When there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon to be credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is ...
No Acts & Articles mentioned in this case
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782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
t95o M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India (Sri
.-Narain Andley, with him), for the appellant.
SarJU Pershad L . (H j U · 'th h' ) f th
•. P. . Banerjee . . mrigar, w1 1m , or e
Raia respondents.
Jwaleshwari
Pratap Narain 1950. November 14. The judgment of the Court
S.ngh .t Others was delivered by
Mukherjea J. MuKHERJEA J.-This is an appeal against a judg-
ment
and decree of a Division Bench of the Allahabad
High
Court dated April 22, 1943, which reversed on
appeal those
of the
Civil Judge of Basti dated 6th
of November 1939.
The suit, out of which the appeal arises, was com
menced by the plaintiff, whose successor the present
appellant is, to recover a
sum of Rs. 11,935 by enforce
ment of a simple mortgage bond. The mortgage deed
is dated the 8th of March 1926 and was executed by
Raja
Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the then holder
of Basti Raj which is
an impartible estate governed by
the
rule of primogeniture, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu,
the father of the original plaintiff Ramdeo, to secure a
loan
of Rs.
5,500 advanced by the mortgagee on
hypothecation of certain immovable properties apper
taining to the estate of the mortgagor. The loan
carried interest
at the rate of 9 per cent. per annum
and there was a stipulation to pay the mortgage money
within one year from the date of
the bond. The
mortgagor and the mortgagee were both dead at the
time when the suit was instituted, and the plaintiff in
the action was Ramdeo
Sahu, the son and heir of the
mortgagee, while the principal defendant was
the eldest
son of the mortgagor
who succeeded to the Basti estate
under the rule of primogeniture.
It was stated in the
plaint that absolutely nothing was paid by the
mort
gagor or his successor towards the mortgage dues and
the plaintiff claimed the principal amount of Rs. 5,500
together with interest at the rate of 9 per cent. per
annum up to the date of the suit.
A number of pleas were taken
by the contesting
defendant in answer to the plaintiff's claim, most of
which are not relevant for our
present purpose. The
Iii
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 783
substantial contentions raised by the defendant were 1950
of a three-fold character. In the first place, it was
urged
that the document sued upon was not a properly
Sariu Ptrshad
attested or validly registered document and could not 1
;~ia
operate as a mortgage instrument in law. The second Jwal••hwar;
contention raised was that there was no consideration Pratap Narain
in support of the transaction, at least to the extent of Singh .t Othm.
Rs. 2,000, which was represented by items 3 and 4 of
the consideration clause in the document. The third Mukhorjea J.
and the last material defence related to a claim for
relief under the United Provinces Agriculturists' Relief
Act.
The trial Judge held in favour
of the defendant on
the last point mentioned above and negatived his other
pleas. The result was
that he made a preliminary
decree for sale in favour
of the plaintiff for recovery of
the principal sum
of Rs. 5 ,500 with interest at certain
rates as are sanctioned
by the
U. P. Agriculturists'
Relief
Act; and agreeably to the provisions of that Act
the decretal dues were directed to be paid in a number
of instalments.
Against this decision, the defendant took an appeal
to the High
Court of Allahabad which was heard by
a Division Bench consisting of Verma and York J J.
The learned Judges reversed the judgment of the trial
Judge and dismissed the plaintiff's suit on one ground
only,
viz., that the bond was not attested in the
manner required by law and consequently could not
rank as a mortgage bond ; and as the suit
was instituted
beyond 6 years from the date of the bond, no money
decree could be claimed by the plaintiff.
It is against this judgment that the plaintiff has
come up on appeal to this court, and the main
con
tention raised by the learned Attorney.General, who
appeared in support of the appeal, is that in arriving
at its decision on the question of attestation, the High
Court approached the matter from a wrong standpoint
altogether and
on the materials in the record it had no
justification for reversing the findings of the trial court
on
that point.
The question
for our consideration is undoubtedly
one of
fact, the decision of which depends upon the
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
1950 appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case.
In such cases, the appellate court has got to bear in
S(l,rju P~rshad d · d h" h h
v. min that it has not the a vantage w ic t e trial
Raja Judge had in having ·the witnesses before him and of
Jwal.,hwari observing the manner in which they deposed in court.
Pratap Narai" This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies
Si·•gh & Othera, on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse
~
1
k-;:--. J a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. The rule
u "
1
'a · is -and it is nothing more than a rule of practice --that
when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on
any
matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the
credibility of
the witnesses, then unless there is
some
special feature about the evidence of a particular
witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or
there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace
his opinion as to where
the credibility lies, the appel
late court should not interfere with the finding of the
trial Judge on a question of fact('). The gist of the nume
rous decisions on
this subject was clearly summed up by
Viscount
Simon in Watt v. Thomas('), and his observa
tions were adopted and reproduced in extenso
by the
Judicial
Committee in a very recent appeal from the
Madras High Court('). The observations are as
follows: -·
"But if the evidence as a whole can reasonably be
regarded as justifying the conclusion
arrived at at the
trial, and especially if that conclusion has been arrived
at on confliciting testimony by a tribunal which saw
and heard the witnesses, the appellate court will bear
in
mind that it has not enjoyed this opportunity and
that the view of the trial Judge as to where credibility
lies is entitled
to great weight. This is not to say that
the Judge of first instance can be treated as infallible
in determining which side is telling
the truth or is
refraining from exaggeration. Like other tribunals, he
may go wrong on a question of fact, but it is a cogent
circumstance
that a Judge of first instance, when
(11 Vid9 Lord A•kin's obsetva.tions ·in lV. 0. Macdonald v. Pr~d Latimer,
A.LR. 1929 P.O. 15, 18.
(2) [1947] A.O. 484, alp. 48r..
(3) Vide Saravedrcuwami v. Talluri, A.LR. 19i9 P.O. p. 32,
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 785
estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the 1950
advantage (which is denied to Courts of appeal) of
8
.
-P-d
h
.
th
"t b f h. d b . th ar;u 6'sha
avmg e w1 nesses e ore 1m an o servmg e v
manner in which their evidence is given." Raia
It is in the light of these observations that we pro-Jwal,.hwali
pose to examine the propriety of the decision of the Pratap Nar•m
J h
. . Singh ~Others.
learned udges of t e High Court m the present case. _
It will appear that the mortgage deed besides contain· Mukherjea J.
ing the signature of the executant, purports to bear the
signatures
of three other persons, two of whom are
described as attesting witnesses
<tnd the third one as
the scribe. Harbhajan Lal and Jawala Prasad Tewari
purport
to have signed the document as attesting wit-
nesses and Jawala
Prasad Patwari is the person who
has signed it as the scribe. Jawala Prasad Tewari
was admittedly dead when the suit was brought
and Harbhajan Lal, the only surviving attest-
ing witness was called on behalf
of the plaintiff to
prove the execution of the deed as
is required under
section 68
of the Indian Evidence Act. Harbhajan
Lal stated in the witness box that
he did sign the
document
as a witness and so did Jawala
Prasad
Tewari, but neither of them signed it in the presence
of the mortgagor; nor did the mortgagor sign in their
presence. On this statement being made, the witness
was declared hostile and he was allowed to
be cross-
examined by the plaintiff's
Counsel. He was cross-
examined by the defendant also and in answer to the
questions put to him by the defendant's lawyer,
he
stated that he signed the deed at the
Co!lectorate
Kutchery, meaning thereby the Bar Library, where he
used to sit as a petition writer and the document was
taken to him at that place by Bhikhi Ram Sahu, the
mortgagee, Ghur Lal, a Karinda
ot the mortgagor, and
Jawala
Prasad Patwari, the scribe. Jawala Prasad
Tewari signed the deed after him. The mortgagor
certainly did not come to that place and his signature
was already
on the deed when the witness signed it.
The details of the defendant's version relating to
execution
of this document were given by Jawala
Prasad Patwari,
who was the principal witness on the
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
1950 side of the defendant. He says that he prepared the
--draft at the sherista or the office of the Raja Sahib
SMju Porshad h" h . "d h" K t 1 Th d ft
v w lc lS outs1 e ls o or pa ace. e ra was
Raja prepared under instructions from Bhikhi Ram, the
Jwaleshwari mortgagee. and Ghur Lal, the Karinda of the mort
Pmtap Narain gagor, both of whom were present when the draft was
Singh & Othm prepared. After the draft was fair copied and stamp-
Mukhe,Jea J. ed, the witness signed it as the scribe and then it was
taken
by Bhikhi Ram and Gbur Lal to the Kot or
palace of the
Raja for his signature. After obtaining
the
Raja's signature, Bhikhi Ram went away to his
house
and some time later he as well as Bhikhi Ram
and Gbur Lal went to the
Collectorate Kutchery,
where they took the signatures
of Harbhajan Lal and
Jawala Prasad Tewari. They then went to the
registration office, where the document was presented
for registration
by Jainarayan Sukul who held a
general power
of attorney for the Raja.
As against
this, there is a completely different
version given
by the plaintiff himself and his witness
Buddhu Lal. According to the plaintiff, the
docu
ment was executed and attested at one and the same
sitting in the
Kot or palace of the Raja; the terms had
been settled beforehand between Bhikhi Ram and the
mortgagor
and on the 8th of November 1926 the
plaintiff himself,
and not his father, went to the
Raja's palace at about
10 or 11 A. M. in the morning
to get
the document executed. He was accompanied
by three persons to wit Harbhajan Lal, the deed
writer
of his father, Buddhu Lal, an old servant of the
family, and Jawala Prasad Tewari who was also well
known to the plaintiff
and was taken to bear witness
to
the deed. They found Jawala Prasad Patwari
already
with the Raja when they reached the Kot.
The draft was prepared by Buddhu Lal at the
sugges
tion of the Raja. It was the plaintiff's desire that the
final document should
be scribed by Harbhajan Lal
but as the Raja wanted to oblige Jawala Prasad
Patwari, who was the Patwari of Basti proper, the
deed was faired out and scribed by Jawala Prasad
Patwari. After the Raja had put his signature on the
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 787
document in the presence of Harbhajan Lal and mo
Tewari, both the latter signed the document in the
f l R
· Th b d Sarju Pershad
presence o tie aia. e su sequent events narrate
by the plaintiff relate to the registration of the docu-n:ja
ment and we do not consider them to be material for Jwaleshwari
our present purpose. Pratap Narnin
This story of the plaintiff is supported materially Singh~llim.
and on all points by Buddhu Lal, who was an old .•lukhecjea J.
servant of the family, though he was no longer in
service when
he deposed in court.
There were thus two conflicting versions placed
before the court and each side
attempted to
sub
stantiate its case by verbal testimony of witnesses.
The trial Judge was to decide which
of the two
versions was correct and
he accepted the story of the
plaintiff and rejected that of the defendant.
The learned Judges of the High
Court in dealing
with the appeal do observe, at the beginning of their
discussions,
that on a question of fact the appellate
court should be slow to differ from the conclusions
arrived
at by the trial Judge who had seen and heard
the witnesses;
but in their opinion, this rule did not
apply to the present case
as the trial Judge here did
not base his conclusions
on the impressions created in
his mind
by the witnesses who deposed before
him.
What the trial Judge relied upon, it is said, was not
the demeanour of the witnesses as index of their
credibility
but upon the inherent improbability of the
circumstances deposed to by the defendant's witnesses.
It is observed by the High
Court that the trial Judge,
when
he found the defendant's story to be improbable,
should have considered whether or not there were
improbable features
in the plaintiff's case also, and
_whether the evidence
of the plaintiff and his servant
Buddhu Lal merited credence
at all. The learned
Judges of
the High
Court then proceed to examine
and discuss
at great length the different reasons put
forward by the trial Judge in support of his finding
that the defendant's case was unreliable. These
reasons are held to be inconclusive and unsound and tne High Court further found that the plaintiff's story
.. ,
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
19;0 as narrated by him and his servant is improbable and
not worthy of belief.
Swju Pershad
v. In our opinion, the High C0urt's approach to the
Raia case has not been proper and its findings are un-
Jwaleskwari supportable on the materials in the record.
:rat~p,t;;:'" Here was a case where the controversy related to a
mg"__ ""pure question of fact which had to be determined by
, akheriea J. weighing and appraising of conflicting oral testimony
adduced by the parties.
It cannot be denied that in
estimating the value of oral testimony, the trial Judge,
who sees
and hears the witnesses, has an advantage
which the appellate court does not possess. The High
Court was wrong in thinking that it would detract
from the value to be attached to a trial
Judge's finding
of fact if the
Judge does not expressly base his con
clusion upon the impressions he gathers from the
demeanour of witnesses
(I). The duty of the appellate
court in such cases
is to see whether the evidence
taken as a whole can reasonably justify
the conclusion
which
the trial court arrived at or whether there is an
element of improbability arising from proved circum
stances which, in the opinion
of the court, outweighs
such finding. Applying this principle to
the present
case,
we do not think that the High
Court was justi
fied in reversing the finding of the trial Judge on the
question
of attestiation of the document. In the opinion
of the High
Court the story narrated by the plaintiff
and his servant is untrue, and the main reason given
is that it is not at all probable that the plaintiff and
not his father Bhikhi Ram was present at the palace
of the
Raja when the document was executed. The
mortgagor,
it is said, was an influential person in the
locality occupying a very high social position and it
would be indecorous and against Indian customs
for a
man like Bhikhi
Ram not to be personally present
when the Raja was going
to execute a document in his
favour. The learned Judges seem to
think that the
plaintiff was not really at
the spot when the mortgage
deed was executed
and as Bhikhi Ram was dead, this
story was manufactured by the plain tiff in order to
fll Vida ihe observa.tions of Lord Carson in Netherlatt.dsche Handel
. aatscha:ppij v, R.M,P. Ghetti~r Firm a~d Others, A.LR. 1929 P.C. 20J, '..105,
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 789
enable him to prove attestation. Mr. Banerjee appear-1s5o
ing for the defendant respondent went to the length . -
of suggesting
that it was only after Harbhajan Lal
sar,u Persha<i
turned hostile in the witness box and denied that he R;j.
attested the document that the new story was invent- Jwaleshwari
ed by the plaintiff. Pratop Narain
We think that this argument rests on an extremely Smgh .t OthM.
flimsy basis which does not bear examination. It Muk;;;;.a J.
may be that the Raja was a man of high social posi-
tion, but
it should be remembered that he was in the
position of a borrower and moreover
it was not the
first time
that he was borrowing money from Bhikhi
Ram.
As, however, he was the Raja of Basti, the
document was executed
at his palace and not in the
house
of the mortgagee and if as the plaintiff says,
the terms were already settled between Bhikhi
Ram
and the Raja and the only thing left was to embody
the agreed terms in
writing, we fail to see why it was
absolutely necessary for Bhikhi
Ram to wait upon
the mortgagor personally; and why his adult son, who
was sufficiently old
and experienced in business
affairs, could not represent him in the transaction.
The suggestion of Mr. Banerjee
that the new story
was invented after the plaintiff
had seen Harbhajan
Lal giving evidence against him in the witness box
1s
not worthy of serious consideration having regard to
the fact
that the plaintiff himself stepped into the
witness box immediately after
Harbhajan Lal had
finished his deposition.
It seems to us also that the presence of Harbhajan
Lal
and Buddhu Lal at the sitting when the mortgage
transaction took place was quite a probable
and
natural thing which cannot give
rise to any suspicion.
It appears from the evidence on the record that
Harbhajan Lal, who was a professional deed writer,
was usually employed
for writing deeds of the plaintiff's
father and he figured either as a scribe or
as an
attest
ing witness in various documents to which the plaint
iff's father was a party.
It was quite natural for the
plaintiff in such circumstances to take Harbhajan Lal
_ along with him to
the Raja's palace on the day that
th(!
101
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
1950 mortgage bond was executed and we see no reason to
.
--disbelieve the plaintiff's statement that his original
8
"'
1
u p.,,had intention was to have the deed scribed by Harbhajan
v.
Raja Lal. It is said by the High Court that in the mofussil
Jwaleshwari districts in the United Provinces the Patwari is the
Pratap Narain person generally .employed for drafting and scribing
Singh & Others. deeds. This cannot mean that all the people in the
district of Basti used to have their deeds drafted and
Jfukherjea J.
scribed by the Patwari. We have exhibited docu-
ments in
the records of this case where the name of
Harbhajan Lal appears as the scribe; and so far as the
plaintiff's father was concerned, there is no doubt what
soever
that Harbhajan Lal was the scribe ordinarily
employed to
do his work. In this case also if Jawala
Prasad Patwari had not been present on the spot, the
plaintiff would certainly have the document scribed by
Harbhajan Lal, as so many documents in favour of the
plaintiff's
father had been scfibed by this man on
previous occasions.
We see nothing improbable in the
story
that it was out of deference to the wishes of the
Raja that the plaintiff consented to the document
being scribed
by Jawala
Prasad Patwari.
As regards Buddhu Lal, it is not disputed that he
was
an old and a trusted servant of the plaintiff's
family.
That he was trusted in business matters is
clear from
the fact that his name appears as a witness
in the registered receipt (Ex.
10) given by Sheo Balak
Ram, to whom a sum of Rs. 500 was paid by Bhikhi
Ram under the terms of the disputed mortgage deed.
We fail to see why
it was improbable that Buddhu
Lal would accompany the plaintiff to the Raja's palace
on the day of
the execution of the document.
The
trial Judge relied to some extent upon the fact
that the signatures of the executant and Harbhajan
Lal were in the same ink in support of his conclusion
that Harbhajan Lal signed the document at the place
of its execution
and not at the
Collectorate Kutchery
as alleged
by him. Speaking for ourselves, we do not
attach much importance to the similarity in the ink
which is after all not a very reliable test ; but we do
agree with the trial Judge in holding
that Harbhajan ....
-
S.C.R. SUPREME COURT H.EPORTS 791
1950
Lal must have signed the document at the time when
it was executed and not afterwards; and it is really
Sarju Pe,.shad
inconceivable that an old and experienced deed writer v.
like him did not know the requirements of proper Raja
attestation. On his own evidence he had attested Jwaleshwari
numerous documents and he could not recall a single Pratap Narai"
·instance where he signed the document in such manner Singh &o Others.
as he did in the present case. The way in which the Mukherjea J.
learned Judges of the High Court have attempted to
explain away this
part of Harbhajan Lal's evidence
does not appear to be satisfactory. The other obser-
vation made by the High
Court in this connection that
in this particular province there are many persons who
are acquainted with law but
do
nnt care to comply
with its requirements on accouut of carelessness,
indifference, sloth or over-confidence
is not relevant
and need not be taken seriously. Whatever that may
be, we have no hesitation in holding that Harbhajan
Lal knew perfectly well what attestation means in law
and he did sign the document as an attesting witness
at the Raja's Kot after the document was executed.
Jawala Prasad Patwari is apparently a man under
the control of
the defendant and cannot be trusted.
Why Harbhajan Lal did go over to the defendant's
side
is a
·question which may not admit of an easy
answer. The trial Judge seems to be of opinion that it
was probably due to the influence exercised by
Jaw ala Prasad Patwari, who is a co-villager of Harbhajan.
We think
it unnecessary to speculate upon these
matters, for
ill our opinion Harbhajan Lal stands con
demned
by his own statement in court. Our conclusion is that the finding of the trial Judge
on the question of attestation is perfectly consistent
with the circumstances and probabilities of the case
and the learned Judge did not omit anything which
ought to have been present to his mind in coming to a
conclusion. The evidence
on the record taken as a
whole fully supports the finding, and in our opinion
the High
Court has reversed it on totally inadequate
grounds. The result is
that the appeal must be
il\1Jw~d ind the judgment of tlle Higl1 Court should be
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1950]
1950 set aside. As the High Court, however, has dismissed
--the suit only on the ground of non-attestation of the
Sarju Pmhad mortgage bond and did not consider the other points
;;ja which were raised before it, the case must go. back to
Jwaleshw>ri that court m order that the other matters, which have
Prntap Narain been left undecided, may be heard and decided by the
Singh & Others. learned Judges and the case disposed of in accordance
with law. The plaintiff appellant is entitled to costs of
~fakherjea J. this hearing as well as the costs of the High Court
1950
Nov. 30.
against defendant No. 1.
Appeal allowed.
Agent for the appellant: Rajindar Narain.
Agent for the respondents: 5. P. Varma.
A. M. MAIR & CO.
v.
GORDHANDASS SAGARMULL.
[SAIYID FAZL Au, PATANJALI SASTRI and
MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN JJ.]
Arbitration-Contract by bro~er for sale of goods by "sold"
and "bought" notes-Arbitration clause-Seller denying right of
b•roker to enforce arbitral ,;nn clause-~J urisdiction of arbitrators
Valid,ity of award-Construction of contract.
The appellants, a firm of brokers, entered into a' contract for
the sale and purchase of a quantity of jute under a ''sold note"
addressed to the respondents which they signed as " A & Co.,
brokers" and a "bought note" of the same date and for the
same quantity of jute addressed to a third person in which also
they signed as '
1
A & Co., brokers". The" sold note" contained
the usual arbitration clause under which '' all matters, questions,
disputes, differences
and/.or.
cla.ims, arising out of and/or con
cerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating
to, the contract ......... shall be referred to the arbitration of the
Bengal Chamber of Commerce." A dispute having arisen with
regard to a matter wbich admittedly arose out of the contract
evidenced by the sold note, the appellants referred the dispute
for arbitration. The respondents raised before the arbitrators
the further contention that as the appellants were only brokers
they were not entitled to refer the matter to arbitration. The
arbitrators made an award in favour of the appellants. The
respondents wade an application to the High Court under the
Indian Arbitration Act for setting aside the award:
Held that,. assuming that it was open to the respondents to
raise this objection at that stage, inasmuch as this further dispute -
In the pivotal case of Sarju Pershad v. Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh (1950), the Supreme Court of India established a crucial precedent on the principles of Appellate Court Interference with a trial court's conclusions. This landmark judgment, available for study on CaseOn, clarifies the deference that must be accorded to Findings of Fact when they hinge on the credibility of witness testimonies, setting a high bar for appellate reversal. The ruling underscores the unique advantage a trial judge has in observing the demeanour and veracity of witnesses firsthand, a position an appellate court cannot replicate.
The case originated from a suit to enforce a simple mortgage bond dated March 8, 1926. The bond was executed by Raja Pateshwari Partap Narain Singh, the holder of the Basti Raj impartible estate, in favour of Bhikhiram Sahu for a loan of Rs. 5,500. By the time the suit was filed, both the original mortgagor and mortgagee had passed away. The suit was brought by the mortgagee's son against the mortgagor's eldest son and successor.
The core of the dispute revolved around a single, critical question of fact: Was the mortgage bond properly attested?
The parties presented two diametrically opposed versions of the events surrounding the bond's execution and attestation:
Critically, Harbhajan Lal, the only surviving attesting witness, was called by the plaintiff but turned hostile, supporting the defendant's narrative that he did not sign the document in the mortgagor's presence.
The Trial Judge, after considering the conflicting oral evidence, accepted the plaintiff's version of events. He found the defendant's story improbable and concluded that the mortgage bond was duly attested, granting a preliminary decree for the recovery of the mortgage amount.
However, the Allahabad High Court took a different view. The Division Bench reversed the trial court's decision and dismissed the suit entirely. The High Court's reasoning was that the established rule of an appellate court being slow to interfere with a trial judge's findings did not apply in this case. They argued that the trial judge had based his conclusion on the "inherent improbability" of the defendant's story rather than on the impressions he gathered from the demeanour of the witnesses. Proceeding to re-evaluate the evidence, the High Court found the plaintiff's story to be improbable and unreliable, thereby concluding the attestation was not proven.
The central legal question before the Supreme Court was: What is the correct principle governing an appellate court's power to interfere with a finding of fact by a trial court, especially when the decision hinges on the credibility of conflicting oral evidence?
The Supreme Court reaffirmed a long-standing rule of practice, citing precedents like W. C. Macdonald v. Fred Latimer and Watt v. Thomas. The Court articulated the principle as follows:
"When there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial judge on a question of fact."
Furthermore, the Court clarified that it does not detract from the value of a trial judge's finding if the judge does not expressly state that the conclusion is based on the demeanour of the witnesses. The advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses is inherent to the trial process.
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's approach was improper. It was an error for the High Court to assume it had greater freedom to reassess the evidence simply because the trial judge had not explicitly mentioned witness demeanour. The duty of the appellate court is to determine if the evidence as a whole can reasonably justify the trial court's conclusion.
The Supreme Court then undertook its own analysis of the probabilities:
Navigating conflicting testimonies and assessing witness credibility, as seen in this case, can be complex. For legal professionals short on time, platforms like CaseOn.in offer 2-minute audio briefs that distill the essence of such rulings, providing a quick yet comprehensive understanding of the court's reasoning on specific points of law like appellate interference.
The Supreme Court concluded that the finding of the trial judge was perfectly consistent with the circumstances and probabilities of the case. The High Court, in reversing this finding, had acted on "totally inadequate grounds."
Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court, and remanded the case back to the High Court to decide on any other issues that had been left undecided.
In essence, Sarju Pershad v. Raja Jwaleshwari reinforces the sanctity of a trial court's findings of fact. An appellate court is not to act as a second trial court. Its role is one of review, and it must exercise its power to reverse factual findings with great caution, interfering only when the trial court's conclusion is demonstrably wrong, has overlooked crucial evidence, or is overwhelmingly contradicted by the balance of probabilities.
This judgment is fundamental for both law students and practicing lawyers for several reasons:
It serves as a constant reminder that the printed record of evidence is a poor substitute for the live experience of a trial, and the law rightly respects the judgment of the judge who had that invaluable advantage.
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Disclaimer: The information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice on any legal issue, you should consult with a qualified legal professional.
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