REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3568 OF 2005

SARUP SINGH & ANR. …. Appellants

Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ANR. …. Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3566 OF 2005

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3567 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1.As the facts and issues involved are similar and

interconnected, we propose to dispose of all the appeals by

this common judgment and order. However, we may record

the facts of each of the cases separately and deal with the

issues at one place as they are interconnected.

Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005

2.This appeal arises out of the acquisition of land of Sarup

Singh, the appellant herein, by issuing a notification under

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter

referred to as “the Act”] on 09.10.1974. Possession of the

land was taken on 03.12.1974 and the award was passed

on 11.06.1975. As against the award passed by the Special

Land Acquisition Collector, Bhatinda Cantonment, a

reference case was filed which was decided by the

Reference Court on 31.07.1979. Finally, the matter came

to be decided by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana. The

High Court by an order dated 08.12.1982, determined the

market value of the land and the appellants herein were

also granted solatium at 15 per cent and also interest at 6

per cent per annum. The aforesaid judgment and order

passed by the High Court became final and binding as no

appeal was brought to this Court thereafter.

2

3.Subsequently, however, the decree holders-appellants filed

Civil Miscellaneous Applications No. 1296 of 1985 under

Sections 151 and 152 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [for

short “C.P.C.”] praying for solatium and interest at the

enhanced rate as provided for by the amendment in the Act

(by way of Act 68 of 1984) which was given effect from

24.09.1984. The High Court allowed the said

Miscellaneous Petition by order dated 17.02.1986 by

passing an order enhancing the payment of solatium from

15 per cent to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to 9

per cent per annum for the first year after acquisition and

15 per cent per annum thereafter till the date of actual

payment of the enhanced amount of compensation.

4.On the basis of the aforesaid order dated 17.02.1986, the

appellants filed an execution application before the

Additional District Judge, Bhatinda. The execution

application was dismissed by the Additional District Judge,

Bhatinda by an order dated 30.08.2001 holding that the

appellants herein are not entitled to enhanced rate of

solatium and interest as the award of the Collector and

that of the reference court in their case was passed prior to

3

30.04.1982. The Additional District Judge further held that

the order passed by the High Court under Sections 151

and 152 of C.P.C. was without jurisdiction and as such a

nullity.

5.Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants herein

filed a miscellaneous petition before the High Court which

was registered as Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 and by

the impugned order dated 24.09.2002, the same was

dismissed upholding the order passed by the Additional

District Judge, Bhatinda as against which the present

appeal was filed.

Civil Appeal No. 3566 of 2005

6.This appeal arises out of the same notification dated

09.10.1974, as that of Civil Appeal No. 3568 of 2005,

issued by the respondents under Section 4 of the Act

proposing to acquire land belonging to one Chuhar Singh.

Chuhar Singh died subsequently and therefore his sons,

viz., Hardev Singh, Balwant Singh and Gurbachan Singh

preferred claim on the basis of which the Special Land

Acquisition Collector, Bhatinda Cantonment gave his

4

award on 11.06.1975. As the appellants sought for

reference, a reference case was registered in which the

Additional District Judge passed a judgment and order

dated 31.07.1979. The matter was taken to the High Court

which was initially registered as RFA No. 10687 of 1980

and was decided on 30.07.1981. After which a Letters

patent Appeal No. 128 of 1982 was filed which was decided

on 18.12.1985 and the said was partly allowed and the

respondents were directed to pay solatium at the rate of 30

per cent of the market value of the acquired land as

determined by the court and also interest at the rate of 9

per cent for the first year from the date of their possession

by the Land Acquisition Collector and at the rate of 15 per

cent thereafter till the date of actual payment of enhanced

amount of compensation.

7.The appellants herein filed an execution application for

realization of the balance amount in pursuance to the

order of the High Court in LPA No. 128 of 1982 dated

18.12.1985 which was rejected by the Additional District

Judge, Bhatinda by his order dated 30.08.2001 and the

aforesaid execution applications of the appellants were

5

dismissed by holding that they were not entitled to

enhanced rate of solatium and interest as the award of the

Collector and that of the reference court were prior to

30.04.1982. Additional District Judge, Bhatinda further

held that the aforesaid order passed by the High Court is

nullity in the eyes of law as the benefit of the order of the

High Court dated 18.12.1985 cannot be given to the

appellants in view of various decisions rendered by the

Supreme Court.

8.Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order

passed by the Additional District Judge, Bhatinda the

appellants filed Civil Revision which was registered as Civil

Revision No. 6171 of 2001. The aforesaid matter was also

heard along with the Civil Revision No. 5481 of 2001 filed

by Sarup Singh and Gurdip Singh which was disposed of

by the impugned judgment and order which is under

challenge in Civil Appeal Nos. 3568 and 3566 of 2005.

Civil Appeal No. 3567 of 2005

9.In this case, the lands of the appellants were acquired by

Bhatinda Cantonment in the year 1976 and Special Land

6

Acquisition Collector of Bhatinda Cantonment gave his

award on 18.06.1979. On an application being filed by the

appellants for reference the same was referred to

Additional District Judge, Bhatinda and it was decided on

31.7.1980. Being aggrieved by the said decision of the

Additional District Judge, Bhatinda appellants filed FRA

No. 412 of 1981 before the High Court which was decided

on 27.07.1983. Still aggrieved, appellants filed Special

Leave Petition No. 6701-23 of 1984 in this Court

culminating in Civil Appeal Nos. 4132-65 of 1986. This

Court on 1.9.1986 decided the aforesaid appeals alongwith

the Civil Appeal Nos. 5142-65 of 1986 and enhanced the

compensation holding that the ends of justice require that

compensation shall be awarded to the appellants at the

rate of Rs. 17/- per sq. yard upto the depth of 500 meter of

the acquired and at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. yard

beyond the depth of 500 meters. This Court also held that

consequential payments would also be made on the basis

of the aforesaid rate of compensation. Appellants then filed

their first execution application before the Additional

District Judge for getting said enhanced amount which

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was accordingly ordered vide order dated 9.3.1998 but

with regard to benefits of amended Sections, viz., 23(2) and

28 of the Act, it rejected the prayer of the appellants

holding that since the award of the Collector was given on

18.6.1979 and award of the Court was given on 31.7.1980,

appellants are not entitled to the said benefits.

Respondents then filed revision before the High Court but

the same was dismissed. Respondents then filed appeals

before this Court and vide order dated 12.7.99, the matter

was directed to be filed before the High Court.

10.All the above-mentioned three appeals were listed for

hearing and we heard the learned counsel appearing for

the parties who have ably taken us through all the relevant

documents on record and also placed before us the various

decisions which may have a bearing on the issues raised in

the present appeals.

11.On the basis of the arguments advanced before us the

following issues arise for our consideration: -

a)Whether the benefit of enhancement in the rate of

solatium and interest as introduced by the

Amendment Act of 68 of 1984 could be given to such

of the claimants whose cases for payment of

8

compensation were finalized prior to coming into force

of the aforesaid Amendment Act of 98 of 1984?

AND

b)Whether the judgment and order given by the High

Court enhancing the quantum of compensation by

giving benefit of enhanced solatium from 15 per cent

to 30 per cent and interest from 6 per cent to 9 per

cent per annum in view of the Amendment Act of 68

of 1984 could be negated by the Court of Additional

District Judge, Bhatinda while acting as an Executing

Court and whether the Executing Court of Additional

District Judge, Bhatinda could go behind the

judgment and decree passed by the High Court?

12.In order to answer the aforesaid two issues which arise for

our consideration, we need to point out that the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be amended by virtue of the

Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The said amendment became

effective from 24.09.1984. By the aforesaid Amendment Act

of 68 of 1984, amendments were brought in to the

provisions of Section 23, in that provisions of Sub-Section

23 1(A) and Sub-Section 23 (2) were inserted and added,

which read as follows: -

“Section 23 - Matters to be considered in determining

compensation […]

[…] [(1A) In addition to the market value of the land

above provided, the Court shall in every case award

an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum

per annum on such market-value for the period

commencing on and from the date of the publication of

9

the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), in

respect of such land to the date of the award of the

Collector or the date of taking possession of the land,

whichever is earlier.

Explanation.-In computing the period referred to in

this sub-section, any period or periods during which

the proceedings for the acquisition of the land were

held up on account of any stay or injunction by the

order of any court shall be excluded.

(2) In addition to the market-value of the land as

above provided, the court shall in every case award a

sum of

[thirty per centum on such market-value, in

consideration of the compulsory nature of the

acquisition.]”

13.Similarly, an amendment was brought in to the provisions

of Section 34 by way of Amendment Act of 68 of 1984,

which deals with the quantum of compensation of interest

to be paid to the claimants. In the said section interest

became payable on amendment at 9 per cent per annum

for the period of first one year from the date on which

possession was taken, and thereafter, at the rate of 15 per

cent per annum on expiry of the period of one year on the

amount of compensation. The aforesaid amendment was

made effective by the amending Act of 68 of 1984 from

24.09.1984.

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14.We may also refer to the provisions in Sub-Sections 30 (1)

& 30 (2) of the Act of 68 of 1984 regarding application of

the provisions of the aforesaid amendment to proceedings

pending on or after 30.04.1982 which read as follows: -

“30. Transitional Provisions –

(1) The Provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of

the principal Act, as inserted by clause (a) of Section

15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to

have applied, also to, and in relation to:

(a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land

under the principal Act pending on the 30

th

day of

April, 1982 [the date of introduction of the Land

Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of

the People], in which no award has been made by the

Collector before that date.

(b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land

under the principal Act commenced after that date,

whether or not an award has been made by the

Collector before the date of commencement of this Act.

(2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 and

Section 28 of the principal Act, as amended by clause

(b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act

respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to

have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award

made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed

by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against

any such award under the provisions of the principal

Act after the 30

th

day of April, 1982 [the date of

introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill,

1982, in the House of the People] and before the

commencement of this Act..”

11

15.The aforesaid amended provisions and their application

came to be considered in various decisions of this Court.

Reference in this connection can be made to the decision of

Union of India & Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs.

Etc. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754. This Court in the

aforesaid case was called upon to determine as to which

awards, references and/or appeals would be entitled to

avail of the enhanced rates of interest by virtue of the

Amendment of 1984. In adjudicating the matter, this Court

clearly held that the award made by the Collector under

Section 11 of the Act made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-

1984, i.e., the dates of introduction of the Land Acquisition

Amendment Bill, 1982 in the House of the People and that

of commencement of operation of the Land Acquisition

(Amendment) Act, 1984 respectively, will be entitled to the

enhanced rates under the Amendment. This Court also

held that an award made by the Principal Civil Court of

Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on

a reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of

the Act between the aforesaid dates would also be entitled

to the same, even though it be upon reference from an

12

award made before 30-4-1982,. in which this Court held

as follows: -

“31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to

be clear that the award made by the Collector

referred to here is the award made by the Collector

under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award

made by the Court is the award made by the Principal

Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 23 of

the parent Act on a reference made to it by the

Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There

can be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced

solatium is intended by Section 30(2) in respect of an

award made by the Collector between 30-4-1982 and

24-9-1984. Likewise the benefit of the enhanced

solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of

an award made by the Court between 30-4-1982 and

24-9-1984, even though it be upon reference from an

award made before 30-4-1982.

On the question of appeals to the High Court or Supreme

Court, however, this Court adopted a different stand. It held:-

32. The question is: What is the meaning of the words

“or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme

Court on appeal against any such award?” Are they

limited, as contended by the appellants, to appeals

against an award of the Collector or the Court made

between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984, or do they include

also, as contended by the respondents, appeals

disposed of between 30-4-1982 and September

24,1984 even though arising out of awards of the

Collector or the Court made before 30-4-1982. We are

of opinion that the interpretation placed by the

appellants should be preferred over that suggested by

the respondents. The submission on behalf of the

respondents is that the words ‘any such award’

mean the award made by the Collector or Court, and

carry no greater limiting sense; and that in this

13

context, upon the language of Section 30(2), the order

in appeal is an appellate order made between 30-4-

1982 and 24-9-1984 — in which case the related

award of the Collector or of the Court may have been

made before 30-4-1982. To our mind, the words ‘any

such award’ cannot bear the broad meaning

suggested by learned counsel for the respondents. […]

The words ‘any such award’ are intended to have

deeper significance, and in the context in which those

words appear in Section 30(2) it is clear that they are

intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or

Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984. In other

words Section 30(2) of the Amendment Act extends

the benefit of the enhanced solatium to cases where

the award by the Collector or by the Court is made

between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 or to appeals

against such awards decided by the High Court and

the Supreme Court whether the decisions of the High

Court or the Supreme Court are rendered before 24-9-

1984 or after that date. All that is material is that the

award by the Collector or by the Court should have

been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 […]

[T]o our mind it must necessarily intend that the

appeal to the High Court or the Supreme Court, in

which the benefit of the enhanced solatium is to be

given, must be confined to an appeal against an

award of the Collector or of the Court rendered

between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984.

[...] 34. Learned counsel for the respondents has

strenuously relied on the general principle that the

appeal is a rehearing of the original matter, but we

are not satisfied that he is on good ground in invoking

that principle. [...] If the proceeding has terminated

with the award of the Collector or of the Court made

between the aforesaid two dates, the benefit of

Section 30(2) will be applied to such award made

between the aforesaid two dates. If the proceeding

has passed to the stage of appeal before the High

Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that stage when

the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied. But in

every case, the award of the Collector or of the Court

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must have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-

1984.”

16.This decision of the Court, passed by a Bench of 5 Judges,

squarely applies to the appeals in this case, and makes it

amply clear that the award of the Land Acquisition

Officer/Collector or of the Reference Court must have been

made between the aforesaid stipulated period, i.e., between

30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984.

17.The applicability of the Amendment Act to a proceeding of

the aforesaid nature was made clear by the Act of 18 of

1984 by enacting the provision of Section 30(2). In all the

appeals before us, the award of the Collector and that of

the reference court in their case was passed prior to

30.04.1982. Therefore, the said amendment brought in by

the Act of 18 of 1984 to the concerned provisions could not

have been made applicable to the proceeding of the present

cases. Hence, the judgment and order passed by the High

Court giving the benefit provided by under the Amendment

Act of 68 of 1984, viz., Section 23(1A) and 23(2) and the

amended provision of Section 34 of the Act, cannot be

made applicable in the cases of the appellants herein.

15

18.In so far as the second issue is concerned, it is true that

the executing court cannot go behind the decree and grant

interest not granted in the decree as submitted by the

counsel appearing for the appellants in the light of the

decision rendered by this Court in State of Punjab &

Others v. Krishan Dayal Sharma reported in AIR 1990

SC 2177.

19.But, if a decree is found to be nullity, the same could be

challenged and interfered with at any subsequent stage,

say, at the execution stage or even in a collateral

proceeding. This is in view of the fact that if a particular

Court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or

making an order, a decree or order passed by such Court

would be without jurisdiction and the same is non-est and

void ab initio.

20.The aforesaid position is well-settled and not open for any

dispute as the defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very root

and authority of the Court to pass decree which cannot be

cured by consent or waiver of the parties. This Court in

several decisions has specifically laid down that validity of

any such decree or order could be challenged at any stage.

16

In Union of India v. Sube Ram & Others reported in

(1997) 9 SCC 69 this court held thus:

“5. […] here is the case of entertaining the application

itself; in other words, the question of jurisdiction of

the court. Since the appellate court has no power to

amend the decree and grant the enhanced

compensation by way of solatium and interest under

Section 23(2) and proviso to Section 28 of the Act, as

amended by Act 68 of 1984, it is a question of

jurisdiction of the court. Since courts have no

jurisdiction, it is the settled legal position that it is a

nullity and it can be raised at any stage.”

21.In yet another case of Amrit Bhikaji Kale & Others v.

Kashinath Janardhan Trade & Anothers reported in

(1983) 3 SCC 437 this Court has held that when a

Tribunal of limited jurisdiction erroneously assumes

jurisdiction by ignoring a statutory provision and its

consequences in law on the status of parties or by a

decision are wholly unwarranted with regard to the

jurisdictional fact, its decision is a nullity and its validity

can be raised in collateral proceeding.

22.In Balvant N. Viswamitra & Others v. Yadav Sadashiv

Mule (Dead) Through Lrs. & Others reported in (2004) 8

SCC 706 this Court stated thus:

17

“9. The main question which arises for our

consideration is whether the decree passed by the

trial court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our

opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The

distinction between a decree which is void and a

decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in

accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored.

Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a

decree or making an order, a decree or order passed

by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est

and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court

goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very

authority of the court to pass a decree or make an

order. Such defect has always been treated as basic

and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a

court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a

nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be

challenged at any stage, even in execution or

collateral proceedings.”

23.In Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka (deceased) Through Lrs. v.

Jasjit Singh & Others reported in (1993) 2 SCC 507 this

Court stated thus:

“18. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court

without jurisdiction on the subject-matter or on the

grounds on which the decree made which goes to the

root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is a

coram non judice. A decree passed by such a court is

a nullity and is non est. Its invalidity can be set up

whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon

as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of

execution or in collateral proceedings. The defect of

jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to

pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or

waiver of the party. ………….”

24.In the present cases the judgment and order passed by the

High Court before the amendment Act of 68 of 1984

became final and binding as no appeal was brought to this

18

Court thereafter. However, consequent to the Amendment

in the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants had filed civil

miscellaneous applications for the grant of 30 per cent

solatium and 9 per cent interest for first year and 15 per

cent interest thereafter. This Court has also held in a

catena of decisions that a decree once passed and which

has become final and binding cannot be sought to be

amended by filing petition under Sections 151 and 152,

C.P.C. In the case of Union of India v. Swaran Singh &

Others reported in (1996) 5 SCC 501 this Court held

thus:-

“8. The question then is whether the High Court has

power to entertain independent applications under

Sections 151 and 152 and enhance solatium and

interest as amended under Act 68 of 1984. This

controversy is no longer res integra. In State of Punjab

v. Jagir Singh and also in a catena of decisions

following thereafter in Union of India v. Pratap Kaur;

State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar;

State of Punjab v. Babu Singh; Union of India v.

Raghubir Singh and K.S. Paripoornan v. State of

Kerala, this Court has held that the Reference Court

or the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to

entertain any applications under Sections 151 and

152 to correct any decree which has become final or

to independently pass an award enhancing the

solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of 1984.

Consequently, the award by the High Court granting

enhanced solatium at 30% under Section 23(2) and

interest at the rate of 9% for one year from the date of

taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% till

date of deposit under Section 28 as amended under

Act 68 of 1984 is clearly without jurisdiction and,

therefore, a nullity. The order being a nullity, it can be

challenged at any stage. Rightly the question was

raised in execution. The executing court allowed the

19

petition and dismissed the execution petition. The

High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing

the revision and setting aside the order of the

executing court.”

25.In the case of Union of India v. Rangila Ram (dead) by

Lrs. Reported in (1995) 5 SCC 585 held as follows: -

“4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has

considered the scope of the power of the High Court

under Sections 151 and 152, CPC and also under

Section 13-A of the Act. This Court has held that once

the civil court made an award as per law then in force

which became final and that there is no error of law

as on that date. Subsequent amendment does not

give power to the court to amend the decree under

Sections 151 and 152, CPC. This was held in State of

Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar and Union

of India v. Pratap Kaur. In Maharau Srawan Hatkar

case this Court held that the civil court lacked

inherent jurisdiction and was devoid of the power to

entertain an application to award additional benefits

under the Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The facts

therein were that the award had become final and the

Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24-

9-1984. The respondents made an application under

Sections 151 and 152, CPC to award enhanced

solatium and additional benefits etc. and the civil

court allowed and granted the same. In that context,

considering the civil court’s power under Sections 151

and 152, CPC, this Court laid the above law.”

26.In the case of Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. & Another

reported in (1999) 3 SCC 500 this Court described the

scope of Section 152, C.P.C. thus:

“6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical

or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or

orders of errors arising therein from any accidental

slip or omission. The exercise of this power

contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of

20

its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of

passing effective judicial orders after the judgment,

decree or order. The settled position of law is that

after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the

court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus

being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments,

decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections

contemplated are of correcting only accidental

omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and

mistakes which might have been committed by the

court while passing the judgment, decree or order.

The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the

merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152

for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is

to file appeal or review application. It implies that the

section cannot be pressed into service to correct an

omission which is intentional, however erroneous that

may be. It has been noticed that the courts below

have been liberally construing and applying the

province of Sections 151 and 152 of the CPC even

after passing of effective orders in the lis pending

before them. No court can, under the cover of the

aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of

its original judgment, decree or order. ………….”

27.There are number of decisions of this Court wherein it has

also been held that a wrong judgment given by the High

Court cannot be taken as precedence for perpetrating such

wrong. In the case of State of Haryana & Others v. Ram

Kumar Mann reported in (1997) 3 SCC 321 held as

follows: -

“3. The question, therefore, is whether the view taken

by the High Court is correct in law. It is seen that the

respondent had voluntarily resigned from the service

21

and the resignation was accepted by the Government

on 18-5-1982. On and from that date, the relationship

of employer and the employee between the

respondent and the State ceased and thereafter he

had no right, whatsoever, either to claim the post or a

right to withdraw his resignation which had already

become effective by acceptance on 18-5-1982…The

doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence

of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and

denied equality as some similarly situated persons

had been given the same relief. Article 14 would

apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out

to equals and similarly circumstanced without any

rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The

respondent has no right, whatsoever and cannot be

given the relief wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of

withdrawal of resignation. The High Court was

wholly wrong in reaching the conclusion that there

was invidious discrimination. If we cannot allow a

wrong to perpetrate, an employee, after committing

mis-appropriation of money, is dismissed from service

and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is

reinstated into the service. Can a similarly

circumstanced person claim equality under Article 14

for reinstatement? The answer is obviously “No”.. A

wrong decision by the Government does not give a

right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or

equality. Two wrongs can never make a right. Under

these circumstances, the High Court was clearly

wrong in directing reinstatement of the respondent by

a mandamus with all consequential benefits.”

28.In the case of State of Bihar & Others v. Kameshwar

Prasad Singh & Another reported in (2000) 9 SCC 94 this

Court held thus: -

“30. The concept of equality as envisaged under

Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept

22

which cannot be enforced in a negative manner...

Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or

illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the

plea of equality as enshrined in Article 14 of the

Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High

Court. The Court observed: (SCC p. 465, para 9)

“Neither Article 14 of the Constitution conceives within

the equality clause this concept nor Article 226

empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of

equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it

shall amount to directing to continue and perpetuate

an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending

similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on

equality clause is upheld, it must be established by

the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has

been denied to him, while it has been extended to

others and in this process there has been a

discrimination.”

Again in Secy., Jaipur Development Authority v. Daulat

Mal Jain reported in 1996 (7) SCALE 135 this Court

considered the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution and

reiterated its earlier position regarding the concept of equality

holding: (SCC pp. 51-52, para 28)

“Suffice it to hold that the illegal allotment founded

upon ultra vires and illegal policy of allotment made to

some other persons wrongly, would not form a legal

premise to ensure it to the respondent or to repeat or

perpetuate such illegal order, nor could it be legalised.

In other words, judicial process cannot be abused to

perpetuate the illegalities. Thus considered, we hold

that the High Court was clearly in error in directing

the appellants to allot the land to the respondents.”

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31. In State of Haryana v. Ram Kumar Mann this

Court observed: (SCC p. 322, para 3)

“The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon

existence of an enforceable right. He was

discriminated and denied equality as some similarly

situated persons had been given the same relief.

Article 14 would apply only when invidious

discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly

circumstanced without any rational basis or

relationship in that behalf. The respondent has no

right, whatsoever and cannot be given the relief

wrongly given to them, i.e., benefit of withdrawal of

resignation. The High Court was wholly wrong in

reaching the conclusion that there was invidious

discrimination. If we cannot allow a wrong to

perpetrate, an employee, after committing

misappropriation of money, is dismissed from service

and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is

reinstated into the service. Can a similarly

circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14

for reinstatement? The answer is obviously ‘No’. In a

converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong

but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for

claiming equality for enforcement of the same order.

As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon

enforceable right to entitle him to the equality

treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision

by the Government does not give a right to enforce the

wrong order and claim parity or equality. Two wrongs

can never make a right.”

29.In the light of the aforesaid settled position of law, when

we examine the facts of the present cases it is patently

obvious that the reference case and the matter of payment

of compensation to the appellants became final and

binding after the award was passed and the judgment was

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pronounced by the reference court and further by the High

Court and thereafter, no appeal having been filed in this

Court. Such a judgment and decree which has become

final and binding could not have been reopened by the

High Court on the basis of revision applications filed under

Section 151 and 152 of C.P.C.

30.In view of the two issues that we have discussed and

elaborated herein, we are of the considered opinion that

the executing court as also the High Court were justified in

holding that the orders passed by the High Court granting

enhanced solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of

1984 is without jurisdiction and a nullity.

31.We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals. The orders

passed by the executing court and the High Court are

found to be legal, valid and justified. We, accordingly,

dismiss all these appeals, but, we leave the parties to bear

their own costs.

............................................J

[Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

............................................J

[ Anil R. Dave ]

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New Delhi

November 25, 2010.

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