(Cri) 155] , Hussainara Khatoon (4) v. State of Bihar

[(1980) 1 SCC 98 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 40] , Hussainara

Khatoon (6) v. State of Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 115 : 1980

SCC (Cri) 57] , Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar [(1983)

2 SCC 104 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 361] , T.V. Vatheeswaran

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v. State of T.N. [(1983) 2 SCC 68 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 342]

and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1

SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .

32. The present provision is to be tested on the

touchstone of the aforesaid constitutional principle.

The provision clearly mandates that the trial under this

Act of any offence by the Special Court shall have

precedence and shall be concluded in preference to the

trial in such other courts to achieve the said purpose.

The legislature thought it appropriate to provide that

the trial of such other case shall remain in abeyance. It

is apt to note here that “any other case” against the

accused in “any other court” does not include the

Special Court. The emphasis is on speedy trial and not

denial of it. The legislature has incorporated such a

provision so that an accused does not face trial in two

cases simultaneously and a case before the Special

Court does not linger owing to clash of dates in trial. It

is also worthy to note that the Special Court has been

conferred jurisdiction under sub-section (1) of Section

8 of the Act to try any other offences with which the

accused may, under any other law for the time being in

force, have been charged and proceeded at the same

trial.

33. As far as fair trial is concerned, needless to

emphasise, it is an integral part of the very soul of

Article 21 of the Constitution. Fair trial is the

quintessentiality of apposite dispensation of criminal

justice. In Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of

Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999] , it

has been held as follows: (SCC p. 183, para 33)

“33. The principle of fair trial now informs and

energises many areas of the law. It is reflected in

numerous rules and practices. It is a constant,

ongoing development process continually adapted to

new and changing circumstances, and exigencies of

the situation—peculiar at times and related to the

nature of crime, persons involved— directly or

operating behind, social impact and societal needs

and even so many powerful balancing factors which

may come in the way of administration of criminal

justice system.”

(self emphasis supplied)

17. Similar view has been taken by a two Judges’

Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as

Hussain and another versus Union of India, reported in

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(2017) 5 Supreme Court Cases 702 . Relevant

paragraphs 9 to 12 of the judgment, are reproduced, as

under:

“9. As already noticed, speedy trial is a part of

reasonable, fair and just procedure guaranteed under

Article 21. This constitutional right cannot be denied

even on the plea of non-availability of financial

resources. The court is entitled to issue directions to

augment and strengthen the investigating machinery,

setting up of new courts, building new court houses,

providing more staff and equipment to the courts,

appointment of additional Judges and other measures

as are necessary for speedy trial [Hussainara Khatoon

(4) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98, para 10 : 1980

SCC (Cri) 40].

10. Directions given by this Court in Hussainara

Khatoon (7) v. State of Bihar, (1995) 5 SCC 326 : 1995

SCC (Cri) 913, to this effect which were left to be

implemented by the High Courts are as follows: (SCC p.

328, para 2)

“2. Since this Court has already laid down the

guidelines by orders passed from time to time in this

writ petition and in subsequent orders passed in

different cases since then, we do not consider it

necessary to restate the guidelines periodically

because the enforcement of the guidelines by the

subordinate courts functioning in different States

should now be the responsibility of the different High

Courts to which they are subordinate. General

orders for release of undertrials without reference to

specific fact situations in different cases may prove

to be hazardous. While there can be no doubt that

undertrial prisoners should not languish in jails on

account of refusal to enlarge them on bail for want of

their capacity to furnish bail with monetary

obligations, these are matters which have to be dealt

with on case-to-case basis keeping in mind the

guidelines laid down by this Court in the orders

passed in this writ petition and in subsequent cases

from time to time. Sympathy for the undertrials who

are in jail for long terms on account of the pendency

of cases has to be balanced having regard to the

impact of crime, more particularly, serious crime, on

society and these considerations have to be weighed

having regard to the fact situations in pending cases.

While there can be no doubt that trials of those

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accused of crimes should be disposed of as early as

possible, general orders in regard to Judge-strength

of subordinate judiciary in each State must be

attended to, and its functioning overseen, by the

High Court of the State concerned. We share the

sympathetic concern of the learned counsel for the

petitioners that undertrials should not languish in

jails for long spells merely on account of their

inability to meet monetary obligations. We are,

however, of the view that such monitoring can be

done more effectively by the High Courts since it

would be easy for those Courts to collect and collate

the statistical information in that behalf, apply the

broad guidelines already issued and deal with the

situation as it emerges from the status reports

presented to it. The role of the High Court is to

ensure that the guidelines issued by this Court are

implemented in letter and spirit. We think it would

suffice if we request the Chief Justices of the High

Courts to undertake a review of such cases in their

States and give appropriate directions where needed

to ensure proper and effective implementation of the

guidelines. Instead of repeating the general

directions already issued, it would be sufficient to

remind the High Courts to ensure expeditious

disposal of cases.”

11. Deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring

speedy trial is not consistent with Article 21. While

deprivation of personal liberty for some period may not

be avoidable, period of deprivation pending trial/appeal

cannot be unduly long. This Court has held that while

a person in custody for a grave offence may not be

released if trial is delayed, trial has to be expedited or

bail has to be granted in such cases [Supreme Court

Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial

Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 731, para 15

: 1995 SCC (Cri) 39].

12. Timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights.

Denial of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence

in the administration of justice. Directions of this Court

in Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202,

are as follows: (SCC p. 217, para 34)

“34. … Therefore, we request the learned Chief

Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well as the

other learned Chief Justices to conceive and adopt a

mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases,

to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can

really be dealt with in an expeditious manner.

Putting a step forward is a step towards the

destination. A sensible individual inspiration and a

24 2026:HHC:9700

committed collective endeavour would indubitably

help in this regard. Neither less, nor more.”

(self emphasis supplied)

18. A three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court, in case, titled as Union of India versus K.A.

Najeeb, reported in (2021) 3 Supreme Court Cases

713, has held that when a timely trial would not be

possible and the accused has suffered incarceration

for a significant period of time, the Courts would

ordinarily be obligated to enlarge accused on bail.

Relevant paragraphs 11 and 15 of the judgment, are

reproduced, as under:

“11. The High Court's view draws support from a batch

of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare

Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616 : 1996 SCC

(Cri) 366 , laying down that gross delay in disposal of

such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of

the Constitution and consequential necessity to release

the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the

following observations from the cited case: (SCC p. 622,

para 10)

“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the

need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has

prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for

granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be

justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was

held in Kartar Singh case [Kartar Singh v. State of

Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899] , on

the presumption that the trial of the accused will

take place without undue delay. No one can justify

gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials

perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible

situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.”

*** *** ***

25 2026:HHC:9700

15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that

the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution

would cover within its protective ambit not only due

procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a

speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee

(Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India

[Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing

Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC

731, para 15 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 39] , it was held that

undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial.

Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences

of his acts unless the same is established before a

neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of

real life where to secure an effective trial and to

ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal

is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with

deciding whether an individual ought to be released

pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial

would not be possible and the accused has suffered

incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts

would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”

(self emphasis supplied)

19. In the recent decision of Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar @ Banu

versus State of Punjab, in Cr. Appeal No.

1341/2026 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.

18775/2025, the similar view has again been

reiterated. Relevant paragraphs 5 and 6 of the

judgment are reproduced as under:

“5. Prosecution proposes to examine 23

witnesses to drive home that charges against the

appellant, but none has been examined. Thus,

the trial is likely to take some time to conclude.

6. Almost two years have passed since the

appellant was arrested without trial having

commenced and conclusion thereof nowhere

26 2026:HHC:9700

being in sight. Incarceration without trial

amounts to punishment.”

20. In view of decision of Hon’ble

Supreme Court, as referred to above, now,

this Court would proceed to determine the

fact whether there is any undue delay in trial,

as mentioned above, as out of 47 witnesses,

only 3 witnesses have been examined till date

and the case is now listed for remaining PWs,

in the month of May, 2026 and on all these

dates, all the PWs, as per provisions of

Section 309 Cr. P.C. (BNSS) have not been

summoned. The trial is moving in snail pace,

as witnesses have been summoned in peace

meal manner.

21. Considering the fact, so discussed

above, this Court is of the view that the

applicant was arrested on 13.12.2023 and

after the lapse of two years and three months,

27 2026:HHC:9700

the prosecution could examine only three

witnesses and the case is now listed in the

month of May, 2026, that too, for recording

only 23 PWs. Meaning thereby, the chances of

conclusion of the trial, against the applicant,

in near future, are not so bright. From the

above fact, the undue delay in the the trial is

writ at large. Hence, the applicant is entitled

for the relief of bail.

22.Considering all these facts this Court is of

the view that the bail application of the

applicant is liable to be allowed.

23. Consequently, the bail application is allowed

and the applicant is ordered to be released on bail, in

case FIR No. 313 of 2023, dated 12.12.2023,

registered under Sections 302 and 201 read with

Section 34 of the IPC and Section 25 of the Arms

Act, registered with Police Station, Haroli, District

Una, H.P. on his furnishing personal bond in the

28 2026:HHC:9700

sum of Rs. 50,000/-, with one surety, in the like

amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court.

24. This order, however, shall be subject to the

following conditions:-

a) Applicant shall regularly attend the trial Court on each

and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason

to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing the

appropriate application;

b) Applicant shall not tamper with the prosecution

evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any

manner whatsoever;

c) Applicant shall not make any inducement, threat or

promises to any person acquainted with the facts of the

case so as to dissuade them from disclosing such facts to

the Court or the Police Officer, and

d) Applicant shall not leave the territory of India without

the prior permission of the Court.

25. Any of the observations, made herein

above, shall not be taken, as an expression of

opinion, on the merits of the case, as these

observations are confined, only to the disposal of

the present bail application.

26. It is made clear that the respondent-State

is at liberty to move an appropriate application,

in case, any of the bail conditions is found to be

violated by the applicant.

29 2026:HHC:9700

27. The Registry is directed to forward a soft

copy of the bail order to the Superintendent of

District Jail, Una, through e-mail, with a

direction to enter the date of grant of bail in the

e-prison software.

28. In case, the applicant is not released

within a period of seven days from the date of

grant of bail, the Superintendent of District Jail,

Una is directed to inform this fact to the

Secretary, DLSA, Una. The Superintendent of

the District Jail, Una is further directed that if

the applicant fails to furnish the bail bonds, as

per the order passed by this Court within a

period of one month from today, then, the said

fact be submitted to this Court.

29. The applicant has also given the

details of his ailment in para-9 of the

application, which is re-produced as under:

“i.27.02.2024: The petitioner was examined at PGI

Chandigarh and was advised continuous physiotherapy

30 2026:HHC:9700

for 10 days from 04.03.2024 to12.03.2024, with MWD

7/10 till 16.04.2024 and review on 16.04.2024.

ii.06.03.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised the petitioner

to avoid travelling, lifting heavy weights, and forward

bending.

iii. 03.04.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised continuation

of physiotherapy for another six weeks and to avoid

Indian-style toilets and travelling.

iv. 26.06.2024: Regional Hospital (RH), Una advised

regular physiotherapy.

v. 02.07.2024: RH Una again advised regular

physiotherapy.

vi. 12.07.2024: PGI Chandigarh reiterated advice to

avoid Indian-style toilets and travelling and prescribed

physiotherapy for six weeks.

vii. 19.07.2024: PGI Chandigarh physiotherapy for 10

days. Advised RH Una advised viii. 07.09.2024: regular

physiotherapy sessions as recommended by PGI

Chandigarh.

viii. 7.9.2024: RH Una advised regular physiotherapy

sessions as recommended by PGI Chandigarh.

ix. 17.09.2024: RH Una reiterated advice for regular

physiotherapy as per PGI Chandigarh.

x. 03.10.2024: advised Una RH regular physiotherapy

sessions for 25 days as per PGI Chandigarh.

xi 17.10.2024: CT scan revealed depression of the

superior end plates of L3 and L5 vertebral bodies.

xii. 07.11.2024: PGI Chandigarh advised the petitioner

to avoid travelling, lifting, forward bending, and

climbing stairs, and recommended continued treatment

at a local hospital with regular physiotherapy.

xiii. 11.11.2024: RH Una advised avoidance of forward

bending and climbing.

31 2026:HHC:9700

xiv. 10.01.2025: The Hon'ble High Court, while

dismissing the bail application, directed the jail

authorities to provide proper medical treatment to the

petitioner.

XV. 14.01.2025: RH Una referred the petitioner to a

spine surgeon/neurosurgeon.

xvi. 30.01.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised that the

petitioner required admission at a local hospital for

continued and regular physiotherapy and lumbar

traction.

xvii. 10.02.2025: A Medical Board at Dr. Rajendra

Prasad Government Medical College, Tanda, opined

that the petitioner was suffering from chronic low

backache with intermittent left radicular pain and

advised continuation of treatment as prescribed by PGI

Chandigarh.

xviii. 22.04.2025: RH Una noted lapse in follow-up in

the medical case file.

xix. 21.06.2025: The petitioner filed Application No.

Cr.M.A/464/2025 for medical treatment before the

learned Additional Sessions Judge. Vide order dated

04.07.2025, jail authorities were directed to take

necessary steps; however, no regular treatment was

ensured.

xx. 07.07.2025: PGI Orthopaedics Department XX.

advised rheumatology consultation and physiotherapy

for 10 consecutive days. The petitioner was referred to

the Rheumatology Department on 22.08.2025.

Physiotherapy, though advised from 07.07.2025,

commenced belatedly on 17.07.2025.

xxi. 29.07.2025: It was recorded that over a span of 26

days, physiotherapy was conducted only 8 times and

remained incomplete. Jail authorities, vide Letter No.

2639-40 dated 29.07.2025, stated that treatment could

32 2026:HHC:9700

not be provided regularly due to non-availability of

police escort and further disclosed that no Medical

Officer was posted at District Jail Una, Bangarh,

compelling inmates to rely on old prescriptions or

generic painkillers available in the jail pharmacy.

xxii 11.08.2025: The petitioner was admitted at RH

Una but was discharged on the same day due to non-

availability of police guard, with advice to get Registrar

admitted again once escort was available: however,

thereafter. re-admission no was arranged thereafter.

xxiii. 22.08.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised blood tests,

for which fees were deposited the same day, but the

petitioner was asked to report again on 24.10.2025.

Reports have not been collected till date.

xxiv. 15.10.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised certain

blood tests; the petitioner was taken to RH Una, but

the tests were unavailable there and hence not

conducted.

xxv. 24.10.2025: PGI Chandigarh advised ECG and

TFT tests at PGI laboratory; however, the same have

not been conducted till date.”

30. Although, it is the duty of the jail

authorities to take the applicant to the

hospital, as advised by the Doctor, however,

alongwith the bail application, copy of

information, under Right to Information Act,

has also been annexed, as Annexure P-3.

This Court deems it appropriate to reproduce

33 2026:HHC:9700

paras-3 and 4 of the said information to

demonstrate the sorry state of affairs, as

prevailing in the jail, in which, the applicant

has been confined. Accordingly, paras-3 and

4 of Annexure P-3, are reproduced, as under:

“3) As far as possible, the treatment recommended by

the PGI and TMC Kangra was provided but sometimes

due to non-availability of Police escort inspite of

repeated requests for guard deployment, the

unavoidable delay occurred as vide letter No. 3168-

3267 dated 21.01.2025 the non-availability of Police

escort as large Police Personnel were deployed to

impart the rehearsal and other multifarious duties

from 21.01.2025 to 26.01.2025, vide letter No. 5702-

5801 dated 07.02.2025 the non-availability of Police

escort as large Police Personnel were engaged in

constable recruitment process duty from 10.02.2025

to 18.02.2025, vid letter No. 9485-88 datedę

03.03.202.5 the non-availability of Police escort as

large Police Personnel were deployed for the cremation

ceremony of Sant Dera baba Rudra Nand Ji Maharaj at

Basal from 02.03.2025 03.03.2025, vide letter No.το

10111 dated 05.03.2025 the non-availability of Police

escort as large Police Personnel were deployed in Baba

Badbhag Singh Ji at Mari Tehsil Amb from 07.03.2025

to 17.03.2025 and vide letter No. 17156-256 dated

26.04.2025 the non-availability of Police escort as

large Police Personnel were deployed in Haroli

Mahotsav from 27.04.2025 to 29.04.2025 (Annexure-

B.).

34 2026:HHC:9700

4) Currently, no permanent Medical Officer has been

posted in this jail. However, deputed Medical officers

from R.H, Una on weekly visit Jail for checking up of

ailing inmates while one whole time jail dispenser,

Sh.Raj Kumar has been posted for looking after the

ailing inmates.”

31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case

reported in Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) versus State of Uttar

Pradesh, (1983) 2 SCC 308, has stressed upon the

rights of inmates to live in human and good

conditions. Relevant para-1 of the judgment is

reproduced as under:

"1. When this writ petition came up for hearing before us on

May 8, 1981 we made an order giving various directions in

order to ensure that the inmates of the Protective Home at

Agra do not continue to live inhuman and degrading

conditions and that the right to live with dignity enshrined in

Article 21 of the Constitution is made real and meaningful

for them. We gave to the State Government which is running

the Home, the entire period of vacation for carrying out these

directions. Miss Srivastava, Superintendent of the Home, has

filed an affidavit before us setting out the action taken by the

State Government with a view to complying with these

directions."

32. The similar view has also been taken by

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parmanand Katara versus

35 2026:HHC:9700

Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286. Relevant

paragraph of the judgment is reproduced as under:

"7. There can be no second opinion that preservation of

human life is of paramount importance. That is so on

account of the fact that once life is lost, the status quo

ante cannot be restored as resurrection is beyond the

capacity of man. The patient whether he be an innocent

person or be a criminal liable to punishment under the

laws of the society, it is the obligation of those who are

in-charge of the health of the community to preserve life

so that the innocent may be protected and the guilty may

be punished. Social laws do not contemplate death by

negligence to tantamount to legal punishment."

(self-emphasis supplied)

33. Failure of the authorities to provide timely

medical treatment is also held to be violative of right

to life, guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India, as held by Hon’ble Supreme

Court in a case titled as Paschim Banga Khet

Mazdoor Samity versus State of W.B., reported in

(1996) 4 SCC 37. Relevant paragraph-9, of the

judgment, is reproduced, as under:

"9. The Constitution envisages the establishment of a welfare

State at the federal level as well as at the State Level. In a

36 2026:HHC:9700

welfare State the primary duty of the Government is to

secure the welfare of the people. Providing adequate medical

facilities for the people is an essential part of the obligations

undertaken by the Government in a welfare State. The

Government discharges this obligation by running hospitals

and health centres which provide medical care to the person

seeking to avail of those facilities. Article 21 imposes an

obligation on the State to safeguard the right to life of every

person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount

importance. The government hospitals run by the State and

the medical officers employed therein are duty-bound to

extend medical assistance foi preserving human life. Failure

on the part of a government hospital to provide timely

medical treatment to a person in need of such treatment

results in violation of his right to life guaranteed under

Article 21. In the present case there was breach of the said

right of Hakim Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 when he

was denied treatment at the various government hospitals

which were approached even though his condition was very

serious at that time and he was in need of immediate

medical attention. Since the said denial of the right of Hakim

Seikh guaranteed under Article 21 was by officers of the

State, in hospitals run by the State, the State cannot avoid

its responsibility for such denial of the constitutional right of

Hakim Seikh. In respect of deprivation of the constitutional

rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution the

position is well settled that adequate compensation can be

awarded by the court for such violation by way of redress in

proceedings under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution.

Hakim Seikh should, therefore, be suitably compensated for

the breach of his right guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution. Having regard to the facts and circumstances

of the case, we fix the amount of such compensation at Rs

25,000. A sum of Rs 15,000 was directed to be paid to

37 2026:HHC:9700

Hakim Seikh as interim compensation under the orders of

this Court dated 22-4-1994. The balance amount should be

paid by Respondent 1 to Hakim Seikh within one month.”

34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case titled as

State of A.P. versus Challa Ramkrishna Reddy,

reported in (2000) 5 SCC 712 has held that even the

prisoners do have fundamental rights, human rights

and human dignity, which cannot be permitted to be

shrinked or taken away. Relevant paragraphs 22, 24

and 28, of the judgment, are reproduced, as under:

“22. Right to life is one of the basic human rights. It is

guaranteed to every person by Article 21 of the Constitution

and not even the State has the authority to violate that right.

A prisoner, be be a convict or undertrial or a detenu, does

not cease to be a human being. Even when lodged in the jail,

he continues to enjoy all his fundamental rights including

the right to life quaranteed to him under the Constitution.

On being convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in

accordance with the procedure established by law, prisoners

still retain the residue of constitutional rights.

24. Thus, according to the definition under the Prisoners

Act, there is a convict, there is an undertrial and there is a

civil prisoner who may be a detenu under preventive

detention law. None of the three categories of prisoners lose

their fundamental rights on being placed inside a prison. The

restriction placed on their right to movement is the result of

their conviction or involvement in crime. Thus, a person

(prisoner) is deprived of his personal liberty in accordance

38 2026:HHC:9700

with the procedure established by law which, as pointed out

in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India must be reasonable, fair

and just.

28. Thus, fundamental rights, which also include basic

human rights, continue to be available to a prisoner and

those rights cannot be defeated by pleading the old and

archaic defence of immunity in respect of sovereign acts

which has been rejected several times by this Court."

35. If the grievances, so put forth by the

applicant, in the present case, as highlighted above,

are seen in the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, as referred to above, then the

violation of fundamental right, under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India, is writ at large.

36. The poor prisoner has been denied proper

medical aid, on various occasions, only on account of

the fact that no permanent Medical Officer has been

posted in the jail, and on many occasions, he has not

been taken to hospital, on account of non-availability

of the police escort. In such situation, it is high time

for this Court to direct the Chief Secretary to the

Govt. of Himachal Pradesh to look into the matter

39 2026:HHC:9700

and submit the detailed report, on or before the next

date of hearing.

37. In addition to this, the Director General of

Prisons & Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is

directed to submit the details of the jails, including

availability of the police escort to take the inmates to

hospital, in case, need so arises.

38. The Director General of Prisons &

Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is also

directed to submit the detailed report, with regard to

posts of Medical Officers/para-medical staff, in the

jails, and alternate arrangements, if any, made in the

absence of Medical Officer, on account of any

unforeseen circumstances.

39. The Director General of Prisons &

Correctional Services, Himachal Pradesh is also

directed to submit the detailed report regarding the

availability of the medical facilities, including

specialized treatment to the inmates, in the vicinity of

40 2026:HHC:9700

the jail(s), including distance of the nearby

hospital(s), including super-specialty hospital(s). This

also includes the mode of transport, adopted by the

jail authorities to take the inmates, in case of medical

emergency, as well as, availability of the police escort.

This information be submitted to this Court, on or

before the next date of hearing.

40. List on 27.4.2026.

(Virender Singh)

Judge

March 31, 2026

Kalpana