IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

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AT JABALPUR

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BEFORE

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HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE DEEPAK KHOT

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ON THE 13

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th

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OF JANUARY, 2026

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MISC. CIVIL CASE No. 66 of 2022

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SANTOSH KUMAR (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. SMT. ASHA JAIN AND

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OTHERS

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Versus

RAJESH AND OTHERS

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Appearance:

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Shri Jaspreet Gulati - Advocate for the applicants/L.Rs.

Shri Rajendra Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1

to 5.

Shri Sandeep Vyas - Panel Lawyer for the respondent/State.

ORDER

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The applicants have filed this application under Order 39 Rule 2-A of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for punishing the non-applicants for

breach of the order dated 16.04.2012 confirmed by order dated 12.03.2014

passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 140/2012.

2.

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It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that the

original applicant/sole appellant-Santosh Kumar instituted a suit against the

non-applicants seeking relief of declaration of title and partition. The

respondents contested the suit by filing the written statement.

3.

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It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that the

learned court below vide judgment and decree dated 30.11.2011 dismissed

the claim of the applicants/plaintiffs holding that the applicants/plaintiffs

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have failed to prove their case. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree

dated 30.11.2011, the applicants have filed First Appeal No. 140/2012

alongwith an application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of the Code.

4.

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The said first appeal came up for hearing before this Court on

16.04.2012. After hearing both the parties, this Court vide order dated

16.04.2012 (Annexure A/2) directed the parties that till the next date of

hearing, parties to the appeal will maintain status quo with respect to the suit

property. Thereafter, vide order dated 12.03.2014 (Annexure A/3), the order

maintaining status quo was made absolute.

5.

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It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants that the

order granting status quo has been passed in presence of both the parties,

hence the respondents are well aware of the same and they are obliged to

ensure compliance of the order passed by this Court.

6.

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It is submitted that despite of the order of maintaining status quo,

the non-applicants have raised construction over the suit property, as they

have built a shop over the suit property and are continuing to expand their

constructions, which is evident from the photographs clicked on 01.12.2021

(Annexure A/4). It is submitted that the applicants have also filed photos of

the suit property before raising the construction vide Annexure A/6. It is

submitted that the applicants have also made a complaint to the Chief

Municipal Officer, Bina vide Annexure A/5. Thus, prayed that the said act of

the applicant is a clear violation/breach of the order passed by this Court on

16.04.2012 and therefore, the non-applicants may be suitably punished.

7.

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Per contra, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents

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that he has filed reply to the application denying the averments made in the

application. He has submitted that the applicants have not violated the order

of maintaining status quo granted by this Court in respect of the suit

property. It is submitted that the non-applicants have not been prohibited or

restrained by any order of this Court from using and enjoying the suit

property. The applicants taking shelter of the order of status quo are trying to

deprive the non-applicants from using the suit property. The respondents are

owners in possession of the suit property and consequently, they are enjoying

the suit property.

8.

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It is submitted that the applicants are making false complaint

against the non-applicants. The suit property, in respect of which the status

quo order has been passed by this Court, still exists and the respondents have

not transferred the said property to anybody or created any third party

interest over the suit property. It is further submitted that the applicants have

not filed any documents in respect of the actual physical condition of the suit

property at the time of passing status quo order by this Court.

9.

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It is submitted that the applicants have not specifically stated in the

application as to on which land the construction has been carried out by the

non-applicants. It is submitted that although the applicants have made the

alleged complaint to the CMO, Bina, but when no action has been taken on

the said complaint, they should have approached the competent authority. On

the basis, prayed for dismissal of the application.

10.

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Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

11.

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From the perusal of the reply submitted by the non- applicants, it is

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found that the non-applicants have nowhere stated that such construction, as

alleged by the applicants, has not been raised. The non-applicants have very

cleverly stated that the applicants have not mentioned as to where the

construction has been raised showing in the appendix of the suit property,

however, it is nowhere denied by the non-applicants that the construction has

not been raised after passing of the status quo order by this Court.

12.

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During the course of the arguments, learned counsel for the

respondents has tried to distinguish the case from the breach of injunction

stating that in the application the relief for not creating third party right has

been sought, therefore, they have not created third party right and thus, the

order of status quo is interpreted as stay on creating third party right.

13.

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The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Messrs Bharat Coking Coal

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Limited vs. State of Bihar and others

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reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 394

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, has

defined the 'status quo' and held as under:

"5.

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The expression “status quo” is undoubtedly a term of

ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty.

According to the ordinary legal connotation, the term “status quo”

implies the existing state of things at any given point of time. The

qualifying words “as in the High Court” clearly limit the scope

and effect of the status quo order. In the present case, the High

Court determined only one question, namely, that slurry was not

coal or mineral. It refrained from entering into the question of

right or title of the parties on the ground that it involved

investigation into disputed questions of facts. Therefore, apart

from the abstract question that slurry was not coal or mineral, the

impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the rights of the

parties. Viewed from that angle, it is obvious that status quo as in

the High Court cannot mean anything else except status quo as

existing when the matter was pending in the High Court before the

judgment was delivered. Both the parties understood the scope and

effect of the status quo order as meaning the state of things

existing while the writ petition was still pending i.e. till the

delivery of the judgment by the High Court. Respondent 4 moved

the High Court in CriMP No. 4841/86(8) without impleading the

appellant herein and obtained the impugned order from the High

Court dated 3-1-1987 which we have vacated. The proper course

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for Respondent 4 to have adopted was to have approached this

Court to seek clarification, if he had any doubt as to the meaning

and effect of the status quo order. We highly deprecate the conduct

of Respondent 4 for having approached the High Court and

obtained the impugned order by suppressing the fact that this

Court had passed the status quo order."

14.

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This High Court in Sumer Singh vs. Sanman Singh

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reported in

(

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2011) 1 MPLJ 387,

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while holding the respondent No.1 guilty for breach of

the order restraining the respondents from alienating the suit property and

also not to raise any construction over the suit property, has relied upon a

judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court, which is reproduced hereinbelow:

"8.

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Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Patel Rajnikant

Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai, reported in (2008) 14

SCC 561 : AIR 2008 SC 3016 has held as under in regard to

proper punishment in the event of breach of the order of the Court:

—

“59. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a

person for Contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and

normally such action should not be taken. At the same time,

however; it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to

uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law

which may call for such extreme step. If for proper

administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with

the orders passed by a Court, it is required to take strict view

under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent

weapon of contempt.

60. Now, in the instant case, both the orders passed by this

Court on April 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005, were

explicitly clear. The first order totally prohibited/restrained

the respondents/contemners from creating any interest

whatsoever in the suit property. As held by us, in spite of the

said order, interest had been created by the contemners in the

suit property. But even otherwise there is intentional

disobedience and wilful breach of the subsequent order dated

January 10, 2005 inasmuch as transactions had been entered

into without issuing notice to the petitioners. We have

already held that they could not have been entered into by the

respondents before issuance of notice to the petitioners. The

respondents were clearly aware of the order. In fact, the

action was sought, to be defended and justified on the ground

that the Court had not directed ‘prior’ notice, and as such,

non-issuance of notice before entering into sale transactions

would not amount to disobedience of the order of the Court.

We are unable to uphold the contention. In the circumstances

it must be held that the disobedience of the order by the

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contemners was wilful, intentional and deliberate.

61. The question then is whether the case calls for imposition

of punishment on the contemners. The learned counsel for

the contemners submitted that in the affidavit-in-reply, the

respondents have stated that if this Court comes to the

conclusion that they had committed contempt of Court, the

Court may accept unconditional and unqualified apology and

may discharge notice. The counsel submitted that the

statutory provision itself enacts that no apology shall be

rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or

conditional [Explanation to section 12(1)].

62. We must frankly admit our inability to agree with the

learned counsel. In the light of what is stated above, we are

convinced that the contemners have intentionally and

deliberately violated the orders of the Court. We are also

convinced that the orders were clear, unambiguous and

unequivocal having one and only one meaning. Wilful and

deliberate disobedience of the orders passed by the Apex

Court of the country can never be said to be bona fide, honest

or in good faith. If it is so, the action calls for serious view to

ensure, proper administration of justice.

63. In Hiren Bose, Re, AIR 1969 Cal 1 : 72 Cal WN 82, the

High Court of Calcutta stated:

“It is also not a matter of course that a Judge can be expected

to accept any apology. Apology cannot be a weapon, of

defence forged always to purge the guilty. It is intended to be

evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a

wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to

make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoer's power. Only

then is it of any avail in a Court of justice. But before it can

have that effect, it should be tendered at the earliest possible

stage, not the latest. Even if wisdom dawns only at a later

stage, the apology should be tendered unreservedly and

unconditionally, before the judge has indicated the trend of

his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered

apology robbed of all grace but it ceases to be an apology. It

ceases to be the full, frank and manly confession of a wrong

done, which it is intended to be”.

64. It is well-settled that an apology is neither a weapon of

defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended

to operate as a universal panacea, it is intended to be

evidence of real contriteness [Vide M.Y. Shareaf v. Hon'ble

Judges of the High Court of Nagpur, (1955) 1 SCR

757; M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana,

(1991) 3 SCR 312]. AIR 1955 SC 19; 1991 AIR SCW 2011.

65. In T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad through the Amicus

Curiae v. Ashok Khot, (2006) 5 SCC 1, a three-judge Bench

of this Court had an occasion to consider the question in the

light of an ‘apology’ as a weapon defence by the contemner

with a prayer to drop the proceedings. The Court took note of

the following observations of this Court in L.D.

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Jaikwal v. State of U.P., (1984) 3 SCC 405 : 2006 AIR SCW

2475, (1984) 3 SCC 405 : AIR 1984 SC 1374.

“We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the ‘slap - say

sorry - and forget’ school of thought in administration of

contempt jurisprudence. Saying ‘sorry’ does not make the

slipper taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical

word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and

expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not

from the pen. For it is one thing to ‘say’ sorry - it is another

to ‘feel’ sorry.” Para 32 of AIR SCW

66. The Court, therefore, rejected the prayer and stated:

“Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at

the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology is

shorn of penitence and hence it is liable to be rejected. If the

apology is offered at the time when the contemer finds that

the Court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an

apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward.” Para 31

of AIR SCW

67. Similar view was taken in other cases also by this Court

68. We are also satisfied that the so-called apology is not an

act of penitence, contrition or regret. It has been tendered as

a ‘tactful move’ when the contemners are in the tight corner

and with a view to ward off the Court. Acceptance of such

apology in the case on hand would be allowing the

contemners to go away with impunity after committing gross

contempt of Court. In our considered opinion, on the facts

and in the circumstances of the case, imposition of fine in

lieu of imprisonment will not meet the ends of justice.

69. Considering the facts and circumstances in their entirety,

in our opinion, ends of justice would be served if we hold the

respondents/contemners guilty under section 12 of the

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with section 94(c) and

Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1976 and Article 129 of the Constitution

and order the respondents-contemners to undergo simple

imprisonment for a term of two weeks i.e. fourteen days."

15.

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This Court is surprised to note the understanding of the non-

applicants that the status quo means not to create third party right, but it

means to carry on construction on the suit property. The non-applicants have

not denied that the construction has been raised on the suit property. Thus,

this Court finds that the non-applicants, despite knowing well that there is an

order of maintaining status quo by this Court, have breached the order and

flouted it deliberately. When it has been noticed and the application has been

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(DEEPAK KHOT)

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JUDGE

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filed, the same has been defended by giving wrong interpretation to the order

and misleading the court. Therefore, the application reporting breach of the

injunction order dated 16.04.2012 passed by this Court is allowed.

16.

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The non-applicants are held guilty of committing breach of the

order of injunction passed by this Court. Consequently, the respondent Nos.

1 to 5 are directed to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- to the applicants within a

period of 15 days failing which they shall undergo simple imprisonment for a

term of two weeks i.e. 14 days.

17.

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With the aforesaid, the MCC is allowed and disposed of.

RAGHVENDRA

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