criminal law, Punjab case, procedural safeguards, Supreme Court India
0  26 Mar, 1999
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Satwant Singh Sodhi Vs. State of Punjab and Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India Civil Appeal/1743/1999
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Case Background

As per case facts, disputes arose from a construction agreement, leading to arbitration. The Arbitrator issued an interim award for a specific claim (Item No.1) and later a final award ...

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Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5

PETITIONER:

SATWANT SINGH SODHI

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/03/1999

BENCH:

S.R.Babu

JUDGMENT:

RAJENDRA BABU, J. :

Leave granted.

In relation to the construction of High Level Bridge

over river Ghaggar on Pehawa Road at Devigarh, an agreement

was entered into between the appellant and the respondents.

The disputes between them arose in respect of certain claims

made by the appellant and the matter was referred to

arbitration (respondent No.3) pursuant to an order made by

Sub-Judge (1st Class), Patiala. The appellant submitted his

claim before the Arbitrator and sought for an interim award

in respect of Item No.1 with a claim for 18% compound

interest from 1.2.1981 to 15.3.1992. The Arbitrator, by

award made on November 26, 1992, awarded a sum of Rs.7.45

lacs in respect of Item No.1 with interest @ 18% compound

yearly from 1.2.1981 to 15.3.1992. On January 28, 1994, the

Arbitrator made another award inclusive of Item No.1 and

awarded a sum of Rs.3,75 lacs and interest @ 12% per annum

with effect from 1.2.1981 to 15.3.1992 on the amount and

also in respect of other claims. The appellant made an

application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940

(hereinafter referred to as the Act) for making the awards

dated November 26, 1992 and January 28, 1994 as the rule of

the court. The trial court made the award as the rule of

the court holding that the interim award in regard to Item

No.1 should be made the rule of the court and that award

having covered Item No.1 should not be taken note of in the

award made on January 28, 1994. Thereby the trial court

took the view that interim award made on November 26, 1992

is liable to be made the rule of the court with regard to

Item No.1 and that Item No.1 of the award made on January

28, 1994 will merge in the same deciding that aspect of the

matter against the respondents and in favour of the

appellant. The award dated January 28, 1994 was ordered to

be made the rule of the court except for Item No.1 for which

interim award has already been granted.

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 preferred an appeal before the

High Court which was allowed by holding that the trial court

fell in error in making the interim award the rule of the

court which was superseded by the final award made on

January 28, 1994.

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In these appeals by special leave, the appellant

contended that on the award being made by the Arbitrator

insofar as Item No.1 was concerned it became final but the

High Court lost sight of the fact that it was not open to

the Arbitrator to revise the Award made by him earlier as he

had become functus officio. It is submitted that the High

Court erred in holding that the award made on November 26,

1992 was not pronounced though it was made and signed by the

Arbitrator and, therefore, was open to be corrected.

Assailing this conclusion, it was contended that the

Arbitrator has to make and sign the award and it is valid in

law if he does so and merely because no notice has been

given to the parties it cannot be held to be invalid and

notice to the parties could be postponed. The requirement

of making and signing the award simultaneously is sufficient

to result in binding award. It was next contended that the

view of the High Court that the Arbitrator himself

superseded the award made on November 26, 1992 by treating

it to be an interim award was erroneous and it was submitted

that the interim award having been made and being final in

character it was not open for modification or alteration

except in terms as provided in Section 13(d) of the Act.

The trial court adverted to the facts leading to the

award being made on Item No.1. The appellant claimed for

interim award in respect of Item No.1 for Rs. 10,05,422/-

with compound interest @ 18% with effect from 1.2.1981 to

15.3.1992. The Arbitrator made an award on Item No.1 to the

tune of Rs.7.45 lacs with interest @ 18% compound per annum

from 1.2.1981 to 15.3.1992 after examining the oral and

documentary evidence and after considering the arguments and

counter arguments. It is necessary to notice the manner in

which the Arbitrator dealt with this aspect of the matter in

the award made on January 28, 1994. At page 3 of the award,

the Arbitrator has mentioned as under :

The Executive Engineer, Provincial Division No.2, PWD

B&R Branch, Patiala informed during the hearing on December

2, 1992 that the Honble High Court heard the case on

November 23, 1992 and subsequently on December 2, 1992 and

stayed the operation of the arbitration proceedings. In

view of the order of the learned court dated September 23,

1992, the proceedings were taken up and both parties

appeared on various dates. After hearing the parties and as

per the directions regarding the finalisation of the interim

award as the case in respect of Item No.1 was heard and was

considered to announce interim award but in view of the stay

granted on December 2, 1992 which was informed by the

Executive Engineer, Provincial Division No.2, Patiala on

December 2, 1992 during the hearing the award as such was

not announced, which has been incorporated in the present

award as given hereinbelow.

The question whether interim award is final to the

extent it goes or has effect till the final award is

delivered will depend upon the form of the award. If the

interim award is intended to have effect only so long as the

final award is not delivered it will have the force of the

interim award and it will cease to have effect after the

final award is made. If, on the other hand, the interim

award is intended to finally determine the rights of the

parties it will have the force of a complete award and will

have effect even after the final award is delivered. The

terms of the award dated November 26, 1992 do not indicate

that the same is of interim nature.

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Section 14 of the provides that when the arbitrator or

umpire has made his award, he shall sign it and shall give

notice in writing to the parties of the making and signing

thereof and of the amount of fees and charges payable in

respect of the arbitration and award. In the language of

the Section, an award will be complete as soon as it is made

and signed. Thus mere writing of an award would not amount

to making of an award. There can be no finality in the

award except when it is signed because signing of the award

gives legal effect to it and to give validity to an award.

It is not necessary that it should also be delivered or

pronounced or filed in the court. Making and delivery of

the award are different stages of an arbitration proceeding.

An award is made when it is authenticated by the person who

makes it. The word made suggests that the mind of the

Arbitrator as being declared and it is validly deemed to be

pronounced as soon as the Arbitrator has signed it and once

an award has been given by the Arbitrator he becomes functus

officio. If this is the position in law, it becomes

difficult to support the view taken by the High Court in

stating that the interim award was not pronounced though it

was made and signed by the Arbitrator. If he had made the

award the question of superseding the same could not arise.

Therefore, the view of the High Court appears to us to be

fallacious. On this aspect of the matter we may refer to

some of the decisions on the aspect as to when an award

becomes final. In Janardhan Prasad vs. Chandrashekhar, AIR

1951 Nagpur 198, after examining the scope of Section 14 of

the Act, it was held as follows :

the award becomes valid and final so far as the

arbitrators or umpire are concerned the moment it is made

and signed by them. The provision for giving notice in

writing to the parties of the making and signing thereof and

of the amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the

arbitration and the award is for the purpose of limitation

under Art. 178 of the Limitation Act, entitling either

party to apply to the Court for the filing in Court of the

award.

No time is fixed for the giving of such notice by the

Arbitrator and it has been held in several cases that it may

be done within reasonable time either by the Arbitrator or

by his agent. A notice may be given to one party and may

not be given to another party for a much longer period. It

cannot be said that an award becomes final so far as the

first party is concerned and no as against the other

entitling the Arbitrators to scrap the award and make a

fresh one.

There is thus a fundamental difference between

the making, signing and delivery of a judgment and making

and signing and giving notice of an award. In the former

case all three must be simultaneous acts and parts of the

same transaction. In the latter case the first two may be

simultaneous and the notice of the award can be postponed.

That award does not become invalid because notice of

the making of it has not been given. An Arbitrator is

entitled to file an award in Court under Section 14,

sub-s.(2). If he does so, the Court is bound to give notice

to the parties of the filing of the award.

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The circumstances in which these observations are made

by the court are as follows :

The Arbitrators had made and signed an award on

January 11, 1944 which was registered on January 13, 1944.

Thereafter the Arbitrators made a second award on January

26, 1944. It was contended that as they did not pronounce

the award by issuing a notice of having signed it, they had

not become functus officio and could, therefore, make and

deliver the second award dated January 26, 1944. The

learned Judges of the High Court refused to hold that the

first award was not final and could be superseded by the

second award because no notice was given before January 26,

1944. This view was followed by the Andhra Pradesh High

Court in Badarla Ramakrishnamma & Ors. vs. Vattikonda

Lakshmibayamma & Ors., AIR 1958 Andhra Pradesh 503, at pare

2. Again in Ram Bharosey vs. Peary Lal, AIR 1957 All.265,

it was observed as under :

It is true that in the present case the Arbitrators

did not give notice to the parties of the making and the

signing of the award. But the arbitrators after making and

the signing the award filed it in the court. The validity

of the award does not depend upon the notice of the same

being given to the parties. When an award is duly make,

signed and filed in Court it is a valid document.

This position was reiterated in Asad-ul-lah vs.

Muhammad Nur, ILR 27 All. 459(A) and it was held that :

for the making of an award it is enough that the

Arbitrators act together and finally make up their minds and

express their decision in writing. This writing must be

authenticated by their signatures. The award is thus made

and signed and is complete and final so far as the

Arbitrators are concerned.

This Court in Rikhabdas vs. Ballabhdas & Ors., 1962

(1) SCR Supp. 475, held that once an award is made and

signed by the Arbitrator the Arbitrator becomes functus

officio. In Juggilal Kamlapat vs. General Fibre Dealers

Ltd., 1962 (2) SCR Supp. 101, this Court held that an

Arbitrator having signed his award becomes functus officio

but that did not mean that in no circumstances could there

by further arbitration proceedings where an award was set

aside or that the same Arbitrator could never have anything

to do with the award with respect to the same dispute. Thus

in the present case, it was not open to the Arbitrator to

re-determine the claim and make an award. Therefore, the

view taken by the trial court that the earlier award made

and written though signed was not pronounced but

nevertheless had become complete and final, therefore,

should be made the rule of the court appears to us to be

correct with regard to Item No.1 inasmuch as the claim in

relation to Item No.1 could not have been adjudicated by the

Arbitrator again and it has been rightly excluded from the

second award made by the Arbitrator on January 28, 1994.

Thus the view taken by the trial court on this aspect also

appears to us to be correct. Therefore, the trial court has

rightly ordered the award dated January 28, 1994 to be the

rule of the court except for Item No.1 and in respect of

which the award dated November 26, 1992 was ordered to be

the rule of the court.

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In the circumstances aforementioned, we have no option

but to reverse the view taken by the High Court and restore

that of the trial court. The appeals stand allowed

accordingly.

Reference cases

Description

Understanding Arbitration Award Finality: A Deep Dive into Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab & Ors.

Decoding Arbitration Award Finality: The Supreme Court's Stance on Interim Awards and Functus Officio

This landmark ruling, Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab & Ors., addressing critical aspects of Arbitration Award Finality and the concept of an Functus Officio Arbitrator, is prominently featured on CaseOn, offering invaluable insights for legal practitioners and students alike. The Supreme Court's pronouncement clarifies the precise moment an arbitration award attains finality and the limitations on an arbitrator's authority thereafter, shedding light on the intricate balance between interim and final awards.

Case Background: The Dispute Over an Arbitration Award

The case originated from a construction agreement for a High-Level Bridge on the Ghaggar river at Devigarh, involving the appellant, Satwant Singh Sodhi, and the State of Punjab. Disputes arose regarding various claims, leading to the matter being referred to arbitration by an order of the Sub-Judge (1st Class), Patiala. The core of the appellant's claim before the Arbitrator was for an interim award on 'Item No.1,' seeking 18% compound interest.

The Arbitrator's Awards and Subsequent Legal Journey

  • First Award (November 26, 1992): The Arbitrator initially awarded Rs. 7.45 lacs for Item No.1, along with 18% compound yearly interest from February 1, 1981, to March 15, 1992.
  • Second Award (January 28, 1994): Subsequently, the Arbitrator issued another award covering Item No.1 and other claims, awarding Rs. 3.75 lacs with 12% interest for Item No.1. This later award referenced a stay order on arbitration proceedings which, according to the arbitrator, prevented the announcement of the first award.
  • Trial Court's Decision: The appellant sought to make both awards the rule of the court. The Trial Court held that the November 26, 1992, interim award regarding Item No.1 should be made the rule of the court. It concluded that the earlier award for Item No.1 was final and, therefore, the January 28, 1994, award should not supersede it for that specific item.
  • High Court's Reversal: Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 appealed to the High Court, which reversed the Trial Court's decision. The High Court opined that the interim award of November 26, 1992, was superseded by the final award of January 28, 1994, essentially treating the earlier award as not final until formally pronounced.

IRAC Method Analysis

Issue: When does an Arbitration Award become Final, and can an Arbitrator Revise a Previously Signed Award?

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was twofold: First, at what point does an arbitration award, particularly one termed 'interim,' become final and binding, especially when signed but not formally 'pronounced' or 'delivered' to the parties? Second, does an arbitrator become 'functus officio' (lacking further authority) after making and signing an award, thereby preventing them from modifying or superseding it with a subsequent award covering the same subject matter?

Rule: The Mandate of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the Doctrine of Functus Officio

The Supreme Court relied on Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which stipulates that an arbitrator must sign the award and give notice in writing to the parties. Crucially, the Court referred to established precedents (such as Janardhan Prasad vs. Chandrashekhar and Rikhabdas vs. Ballabhdas & Ors.) which hold that:

  • An arbitration award becomes valid and final, as far as the arbitrator is concerned, the moment it is made and signed by them. The act of giving notice to the parties is a procedural requirement, primarily for limitation purposes, and does not determine the award's validity.
  • Once an arbitrator signs an award, they generally become functus officio, meaning their authority over the specific matter ceases. They cannot revisit, modify, or supersede the award unless specific statutory provisions (like Section 13(d) for correcting clerical errors) permit it, or if the award is set aside by a court.
  • The nature of an 'interim award' depends on its terms. If it conclusively determines the rights of the parties on a specific issue, it can be considered a final award for that particular issue, even if other matters remain to be arbitrated.

Analysis: Applying the Law to the Arbitrator's Actions

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the High Court's reasoning, finding it fallacious. The High Court's assertion that the November 26, 1992, award was not 'pronounced' and thus not final was directly contradicted by established legal principles. The Supreme Court underscored that the act of making and signing an award by the arbitrator is sufficient for its completion and validity.

Once the arbitrator had signed the award concerning Item No.1 on November 26, 1992, they became functus officio regarding that specific claim. This meant they no longer possessed the authority to re-adjudicate or modify Item No.1 in the subsequent award of January 28, 1994. The terms of the November 26, 1992, award unequivocally determined the rights of the parties concerning Item No.1, thereby rendering it a final award for that aspect, regardless of whether it was explicitly termed 'interim.' The arbitrator’s reference to a stay order to justify not announcing the earlier award or incorporating it into a later one was deemed irrelevant to the fundamental principle of an award's finality upon signing.

CaseOn.in offers concise 2-minute audio briefs that distill complex rulings like *Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab & Ors.*, enabling legal professionals to quickly grasp the nuances of Arbitration Award Finality and the implications for an Functus Officio Arbitrator in their daily practice.

Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the Trial Court's decision to make the November 26, 1992, award the rule of the court for Item No.1 and exclude it from the later award was entirely correct. The High Court's view, which suggested the interim award was superseded, was thus erroneous.

Conclusion: Upholding the Finality of the First Award

The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, affirming the Trial Court's order. It ruled that the November 26, 1992, award for Item No.1 was final and binding, and the arbitrator had become functus officio after signing it. Consequently, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to re-adjudicate Item No.1 in the subsequent January 28, 1994, award. The appeals were thus allowed, restoring the legal standing of the earlier award.

Why This Judgment is Important for Lawyers and Students

This Supreme Court judgment serves as a vital precedent for understanding the nuances of arbitration law, particularly concerning the finality of awards and the arbitrator's powers. For lawyers, it reinforces the principle that an arbitrator's authority ceases upon signing an award, preventing subsequent modifications unless explicitly permitted by statute. This has significant implications for drafting arbitration clauses, managing arbitration proceedings, and challenging or enforcing awards.

For law students, it provides a clear illustration of the 'functus officio' doctrine in practice and distinguishes between the 'making and signing' of an award versus its 'pronouncement' or 'delivery.' It also highlights how courts interpret the nature of an 'interim' award, looking beyond mere terminology to the substance of whether it conclusively determines a specific issue. This ruling underscores the importance of precision in arbitration proceedings and the finality attached to arbitral decisions once duly rendered.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. While efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.

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