2026 INSC 652

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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8705 OF 2026

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO.24352/2017)

SARAFAT ALI ( DECEASED)

THROUGH LRS AND OTHERS

…. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF

CONSOLIDATION HARIDWAR

AND OTHERS

…. RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA , J.

1) Leave granted.

2) The lis at hand concerns a protracted dispute arising from the rights

asserted by the appellants under a sale deed dated 04.06.1957. What

initially commenced as proceedings for mutation gradually traversed into

the realm of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950

1

and

the consolidation framework, though its odyssey across multiple forums

only culminated in futility, with the authorities below concurrently holding

that the appellants had failed to prove the execution of the said sale deed,

thereby compelling them to seek refuge before this Court.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3) The chequered trail of the lis can be adumbrated as thus: the

predecessors of the appellants herein purchased the land measuring 15

1

Hereinafter referred to as Abolition Act

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bigha, 11 biswa, 0 Biswansi of Khasra No.70/32 situated in Narsipur Kalan

village, Jwalapur Paragana, Roorki Tehsil, Haridwar District, through a

registered sale deed dated 04.06.1957. It is to be noted that the

predecessors of the appellants were minors at the time of purchase.

Subsequently, the possession of the said land was transferred, and the

appellants claim to be in possession since the date of purchase.

4) On 08.12.1983, the appellants moved an application under Section 34

of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901, before the Naib Tehsildar

seeking mutation of the said land in their favour. Meanwhile, one of the

sellers, namely, Hasmatullah filed an objection against the appellants ’

mutation application. Though, he subsequently withdrew the same and

consented for the mutation. Vide order dated 03.04.1984, the Naib Tehsildar

allowed the appellants’ application and ordered for mutation of the land in

the appellants favour.

5) Subsequently, in 1991, consolidation proceedings were initiated in the

subject village and the name of the appellants could not be recorded in the

revenue records. This prompted the appellants to file an objection under

Section 9A of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act , 1953,

claiming that they purchased the subject lands and the names of

Hasmatullah and others be cancelled from the record, and their names be

recorded. The Consolidation Officer after issuing notice to both the parties

and considering that the Tehsildar has already passed an order of mutation

in favour of the appellants, without any objection from the other side,

allowed the appellants’ application ex-parte vide order dated 13.09.1991

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and directed that the names of the appellants be recorded as Bhumidhar on

the basis of sale deed dated 04.06.1957.

6) Aggrieved by the above order, the sellers/respondents, namely,

Rashideen widow of Inayutulla and Hasantulla son of Fateh Mohd, filed a

restoration application dated 16.09.1991 seeking recall of the order dated

13.09.1991. The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 24.12.1991 allowed

the recall application and set aside the order dated 13.09.1991 and directed

the matter to be heard afresh on merits.

7) In the interregnum, Hasmatullah entered a compromise with the

appellants on 08.06.1993, consented for the mutation and admitted that the

appellants are in possession of the subject land since the execution of the

sale deed dated 04.06.1957. Consequently, vide order dated 18.06.1993, the

Consolidation Officer, considering the compromise entered into between the

parties, ordered to enter the names of the appellants in the khata and

deletion of the names of the original Khatedars, namely, Abdul Mazeed,

Hasmatullah and Rasheedan from the revenue records. However, it is

pertinent to take note that the said compromise was not entered into by all

the co-tenure holders and was later disputed, as a result of which , the

proceedings continued and were adjudicated on merits.

8) In the course of the proceedings, evidence was led by both the sides,

including the statement of the appellant Sarafat Ali and the statement of the

attesting witness, namely Baru. Upon appreciation of the entire material on

record, the Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 30.12.1999, rejected the

claim of the appellants, inter alia holding that the execution of the sale deed

dated 04.06.1957 had not been duly proved, particularly in view of the

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inconsistencies relating to the identity of the attesting witness and the lack

of cogent documentary evidence.

9) Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred Appeal No.813/2000

under Section 11(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act

before the Settlement Officer. The Appellate Authority, vide order dated

17.09.2001, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings of the

Consolidation Officer.

10) The appellants thereafter preferred revisions being Revision

Nos.328/2001 and 331/2001 before the District Deputy Director of

Consolidation. The revisional authority, vide common order dated

14.01.2003, dismissed the revisions and concurred with the findings of the

Authorities below. It was further held that the alleged sale was hit by the

provisions of Section 154 of the Abolition Act, rendering the sale deed void.

11) Thereafter, the appellants filed Civil Writ Petition No.59/2003,

challenging the orders of the Forums below. Upon consideration, the High

Court vide impugned judgment dated 18.08.2017, dismissed the Writ

Petition and upheld the concurrent findings of the Authorities below, inter

alia holding that the appellants had failed to prove the execution of the sale

deed vis-a-vis the subject land and further held that the sale deed was

executed in contravention of Section 154 of the Abolition Act rendering it

void.

SUBMISSIONS

12) Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants assailed

the concurrent findings rendered by the High Court and the Consolidation

Authorities on multiple grounds. It was contended that the sale deed dated

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04.06.1957 was erroneously held to be in contravention of Section 154 of

the Abolition Act. Learned senior counsel submitted that on the date of

execution of the sale deed, the ceiling prescribed under Section 154 was 30

acres and not 12.5 acres, the latter having been introduced subsequently by

U.P. Act 37 of 1958. It was further contended that even assuming Section

154 stood attracted; a transfer in contravention thereof was not void ab initio

but merely voidable at the instance of the Gaon Sabha under the statutory

framework then prevailing.

13) Further, it was contended that the Consolidation Authorities lacked

jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of the registered sale deed.

According to the learned senior counsel, unless a document is void ab initio,

the same remains binding and operative until cancelled by a competent

Court of law. Since the sale deed in question was at best voidable and not

void, the Consolidation Authorities could not have ignored the same while

deciding title.

14) On the third count, learned senior counsel submitted that the subject

sale deed being a registered document of over thirty years old carried a

statutory presumption as to its due execution and authenticity. It was urged

that the Consolidation Authorities below erred in discarding the document

solely on the basis of alleged discrepancies relating to the attesting witness,

particularly when a registered sale deed does not mandatorily require

attestation. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned senior counsel seeks

intervention of this Court to set aside the concurrent findings rendered by

the High Court and the Consolidation Authorities below.

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15) Conversely, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents

supported the impugned judgment of the High Court upholding the orders of

the Consolidation Authorities. It was submitted that the sale deed executed

by the appellants is in contravention of Section 154 of the Abolition Act and

is void.

16) It was further contended that as the consolidation proceedings

commenced only in 1984, the law as on the date of proceedings should be

applicable and the subject land which is in violation of the provisions of the

Act as under Section 166 of the Abolition Act, will vest in the State as

provided under Section 167 of the Abolition Act.

17) It was also put forth by the learned counsel for the respondents that

the appellants have failed to prove the execution of the sale deed dated

04.06.1957. It was pointed out that there was a discrepancy in the attesting

witness and, therefore, the execution of the document stood unproved.

18) Predicating upon the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for

the respondents prayed for the dismissal of the present Appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

19) Heard the learned counsel for either side and perused the material on

record. It is now incumbent upon us to examine the correctness of the

concurrent findings rendered by the High Court and the Authorities below.

20) We are cognizant that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136

of the Constitution of India is limited in the matters wherein concurrent

findings have been rendered. Nevertheless, this Court can examine such

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findings where they suffer from perversity or manifest illegality so as to

warrant interference.

21) In the lis at hand, the High Court as well as the Consolidation

Authorities below have concurrently held against the appellants primarily

on the following grounds:

A. That the sale deed executed in favour of the appellants was in

contravention of Section 154 of the Abolition Act, rendering the

deed void; and

B. The execution of the subject sale deed could not be proven due to

discrepancy in the attesting witness produced.

22) To examine the dispute in better light, it is necessary to reproduce the

relevant provision. The germane part of Section 154 of the Abolition Act

reads as follows :

“154. Restriction on transfer by a bhumidhar. — (1) Save as

provided in sub-section (2), no bhumidhar shall have the right to

transfer by sale or gift, any land other than tea garden to any

person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift,

become entitled to land which together with land, if any, held by

his family will in the aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50

acres) in Uttar Pradesh.

[Explanation.— For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared

that in this sub-section the expression “person” shall include and

be deemed to have included on June 15, 1976 a “Co-operative

Society” :

Provided that where the transferee is a Co-operative Society,

the land held by it having been pooled by its members under

Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 77 of the Uttar Pradesh Co-

operative Societies Act, 1965 shall not be taken into account in

computing the 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) land held by it.]

2

(2) Subject to the provisions of any other law relating to the land

tenures for the time being in force, the State Government may, by

general or special order, authorise transfer in excess of the limit

prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that such

transfer is in favour of a registered co-operative society or an

2

Inserted by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1997.

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institution established for a charitable purpose, which does not

have land sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the

interest of general public.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression

‘family’ shall mean the transferee, his or her wife or husband (as

the case may be) and minor children and where the transferee is a

minor also his or her parents.

[(3) For every transfer of land in excess of the limit prescribed

under sub-section (1) prior approval of the State Government shall

be necessary :

Provided that where the prior approval of the State

Government is not obtained under this sub -section, the State

Government may on an application give its approval afterward in

such manner and on payment in such manner of an amount, as

fine, equal to twenty five per cent of the cost of the land as may be

prescribed. The cost of the land shall be such as determined by

the Collector for stamp duty.]

3

[Provided further that where the State Government is satisfied

that any transfer has been made in public interest, it may exempt

any such transferee from the payment of fine under this sub -

section.]

4

[UTTARAKHAND]

5

AMENDMENT

[(3) A bhumidhar with transferable rights may sell his land to

any of the categories of tenure holders in the State of Uttaranchal

as mentioned in Section 129 or such owner of any immovable

property in Uttaranchal who has acquired it on or before

12.9.2003 or to any member of the ‘family’, which means

husband, his wife and their children, including step or adopted

children, and includes parents, grandparents, brothers and

unmarried, widowed, separated and divorced sisters of such

tenure holder of the owner, as the case may be.]

6

[(4)[(1)(a) Subject to other restrictions and save as otherwise

provided in this Act, “any person for his own or on behalf of his

family (which means husband, his wife, minor children,

unmarried sons, unmarried daughters and dependent parents)

even though he is not a tenure holder under Section 129 or the

owner of any immovable property in Uttarakhand, may purchase

land not exceeding 250 sq. mts. for residential purpose in his

lifetime without the permission;]

7

(b) A registered agreement to sell the land executed on or before

12.9.2003 shall be valid if the sale deed on the basis of such

agreement is executed on or before 31.3.2004, irrespective of any

time limit provided in the agreement, unless extended by the

Collector of the district for reasons to be recorded in writing.”

3

Inserted by U.P. Act No. 13 of 2005 (w.e.f. 29.03.2005).

4

Inserted by U.P. Act No. 36 of 2006.

5

The word ‘Uttaranchal’ substituted by Section 3 of Act No. 52 of 2006 (w.e.f. 01.01.2007).

6

Added by Uttaranchal Act No. 29 of 2003 (w.e.f. 15.01.2004)

7

Substituted by Uttarakhand Act No. 3 of 2007.

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23) A careful perusal of the present statutory framework indicates that

Section 154 merely imposes a restriction upon transfers exceeding the

prescribed ceiling limit. Significantly, sub-section (3) contemplates that even

where a transfer is made in excess of the prescribed limit without prior

approval, the State Government may subsequently grant approval upon

such terms as stipulated therein. The statutory scheme , therefore,

demonstrates that a transfer in contravention of Section 154 is not rendered

void ipso facto, but remains capable of ratification in accordance with law.

24) However, the position which obtains as on date cannot be

mechanically extended to transactions executed at a point of time when the

statutory framework was materially different. It is a settled principle that

the legality of a transfer must be adjudged with reference to the law as it

stood on the date of execution of the instrument. Section 154 as on the

date of the execution of the sale deed stood thus:

“154. Restrictions on the transfers by a bhumidhar. —No

bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer, by sale or gift, any

land other than tea gardens, to any person (other than an

institution established for a charitable purpose) where such

person shall, as a result of the sale or gift, become entitled to

land which together with land, if any, held by himself, or

together with his family will, in the aggregate, exceed 30 acres

in Uttar Pradesh.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section a person's

family shall, if the members are living jointly, consist of the

person himself, his minor children, his wife or her husband, as

the case may be, and if the person himself is a minor his father

and mother.”

(emphasis supplied)

25) At this juncture, it is necessary to note that though the ceiling of 12.5

acres came to be introduced by U.P. Act 37 of 1958, the amending

enactment expressly provided under Section 1(2) that the Act shall be

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deemed to have come into force from 1

st

July, 1952, save and except

Sections 37, 38 and 60 of the Abolition Act which were brought into force at

once. Consequently, the ceiling provision prescribing the limit of 12.5

acres stood retrospectively applicable even on the date of execution of the

subject sale deed dated 04.06.1957.

26) Moreover, even under the said provision, the embargo was not upon

every transfer simpliciter, but only upon such transfer whereby the

transferee, together with the land already held by him or his family, would

in the aggregate exceed 12.5 acres. Therefore, unless it was established

that the transferee’s aggregate holding crossed the prescribed ceiling, mere

execution of the sale deed could not ipso facto attract Section 154.

27) As a corollary, any transfer which violates section 154 , directly traces

to Section 163

8

of the Abolition Act, which reads as under:

“163. Transfer in contravention of this Act.—(1) Where a

transfer of any holding or part thereof has been made in

contravention of the provisions of section 154, the transferee

shall, notwithstanding anything in any law, “be liable to

ejectment from such holding or part on the suit of the

Gaon Sabha, which shall thereupon become vacant land;

but nothing in this section will prejudice the right of the

transferor to realize the whole or portion of the price remaining

unpaid, or the right of any other person other than the

transferee to proceed against such holding or land in

enforcement of any claim thereto.

(2) To every suit for ejectment under this section the transferor

shall be made a party.”

(emphasis supplied)

28) On a bare reading of the said provision, it is evident that when a

transfer is made in contravention of Section 154, the transferee is liable for

ejectment, albeit, only upon the suit filed by the Goan Sabha. The statutory

scheme, therefore, does not ipso facto render the transfer void, but merely

8

Omitted by U.P Act No.20 of 1982 (w.e.f 03.06.1981)

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exposes the transferee to the consequence of ejectment, contingent upon the

suit filed by the Goan Sabha.

29) Be that as it may, the question as to whether a transfer is void or

voidable when hit by Section 154 of the Abolition Act was examined and

concretely clarified by this Court in the case of Kripashanker vs. Director

of Consolidation and Others

9

the germane observations are reproduced

herein below:

“6. At the outset (sic) it may be noticed that the legislature has

made a distinction between a transfer made by a bhumidhar in

contravention of Section 154 and a transfer made by a sirdar

or asami in contravention of the provisions of the Act. Unlike

Section 166 whereunder any transfer made on behalf of a

sirdar or asami in contravention of the provisions of Chapter

VIII has been declared to be void, a transfer by a bhumidhar in

contravention of Section 154 has not been so declared. Section

163 merely indicates that such contravention would entail

ejectment of the transferee at the instance of the Gaon

Sabha but till action is taken by the Gaon Sabha the

transferee continues in enjoyment . Further the very fact

that by an amendment of Section 163 made by U.P. Act 35

of 1976 it was provided for the first time that a transfer by

a bhumidhar in contravention of Section 154 could be

declared to be void emphasizes the position that under

Section 163 as it stood prior to the amendment such

transfer would not be void.

7. Secondly, sub-section (1) of Section 154 merely places a

restriction on transfers by a bhumidhar but does not deal with

the effect of a deed executed in breach of the restriction

imposed. The effect of the contravention of Section 154 has

been specified in Section 163 and all that Section 163 provides

is that where such a transfer in contravention of Section 154

has been made the transferee shall be liable to ejectment but

the question is from what portion he is liable to be ejected? The

section provides “the transferee shall, notwithstanding

anything in law, be liable to ejectment from such holding

or part”. The expression “holding or part”, which

undoubtedly refers to the holding or part that has been

transferred by the bhumidhar, is preceded by the word

“such” and that whole expression “such holding or part”

clearly means that holding or part thereof which has been

transferred in contravention of Section 154. In other words,

the use of the word “such” clearly suggests that the ejectment

should be from the land transferred in contravention of Section

154, that is to say, from the land in excess of the prescribed

limit. Reading Sections 154 and 163 together, therefore, it

9

(1979) 4 SCC 199

Page 12 of 27

seems to us clear that any transfer by a bhumidhar in

contravention of Section 154 is not void but voidable at

the instance of the Gaon Sabha only to the extent of the

contravention, that is to say, only to the extent of excess

over and above the prescribed limit. Section 189, on which

reliance was placed by counsel for the respondents, deals with

extinction of interest of a transferor-bhumidhar who has

effected a transfer in contravention of Section 154 and has no

bearing on the question as to how and to what extent the

transferee is affected by the contravention.”

(emphasis supplied)

30) It is also pertinent to note that under the statutory framework the

proceedings for ejectment under Section 163 were circumscribed by

limitation. Rule 338 read with Appendix III and Serial No.19 of Uttar

Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules 1952, prescribes a six

year limitation for institution of a suit under Section 163, reckoned from the

date of the alleged illegal transfer. Admittedly, in the present lis, no such

suit was filed during or even beyond the prescribed limitation period.

31) The legislative history of the provisions further fortifies the above

interpretation. Prior to the amendment brought into force w.e.f. 03.06.1981,

Section 166 merely declared transfers made by a sirdar or asami in

contravention of the Act to be void. Transfers by a bhumidhar falling under

Section 154 were separately governed by Section 163 and were not expressly

declared void.

32) However, by U.P. Act No.20 of 1982, enforced w.e.f. 03.06.1981,

Section 163 came to be omitted and Section 166 was amended so as to

include and widen the scope of its operation, to encompass all the transfers

made in contravention of the provisions of the Act and to render such

transfers void. The consequential provisions under Section 167 (post

amendment) were also amended to provide for vesting of such land in the

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State from the date of the transfer itself. The relevant amended provisions

as reproduced below:

“[166. Every transfer made in contravention of the provisions

of this Act, shall be void.]

10

[167.(1) The following consequences shall ensue in respect of

every transfer which is void by virtue of Section 166, namely-

(a) the subject-matter of transfer shall with effect from

the date of transfer, be deemed to have vested in the

State Government free from all encumbrances;

(b) the trees, crops and wells existing on the land on the

date of transfer shall, with effect from the said date, be

deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all

encumbrances; and

(c) the transferee may remove other moveable property or

the materials of any immovable property existing on such

land on the date of transfer within such time as may be

prescribed.

(2) Where any land or other property has vested in the State

Government under sub-section (1), it shall be lawful for the

Collector to take over possession over such land or other

property and to direct that any person occupying such land or

property be evicted therefrom. For the purposes of taking over

such possession or evicting such unauthorised occupants, the

Collector may use or cause to be used such force as may be

necessary.]

11

”

(emphasis supplied)

33) This statutory evolution is not without significance. The omission of

Section 163 and the simultaneous expansion of the ambit of Sections 166

and 167 of the Abolition Act clearly demonstrate that prior to the

amendment, transfers made in contravention of Section 154 were not

treated as void. Had such transfers already been void under the unamended

statutory regime, there would have been no necessity for the legislature to

omit Section 163 and correspondingly expand the operation of Sections 166

and 167 so as to expressly render such transfers void and provide for

automatic vesting in the State. In this regard, it is apposite to refer to the

10

Substituted by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982 (w.e.f. 03.06.1981).

11

Substituted by U.P. Act No. 20 of 1982 (w.e.f. 03.06.1981).

Page 14 of 27

Prefatory Note No-3 appended to the Statement of Objects and Reasons

attached to the Bill pertaining to U.P. Act No.20 of 1982, which reads as

under:

“3. Under the existing provisions the transfers made in contravention

of the provisions of the said Act are declared void after following

the given procedure. It has been considered necessary to

provide that such transfers shall be deemed to be void and no

declaration shall be necessary therefor.”

(emphasis supplied)

34) Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the sale deed dated

04.06.1957 could not have been treated as void by High Court and the

Consolidation Authorities below.

RETROSPECTIV E OPERATION OF THE AMENDED STATUTORY

REGME AND CONSEQUENCES THEREOF ON ACCRUED RIGHTS

35) In view of the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents that

the law prevailing on the date of commencement of the consolidation

proceedings would govern the present dispute, the next question which

arises for consideration is whether the amended provision of Sections 166

and 167 of the Abolition Act, brought into w.e.f. 03.06.1981, could

retrospectively operate upon the sale deed dated 04.06.1957 so as to render

the transfer void and vest the subject land in the state.

36) Before examining the effect of amended provisions, it is necessary to

advert to the settled principles governing retrospective operation of statutes.

In Zile Singh vs. State of Haryana and Others

12

, this Court succinctly

explained that retrospective operation may be inferred where the

12

(2004) 8 SCC 1

Page 15 of 27

amendment merely explains the prior law, cures an acknowledged defect, or

supplies an obvious omission. The following observations are pertinent:

“13. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is

prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary

implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule

in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to

affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair

existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute

sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect

existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only — “nova

constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis ” —

a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past.

(See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.

Singh, 9th Edn., 2004 at p. 438.) It is not necessary that an

express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the

presumption against retrospectivity may be rebutted by necessary

implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure

an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole

(ibid., p. 440).

14. The presumption against retrospective operation is not

applicable to declaratory statutes…. In determining, therefore, the

nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather

than to the form. If a new Act is “to explain” an earlier Act, it

would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An

explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious

omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the

previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or

merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation

is generally intended…. An amending Act may be purely

declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act

which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this

nature will have retrospective effect (ibid., pp. 468-69).

15. Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there

is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute

Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having

retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express

enactment or by necessary implication from the language

employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language

employed that the legislature intended a particular section to

have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an

operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been

expressly given, the courts may be called upon to construe the

provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had

sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute

retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general

scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be

applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was

the legislature contemplated. (p. 388) The rule against

retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a

repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right. (p. 392)”

(emphasis supplied)

Page 16 of 27

37) The principles enunciated in Zile Singh (supra) make it abundantly

clear that retrospective operation may ordinarily be inferred where the

amendment is declaratory, clarificatory, curative, or intended to explain an

obvious omission in the prior law. However, the amendment brought about

to Sections 166 and 167 of the Abolition Act w.e.f. 03.06.1981 does not

answer any such description. Prior to the amendment, transfers falling foul

of Section 154 were governed by Section 163, which merely rendered the

transferee liable to ejectment at the instance of the Gaon Sabha. By the

amendment, Section 163 came to be omitted and the ambit of Sections 166

and 167 was simultaneously enlarged so as to render such transfers void

and provide for vesting in the State. The amendment therefore did not

merely clarify the existing law but introduced a substantive alteration in the

legal consequences attached to such transfers.

38) In contrast to statutes dealing with substantive rights, statutes

dealing merely with matters of procedure are presumed to be retrospective

unless such construction is textually inadmissible. However, even a

procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively

where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to

impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. Further,

a statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights

and obligations shall ordinarily be construed to be prospective unless

otherwise provided either expressly or by necessary implication.

39) It is equally settled that statutes regulating transfers are ordinarily

prospective in operation. Statutes prescribing formalities for effecting

transfers are not applicable to transfers made prior to their enforcement,

Page 17 of 27

and similarly statutes dispensing with earlier formalities do not validate

prior transactions lacking such formalities. Likewise, a transfer valid when

made is not invalidated by a subsequent statutory prohibition. [See:

Thakoor Hurdeo Bux v. Thakoor Jowahir Singh, (1879) 6 IA 161; State

of Kerala v. Philomina, (1976) 4 SCC 314].

40) At this juncture, it is also apposite to refer to the provisions of the

U.P. General Clauses Act, 1904. Section 6(c) thereof provides that unless a

different intention appears, the repeal of an enactment shall not affect any

right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under

the repealed enactment. Similarly, Section 6(e) stipulates that repeal shall

not affect any remedy or legal proceeding in respect of such rights or

liabilities and that the same may be continued as if the repealing enactment

had not been passed. Further, Section 4(13) defines the expression

“enactment” to include any provision contained in an Act. Thus, the

omission of Section 163 and the subsequent enlargement of the ambit of

Sections 166 and 167 cannot, in absence of a contrary intention,

retrospectively alter the legal consequences already attached to transactions

governed by the pre-amended statutory regime.

41) Even arguendo, if the contention advanced on behalf of the

respondents is accepted and Sections 166 and 167 are retrospectively

applied to transactions already governed by Section 163, the same would

create an irreconcilable dichotomy within the statutory framework itself.

Under the unamended regime, Section 163 specifically contemplated a

situation where a transfer made in contravention of Section 154 would

merely render the transferee liable to ejectment at the instance of the Gaon

Page 18 of 27

Sabha. The illegality under Section 163 was therefore neither automatic nor

self-operative, but conditional upon the institution of proceedings by the

Gaon Sabha. In contrast, the amended framework under Sections 166 and

167 treats such transfer itself as void and contemplates automatic vesting of

the land in the State. If both consequences are retrospectively superimposed

upon the same transaction, it would lead to a manifest statutory

inconsistency and an administrative cul-de-sac, thereby defeating the very

legislative scheme underlying the unamended provisions. Such an

interpretation, apart from unsettling vested rights, would attribute to the

legislature an intention to create two mutually inconsistent consequences

governing the same transaction, which plainly cannot be sustained. Such a

construction must be eschewed, for it is a settled principle that statutory

interpretation ought to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy

rather than create internal inconsistency within the enactment itself. [See:

Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd v State of Bihar, 1955 1 SCC 763. ]

42) In the present case, neither the language of the amending Act of 1982

nor the scheme of the amended provisions discloses any express intention to

give retrospective operation to the enlarged scope of Sections 166 and 167 of

the U.P.Z.L.R.A. Equally, no such intention can be gathered by necessary

implication, particularly when the amendment substantially altered the legal

consequences attached to transfers previously governed by Section 163. The

amendment, being substantive in nature and affecting accrued rights and

liabilities, must therefore operate prospectively. Consequently, the sale deed

dated 04.06.1957 could not have been rendered void nor could the land vest

in the State by retrospective application of the amended provisions.

Page 19 of 27

THE STATUTORY COMPETENCE OF CONSOLIDATION

AUTHORITIES VIS-À-VIS REGISTERED INSTRUMENTS

43) This now brings us to the next contention advanced on behalf of the

appellants, namely, whether the Consolidation Authorities were competent

to disregard the registered sale deed dated 04.06.1957 while adjudicating

title under the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,1953.

44) Section 5(2)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings

Act,1953, provides that upon issuance of a notification under Section 4(2),

every suit or proceeding relating to declaration or adjudication of rights and

interests in land situated within the consolidation area shall stand abated,

insofar as such matters can or ought to be adjudicated under the Act.

Similarly, Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act,1953,

expressly bars the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts in respect of

matters relating to declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders,

or any other question which could or ought to be determined by the

consolidation authorities under the statutory scheme. The combined effect

of the aforesaid provisions is that once consolidation operations commence,

the jurisdiction to adjudicate rights and interests in the subject land stands

exclusively vested in the consolidation authorities.

45) In the present lis, the consolidation authorities have proceeded on

multiple grounds to reject the appellants’ claim under the sale deed dated

04.06.1957. Inter alia, it has been held that the said sale deed is hit by

Section 154 of the Abolition Act and is, therefore, void ab initio. Additionally,

reliance has also been placed upon alleged discrepancies in the evidence

regarding execution of the document, including variations in the particulars

Page 20 of 27

of the attesting witness, to doubt its due execution. Proceeding on these

cumulative findings, the authorities declined to accept the sale deed as

conferring valid title upon the appellants.

46) To counter the reasoning of the Consolidation Authorities, the first

limb of the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants rests upon the

decision of this Court in Gorakh Nath Dube v s. Hari Narain Singh and

Others

13

. In the said decision, this Court drew a distinction between

documents which are wholly or partially invalid and can be disregarded in

appropriate proceedings, and those which require cancellation by a

competent court before they cease to have legal effect. It was further held

that while Consolidation Authorities may examine the effect of an invalid

alienation, they cannot ignore a document whose legal effect can only be

taken away by a decree of cancellation. The relevant observations read as

under:

“5. …..a distinction can be made between cases where a document is

wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court

or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it

can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power

to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An

adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be

necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting

claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject-matter of

consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights

claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation

authorities which would be deemed to be invested with

jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory

powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to

declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where

there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken

away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged

that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the

deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so

long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel

it…..”

(emphasis supplied)

13

(1973) 2 SCC 535

Page 21 of 27

47) At this juncture, it would be apposite to elucidate the distinction

between void and voidable transactions, which becomes germane for

appreciating the principle laid down in Gorakh Nath Dube (supra). In this

regard, a beneficial reference can be made to the case of Ningawwa vs.

Byrappa Shiddappa Hireknrabar and Others

14

, wherein the legal

position was explained as follows:

“4…..It is well established that a contract or other transaction

induced or tainted by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the

option of the party defrauded. Until it is avoided, the

transaction is valid, so that third parties without notice of the

fraud may in the meantime acquire rights and interests in the

matter which they may enforce against the party defrauded.

“The fact that the contract has been induced by fraud does not make

the contract void or prevent the property from passing, but merely

gives the party defrauded a right on discovering the fraud to elect

whether he shall continue to treat the contract as binding or

disaffirm the contract and resume the property. If it can be shown

that ‘the party defrauded’ has at any time after knowledge of the

fraud either by express words or by unequivocal acts affirmed the

contract, ‘his’ election is determined for ever. The party defrauded

may keep the question open so long as he does nothing to affirm the

contact.” (Clough v. L. & N.W. Ry.) [(1871) LRs 7 Ex 26, 34] .

5. The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent

misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the

document but as to its character. The autho rities make a clear

distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the

character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as

to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has

been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the

latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon [(1869) 4 CP

704] the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The

defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent

representation by the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. In

holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed:

“It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where

fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not

accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to

sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the

contract to which his name is appended…. The defendant never

intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never

intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or

thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as

to the legal effect, but as to the ‘actual contents’ of the instrument.”

(emphasis supplied)

14

1968 SCC OnLine SC 206

Page 22 of 27

48) The aforesaid distinction between void and voidable instruments in

the context of consolidation proceedings has been recently reiterated by this

Court in Khursheed and Another vs. Shaqoor

15

, wherein, after

considering Ningawwa (supra) and Gorakh Nath Dube (supra), the legal

position was succinctly restated in the following terms:

“10. This Court, in Dularia Devi v. Janardan Singh, 1990 Supp SCC

216 : AIR 1990 SC 1173 relying upon the law laid down

in Ningawwa (supra) and Gorakh Nath Dube (supra) had held that a

“voidable” document continues to be in force until it is set aside

and such a document can only be set aside by a competent civil

court. Further, such documents were held to be binding upon

the Consolidation Authorities so long as they are not cancelled

or set aside by a Court vested with the jurisdiction to do so .

Moreover, in Ram Sakal Singh v. Mosamat Monako Devi , (1997) 5

SCC 192 this Court has held that the consolidation authorities do

not have the jurisdiction and power to cancel a document,

which is required to be set aside or cancelled and the document

will continue to be valid till it is cancelled by a Competent Court

i.e. a Civil Court. This court also held that if the document is void,

it would be open for the Consolidation Authorities to disregard such

a document & in such a case, they would get the exclusive

jurisdiction to proceed with the matter. But if the document is

voidable, the Civil Court is vested with the jurisdiction to

declare the same to be voidable. In the case of voidable

documents, not only would the Consolidation Authorities have

no power to cancel such documents, but even the proceedings

pending before any competent Civil Court would not abate .”

(emphasis supplied)

49) Thus, it is clear from the above principles that Consolidation

Authorities cannot brush away from considering a sale deed which is

voidable, until and unless, the same stands cancelled by a competent Civil

Court.

THE PRESUMPTION OF GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION

50) We will now advert to the next facet of the lis, namely, whether the

Consolidation Authorities and the High Court were justified in doubting the

15

2024 SCC OnLine SC 2929

Page 23 of 27

genuineness and due execution of the registered sale deed dated 04.06.1957

based on alleged discrepancies relating to the attesting witness.

51) At the outset, it is necessary to note that the original sale deed dated

04.06.1957 was a registered document. The original deed having not been

available, a certified copy thereof was produced before the Consolidation

Authorities. It is trite law that a registered document carries a presumption

of valid execution and genuineness unless rebutted by cogent evidence. In

this regard, it would be apposite to refer to the recent decision of this Court

in Hemalatha (D) by Legal Representatives v. Tukaram (D) by Legal

Representatives

and Others

16

, wherein the relevant observation read thus:

“31. It is a settled position of law that a registered Sale Deed carries

with it a formidable presumption of validity and genuineness.

Registration is not a mere procedural formality but a solemn act that

imparts high degree of sanctity to the document. Consequently, a

Court must not lightly or casually declare a registered instrument as

a “sham”. Adopting the principles enunciated in Prem

Singh v. Birbal, (2006) 5 SCC 353

1

, Jamila Begum (Dead) Through

Lrs. v. Shami Mohd. (Dead) Through Lrs. , (2019) 2 SCC 727

2

,

and Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, (2021) 15 SCC 300

3

, this Court

reiterates that the burden of proof to displace this presumption

rests heavily upon the challenger. Such a challenge can only be

sustained if the party provides material particulars and cogent

evidence to demonstrate that the Deed was never intended to

operate as a bona fide transfer of title.

32. The grounds typically accepted to challenge a registered Deed at

the instance of the vendee/executant are fraud or want of capacity in

any party or mistake of fact or fundamental illegality like where the

Deed was executed under deceit or sold by a fraudster who did not

own the land or where the Deed was executed without consideration,

namely, if no money or value was actually exchanged despite recitals

in the Deeds or where there was coercion or intimidation like where

the seller was forced to sign without free consent.

33. While the aforementioned grounds are illustrative and not

exhaustive, this Court must caution against the growing tendency to

challenge registered instruments ‘at the drop of a hat’. If the sanctity

of registered documents is diluted, it would erode public confidence

in property transactions and jeopardize the security of titles. In a

society governed by the Rule of Law, registered documents must

inspire certainty; they cannot be rendered precarious by frivolous

litigation.”

(emphasis supplied)

16

2026 SCC OnLine SC 106

Page 24 of 27

52) The aforesaid observations leave little room for doubt that a registered

conveyance cannot be lightly brushed aside on conjectures or insignificant

discrepancies. The burden to dislodge the presumption attaching to such an

instrument lies heavily upon the party assailing it, and such burden can be

discharged only through clear, cogent and convincing evidence establishing

fraud, fabrication, want of execution or any other circumstance striking at

the root of the transaction itself.

53) At this juncture, it is also necessary to note that attestation is not a

statutory requirement for the validity of a sale deed. Unlike instruments

such as wills or gifts, a sale deed does not derive its validity from

attestation. Consequently, minor discrepancies relating to the particulars of

an attesting witness cannot, by themselves, render the execution of a

registered sale deed doubtful, particularly where the document otherwise

carries the statutory presumption attached to registered instruments. In

this regard, Section 79 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 further provides

that the Court shall presume to be genuine every certified copy which is by

law declared admissible in evidence and which purports to be duly certified

by a public officer in the manner directed by law. Thus, the certified copy of

the registered sale deed produced in the present case carried a presumption

as regards its genuineness and due certification, particularly when the

genuineness of the sale deed itself has never been questioned.

54) In the present lis, one of the principal circumstances which weighed

with the Consolidation Authorities and the High Court while doubting the

execution of the sale deed was the discrepancy in the description of the

Page 25 of 27

attesting witness Baru. In the witness statement recorded on 07.09.1995,

the witness described himself as “Baru son of Nathu, resident of Nasirpur

Kalan”, whereas in the certified copy of the registered sale deed the attesting

witness was described as “Baru resident of Nihandpur Suthari”. Proceeding

on this discrepancy, the authorities below doubted the due execution of the

sale deed itself.

55) In our considered opinion, the aforesaid discrepancy was wholly

inconsequential and incapable of dislodging the presumption attaching to a

registered conveyance executed nearly four decades earlier. The sale deed in

question was executed on 04.06.1957, whereas the testimony of the

attesting witness came to be recorded after approximately 38 years on

07.09.1995. In such circumstances, minor variations in the description of

residence or village particulars could hardly be treated as material

contradictions striking at the root of the transaction itself, particularly when

both villages are admittedly proximate to each other.

56) More importantly, a careful reading of the cross-examination of the

witness Baru does not disclose that any suggestion whatsoever was put to

him that he was a fictitious or fraudulent witness, or that the discrepancy in

the village description rendered his testimony suspicious. The cross -

examination substantially revolved around his memory regarding

surrounding circumstances, boundaries, consideration, and ancillary details

relating to a transaction which had taken place several decades prior.

Significantly, despite lengthy cross-examination, the witness consistently

maintained that he had witnessed the execution of the sale deed and that

possession had been delivered pursuant thereto. No material contradiction

Page 26 of 27

was elicited to impeach his credibility or to establish fabrication of the

document.

57) Equally, it is not even the pleaded case of the respondents that the

sale deed was forged, executed under coercion, impersonation or fraudulent

misrepresentation as contemplated in Ningawwa (supra). The challenge

was not founded upon any allegation that the executants were deceived as

to the character of the document, nor that the transaction suffered from

fraud of such nature as would render the instrument void ab initio. At the

highest, the objections raised pertained only to peripheral discrepancies in

proof. Such circumstances, by no stretch, could justify disregarding a

registered conveyance carrying a presumption of validity in law.

58) Further, the appellants have consistently asserted possession

pursuant to the sale deed, and significantly, such assertion has not been

effectively controverted by the respondents. The cumulative effect of the

registered sale deed, the presumption attaching thereto, the absence of any

substantive challenge alleging forgery or fraud, and the failure of the

respondents to elicit any material contradiction in the testimony of the

attesting witness, clearly render the findings recorded by the Consolidation

Authorities and affirmed by the High Court unsustainable in law.

59) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion

that the High Court as well as the Consolidation Authorities committed

manifest error in treating the sale deed dated 04.06.1957 as void and in

disregarding the same based on immaterial discrepancies relating to the

attesting witness.

Page 27 of 27

60) The impugned judgment and orders , therefore, cannot be sustained

and are accordingly set aside and it is directed that the names of the

appellants be recorded in the revenue records.

61) The Civil Appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.

…………………..........................J.

(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

.………………............................J.

(N.V.ANJARIA)

NEW DELHI;

JUNE 23, 2026.