Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 1587-1636 OF 2017

SATISH KUMAR GUPTA ETC. ETC. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ETC. ...RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.1637 OF 2017, 1638-1653 OF 2017, 1655-1658 OF

2017, 1659-1663 OF 2017, 1664 OF 2017, 1665-1669 OF 2017,

1670-1675 OF 2017, 1677-1691OF 2017, 1692 OF 2017, 1693 of 2017,

1694 of 2017, 1695 OF 2017, 1696 OF 2017, 1699-1701 OF 2017, 1702

OF 2017, 1703-1780 OF 2017, 1783-1852 OF 2017, 1853-1927 OF

2017, 1930-2003 OF 2017, 2004-2058 OF 2017, 2059-2111 OF 2017,

2112-2114 OF 2017, 2117-2118 OF 2017, 2123-2126 OF 2017,

2127-2128 OF 2017, 2129-2132 OF 2017, 2133-2138 OF 2017,

2139-2143 OF 2017, 2144-2145 OF 2017, 2146-2200 OF 2017,

2201-2203 OF 2017, 2204 of 2017, 2205-2206 OF 2017, 2207-2214 OF

2017, 2215-2219 OF 2017, 2220 OF 2017, 2221-2223 OF 2017, 2224

OF 2017, 2226-2227 OF 2017, 2228 OF 2017, 2232-2246 OF 2017 AND

2249-2279 OF 2017.

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.These appeals have been preferred against judgment and order

dated 06

th

October, 2015 passed by the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh in R.F. A. Nos.4316 of 2010 etc. etc.

1

Page 2 2.Question for consideration is whether a post-acquisition allottee of

land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the

matter of determination of compensation under the scheme of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act). If not, whether the impugned order

permitting additional evidence and directing remand is sustainable.

3.Facts giving rise to the question may be briefly noted. Huge

chunks of land were acquired by the State of Haryana in different phases

for the public purpose of setting-up Industrial Model Township by the

Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) in Gurgaon

District in Haryana. Substantial part of the acquired land was allotted by

the HSIDC to Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL). One of the clauses in

the Conveyance Deed executed in favour of the allottee provided that if

compensation was enhanced, the allottee shall be liable to pay additional

price on that basis. In HSIDC v. Pran Sukh

1

, issue of compensation for

land acquired in Phase I was decided by this Court. Review Petitions

against the said judgment were dealt with in HSIDC v. Mawasi

2

and

HSIDC v. Pran Sukh

3

. Matter of determining compensation in respect

1

(2010) 11 SCC 175

2

(2012) 7 SCC 200

3

(2012) 7 SCC 721

2

Page 3 of Phase II and Phase III came-up for consideration in HSIDC v. Udal

4

.

As noticed in judgment of this Court in Udal (supra), the Reference

Court awarded compensation in the light of compensation determined in

the judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra) and other awards

relating to land acquired for Phase III. Against the decision of the

Reference Court, the land owners as well as the HSIDC filed appeals

under Section 54 of the Act. The High Court assessed the compensation

based on judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra). Reference to

paras 29 to 33 of the judgment of this Court Udal (supra) shows that

after referring to the plea of the HSIDC that the annual increase of 12%

for the time gap was erroneous in view of ONGC v. Rameshbhai

Jivanbhai Patel

5

and Valliyammal v. Special Tehsildar (LA)

6

, this

Court found merit in the arguments of the land owners that an

important piece of evidence was not taken into account which

necessitated remand. The matter was remanded to the High Court for

fresh disposal and it was also observed that MSIL was free to file an

4

(2013) 14 SCC 506

5

(2008) 14 SCC 745

6

(2011) 8 SCC 91

3

Page 4 appropriate application for its impleadment or for leave to act as

intervenor.

4.Thereafter, the matter was dealt with by the High Court in the

impugned judgment. The High Court held that the allottee had a right to

be impleaded as a party for the following reasons:

a) The State or the local authority for whose benefit the land is

acquired may not lead proper evidence or advance effective

arguments.

b) A clause in the deed of allotment in favour of the allottee

provides for payment of additional price as a consequence of

enhancement of compensation.

c) As a result of enhancement of compensation by the

Reference Court, the company in question was required to pay

about Rs.900 crores.

d)Under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC the Court can add or delete a

party at any stage.

e)Section 50 of the Act provides a right to a local authority or a

company for whose benefit the land is acquired to be represented

4

Page 5 before the Collector or the Court in the process of determination of

compensation.

f)The principle behind giving the right of representation to a

local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired

can also be applied to any person who is liable to pay the enhanced

compensation treating such person to be the “person interested”

under Section 3(b) of the Act.

5.After permitting the allottee to be impleaded as a party, the High

Court also allowed application to lead additional evidence on the ground

that the acquiring authority did not defend the case properly. Similar

application filed by the HSIDC to lead additional evidence was also

allowed and, thereafter, on considering the additional evidence it was

observed that it was not possible for the High Court to assess the

compensation as there was no site plan showing the location of the

transactions relied. It was also considered necessary to give an

opportunity to MSIL, who was impleaded for the first time. On that basis

the matter was remanded to the Reference Court for fresh decision.

6.Aggrieved by the order of the High Court these appeals have been

preferred. Contentions of the appellants are as follows:

5

Page 6 i)The post-acquisition allottee had no right to be heard in the

matter of compensation. Reliance has been placed on Hindu

Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind and anr. v. Municipal

Committee, Jind and ors.

7

; Haryana State Industrial

Development Corporation v. Pran Sukh and ors. (supra) and;

Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (Dead) by legal representatives

and ors. v. State of Karnataka and anr.

8

ii) Applications for impleadment have been filed by MSIL 12 years

after the acquisition and applications for additional evidence were

also filed after a long delay and for the first time after remand by

this Court, which could not be considered within the scope of Order

XLI Rule 27 of CPC.

(iii) Application for additional evidence was rejected by this Court in

the earlier round. The remand by this Court was limited to the

question whether there was a need for further enhancement in the

light of evidence which was not earlier considered.

7.On the other hand, learned counsel for the MSIL as well as the

HSIDC and other allottees have supported the impugned judgment. They

7

1988 (Supp) SCC 719

8

(2015) 10 SCC 469

6

Page 7 submit that since allottees have to pay the enhanced compensation, they

ought to be treated as “person interested” under Section 3 (b) of the Act.

Reliance has been placed on judgments of this Court in Himalayan

Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho (Dead) by

Lrs.

9

; Santosh Kumar and ors. v. Central Warehousing

Corporation and anr.

10

; Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v.

Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely and Ors.

11

and;

U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (Dead) by Lrs. and

Ors.

12

.

8.We have given our due consideration to the rival submissions.

9.To determine the question whether the post-acquisition allottee of

land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the

matter of determination of compensation, we may refer to the scheme of

the Act. The acquisition may either be for a “public purpose” as defined

under Section 3(f) or for a company under Part-VII of the Act. If the

acquisition is for a public purpose (as the present case), the land vests in

9

(1980) 3 SCC 223

10

(1986) 2 SCC 343

11

(1995) 1 SCC 221

12

(1995) 2 SCC 326

7

Page 8 the State after the Collector makes an award and the possession is

taken. Till the award is made, no person other than State comes into

the picture. Once the land vests in the State, the acquisition is complete.

Any transferee from the State is not concerned with the process of

acquisition. The State may transfer the land by public auction or by

allotment at any price with which the person whose land is acquired has

no concern. The mere fact that the Government chooses to determine

the allotment price with reference to compensation price determined by

the Court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest the claim

for enhancement of compensation.

10.This legal position is well settled on principle as well as the

precedent. In Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya (supra) it was observed:

“3. … … …Indisputably the land in dispute was not acquired

for the purpose of appellants instead the land was acquired

for the Municipal Committee for the purpose of developing its

Scheme No. 5. After the declaration of award Municipal

Committee took possession of the land and thereafter

transferred a portion of the same to the appellants under an

agreement. In these circumstances the ratio laid down by this

Court in Himalayan Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor

Countinho [(1980) 3 SCC 223] does not apply as the

appellants are not interested persons and they have no right

to question the award. … … …”

11.Again, in Peerappa Hanmantha (supra) inter alia the following

questions were framed for consideration.

8

Page 9 “30.1. (i) Whether the allottee Company (M/s. Ultra Tech

Cement Ltd.) is either a beneficiary or interested person

entitled for hearing before determination of the market value

to award just and reasonable compensation in respect of the

acquired land of the appellants either before the Deputy

Commissioner or Reference Court?

(ii) Whether the writ petition filed by the allottee Company

before the High Court is maintainable in law?

(iii) Whether the order of remand allowing the writ petition of

the allottee Company to the Reference Court is legal and

valid?”

12.The above questions were answered as follows:

“63. In view of the foregoing reasons recorded by us on the

basis of the acquisition notifications issued by the State

Government under the statutory provisions of the KIAD Act

and therefore, we have to answer Points (i), (ii) and (iii) in

favour of the landowners holding that the Company is neither

the beneficiary nor interested person of the acquired land,

hence, it has no right to participate in the award proceedings

for determination of the market value and award the

compensation amount of the acquired land of the appellants.

Hence, the writ petition filed by the Company questioning the

correctness of the award passed by the Reference Court

which is affirmed by the High Court is not at all maintainable

in law. On this ground itself, the writ petition filed by the

Company should have been rejected by the High Court,

instead it has allowed and remanded the case to the

Reference Court for reconsideration of the claims after

affording opportunity to the Company, which order suffers

from error in law and therefore, the same is liable to be set

aside.”

13.Judgments in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra),

Himalayan Tiles (supra) and P. Narayanappa and anr. v. State of

Karnataka and ors.

13

as mentioned in para 61 of the judgment in

13

9

Page 10 Peerappa Hanmantha (supra) were held to be not applicable as the

same applied only when the acquisition is for a company or for the

beneficiary of the acquisition as mentioned in the notification for

acquisition itself. This is clear from the following:

“61. Further, both the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of

KIADB and the Company have placed reliance on various

decisions rendered by this Court in support of their above

respective legal submissions that the Company is an

interested person and, therefore, it has got right to participate

in the proceedings before the Reference Court for

determination of compensation before passing the award

either by the Land Acquisition Officer or the Deputy

Commissioner or the Reference Court at the instance of the

owner or any other interested person. These include

judgments rendered by this Court in U.P. Awas Evam Vikas

Parishad v. Gyan Devi, Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. v.

Francis Victor Coutinho and P. Narayanappa v. State of

Karnataka and other decisions which are not required to be

mentioned in this judgment as they are all reiteration of the

law laid down in the above cases.

62. The reliance placed on the various decisions of this Court

by both the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of KIADB and

the Company, is misplaced as none of the said judgments

relied upon are applicable to the fact situation in the present

case for the reason that those cases dealt with reference to

the acquisition of land under the provisions of the LA Act,

either in favour of the company or development authorities,

whereas in the case on hand, the acquisition proceedings

have been initiated under the KIAD Act for industrial

development by KIADB. Further, the original acquisition

record in respect of the acquired land involved in the

proceedings by the learned Standing Counsel on behalf of the

State of Karnataka as per our directions issued vide our

(2006) 7 SCC 578

10

Page 11 orders dated 17-11-2014

14

and 24-3-2015

15

, do not disclose

the fact that the acquisition of lands covered in the acquisition

notifications are in favour of the Company. Thus, the

acquisition of land in favour of KIADB is abundantly clear

from the preliminary and final notifications issued by the

State Government and thereafter following the procedure

under sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act, it

took possession of the acquired land from the owners who

were in possession of the same and was transferred in favour

of KIADB for its disposal for the purpose for which lands were

acquired as provided under Section 32(2) of the KIAD Act read

with the Regulations referred to supra framed by KIADB

under Section 41(2)(b) of the KIAD Act. Therefore, the reliance

placed upon the judgments of this Court by the learned Senior

Counsel on behalf of the Company and KIADB, are wholly

inapplicable to the fact situation and do not support the case

of the Company.”

14

Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karnataka, SLP(C)No. 19819 of

2013, order dated 17-11-2014 (SC), wherein it was directed: “Issue notice to

the State Government. The learned counsel for the petitioners to take out notice to

the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State Government. Dasti, in

addition, is also permitted. Mr. V.N. Raghupathy, learned counsel accepts notice for

the State of Karnataka and Mr. Nishanth Patil, learned counsel accepts notice for

Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (for short ‘KIADB’). The learned

counsel appearing for the State Governument and the learned counsel appearing

for KIADB are directed to produce the relevant records in respect of the proceedings

relating to land acquisition involved in these matters. There shall be stay of the

effect and operation of the impugned order during the pendency of these petitions.

List the matters after four weeks. In the meanwhile, all the respondents are at

liberty to file written statements, if any.”

15

Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karnataka, SLP(C)No. 19819 of

2013, order dated 24-3-2015(SC), wherein it was directed: “Heard Ms. Kiran

Suri, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in SLPS(C)Nos. 31624-25 of 2014 in

part. List all the matters as part for further hearing. Vide order dated 17-11-2014,

learned counsel for the State as well as the learned counsel for KIADB were directed

to produce the relevant records in respect of the proceedings relating to land

acquisition involved in these matters, record as well as the records relating to

allotment of land. However, as per office records, nothing has been produced so

far. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel for the State as well as the

learned counsel for KIADB are directed to comply with the order dated 17-11-2014

and produce the relevant records in respect of the proceedings relating to land

acquisition and the allotment of land involved in these matters before the next date

of hearing. List the matters on 15-4-2015.”

11

Page 12 14. We are in respectful agreement with the above view in Hindu

Kanya Maha Vidyalaya (supra) and Peerappa Hanmantha (supra).

No contrary view of this Court has been brought to our notice. The

judgments relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable as

already held by this Court.

15. In Himalayan Tiles (supra) the acquisition was under

Part-VII of the Act. In Santosh Kumar (supra) the question was

whether award of the Collector could be challenged, to which this

Court answered in the negative except on the ground of fraud,

corruption or collusion. In Neyvely Lignite (supra) again the

acquisition was under Part-VII of the Act and in that context this

Court held that the expression “person interested” could include a

company or local authority for whose benefit the land was acquired.

The post-acquisition allottee cannot by any stretch of imagination be

treated at par with beneficiary for whom the land was acquired. In

U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra), the matter dealt with was

in the context of statutory authority for whom the land was acquired.

Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma (dead) by

12

Page 13 Lrs. and ors.

16

was a case in the context of beneficiary for whom the

land was acquired.

16. The only other justification in the impugned judgment which

has been relied upon by the respondents is lack of sincerity on the

part of the State authority for whose benefit the acquisition has been

made viz. HSIDC, which by itself cannot be a valid ground to permit

post-acquisition allottee to be treated as a necessary or proper

authority under Order I Rule 10 of CPC to proceedings for

determination of compensation. The view taken in the impugned

judgment cannot be sustained on any principle or precedent.

17. We may now refer to an order of this Court dated

15

th

July, 2004 which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment

in para 31. There is no consideration of the principle of law and

thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law

could not be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at

hand.

16

(2011) 2 SCC 54

13

Page 14 18. Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no

locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper

party.

19. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional

evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for.

No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled

principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The provision is

reproduced below:-

“27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate

Court.- (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled

to produce additional evidence, whether oral or

documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if –

(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is

preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to

have been admitted, or

(aa) the party seeking to produce additional

evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise

of due diligence, such evidence was not within his

knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due

diligence, be produced by him at the time when the

decree appealed against was passed, or

(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to

be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it

to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial

cause,

The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or

document to be produced, or witness to be examined.

14

Page 15 (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be

produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record

the reason for its admission.”

20.It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the

evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was

not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to

necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be

permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the

case

17

. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.

21.We may also refer to the argument that this Court, while

remanding the matter in the earlier round, had given liberty to the MSIL

to file an application for impleadment or to act as an intervenor which

implied that such application was to be accepted. We do not find any

merit in this contention also. It cannot be held that any right was

crystalised by the said observation and such prayer had to be considered

according to law. We have already held that the post-acquisition allottee

had no right in the matter.

17

N. Kamalam v. Ayyaswami (2001) 7 SCC 503: para 19

15

Page 16 22.For the above reasons, we allow these appeals and set aside the

impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court once again for

fresh decision in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear

before the High Court on 27

th

March, 2017.

………… ..…………………………….J.

[ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

.….……………………..……………..J.

[ UDAY UMESH LALIT ]

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 21, 2017.

16