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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019)

SATISH CHANDRA YADAV ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2022

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021)

J U D G M E N T

J.B. Pardiwala, J. :

1. Leave granted.

2. Since the issues raised in both the captioned matters are

almost the same and the principles of law applicable are also

common, those were taken up for hearing analogously and are

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being disposed of by this common judgment and order.

3. We first take up the Appeal arising out of the Special Leave

Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 20860 of 2019

4. This appeal is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ

applicant of a writ application being the Writ Petition (C) No. 1167

of 2018 filed in the High Court of Delhi and is directed against the

judgment and order dated 15.04.2019 by which a Division Bench

of the High Court rejected the writ application filed by the writ

applicant (appellant herein) thereby affirming the dismissal of the

appellant herein from service as a Constable (General Duty) with

the CRPF.

5. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as

under:

5.1 The appellant herein was serving as a Constable (General

Duty) with the CRPF. He was recruited as a temporary employee of

the post of Constable (GD) in the CRPF on 28 .07.2014. After

undergoing the basic training, he reported at the 179

th Battalion

on 17.12.2015.

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5.2 While filling up the requisite verification Form–25 at the time

of his recruitment in the CRPF in Column 12 in response to the

question whether any case was pending against him, the appellant

answered in the negative.

5.3 Thereafter, under Rule 14 of the CRPF Rules, the Character

and Antecedents verification Form of the appellant was sent to the

Collector, District Sant Kabir Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. The Collector,

vide his letter dated 25.02.2015, informed the Deputy Inspector

General of Police (DIGP), Group Centre, CRPF Rampur that the

Criminal Case No. 1015 of 2008 had been registered against the

appellant herein at the P.S. Khalilabad Sant Kabir Nagar, Police

Station for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 323, 324,

504 and 506 resply of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”).

Upon receipt of the information as aforesaid, the services of the

appellant herein came to be terminated in exercise of the powers

conferred under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary

Service) Rules, 1965 vide the order dated 11.03.2016 on the

ground that he had concealed the information as aforesaid while

filling up the Form–25.

5.4 The further appeal addressed by the appellant herein to the

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Inspector General (IG) was also dismissed.

5.5 The appellant herein challenged his dismissal from service by

filing the Writ Petition (C) No. 10558 of 2016 in the High Court of

Delhi. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by a Division Bench

of the High Court on 25.09.2017 remitting the matter to the

Revisionary Authority for fresh consideration within a period of six

weeks from the date the appellant herein would make a

representation.

5.6 The representation filed by the appellant herein ultimately

came to be rejected and a fresh order dated 05.01.2018 reiterating

the termination of the appellant’s services was passed.

5.7 The appellant herein once again preferred a fresh Writ

Petition (C) No. 1167 of 2018 challenging the impugned order dated

05.01.2018 terminating his services.

5.8 The High Court rejected the writ petition vide order dated

15.04.2019 holding as under:

“9. The fact remains that FIR No. 1015/2008 was

registered at P.S. Khalilabad against the Petitioner and

placed under Sections 147/323/324/504/506 IPC.

Admittedly, the Petitioner got bail in the above Criminal

case which was for cognizable offences. It is not

therefore the case where the time of filing up of the

verification form-25 the Petitioner was not aware of the

pendency of the Criminal case against him.

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x x x

11. In the present case, on the date of filling up of

the verification form the criminal case against the

Petitioner was very much pending. The fact that the

charge sheet had been filed after the filling up the form

will not make any difference to the fact that the

Petitioner deliberately gave a wrong answer to the

question whether any case was pending against the

Petitioner. This could not be termed as innocent. The

Petitioner is applying for the post of Constable in a para

military organization and is expected to be truthful in

all responses to the columns in the verification form. At

the time of filling up of that form the Petitioner was very

much aware of the pendency of the criminal case.

Therefore, there could be no excuse for not filling up the

correct answer in response to the question under

Column 12.

12. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds

no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the

DA which was confirmed by the AA.”

6. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here

before this Court with the present appeal.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant

7. Ms. Jyoti Dutt Sharma, the learned counsel appearing for the

appellant vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a

serious error in passing the impugned order. She would submit

that the prosecution against the appellant was of a very trivial

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nature. It did not involve any moral turpitude. The suppression, if

at all believed, by itself, cannot be a ground to deny public

employment. It was argued that the appellant had no knowledge of

the pendency of the criminal case on the date when the verification

Form was filled up. She submitted that for the purpose of

determining whether the suppression was with a guilty mind, the

attestation/verification Form should be very specific and not vague

so as to confuse the person filling up such Forms. It was further

argued that at the relevant point of time, the appellant was 19

years of age. The criminal prosecution against him along with the

others was on account of a family dispute. The appellant had been

falsely arrayed as an accused in the said case. There was a

settlement between the parties before the local village panchayat.

Ultimately, the appellant herein along with the other co-accused

came to be acquitted by the trial court.

8. The learned counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of

this Court in the case of Avatar Singh v. Union of India, (2016)

8 SCC 471 to fortify her submission that while passing the order

of termination of services for giving false information, the employer

must take notice of the special circumstances of the case, if any.

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The High Court, in the first round of litigation, had taken notice of

such non-application of mind and thought fit to remit the case for

fresh consideration. It was argued that even upon fresh

consideration, the Authority committed the very same mistake

while reiterating the termination.

9. In the last, the learned counsel submitted that the High Court

failed to consider an important question of fact that the Form CRP–

25 was quite vague and not specific about the information in regard

to the criminal antecedents. It is on account of such vagueness

that the appellant was not able to understand the question in a

proper manner and answered the same accordingly which is now

being treated as false information.

10. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel

prays that there being merit in her appeal, the same may be

allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court may be

set aside and the appellant may be ordered to be reinstated in

service with full back wages.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent

11. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed

by Ms. Madhavi Divan, the Additional Solicitor General (ASG)

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submitting that no error, not to speak of any error of law, could be

said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the

impugned order. She would submit that the appellant is guilty of

“suppression” of material facts which, by itself, was sufficient to

terminate his services. It was argued that the services of the

appellant herein were terminated because he was found guilty of

submitting false information or to put in other words, guilty of

suppression of material facts. The learned ASG vehemently

submitted that the appellant herein not only suppressed

information about his arrest but also suppressed the information

about the criminal case which was pending against him at the time

he filled up the verification Form.

12. The learned ASG further submitted that the appellant herein

and the other co-accused were not honourably acquitted. They all

came to be acquitted as the prosecution witnesses turned hostile.

The learned ASG, while relying on the decision of this Court in the

case of Avtar Singh (supra), more particularly, the para 38.4

therein submitted that the Authority concerned is duty bound to

take into account the gravity of the offence in a situation where

acquittal is not recorded at the time of filling up of the verification

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Form.

13. It was argued that in a disciplined force which seeks to

maintain high standards of integrity the suppression of material

facts cannot be countenanced.

14. In the last, the learned ASG submitted that the judicial review

under Article 136 of the Constitution in matters pertaining to the

suitability of a candidate is limited to the extent of determining if

the Authority concerned had acted with malice, mindlessness or

gross illegality. She placed strong reliance on the decision of this

Court in the case of Commissioner of Police v. Raj Kumar, (2021)

8 SCC 347 to fortify her submission that the scope of judicial

review in the matters of the present type is very limited. She placed

reliance on the following observations made by this Court:

“28. Courts exercising judicial review cannot second

guess the suitability of a candidate for any public office

or post. Absent evidence of malice or mindlessness (to

the materials), or illegality by the public employer, an

intense scrutiny on why a candidate is excluded as

unsuitable renders the courts' decision suspect to the

charge of trespass into executive power of determining

suitability of an individual for appointment. This was

emphasised by this Court in M.V.

Thimmaiah v. UPSC [M.V. Thimmaiah v. UPSC, (2008)

2 SCC 119 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 409] which held as

follows : (SCC pp. 131, 135-36, paras 21 & 30)

“21. Now, comes the question with regard to the

selection of the candidates. Normally, the

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recommendations of the Selection Committee

cannot be challenged except on the ground of mala

fides or serious violation of the statutory rules. The

courts cannot sit as an appellate authority to

examine the recommendations of the Selection

Committee like the court of appeal. This discretion

has been given to the Selection Committee only and

courts rarely sit as a court of appeal to examine the

selection of the candidates nor is the business of

the court to examine each candidate and record its

opinion. …

x x x x

31. Public service — like any other, presupposes that

the State employer has an element of latitude or choice

on who should enter its service. Norms, based on

principles, govern essential aspects such as

qualification, experience, age, number of attempts

permitted to a candidate, etc. These, broadly constitute

eligibility conditions required of each candidate or

applicant aspiring to enter public service. Judicial

review, under the Constitution, is permissible to ensure

that those norms are fair and reasonable, and applied

fairly, in a non-discriminatory manner. However,

suitability is entirely different; the autonomy or choice

of the public employer, is greatest, as long as the

process of decision-making is neither illegal, unfair, or

lacking in bona fides.”

15. The learned ASG also placed strong reliance on the decision of

this Court in the case of Union of India and Others v. Methu

Meda, (2022) 1 SCC 1, more particularly, in the following

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observations as under:

“17. In view of the above, in the facts of the present

case, as per paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of Avtar Singh

case [Avtar Singh v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 471 :

(2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425] , it is clear that the employer

is having right to consider the suitability of the

candidate as per government orders/instructions/rules

at the time of taking the decision for induction of the

candidate in employment. Acquittal on technical ground

in respect of the offences of heinous/serious nature,

which is not a clean acquittal, the employer may have

a right to consider all relevant facts available as to the

antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to

the continuance of the employee. Even in case, truthful

declaration regarding concluded trial has been made by

the employee, still the employer has the right to

consider antecedents and cannot be compelled to

appoint the candidate.”

16. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned ASG

prayed that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be

dismissed.

Analysis

17. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

having gone through the materials on record, the only question

that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court

committed any error in passing the impugned order?

18. The following facts are not in dispute:

a) The verification Form was filled up by the appellant on

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02.09.2014.

b) A First Information Report was registered against the appellant

herein and others on 26.05.2008 for the offences punishable

under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324, 504 and 506 resply of the

IPC.

c) Upon registration of the FIR on 26.05.2008, the appellant

herein filed two applications in the Court of the Chief Judicial

Magistrate, Sant Kabir Nagar, one application seeking to

surrender himself before the Court in connection with the FIR

referred to above and the second application seeking for regular

bail.

d) It appears that the appellant upon surrendering before the

Chief Judicial Magistrate was taken in deemed judicial custody

with effect from 06.06.2008 and was ordered to be released on

bail on 10.06.2008. It appears that the appellant was not

actually put behind bars as asserted by the appellant.

e) At the end of the investigation, the Investigating Officer filed

chargesheet in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate which

culminated in the Criminal Case No. 1015 of 2008. The

appellant herein and the other co-accused were put to trial and

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vide the judgment and order dated 13.01.2016 passed by the

Chief Judicial Magistrate District Sant Kabir Nagar came to be

acquitted.

f) At the time when the services of the appellant came to be

terminated, he was a probationer.

g) In the verification Form, more particularly in clause 12, the

following questions are to be found:

“(a) Have you ever been arrested? Yes/No✔

(b) Have you ever been prosecuted? Yes/No✔

(c) Have you ever been kept under detention Yes/No✔

x x x x

(i) Is any case pending against you in any Court Yes/No✔

of Law at the time of filling up this Verification

Roll?”

19. Against all the aforesaid questions, the appellant put a tick

on “NO”, as above.

20. The Authority concerned reached to the conclusion that the

appellant had not only suppressed the fact that an FIR was

registered against him but also suppressed the fact that he had

surrendered before the Chief Judicial Magistrate who, in turn, had

released him on regular bail. He also suppressed the fact that there

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was a Criminal Case No. 1015 of 2008 registered against him and

pending in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate for the offences

enumerated above.

21. In such circumstances, a notice was issued to the appellant

herein to show cause as to why his services should not be

terminated. Upon conclusion of the enquiry the appellant

ultimately came to be dismissed from service.

22. We now look into the connected Appeal arising out of the

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5170 of 2021.

23. This appeal is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicant

of a writ application being the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 9456 of 2018

filed in the High Court of Delhi and is directed against the judgment

and order dated 04.02.2020 by which a Division Bench of the High

Court rejected the writ application filed by the writ applicant

(appellant herein) thereby affirming the dismissal of the appellant

herein from service as a Sub-Inspector/GD, 45th Battalion, CRPF.

24. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as

under:

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24.1 The appellant herein was serving on the post of SI/GD with

the CRPF.

24.2 In August, 2011, the appellant had applied for the post of SI

in the CRPF pursuant to a call for applications by the Union Public

Service Commission.

24.3 As part of the said application, the appellant was required to

fill the CRP-25 verification Form. While filling up the form in

August, 2011, in response to the question of whether any criminal

proceeding is pending against him in any court of law, he answered

in the negative.

24.4 The appellant came to be inducted in the CRPF as an SI.

24.5 The appellant received an order dated 19.11.2015 from the

office of the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIGP), Rampur, UP

whereby he was informed that an inquiry would commence on the

Article of Charge (AOC) under Section 11 of the CRPF Act r/w Rule

27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 that had been framed against him. The

translated version of the statement of the AOC reads as under:

“That No. 115213628 SI/GD Pushpendra Kumar

Yadav, C/45 Battalion, CRPF, while working on the

post of Sub Inspector / GD, being the member of force,

has committed the misconduct and misbehaviour, in

which at the time of recruitment, personnel gave false

information in the Past Antecedents Verification Form

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(CRP Form – 25) at column No. 12 (a and b) that no case

is pending against the personnel in any court, however

before the recruitment of personnel, a case Crime No.

261/2002 under Section 147, 149, 323, 325, 504, 506,

307 IPC was registered against him at Police Station

Khajni, District Gorakhpur (UP. Personnel, during his

recruitment, has concealed the information regarding

criminal case pending against him and misguided the

department by giving wrong information, which is an

offence punishable under Section 11 (1) of CRPF Act,

1949 and Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force

Rules, 1955.”

24.6 By an order dated 23.09.2016, the office of the DIGP imposed

a penalty of removal from service on the applicant.

24.7 Departmental inquiry came to be conducted in which the

appellant submitted his defence statement. The Inquiry Officer

submitted his report to the Commandant, 45

th Battalion, who in

turn submitted it to the DIG.

24.8 The appellant offered inter alia the following reasons in his

defence:

(i) He was entirely unaware about the pendency of a case against

him in Rampur as he “was studying outside the village.”

(ii) When he met some of the co-accused, they “assured” him that

a compromise had been reached in the criminal case.

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(iii) He never received any summons nor appeared before any

Court.

(iv) He could not understand the meaning of the contents of the

12(a) and (b) of the verification Form.

24.9 Upon considering the aforesaid reasons put forth by the

appellant and his response to the questions in column 12 (a) and

(b) of the verification Form, the DIGP, Rampur vide order dated

23.09.2016 imposed the penalty of removal of service on the

appellant.

24.10 The appeal filed by the appellant in the office of the Inspector

General of Police (IGP), Lucknow also came to be dismissed.

24.11 The revision petition filed by the appellant in the office of

SDG also came to be rejected.

24.12 The appellant thereafter preferred the writ petition being the

Writ Petition No. 9456 of 2018 in the High Court questioning the

legality and validity of the action of removal from service.

24.13 The High Court adjudicated the Writ Petition and vide the

impugned judgment and order dated 04.02.2020 rejected the same.

The High Court while rejecting the writ application held as under:

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“26. The Court has perused all the impugned orders,

which have taken note of the facts surrounding the

Petitioner’s case, as noted in the foregoing paragraphs,

and arrived at the decision to remove the Petitioner from

service. The Petitioner’s contention that the

Respondents in accordance with the decision in Avtar

Singh (supra) were required to factor in the relevant

facts as to his antecedents, is untenable. In order for

the Petitioner to demand that the Respondents consider

his antecedents before passing an order of termination

from service, as per paragraph 34 (4) (c) of Avtar Singh

(supra), the Petitioner’s acquittal should have been

before his appointment. Admittedly, the Petitioner’s

case is not one of acquittal before his appointment.

27. In any event, the order of the DA has set out detailed

reasons for rejecting every contention raised by the

Petitioner in his representation against the findings in

the inquiry report. The orders of the AA, RA as well as

the DG, CRPF also do not merely reiterate the findings

of each lower authority, but offer their reasons for

affirming the penalty of removal of service, while

having regard to the CRPF Act and Rules. The Court,

therefore, is not convinced by the Petitioner’s argument

alleging "non-application of mind" on the part of the

Respondents.

28. As regards the Petitioner’s submission that the

Respondents had not complied w ith the DoPT’s

instructions on the handling of

anonymous/pseudonymous complaints as put forth in

several OMs issued in this regard, it bears mentioning,

firstly, that the OM dated 11th October, 2002 upon

which the Petitioner relied, which stipulated that prior

concurrence of the CVC was required to taken to look

into the verifiable facts contained in such

anonymous/pseudonymous complaints, has since been

withdrawn by an OM dated 26th November, 2014.

29. Turning to OM dated 18th October 2013, paragraph

3 (iii) thereof reads as under:

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"(iii) If a complaint contains verifiable allegations,

the administrative Ministry/Department may take

cognizance of such complaint with the approval of

the competent authority to be designated by the

Ministry/Department as per their distribution of

work. In such cases, the complaint will be first sent

to the complainant for owning/disowning, as the

case may be. If no response is received from the

complainant within 15 days of sending the

complaint, a reminder will be sent. After waiting for

15 days after sending the reminder, if still nothing

is heard, the said complaint may be filed as

pseudonymous by the Ministry/Department."

30. It must be noticed, at this juncture, that it is not the

Petitioner’s case that the paragraph reproduced

hereinabove was not complied with by the

Respondents. In any event, the aforesaid paragraph 3

(iii) makes provision for the method of ascertaining the

identity of the complainant before such a complaint may

be filed as "pseudonymous." A bare perusal of the

record of the case evinces that such an attempt was

made by the Respondents by engaging in

correspondence with the SP, Gorakhpur, through which

the Petitioner’s involvement in criminal proceedings

was incontrovertibly established. Indeed, nowhere has

the Petitioner denied his involvement in the case

thereafter. Hence, the Respondents cannot be faulted

for relying solely on an unsubstantiated pseudonymous

complaint in proceeding against the Petitioner.

31. Learned counsel for the Petitioner then referred to a

letter dated 1st February 2012 issued by the Ministry

of Home Affairs announcing ‘Policy Guidelines for

considering cases of candidates for appointment in the

CAPFs - pendency of criminal cases against candidates

- the effect of:.’ He referred in particular to para 2 (iii) of

the said document which lists out instances where the

candidate ‘will not be considered for recruitment’ and

to the first proviso thereto which states "Provided

further that the candidate shall not be debarred in the

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above cases, if only an FIR has been registered/the

case is under investigation and no charges have been

framed either or FIR or on the complaint in any court of

law." Learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that

in the instant case since at the time of his filling up the

form in August 2011, only an FIR registered against him

and charges were not yet framed, the above proviso

would apply.

32. This Court is unable to accept the above submission.

The said policy guidelines do not excuse the candidate

from giving correct answers to the questions posed in

the application/attestation form. In fact, it presupposes

that the candidate has been truthful about the pending

FIR. However, in the present case, it is not in dispute

that the Petitioner did not give the correct answers to

the critical questions about pendency of the criminal

case against him. The proviso to para 2 (iii) above,

therefore, does not help the Petitioner.

33. For all the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds

no merit in the petition and dismisses it, as such.”

25. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant is here

before this Court with the present appeal.

Submissions on behalf of the appellant:

26. Mr. M. M. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the writ

applicant vehemently submitted that the High Court committed a

serious error in passing the impugned order. He would submit that

the criminal prosecution did not involve any moral turpitude. He

laid much stress on the fact that in the year 2002 when the

criminal prosecution was instituted the appellant was just 19 years

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of age and was not even residing in the village as he was pursuing

his studies at some other place. He pointed out that as it was a

family dispute, the same came to be resolved. The settlement was

arrived at between the parties.

27. In the aforesaid context, the learned counsel invited the

attention of this Court to page 163 of the paper book. The document

at page 163 of the paper book is in the form of a settlement recorded

before the local village panchayat in writing duly signed by the

parties concerned. The same reads thus:

“SETTLEMENT BY THE PANCHAYAT

We, Ram Prit Yadav S/o Ishwari Yadav resident of

village – Nakdah, police station-Khajani, District-

Gorakhpur

….First party

And

We, Paramhansh Yadav S/o late Ram Bali Yadav R/o

village- Nakdah, police station-Khajani, District-

Gorakhpur

…..Second party

We both parties are resident of same village and are

Pattidar with each other. On the issue of land of

khalihan near our house and on ‘paimaish’ a quarrel

had occurred between us on 28.6.2002 and due to

confusion and misunderstanding, me first party has

submitted written complaint at police station. But now

we both sides after sitting together is settling our

dispute through panchayat on 7.7.2002. Now onwards

all disputes have been mutually settled/over between

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us. I Ram Prit Yadav first party do station Khajani,

regarding this Panchayati settlement tomorrow and will

make written request that no further action is required

to be taken regarding the incident occurred on

28.6.2002 because now we both sides do not want any

further action in the matter in court. We both sides have

settled the issue mutually.

Second party First party

Sd/-Paramhansh Sd/-Ram Prit

Paramhash Yadav Ram Prit Yadav

Witnesses:

1. Ramawati

2. Subhash Chandra Gupta

3. Anil Kumar Gupta

4. Chandra Bhan

5. Shyam Sunder

6. Ram Sagar

Date: 07.07.2002”

28. The learned counsel further submitted that the form was filled

up by the appellant almost after a period of nine years from the

date of the registration of the FIR in the year 2002. As it was a

family dispute which ultimately came to be compromised, the

appellant all throughout remained under the impression that

nothing further was required to be done in regard to the criminal

case. He further pointed out that the charge was framed by the trial

court in 2011 i.e. almost after nine years from the date of

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registration of the FIR. The trial ultimately resulted in acquittal in

view of the settlement arrived at between the parties.

29. The learned counsel would submit that the appellant bona fide

believed that in view of the settlement arrived at between the

parties, there was no criminal case thereafter pending against him

and the others.

30. The learned counsel submitted that even filling up of the

verification Form, the previous record of the appellant was got

verified through the District Magistrate who in turn sent a report

to the DIG, CRPF through the letter dated 28.11.2011 wherein it

was stated that nothing adverse was found in the police records.

He submitted that on 27.02.2015, one unknown person named

Brijesh Yadav (who was later found to be not traceable) made a

complaint with the respondent/department against the appellant

regarding the pendency of the case. That the complaint was

received by the Department, and a report was called for by the office

of the DIG, CRPF from the office of the SSP, Gorakhpur. In

pursuance of this, the SSP Gorakhpur got an investigation carried

out by the Circle Officer, Khajani, Gorakhpur and the Circle Officer

submitted his report to the SSP. In the report, it was mentioned

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that no such person by name Brijesh Yadav was found and the

Crime Case No. 261/2002 was at the stage of settlement but since

charge sheet was filed, it was pending in the Court. The report was

sent by the SSP Gorakhpur to the DIG CRPF. He further pointed

out that on 28.07.2015, the appellant was acquitted from all the

charges by the Ld. Additional Sessions Judge, Gorakhpur in the

Crime Case No. 261/2002 on merits vide the judgment and order

dated 28.07.2015.

31. The learned counsel further submitted that the appellant

served for about 5 years in the CRPF with utmost sincerity and

loyalty. Most of the time during his (appellant herein) service, i.e.

about 4 years, he served in the region of Kashmir. His service

record has been commendable and time and again he was rewarded

for his service. He further pointed out that the appellant was also

selected in the CISF as an ASI in 2010-11, but as he was already

in service with the CRPF he could not join the CISF. He made a

fervent appeal that one chance may be given to the appellant as the

termination from service will come in his way in all future

employments public or private.

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32. In such circumstances, referred to above, the learned counsel

prayed that there being merit in his appeal, the same may be

allowed and the appellant may be ordered to be reinstated in

service by set asiding the impugned order passed by the High Court

as well as by the Department.

Submissions on behalf of the Respondent:

33. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed

by Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned ASG appearing for the

respondent. She submitted that no error, not to speak of any error

of law, could be said to have been committed by the High Court in

passing the impugned order. She reiterated the very same

submissions as canvassed by her while opposing the connected

appeal.

34. Ms. Divan, the learned ASG submitted that there being no merit

in the present appeal, the same may be dismissed.

35. The following facts are not in dispute:

a) The FIR was registered against the appellant herein and others

dated 28.06.2002 at the Khajani Police Station bearing Crime Case

26

No. 261/2002 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 148,

323, 325, 307, 504 & 506 resply of the IPC;

b) The accused persons including the appellant herein were

arrested & later ordered to be released on bail by the Sessions

Court, Gorakhpur;

c) At the end of the investigation, chargesheet was filed in the court

of the Judicial Magistrate, Gorakhpur. Upon filing of the

chargesheet, the Criminal Case No. 3266 of 2009 came to be

registered on the file of the court of the Judicial Magistrate,

Gorakhpur;

d) The Judicial Magistrate Court No. 24, Gorakhpur vide order

dated 02.08.2011 committed the case to the Court of Sessions in

exercise of his powers under Section 207 of the CrPC;

e) The Sessions Court at Gorakhpur framed charge vide order dated

23.12.2011 for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 323,

325, 307, 504 and 506 resply r/w 149 of the IPC;

f) The trial court ultimately acquitted all the accused persons as

the prosecution witnesses turned hostile;

g) The material on record would indicate that at the time of filling

of verification Form on 20.08.2011, the appellant was on bail. On

27

09.07.2002 chargesheet was filed and on 02.08.2011, a copy of the

chargesheet was also furnished to the appellant;

h) In the verification Form, more particularly in clause 12, the

following questions are to be found:

“(a) Have you ever been arrested? Yes/No✔

(b) Have you ever been prosecuted? Yes/No✔

(c) Have you ever been kept under detention Yes/No✔

x x x x

(i) Is any case pending against you in any Court Yes/No✔

of Law at the time of filling up this Verification

Roll?”

36. Against all the aforesaid questions, the appellant put a tick

on “NO”, as above.

Position of Law

37. In Union of India and Others v. M. Bhaskaran, AIR (1996)

SC 686, this Court held that when an appointment is procured by

a workman on the basis of a bogus and forged casual labourer

service card, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on

the employer. Therefore, it would create no equity in favour of the

workman or any estoppel against the employer and for such

misconduct, termination would be justified without any domestic

28

inquiry. This Court held:

“6. ... Consequently, it has to be held that the

respondents were guilty of misrepresentation and

fraud perpetrated on the appellant-employer while

getting employed in railway service and had snatched

such employment which would not have been made

available to them if they were not armed with such

bogus and forged labourer service cards. ...

… It was clearly a case of fraud on the appellant-

employer. If once such fraud is detected, the

appointment orders themselves which were found to be

tainted and vitiated by fraud and acts of cheating on the

part of employees, were liable to be recalled and were

at least voidable at the option of the employer

concerned. …

… The aggrieved are all those who had similar or even

better qualifications than the appointee or appointees

but who had not applied for the post because they did

not possess the qualifications mentioned in the

advertisement. It amounts to a fraud on public to

appoint persons with inferior qualifications in such

circumstances unless it is clearly stated that the

qualifications are relaxable. No court should be a party

to the perpetuation of the fraudulent practice. It is of

course true as noted by the Tribunal that the facts of the

case in the aforesaid decision were different from the

facts of the present case. And it is also true that in that

case pending the service which was continued

pursuant to the order of the Tribunal the candidate

concerned acquired the requisite qualification and

hence his appointment was not disturbed by this Court.

But that is neither here nor there. As laid down in the

aforesaid decision, if by committing fraud any

employment is obtained, such a fraudulent practice

cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of

law. …”

29

38. M. Bhaskaran (supra) was a case of fraud as forgery was

committed.

39. In Delhi Administration, v. Sushil Kumar , (1996) 11 SCC

605, this Court laid stress on the fact that the verification of

character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test

whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the

State.

40. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Others v. Ram

Ratan Yadav, (2003) 3 SCC 437, this Court held that:

“12. … In the present case the respondent was to serve

as a Physical Education Teacher in Kendriya

Vidyalaya. The character, conduct and antecedents of

a teacher will have some impact on the minds of the

students of impressionable age. The appellants having

considered all the aspects passed the order of

dismissal of the respondent from service. The Tribunal

after due consideration rightly recorded a finding of fact

in upholding the order of dismissal passed by the

appellants. …”

41. In the aforesaid case, this Court held that the purpose of

requiring an employee to furnish information regarding

prosecution/conviction, etc. in the verification Form was to assess

his character and antecedents for the purpose of employment and

continuation in service; that suppression of material information

30

and making a false statement in reply to queries relating to

prosecution and conviction had a clear bearing on the character,

conduct and antecedents of the employee; and that where it is

found that the employee had suppressed or given false information

in regard to matters which had a bearing on his fitness or

suitability to the post, he could be terminated from service during

the period of probation without holding any inquiry. This Court

also made it clear that neither the gravity of the criminal offence

nor the ultimate acquittal therein was relevant when considering

whether a probationer who suppresses a material fact (of his being

involved in a criminal case, in the personal information furnished

to the employer), is fit to be continued as a probationer.

42. In Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of Madh ya Pradesh and

Others, (2010) 2 SCC 169, the ratio decidendi in Ram Ratan

Yadav (supra) was discussed and clarified as follows:

“14. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of Ram Ratan

Yadav (2003) 3 SCC 437 is, where an employee

(probationer) is required to give his personal data in an

attestation form in connection with his appointment

(either at the time of or thereafter), if it is found that the

employee had suppressed or given false information in

regard to matters which had a bearing on his fitness or

suitability to the post, he could be terminated from

service during the period of probation without holding

31

any inquiry. The decision dealt with a probationer and

not a holder of a civil post, and nowhere laid down a

proposition that a confirmed employee holding a civil

post under the State, could be terminated from service

for furnishing false information in an attestation form,

without giving an opportunity to meet the charges

against him.” [Emphasis supplied]

43. Thus, this Court in Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra) held that

an employee who is found to have suppressed material facts at the

time of appointment, must be given an opportunity to defend the

charges against him and cannot be terminated without due notice.

44. In R. Radhakrishnan v. Director Gener al of Police and

Others, (2008) 1 SCC 660, this Court considered the case of a

candidate for appointment as a Fireman who had furnished wrong

information about his involvement in a criminal case, though he

was acquitted. This Court held that the standards expected of a

person intended to serve in such a service are different from the

one of the persons who intended to serve in other services. It was

also concluded that the candidate knew and understood the

implications of the omission in his statement to disclose vital

information. The candidate by not disclosing his involvement in a

criminal case, prevented the Authority from verifying his character

as a suitable appointment. This Court, therefore, declined to

32

exercise its equitable jurisdiction in favour of such a candidate who

had suppressed such material facts.

45. Similarly, in the Union of India and Others v. Bipad

Bhanjan Gayen, (2008) 11 SCC 314, this Court dealt with the

validity of the termination of the candidate, who had been selected

for training as a constable in the Railway Protection Force. This

Court recognised that different standards are to apply to the

different services while determining the question of validity of the

termination when material facts are suppressed. It was held as

under:

“10. It bears repetition that what has led to the

termination of service of the respondent is not his

involvement in the two cases which were then pending,

and in which he had been discharged subsequently,

but the fact that he had withheld relevant information

while filling in the attestation form. We are further of the

opinion that an employment as a police officer pre-

supposes a higher level of integrity as such a person is

expected to uphold the law, and on the contrary, such

a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be

tolerated.” [Emphasis supplied]

46. In State of Haryana and Others v. Dinesh Kumar (2008) (3)

SCC 222, this Court considered the case of an employee (constable

driver for State Police) who had answered "No" to a query as to

whether he was arrested. The employee had argued that as a

33

layman, his understanding of arrest did not match with the legal

definition of arrest. The candidate said he had voluntarily appeared

before the Magistrate, without being taken into formal custody,

was granted bail and was ultimately acquitted. This Court held as

under:

“12. One of the common questions which, therefore,

need to be answered in both these appeals is whether

the manner in which they had appeared before the

Magistrate and had been released without being taken

into formal custody, could amount to “arrest” for the

purpose of the query in Column 13(A). …

x x x x

31. In our view, the reasoning given in Dinesh Kumar's

case in that context is a possible view and does not call

for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Conversely, the decision rendered in the writ petitions

filed by Lalit Kumar and Bhupinder has to be reversed

to be in line with the decision in Dinesh Kumar's case.

When the question as to what constitutes “arrest” has

for long engaged the attention of different High Courts

as also this Court, it may not be altogether

unreasonable to expect a layman to construe that he

had never been arrested on his appearing before the

court and being granted bail immediately. The position

would have been different, had the person concerned

not been released on bail. We would, in the facts of

these cases, give the benefit of a mistaken impression,

rather than that of deliberate and wilful

misrepresentation and concealment of facts, to the

appellants in the second of the two appeals as well,

while affirming the view taken by the High Court in

Dinesh Kumar's case.” [Emphasis supplied]

34

47. Thus, it was held that even if what transpired may technically

amount to arrest, the benefit of a mistaken impression rather than

the consequences of a deliberate and willful misrepresentation and

concealment of facts, should be extended to the employee.

48. This Court in the case of Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union of

India and Others, (2010) 14 SCC 103 was faced with a similar

issue wherein a CRPF officer upon suppression of material facts

was terminated from the service. This Court while referring to its

previous decisions, summarised the position as follows:

“14. … The purpose of seeking the said information is

to ascertain the character and antecedents of the

candidate so as to assess his suitability for the post.

Therefore, the candidate will have to answer the

questions in these columns truthfully and fully and any

misrepresentation or suppression or false statement

therein, by itself would demonstrate a conduct or

character unbefitting for a uniformed security service.”

15. When an employee or a prospective employee

declares in a verification form, answers to the queries

relating to character and antecedents, the verification

thereof can therefore lead to any of the following

consequences:

(a) If the declarant has answered the questions in

the affirmative and furnished the details of any

criminal case (wherein he was convicted or

acquitted by giving benefit of doubt for want of

evidence), the employer may refuse to offer him

employment (or if already employed on probation,

35

discharge him from service), if he is found to be unfit

having regard to the nature and gravity of the

offence/crime in which he was involved.

(b) On the other hand, if the employer finds that the

criminal case disclosed by the declarant related to

offences which were technical, or of a nature that

would not affect the declarant's fitness for

employment, or where the declarant had been

honourably acquitted and exonerated, the employer

may ignore the fact that the declarant had been

prosecuted in a criminal case and proceed to

appoint him or continue him in employment.

(c) Where the declarant has answered the

questions in the negative and on verification it is

found that the answers were false, the employer

may refuse to employ the declarant (or discharge

him, if already employed), even if the declarant had

been cleared of the charges or is acquitted. This is

because when there is suppression or non-

disclosure of material information bearing on his

character, that itself becomes a reason for not

employing the declarant.

(d) Where the attestation form or verification form does

not contain proper or adequate queries requiring the

declarant to disclose his involvement in any criminal

proceedings, or where the candidate was unaware of

initiation of criminal proceedings when he gave the

declarations in the verification roll/attestation form,

then the candidate cannot be found fault with, for not

furnishing the relevant information. But if the employer

by other means (say police verification or complaints

etc.) learns about the involvement of the declarant, the

employer can have recourse to courses (a) or (b) above.

16. Thus an employee on probation can be discharged

from service or a prospective employee may be refused

employment:

36

(i) on the ground of unsatisfactory antecedents and

character, disclosed from his conviction in a

criminal case, or his involvement in a criminal

offence (even if he was acquitted on technical

grounds or by giving benefit of doubt) or other

conduct (like copying in examination) or rustication

or suspension or debarment from college etc.; and

(ii) on the ground of suppression of material

information or making false statement in reply to

queries relating to prosecution or conviction for a

criminal offence (even if he was ultimately

acquitted in the criminal case).

This ground is distinct from the ground of previous

antecedents and character, as it shows a current

dubious conduct and absence of character at the time

of making the declaration, thereby making him

unsuitable for the post.”

49. This Court in the aforesaid case while deliberating on the very

same questions as were asked in the verification Form from the

appellant in the present case, held that:

“24. We are satisfied that the appellant had knowingly

made a false statement that he was not prosecuted in

any criminal case. Therefore, the employer (CRPF) was

justified in dispensing with his services for not being

truthful in giving material information regarding his

antecedents which were relevant for employment in a

uniformed service, and that itself justified his discharge

from service. Consequently, we dismiss this appeal as

having no merit.”

50. In the case of Commissioner of Police and O thers. v.

37

Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644, the candidate after clearing

the test, disclosed his involvement in a criminal case which was

compromised and later on such compromise was acquitted . A

Show-Cause notice was issued to him asking him to show cause

as to why his candidature for the post should not be cancelled as

he had concealed the fact of his involvement in the criminal case

and had made a wrong statement in his application form . The

authorities were not satisfied with the explanation offered and went

on to terminate his employment. A challenge was made by him

before the Administrative Tribunal which declined to interfere.

However, the High Court granted the relief by setting aside the

proposal for cancellation of his candidature. This Court upheld the

order of the High Court by granting the relief and held as under:

“12. It is true that in the application form the respondent

did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case

under Sections 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not

mention this out of fear that if he did so he would

automatically be disqualified. At any event, it was not

such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and

hence a more lenient view should be taken in the

matter.”

51. The Court in the aforesaid took into consideration the fact

that the incident had happened when the respondent was 20 years

of age. The Court held that young people are not expected to behave

38

in as mature a manner as the older people. The Court highlighted

that the approach should be to condone minor indiscretions made

by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the

rest of their lives.

52. In the case of Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. Tr. Prinl.

Sec. Home and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 748, this Court, while

referring to its previous precedents set on the issue of suppression

of material facts being a ground for termination laid down certain

principles to be considered. This Court also called for the

constitution of a larger Bench to settle the issue. The yardsticks laid

down by this Court are as below:

“29. As noted by us, all the above decisions were

rendered by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of

two-Judges and having bestowed our serious

consideration to the issue, we consider that while

dealing with such an issue, the Court will have to bear

in mind the various cardinal principles before granting

any relief to the aggrieved party, namely:

29.1 Fraudulently obtained orders of appointment

could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option

of the employer or could be recalled by the employer

and in such cases merely because the respondent

employee has continued in service for a number of

years, on the basis of such fraudulently obtained

employment, cannot get any equity in his favour or any

estoppel against the employer.

29.2 Verification of the character and antecedents is

39

one of the important criteria to test whether the selected

candidate is suitable to the post under the State and on

account of his antecedents the appointing authority if

find it not desirable to appoint a person to a disciplined

force can it be said to be unwarranted.

29.3 When appointment was procured by a person on

the basis of forged documents, it would amount to

misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and,

therefore, it would create no equity in his favour or any

estoppel against the employer while resorting to

termination without holding any inquiry.

29.4 A candidate having suppressed material

information and/or giving false information cannot

claim right to continue in service and the employer,

having regard to the nature of employment as well as

other aspects, has the discretion to terminate his

services.

29.5 The purpose of calling for information regarding

involvement in any criminal case or detention or

conviction is for the purpose of verification of the

character/antecedents at the time of recruitment and

suppression of such material information will have

clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the

candidate in relation to his continuity in service.

29.6 The person who suppressed the material

information and/or gives false information cannot claim

any right for appointment or continuity in service.

29.7 The standard expected of a person intended to

serve in uniformed service is quite distinct from other

services and, therefore, any deliberate statement or

omission regarding a vital information can be seriously

viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing

authority cannot be faulted.

29.8 An employee on probation can be discharged

40

from service or may be refused employment on the

ground of suppression of material information or

making false statement relating to his involvement in

the criminal case, conviction or detention, even if

ultimately he was acquitted of the said case, inasmuch

as such a situation would make a person undesirable

or unsuitable for the post.

29.9 An employee in the uniformed service

presupposes a higher level of integrity as such a person

is expected to uphold the law and on the contrary such

a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be

tolerated.

29.10 The authorities entrusted with the responsibility

of appointing constables, are under duty to verify the

antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is

suitable for the post of a constable and so long as the

candidate has not been acquitted in the criminal case,

he cannot be held to be suitable for appointment to the

post of constable.”

53. The Court while referring the issues to larger Bench observed

in paras 30 and 31 resply as under:

“30. When we consider the above principles laid down

in the majority of the decisions, the question that looms

large before us is when considering such claim by the

candidates who deliberately suppressed information at

the time of recruitment, can there be different

yardsticks applied in the matter of grant of relief.

31. Though there are very many decisions in support of

the various points culled out in the above paragraphs,

inasmuch as we have noted certain other decisions

taking different view of coordinate Benches, we feel it

appropriate to refer the abovementioned issues to a

larger Bench of this Court for an authoritative

41

pronouncement so that there will be no conflict of views

and which will enable the courts to apply the law

uniformly while dealing with such issues.”

54. This Court before settling the issues in the case of Avtar

Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, discussed

the said principles extensively in the matter of Commissioner of

Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC

685. In this case, a candidate for the post of constable in the Delhi

Police had disclosed his involvement in a criminal case, wherein he

was acquitted on technical grounds. The candidate had his

candidature for the post rejected by the Standing Committee. The

candidate argued that as he had been acquitted, the Standing

Committee by rejecting his candidature had overreached the

decision of the competent Authority. This Court, while deciding on

the issue and whether the respondent was honourably acquitted,

held as under:

“25. The expression "honourable acquittal" was

considered by this Court in S. Samuthiram 2013 (1)

SCC 598. In that case this Court was concerned with a

situation where disciplinary proceedings were initiated

against a police officer. Criminal case was pending

against him under Section 509 IPC and under Section 4

of the Eve-Teasing Act. He was acquitted in that case

because of the non-examination of key witnesses.

42

There was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal

case. Two material witnesses turned hostile. Referring

to the judgment of this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh

Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 where in somewhat similar

fact situation, this Court upheld a bank's action of

refusing to reinstate an employee in service on the

ground that in the criminal case he was acquitted by

giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it was not an

honourable acquittal, this Court held that the High

Court was not justified in setting aside the punishment

imposed in the departmental proceedings. This Court

observed that the expressions "honourable acquittal",

"acquitted of blame" and "fully exonerated" are

unknown to the Criminal Procedure Code or the Penal

Code. They are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is

difficult to define what is meant by the expression

"honourably acquitted". This Court expressed that when

the accused is acquitted after full consideration of the

prosecution case and the prosecution miserably fails to

prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can

possibly be said that the accused was honourably

acquitted.

26. In light of the above, we are of the opinion that since

the purpose of the departmental proceedings is to keep

persons, who are guilty of serious misconduct or

dereliction of duty or who are guilty of grave cases of

moral turpitude, out of the department, if found

necessary, because they pollute the department, surely

the above principles will apply with more vigour at the

point of entry of a person in the police department i.e. at

the time of recruitment. If it is found by the Screening

Committee that the person against whom a serious case

involving moral turpitude is registered is discharged on

technical grounds or is acquitted of the same charge but

the acquittal is not honourable, the Screening Committee

would be entitled to cancel his candidature. Stricter

norms need to be applied while appointing persons in a

disciplinary force because public interest is involved in

it.

43

x x x x

34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage

from the fact that in their application and/or attestation

form they have disclosed their involvement in a criminal

case. We do not see how this fact improves their case.

Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation

form is an essential requirement. An aspirant is

expected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and

integrity are inbuilt requirements of the police force. The

respondents should not, therefore, expect to score any

brownie points because of this disclosure. Besides, this

has no relevance to the point in issue. It bears repetition

to state that while deciding whether a person against

whom a criminal case was registered and who was

later on acquitted or discharged should be appointed to

a post in the police force, what is relevant is the nature

of the offence, the extent of his involvement, whether the

acquittal was a clean acquittal or an acquittal by giving

benefit of doubt because the witnesses turned hostile or

because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, and

the propensity of such person to indulge in similar

activities in future. This decision, in our opinion, can

only be taken by the Screening Committee created

for that purpose by the Delhi Police. If the Screening

Committee's decision is not mala fide or actuated by

extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be

questioned.

35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders

the great responsibility of maintaining law and order

and public order in the society. People repose great faith

and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that

confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force

must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have

impeccable character and integrity. A person having

criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if

he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that

acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to

44

see whether he has been completely exonerated in the

case because even a possibility of his taking to the life

of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police

force. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the

task of taking decisions in these matters to the

Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening

Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide.

In recent times, the image of the police force is

tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a

wayward manner by misusing p ower are in public

domain and are a matter of concern. The reputation of

the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation,

we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy

of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created

by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely

to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At

the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive

to the importance of trust reposed in it and must treat

all candidates with even hand.”

[Emphasis supplied]

Precedent of Avtar Singh

55. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), a three-Judge Bench of

this Court looked into the conflict of opinion in the various

decisions highlighted in Jainendra Singh (supra). The larger

Bench considered plethora of decisions on the question of

suppression of information or submitting false information in the

verification Form, also as to the question of having been criminally

prosecuted, arrested or as to the pendency of a criminal case. After

45

analysing all the previous decisions of this Court on the subject,

the larger Bench held as follows:

“30. The employer is given 'discretion' to terminate or

otherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise,

once employer has the power to take a decision when

at the time of filling verification form declarant has

already been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it

becomes obvious that all the facts and attending

circumstances, including impact of suppression or false

information are taken into consideration while

adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in

question. In case the employer comes to the conclusion

that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would

have been disclosed it would not have adversely

affected fitness of an incumbent, for reasons to be

recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However,

while doing so employer has to act prudently on due

consideration of nature of post and duties to be

rendered. For higher officials/higher posts, standard

has to be very high and even slightest false information

or suppression may by itself render a person unsuitable

for the post. However, same standard cannot be applied

to each and every post. In concluded criminal cases, it

has to be seen what has been suppressed is material

fact and would have rendered an incumbent unfit for

appointment. An employer would be justified in not

appointing or if appointed, to terminate services of such

incumbent on due consideration of various aspects.

Even if disclosure has been made truthfully , the

employer has the right to consider fitness and while

doing so effect of conviction and background facts of

case, nature of offence, etc. have to be considered. Even

if acquittal has been made, employer may consider

nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or

giving benefit of doubt on technical reasons and decline

to appoint a person who is unfit or of dubious character.

In case employer comes to conclusion that conviction or

46

ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the

fitness for employment incumbent may be appointed or

continued in service.”

56. The larger Bench stated that an objective criterion must be

applied while terminating an employee who had suppressed

material facts. The Court held that mere suppression cannot be the

sole reason for termination and due consideration must be paid to

the facts of the case. The Court, while discussing the objective

yardsticks that are to be applied held as under:

“34. No doubt about it that verification of character and

antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess

suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge

antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action

should be based upon objective criteria on due

consideration of all relevant aspects.

35. Suppression of “material” information presupposes

that what is suppressed that “matters” not every

technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on

due consideration of rules/instructions if any in

exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for

terminating the services of employee. Though a person

who has suppressed the material information cannot

claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in

service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily

and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner

with objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.

36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon

the nature of post, higher post would involve more

rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed

service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature

47

of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be

considered by authorities concerned considering

post/nature of duties/services and power has to be

exercised on due consideration of various aspects.”

57. The Court proceeded to hold further that a chance of

reformation should be afforded to the young offenders in suitable

cases while exercising the power for cancelling candidature. The

Court thereafter summarised the discussion on the issue by way

of laying down certain guidelines as stated below:

“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to

explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of

aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion

thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate

as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a

criminal case, whether before or after entering into

service must be true and there should be no

suppression or false mention of required information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of services or

cancellation of candidature for giving false information,

the employer may take notice of special circumstances

of the case, if any, while giving such information.

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the

Government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to

the employee, at the time of taking the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of

involvement in a criminal case where conviction or

acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the

application/verification form and such fact later comes

to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourse

48

appropriate to the case may be adopted: -

38.4.1. In a case trivial in nature in which conviction

had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young

age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not

have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question,

the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such

suppression of fact or false information by condoning

the lapse.

38.4.2.Where conviction has been recorded in case

which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel

candidature or terminate services of the employee.

38.4.3.If acquittal had already been recorded in a case

involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious

nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean

acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given,

the employer may consider all relevant facts available

as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision

as to the continuance of the employee.

38.5. In a case where the employee has made

declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the

employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and

cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in

character verification form regarding pendency of a

criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and

circumstances of the case, in its discretion may appoint

the candidate subject to decision of such case.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with

respect to multiple pending cases such false information

by itself will assume significance and an employer may

pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or

terminating services as appointment of a person

against whom multiple criminal cases were pending

may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the

49

candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have

adverse impact and the appointing authority would

take decision after considering the seriousness of the

crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service,

holding Departmental enquiry would be necessary

before passing order of termination/removal or

dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting

false information in verification form.

38.10. For determining suppression or false information

attestation/verification form has to be specific, not

vague. Only such information which was required to be

specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If

information not asked for but is relevant comes to

knowledge of the employer the same can be considered

in an objective manner while addressing the question

of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be

taken on basis of suppression or submitting false

information as to a fact which was not even asked for.

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio

veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be

attributable to him.”

Position of law post Avtar Singh

58. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration and

Others v. Pradeep Kumar and Another, (2018) 1 SCC 797 the

issue of the respondent therein being honourably acquitted and

entitled to being reinstated was raised. This Court, while relying

upon Mehar Singh (supra) and holding that the nature of the

offences must be looked into, held as follows:

50

“13. It is thus well settled that acquittal in a criminal

case does not automatically entitle him for appointment

to the post. Still it is open to the employer to consider

the antecedents and examine whether he is suitable for

appointment to the post. From the observations of this

Court in Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC 685 and Parvez

Khan (2015) 2 SCC 591 cases, it is clear that a

candidate to be recruited to the police service must be

of impeccable character and integrity. A person having

criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if

he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed

that he was honourably acquitted/completely

exonerated. The decision of the Screening Committee

must be taken as final unless it is shown to be mala

fide. The Screening Committee also must be alive to the

importance of the trust reposed in it and must examine

the candidate with utmost character.

x x x x

15. From the above details, we find that the Screening

Committee examined each and every case of the

respondents and reasonings for their acquittal and

taken the decision. While deciding whether a person

involved in a criminal case has been acquitted or

discharged should be appointed to a post in a police

force, nature of offence in which he is involved, whether

it was an honourable acquittal or only an extension of

benefit of doubt because of witnesses turned hostile

and flaws in the prosecution are all the aspects to be

considered by the Screening Committee for taking the

decision whether the candidate is suitable for the post.”

[Emphasis supplied]

51

59. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v.

Bunty, (2020) 17 SCC 654, the candidate had not disclosed the

fact that he had criminal proceedings pending against him at

the time of verification. The criminal proceedings were based on

the candidate impersonating a police officer and this Court treated

it to be a case which involved moral turpitude. The candidate was

granted benefit of doubt. The candidate had been acquitted on the

technical ground of a witness being held hostile. This Court held

that the perception formed by the Screening Committee, that he

was unfit to be inducted in the disciplined police force, was

appropriate. Further it was held that, the decision of the Scrutiny

Committee could not be said to be such which warranted judicial

interference unless there is a mala fide intent involved.

60. In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others v. Love Kush

Meena, (2021) 8 SCC 774, the respondent was charged under

Sections 302, 323, 341/34 resply of the IPC and was acquitted as

the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The witnesses had turned hostile. The candidate had disclosed the

said fact at the time of applying; however, his appointment was

cancelled relying on Avtar Singh (supra). This Court held as

52

under:

“24. Examining the controversy in the present case in

the conspectus of the aforesaid legal position, what is

important to note is the fact that the view of this Court

has depended on the nature of offence charged and the

result of the same. The mere fact of an acquittal would

not suffice but rather it would depend on whether it is

a clean acquittal based on total absence of evidence or

in the criminal jurisprudence requiring the case to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt, that parameter

having not been met, benefit of doubt has been granted

to the accused. …

x x x x

26. The judgment in Avtar Singh's case (2016) 8 SCC

471 on the relevant parameter extracted aforesaid

clearly stipulates that where in respect of a heinous or

serious nature of crime the acquittal is based on a

benefit of reasonable doubt, that cannot make the

candidate eligible.” [Emphasis supplied]

61. In the case of Union of India and Others v. Methu Meda,

(2022) 1 SCC1, the respondent had applied for the post of constable

in the CISF and was selected. The respondent had disclosed about

the case in which he was acquitted. However, his selection was

subsequently cancelled. The respondent challenged the same vide

a writ petition, which the High Court allowed. This Court, however,

set aside the High Court’s order and discussed the consequence of

53

an acquittal on technical grounds. It was also reiterated that a

person joining the police force must be of impeccable character and

must not have any criminal antecedents. This Court held as under:

“17. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case,

as per paras 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5 of Avtar Singh case

(supra) (2016) 8 SCC 471, it is clear that the employer is

having right to consider the suitability of the candidate

as per government orders/instructions/rules at the time

of taking the decision for induction of the candidate in

employment. Acquittal on technical ground in respect of

the offences of heinous/serious nature, which is not a

clean acquittal, the employer may have a right to

consider all relevant facts available as to the

antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to

the continuance of the employee. Even in case, truthful

declaration regarding concluded trial has been made by

the employee, still the employer has the right to consider

antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the

candidate.

x x x x

20. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear the respondent

who wishes to join the police force must be a person of

utmost rectitude and have impeccable character and

integrity. A person having a criminal antecedents would

not be fit in this category. The employer is having right

to consider the nature of acquittal or decide until he

is completely exonerated because even a possibility of

his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the

discipline of the police force. The Standing Order,

therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions

in these matters to the Screening Committee and the

54

decision of the Committee would be final unless mala

fide. …

21. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If a

person is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the

charge of an offence involving moral turpitude or because

the witnesses turned hostile, it would not automatically

entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force.

The employer is having a right to consider his candidature

in terms of the circulars issued by the Screening Committee.

The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and the result

of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, the

employer cannot be compelled to give appointment to the

candidate. ….”

[Emphasis supplied]

62. In the Union of India (UOI) v. Dilip Kumar Mallick, (2022) 6

Scale 108, a CRPF officer had suppressed the fact that the

proceedings under the IPC were pending against him. The Court,

while referring to Avtar Singh (supra), held that the suppression

can be a ground for an employer to cancel the candidature or to

terminate the services. The respondent served in the organization

since 2003 and continued to remain as an under trial accused

without the knowledge of the organisation. The respondent received

an honourable acquittal from the trial court. This Court held as

under:

55

“13. Thus, it remains beyond the pale of doubt that the

cases of non-disclosure of material information and of

submitting false information have been treated as being

of equal gravity by this Court and it is laid down in no

uncertain terms that non-disclosure by itself may be a

ground for an employer to cancel the candidature or to

terminate services. Even in the summation above-

quoted, this Court has emphasized that information

given to the employer by a candidate as to criminal case

including the factors of arrest or pendency of the case,

whether before or after entering into service, must be

true and there should be no suppression or false

mention of the required information.

14. In case of suppression, when the facts later come to

the knowledge of employer, different courses of action

may be adopted by the employer depending on the

nature of fault as also the nature of default; and this

Court has indicated that if the case is of trivial nature,

like that of shouting slogans at a young age etc., the

employer may ignore such suppression of fact or false

information depending on the factors as to whether the

information, if disclosed, would have rendered

incumbent unfit for the post in question.

14.1. However, the aforesaid observations do not lead

to the corollary that in a case of the present nature

where a criminal case was indeed pending against the

respondent and the facts were altogether omitted from

being mentioned, the employer would be obliged to

ignore such defaults and shortcomings. …

x x x x

16. In the given set of facts and circumstances, where

56

suppression of relevant information is not a matter of

dispute, there cannot be any legal basis for the Court to

interfere in the manner that the employer be directed to

impose 'any lesser punishment', as directed by the

Division Bench of the High Court. The submissions

seeking to evoke sympathy and calling for leniency

cannot lead to any relief in favour of the respondent.”

[Emphasis supplied]

63. In the case of Pawan Kumar v. Union of India , (2022) SCC

OnLine SC 532, a case was registered against the appellant for the

offences punishable under Sections 148, 149, 323, 356 and 506

resply of the IPC. The appellant was honourably acquitted.

However, the fact of the said criminal prosecution was not

disclosed in the attestation form filled by the petitioner. On such

ground, the appellant was discharged from service. The High Court

upheld the discharge. While allowing the appeal, this Court held as

follows:

“13. What emerges from the exposition as laid down by

this Court is that by mere suppression of material/false

information regardless of the fact whether there is a

conviction or acquittal has been recorded, the

employee/recruit is not to be discharged/terminated

axiomatically from service just by a stroke of pen. At the

same time, the effect of suppression of material/false

information involving in a criminal case, if any, is left for

the employer to consider all the relevant facts and

circumstances available as to antecedents and keeping

in view the objective criteria and the relevant service

57

rules into consideration, while taking appropriate

decision regarding continuance/suitability of the

employee into service. What being noticed by this Court

is that mere suppression of material/false information

in a given case does not mean that the employer can

arbitrarily discharge/terminate the employee from

service.

x x x x

18. The criminal case indeed was of trivial nature and

the nature of post and nature of duties to be discharged

by the recruit has never been looked into by the

competent authority while examining the overall

suitability of the incumbent keeping in view Rule 52 of

the Rules 1987 to become a member of the force. Taking

into consideration the exposition expressed by this

Court in Avtar Singh (supra), in our considered view the

order of discharge passed by the competent authority

dated 24th April, 2015 is not sustainable and in sequel

thereto the judgment passed by the Division Bench of

High Court of Delhi does not hold good and deserves to

be set aside.” [Emphasis supplied]

64. In the case of Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam

Limited and another v. Anil Kanwariya , (2021) 10 SCC 136,

this Court gave altogether a different dimension to the issue in

question. In the said case, the respondent had applied for the post

of Technical Helper on the establishment of the appellant Nigam.

The respondent was appointed as a Technical Helper on probation

58

for a period of two years w.e.f. 06.05.2015. The appointment of the

respondent was subjected to the production of a character

certificate/verification report to be issued by the Superintendent of

Police of the native district of the respondent. The Superintendent,

Sawai Madhopur vide his report dated 05.06.2015 informed the

appellant that a criminal case bearing No. 13 of 2011 for the

offences punishable under Sections 143, 341 and 323 resply of the

IPC was registered against the respondent and the respondent

came to be convicted vide the judgment and order dated

05.08.2013 passed by the trial court. The report of Superintendent

of Police further stated that the respondent was given the benefit

under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. In other words,

although the respondent stood convicted for the alleged offence yet

the trial court thought fit to release him on probation. This fact was

supressed by the respondent at the time of his appointment. In

such circumstances, action was taken and ultimately the

respondent’s services came to be terminated. The respondent

challenged the order of termination in the High Court. The learned

Single Judge of the High Court set aside the order of termination

and directed the appellant to reinstate the respondent. The

59

appellant Nigam preferred an intra-court appeal before the Division

Bench. The appeal came to be dismissed. The appellant Nigam

ultimately came to this Court and challenged the orders passed by

the High Court. This Court while allowing the appeal filed by the

Nigam held in Para 14 as under:

“14. The issue/question may be considered from

another angle, from the employer’s point of view. The

question is not about whether an employee was

involved in a dispute of trivial nature and whether he

has been subsequently acquitted or not. The question is

about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of such an

employee who at the initial stage of the employment,

i.e., while submitting the declaration/verification

and/or applying for a post made false declaration

and/or not disclosing and/or suppressing material fact

of having involved in a criminal case. If the correct facts

would have been disclosed, the employer might not

have appointed him. Then the question is of TRUST.

Therefore, in such a situation, where the employer feels

that an employee who at the initial stage itself has

made a false statement and/or not disclosed the

material facts and/or suppressed the material facts

and therefore he cannot be continued in service because

such an employee cannot be relied upon even in future,

the employer cannot be forced to continue such an

employee. The choice/option whether to continue or not

to continue such an employee always must be given to

the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observed and

as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such an

employee cannot claim the appointment and/or

60

continue to be in service as a matter of right.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

65. Thus, this Court took the view that irrespective of the fact

whether the dispute is of a trivial nature or not, it is the credibility/

trustworthiness of a particular employee which matters the most

when it comes to public employment. This Court took the view that

if a particular employee supresses something important or makes

any false declaration with a view to secure public employment then

such employee could be said to have exhibited a tendency which is

likely to shake the confidence of the employer. In such

circumstances, it would be within the discretion of the employer

whether to continue or not to continue such an employee who has

exhibited a tendency which reflects on his overall character or

credibility.

66. We now proceed to look into the decision of this Court in the

case of Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra and Others

(2019) 17 SCC 696, upon which strong reliance has been placed on

behalf of the appellant herein. In the said case, the appellant

Mohammed Imran was denied appointment in judicial service on

the ground of moral turpitude as he had to face criminal

61

prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and

366 resply r/w 34 of the IPC. The appellant had been acquitted of

the charge under Sections 363 and 366 r/w 34 of the IPC much

before he cleared the examination for appointment in the judicial

service in the year 2009. Thus, it was a case wherein the criminal

prosecution came in the way of the appellant. Although he stood

acquitted by the trial court yet he was denied appointment on the

ground of “Moral Turpitude”. The appellant lost before the High

Court of Bombay. This Court while allowing his appeal observed as

under:

“5. Employment opportunities are a scarce commodity

in our country. Every advertisement invites a large

number of aspirants for limited number of vacancies.

But that may not suffice to invoke sympathy for grant

of relief where the credentials of the candidate may

raise serious questions regarding suitability,

irrespective of eligibility. Undoubtedly, judicial service

is very different from other services and the yardstick

of suitability that may apply to other services, may not

be the same for a judicial service. But there cannot be

any mechanical or rhetorical incantation of moral

turpitude, to deny appointment in judicial service

simplicitor. Much will depend on the facts of a case.

Every individual deserves an opportunity to improve,

learn from the past and move ahead in life by self-

improvement. To make past conduct, irrespective of all

considerations, an albatross around the neck of the

candidate, may not always constitute justice. Much

will, however depend on the fact situation of a case.

62

6. That the expression “moral turpitude” is not capable

of precise definition was considered in Pawan

Kumar v. State of Haryana, [(1996) 4 SCC 17 : 1996

SCC (Cri) 583] , opining : (SCC p. 21, para 12)

“12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is

used in legal as also societal parlance to describe

conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved

or having any connection showing depravity.”

7. The appellant by dint of hard academic labour was

successful at the competitive examination held on 16-

8-2009 and after viva voce was selected and

recommended for appointment by the Maharashtra

Public Service Commission on 14-10-2009. In his

attestation form, he had duly disclosed his

prosecution and acquittal. Mere disclosure in an

appropriate case may not be sufficient to hold for

suitability in employment. Nonetheless the nature of

allegations and the conduct in the facts of a case

would certainly be a relevant factor. While others so

recommended came to be appointed, the selection of

the appellant was annulled on 4-6-2010 in view of the

character verification report of the police.

8. It is an undisputed fact that one Shri Sudhir Gulabrao

Barde, who had been acquitted on 24-11-2009 in Case

No. 3022 of 2007 under Sections 294, 504 and 34 IPC,

has been appointed. We are not convinced, that in the

facts and circumstances of the present case, the

appellant could be discriminated and denied

appointment arbitrarily when both the appointments

were in judicial service, by the same selection

procedure, of persons who faced criminal prosecutions

and were acquitted. The distinction sought to be drawn

by the respondents, that the former was not involved in

a case of moral turpitude does not leave us convinced.

In Joginder Singh [Joginder Singh v. State (UT of

Chandigarh), (2015) 2 SCC 377: (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)

63

490], it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 383-84, para

25)

“25. Further, apart from a small dent in the

name of this criminal case in which he has been

honourably acquitted, there is no other material

on record to indicate that the antecedents or the

conduct of the appellant was not up to the mark

to appoint him to the post.”

9. In the present proceedings, on 23-3-2018 [Mohd.

Imran v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 17 SCC 700],

this Court had called for a confidential report of the

character verification as also the antecedents of the

appellant as on this date. The report received reveals

that except for the criminal case under reference in

which he has been acquitted, the appellant has a

clean record and there is no adverse material

against him to deny him the fruits of his academic

labour in a competitive selection for the post of a

judicial officer. In our opinion, no reasonable person

on the basis of the materials placed before us can

come to the conclusion that the antecedents and

character of the appellant are such that he is unfit to

be appointed as a judicial officer. An alleged single

misadventure or misdemeanour of the present

nature, if it can be considered to be so, cannot be

sufficient to deny appointment to the appellant when

he has on all other aspects and parameters been

found to be fit for appointment. The law is well

settled in this regard in Avtar Singh v. Union of

India [(2016) 8 SCC 471 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 425] .

If empanelment creates no right to appointment,

equally there can be no arbitrary denial of

appointment after empanelment.

10. In the entirety of the facts and circumstances of

the case, we are of the considered opinion that the

consideration of the candidature of the appellant

and its rejection are afflicted by a myopic vision,

blurred by the spectacle of what has been described

64

as moral turpitude, reflecting inadequate

appreciation and application of facts also, as justice

may demand.

11. We, therefore, consider the present a fit case to

set aside the order dated 4 -6-2010 and the

impugned order [Mohd. Imran v. State of

Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9939]

dismissing the writ petition, and direct the

respondents to reconsider the candidature of the

appellant. Let such fresh consideration be done and

an appropriate decision be taken in the light of the

present discussion, preferably within a maximum

period of eight weeks from the date of receipt and

production of the copy of the present order. In order

to avoid any future litigation on seniority or

otherwise, we make it clear that in the event of

appointment, the appellant shall not be entitled to

any other reliefs.”

67. Thus, this Court took the view that although employment

opportunity is a scarce commodity in the present times being

circumscribed within a limited vacancies yet by itself may not

suffice to invoke sympathy for grant of relief where the credentials

of a candidate may raise any question regarding his suitability,

irrespective of eligibility. However, at the same time, this Court

observed that there should not be any mechanical or rhetorical

incantation of moral turpitude to deny appointment in a

government service simplicitor which would depend on the facts of

each case. The judicial philosophy flowing through the mind of the

65

judges is that every individual deserves an opportunity to improve,

learn from the past and move ahead in life for self-improvement.

To make past conduct, irrespective of all considerations, may not

always constitute justice. It would all depend on the fact situation

of the given case.

68. The only reason to refer to and look into the various decisions

rendered by this Court as above over a period of time is that the

principles of law laid therein governing the subject are bit

inconsistent. Even after, the larger Bench decision in the case of

Avtar Singh (supra) different courts have enunciated different

principles.

69. In such circumstances, we undertook some exercise to

shortlist the broad principles of law which should be made

applicable to the litigations of the present nature. The principles

are as follows:

a) Each case should be scrutinised thoroughly by the public

employer concerned, through its designated officials–more so, in

the case of recruitment for the police force, who are under a duty

to maintain order, and tackle lawlessness, since their ability to

66

inspire public confidence is a bulwark to society’s security. [See

Raj Kumar (supra)]

b) Even in a case where the employee has made declaration

truthfully and correctly of a concluded criminal case, the

employer still has the right to consider the antecedents, and

cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate. The acquittal in a

criminal case would not automatically entitle a candidate for

appointment to the post. It would be still open to the employer to

consider the antecedents and examine whether the candidate

concerned is suitable and fit for appointment to the post.

c) The suppression of material information and making a false

statement in the verification Form relating to arrest, prosecution,

conviction etc., has a clear bearing on the character, conduct and

antecedents of the employee. If it is found that the employee had

suppressed or given false information in regard to the matters

having a bearing on his fitness or suitability to the post, he can

be terminated from service.

d) The generalisations about the youth, career prospects and

age of the candidates leading to condonation of the offenders’

67

conduct, should not enter the judicial verdict and should be

avoided.

e) The Court should inquire whether the Authority concerned

whose action is being challenged acted mala fide.

f) Is there any element of bias in the decision of the Authority?

g) Whether the procedure of inquiry adopted by the Authority

concerned was fair and reasonable?

Scope of Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution

70. Article 136 of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court

to grant special leave in its discretion against any judgment,

decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter

passed or made by any court or tribunal except by any court or

tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the armed

forces. It reads as under:

“136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.—

(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the

Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special

leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,

determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter

passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory

of India.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,

determination, sentence or order passed or made by

any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law

relating to the Armed Forces.”

68

71. The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is divisible into two

stages: the first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for the special

leave to file an appeal and the second stage commences, if and

when, the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition

is converted into an appeal. The legal position as summarised by

this Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC

359; affirmed in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. Mahadeshwara

Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Ltd ., (2019) 4 SCC 376, regarding

the scope of two stages reads as under:

“(1) While hearing the petition for special leave to

appeal, the Court is called upon to see whether the

petitioner should be granted such leave or not. While

hearing such petition, the Court is not exercising its

appellate jurisdiction; it is merely exercising its

discretionary jurisdiction to grant or not to grant leave

to appeal. The petitioner is still outside the gate of entry

though aspiring to enter the appellate arena of the

Supreme Court. Whether he enters or not would depend

on the fate of his petition for special leave;

(2) If the petition seeking grant of leave to appeal is

dismissed, it is an expression of opinion by the Court

that a case for invoking appellate jurisdiction of the

Court was not made out.

(3) If leave to appeal is granted, the appellate

jurisdiction of the Court stands invoked; the gate for

entry in the appellate arena is opened. The petitioner is

in and the respondent may also be called upon to face

him, though in an appropriate case, in spite of having

granted leave to appeal, the Court may dismiss the

69

appeal without noticing the respondent.

(4) In spite of a petition for special leave to appeal

having been filed, the judgment, decree or order against

which leave to appeal has been sought for, continues to

be final, effective and binding as between the parties.

Once leave to appeal has been granted, the finality of

the judgment, decree or order appealed against is put

in jeopardy though it continues to be binding and

effective between the parties unless it is a nullity or

unless the Court may pass a specific order staying or

suspending the operation or execution of the judgment,

decree or order under challenge.”

72. In Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169, the Constitution

Bench of this Court has explained the scope and powers of this

Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in detail:

“9. On a careful examination of Article 136 along

with the preceding article, it seems clear that the

wide discretionary power with which this Court is

invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and

in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a

more or less uniform standard should be adopted

in granting special leave in the wide range of

matters which can come up before it under this

article. By virtue of this article, we can grant

special leave in civil cases, in criminal cases, in

income tax cases, in cases which come up before

different kinds of tribunals and in a variety of other

cases. The only uniform standard which in our

opinion can be laid down in the circumstances is

that Court should grant special leave to appeal only

in those cases where special circumstances are

shown to exist. The Privy Council have tried to lay

down from time to time certain principles for

granting special leave in criminal cases, which

were reviewed by the Federal Court

in Kapildeo v. King. It is sufficient for our purpose

70

to say that though we are not bound to follow them

too rigidly since the reasons, constitutional and

administrative, which sometimes weighed with the

Privy Council, need not weigh with us, yet some of

those principles are useful as furnishing in many

cases a sound basis for invoking the discretion of

this Court in granting special leave. Generally

speaking, this Court will not grant special leave,

unless it is shown that exceptional and special

circumstances exist, that substantial and grave

injustice has been done and that the case in

question presents features of sufficient gravity to

warrant a review of the decision appealed against.

Since the present case does not in our opinion fulfil

any of these conditions, we cannot interfere with

the decision of the High Court, and the appeal must

be dismissed.” [Emphasis supplied]

73. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Hem Raj,

Son of Devilal Mahajan of Bijainagar, Condemned Prisoner,

at Present Confined in the Central Jail, Ajmer v. State of

Ajmer, AIR 1954 SC 462, held as under:

“2. Unless it is shown that exceptional and special

circumstances exist that substantial and grave injustice

has been done and the case in question presents

features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the

decision appealed against, this Court does not exercise

its overriding powers under Article 136(1) of the

Constitution and the circumstance that because the

appeal has been admitted by special leave does not

entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and

contest all the findings of fact and raise every point

which could be raised in the High Court. Even at the

final hearing only those points can be urged which are

fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave

to appeal is asked for. The question for consideration is

71

whether this test is satisfied in either of these two

appeals. After hearing the learned counsel in both the

appeals we are satisfied that none of them raise any

questions which fall within the rule enunciated above.”

[Emphasis supplied]

74. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of P.S.R.

Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam and Another, (1980) 3 SCC

141, has explained the Article 136 of the Constitution as under:

“7. …..In express terms, Article 136 does not

confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it

confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme

Court to interfere in suitable cases. The

discretionary dimension is considerable but that

relates to the power of the court. The question is

whether it spells by implication, fair a procedure as

contemplated by Article 21. In our view, it does.

Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary

power; it is extraordinary in its amplitude, its limit,

when it chases injustice, is the sky itself. This

Court functionally fulfils itself by reaching out to

injustice wherever it is and this power is largely

derived in the common run of cases from Article

136. Is it merely a power in the court to be

exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no

procedural limitation in the manner of exercise and

the occasion for exercise? Is there no duty to act

fairly while hearing a case under Article 136, either

in the matter of grant of leave or, after such grant,

in the final disposal of the appeal? We have hardly

any doubt that here is a procedure necessarily

implicit in the power vested in the summit court. It

must be remembered that Article 136 confers

jurisdiction on the highest court. The founding

fathers unarguably intended in the very terms of

Article 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest

judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to

72

judicial principles well established by precedents

in our jurisprudence. Judicial discretion is

canalised authority, not arbitrary eccentricity.

Cardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed:

[Benjamin Cardozo : The Nature Of The Judicial

Process, Yale University Press (1921)]

“The Judge, even when he is free, is still not

wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He

is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit

of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is

to draw his inspiration from consecrated

principles. It is not to yield to spasmodic

sentiment, to vague and unregulated

benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion

informed by tradition, methodized by analogy,

disciplined by system, and subordinated to ‘the

primordial necessity of order in the social life’.

Wide enough in all conscience is the field of

discretion that remains.”

8. It is manifest that Article 136 is of composite

structure, is power-cum-procedure — power in that

it vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and

procedure in that it spells a mode of hearing. It

obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and the

mode of hearing so characteristic of the court

process. In short, there is an in-built prescription of

power and procedure in terms of Article 136 which

meets the demand of Article 21.

9. We may eye the issue slightly differently. If

Article 21 is telescoped into Article 136, the

conclusion follows that fair procedure is imprinted

on the special leave that the court may grant or

refuse. When a motion is made for leave to appeal

against an acquittal, this Court appreciates the

gravity of the peril to personal liberty involved in

that proceeding. It is fair to assume that while

considering the petition under Article 136 the court

73

will pay attention to the question of liberty, the

person who seeks such leave from the court, his

motive and his locus standi and the weighty factors

which persuade the court to grant special leave.

When this conspectus of processual circumstances

and criteria play upon the jurisdiction of the court

under Article 136, it is reasonable to conclude that

the desideratum of fair procedure implied in Article

21 is adequately answered.

xxx xxx xxx

11. The wider the discretionary power the more

sparing its exercise. Times out of number this Court

has stressed that though parties promiscuously

“provoke” this jurisdiction, the court

parsimoniously invokes the power. Moreover, the

court may not, save in special situations, grant

leave to one who is not eo nomine a party on the

record. Thus, procedural limitations exist and are

governed by well worn rules of guidance.”

[Emphasis supplied]

75. Thus, the principles of law discernible from the aforesaid are

that unless, it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances

exist; that substantial and grave injustice have been done and the

case and question present features of sufficient gravity to warrant

a review of the decision appealed against, this Court would not

exercise its overriding powers under Article 136(1) of the

Constitution. The wide discretionary power with which this Court

is invested under Article 136 is to be exercised sparingly and in

exceptional cases only.

74

76. In so far as the Appeal arising out of the Special Leave Petition

(C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by Satish Chandra Yadav is concerned,

the same should fail. We are not at all convinced with the case put

forward by Satish Chandra Yadav for informing the respondent

herein that there was no criminal case pending against him on the

date he filled up the verification form. The explanation offered by

Satish Chandra Yadav is nothing but his own understanding of

what is prosecution and pendency of a criminal case. If he knows

that trial is deemed to have commenced with the framing of charge,

then we are sure he knows and understands what is criminal

prosecution.

77. Indisputably, Satish Chandra Yadav was still under probation

at the time, his services had been terminated. It is also apparent

from the record that Satish Chandra Yadav had been given

appointment on probation subject to the verification of facts given

in the verification Form. To our mind, therefore, if an enquiry

revealed that the facts given were wrong, the respondent herein

was at liberty to dispense with the services of the appellant Satish

Chandra Yadav as the question of any stigma and penal

consequences at this stage would not arise. It bears repetition that

75

what has led to the termination of the services of the appellant

Satish Chandra Yadav is not his involvement in the criminal case

which was then pending, and in which he had been acquitted

subsequently but the fact that he had withheld relevant

information while filling in the verification Form. He could be said

to have exhibited or displayed such a tendency which shook the

confidence of the respondent.

78. Administrative law has traditionally approached the review of

decisions classified as discretionary separately from those seen as

involving the interpretation of rules of law. The rule has been that

the decisions classified as discretionary may only be reviewed on

limited grounds such as the bad faith of decision-makers, the

exercise of discretion for an improper purpose, and the use of

irrelevant considerations. A general doctrine of

“unreasonableness” has also sometimes been applied to the

discretionary decisions. In our opinion, these

doctrines incorporate two central ideas — those discretionary

decisions, like all other administrative decisions, must be made

within the bounds of the jurisdiction conferred by the statutory

rules, but that considerable deference will be given to the decision-

76

makers by the courts in reviewing the exercise of that discretion

and determining the scope of the decision -makers’

jurisdiction. These doctrines recognise that it is the intention of a

legislature, when using statutory language that confers broad

choices on the administrative agencies, that courts should not

lightly interfere with such decisions, and should give considerable

respect to the decision-makers when reviewing the manner in

which discretion was exercised. However, discretion must still be

exercised in a manner that is within a reasonable interpretation of

the margin of manoeuvre contemplated by the l egislature, in

accordance with the principles of the rule of law.

79. Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned ASG has rightly relied on

Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (supra) in which this Court held

that the purpose of requiring an employee to furnish information

regarding prosecution/conviction, etc. in the verification Form was

to assess his character and antecedents for the purpose of

employment and continuation in service; that suppress ion of

material information and making a false statement in reply to the

queries relating to prosecution and conviction had a clear bearing

on the character, conduct and antecedents of the employee; and

77

that where it is found that the employee had suppressed or given

false information in regard to the matters which had a bearing on

his fitness or suitability to the post, he could be terminated from

service during the period of probation without holding any inquiry.

This Court also made it clear that neither the gravity of the criminal

offence nor the ultimate acquittal therein was relevant when

considering whether a probationer who suppresses a material fact

(of his being involved in a criminal case, in the personal information

furnished to the employer), is fit to be continued as a probationer.

80. We find that the observations in the aforesaid case are fully

applicable to the appeal filed by Satish Chandra Yadav. We are of

the opinion that it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the

appellant Satish Chandra Yadav to withhold the relevant

information and it is this omission which has led to the termination

of his service during the probation period.

81. In view of the aforesaid, the Appeal arising out of the Special

Leave Petition (C) No. 20860 of 2019 filed by Satish Chandra Yadav

fails and is hereby dismissed.

82. So far as the connected Appeal arising out of the Special Leave

Petition (C) No. 5170 of 2021 filed by Pushpendra Kumar Yadav is

78

concerned, the same also fails on the very same line of reasoning

adopted by us. The only difference in the case of the appellant

Pushpendra Kumar Yadav is that he had put in about four years

of service before he came to be terminated.

83. In the result, both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed

with no order as to costs.

84. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

………………………………………..J.

(SURYA KANT)

………………………………………..J.

(J.B. PARDIWALA)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 26, 2022.