2026:HHC:24828

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

RSA No. 17 of 2009

Reserved on: 08.05.2026

Date of Decision: 25.06.2026

Satyender Sharma & Ors ...Appellants

Versus

Sureshta Devi and Ors ...Respondents

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No

For the Appellants :Mr Ajay Sharma, Sr. Advocate,

with Mr Atharv Sharma,

Advocate.

For respondents No. 2(a) to

2(c)

:Mr Surender K. Sharma, Advocate.

For respondents No. 4(a) to

4(d)

2

: Mr Sanjay Jaswal, Advocate.

Name of respondent No. 3 stands deleted.

Respondent No.1 stated to have expired.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

and decree dated 13.12.2007 passed by learned Additional District

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2

Correction carried in compliance to order dated 13.7.2026

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Judge (Fast Track Court), Kangra at Dharamshala (learned

Appellate Court) vide which the judgment and decree dated

19.06.2003 passed by learned Sub-Judge (II), Nurpur, District

Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall

hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed

before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the plaintiff filed a civil suit for vacant possession

of the suit land mentioned in the headnote and para. 1 of the

plaint. It was asserted that the suit land is recorded in the

ownership of the plaintiff and other co-sharers. Prakash Chand,

S/o Rasila, the predecessor of the defendants, is recorded to be in

unauthorised possession of the suit land. Prakash Chand was

never inducted as a tenant of the suit land. He took forcible

possession of the suit land in the year 1983-84 and raised

construction over it. He started tethering cattle and used the

construction as the cow shed. The defendants were asked to

vacate the possession, but they failed to do so. Hence, the suit was

filed to seek the relief mentioned above.

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3. The suit was opposed by the defendants by filing a

written statement taking preliminary objections regarding lack of

maintainability, locus-standi, cause of action and jurisdiction,

the suit being barred by limitation, plaintiffs being estopped by

their act and conduct from filing the suit. The contents of the

plaint were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the suit land

was and is in possession of the defendants. Moti Ram, father of

defendant No.1, was the tenant of the suit land. He became the

owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land

Reforms Act. He had constructed a house and raised an orchard of

citrus fruits, mango, guava, litchi, pear, etc. on the suit land. The

defendants claimed in the alternative that they had become the

owners by virtue of adverse possession. Hence, they prayed that

the suit be dismissed.

4. A separate written statement was filed by the

defendants No. 3 and 4, taking preliminary objections regarding

lack of locus-standi and cause of action, the suit being not

maintainable, and the suit having not been valued properly for

Court fees and jurisdiction. The contents of the plaint were denied

on the merits. It was asserted that Moti Ram was in possession of

the suit land as a non-occupancy tenant. He resided with his

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family in a shed and constructed a cowshed over the suit land. He

had also planted various fruits on the suit land. He became the

owner after the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land

Reforms Act. Prakash Chand used to cultivate the land on behalf

of Moti Ram. The plaintiff, in collusion with the settlement

officials, got the name of Prakash Chand recorded in the revenue

record. Therefore, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed.

5. Separate replications denying the contents of the

written statement and affirming those of the plaint were filed.

6. The following issues were framed by the learned Trial

Court on 02.12.1998, 22.12.1999, 06.10.2000 and 13.03.2001:

1.Whether the plaintiff is owner of the suit land along with

other co-sharers as alleged? OPP

2.If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is entitled for

possession of the suit land? OPP

3.Whether the suit is within time? OPP

4.Whether the suit has been valued properly for the purposes

of court fee and jurisdiction? OPP

5.Whether the suit is not legally maintainable? OPD

6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct to

file the present suit? OPD

7.Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the present

suit? OPD

7(a)Whether the defendants have become owner of the suit

land by the operation of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms

Act, as alleged? OPP

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7(b)Whether the defendants have become owners of the suit

land by way of adverse possession, as alleged? OPD

8.Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the

present suit? OPD

9. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain

the present suit? OPD

9(a) Whether the defendants No.3 and 4 are successors-in-

interest of Moti, the original tenant and have become

owners in possession by operation of H.P. Tenancy and

Land Reforms Act, as alleged? OPD.

10. Relief.

7. The parties were called upon to produce the evidence,

and the plaintiff examined himself (PW1). The defendants

examined Hukmi Ram (DW1), Rajinder Kumar (DW2), defendant

No.1 Shreshtha Devi (DW3), Rumal Singh (DW4), Parkash Chand

(DW5), Savitri Devi (DW6) and Dhani Ram (DW7).

8. The learned Trial Court had initially dismissed the suit.

The plaintiffs filed an appeal and learned Appellate Court framed

additional issues 9(b) and 9(c) and remanded the matter to the

learned Trial Court:

9(b) Whether Prakash Chand, predecessor-in-interst

of defendants No.1 and 2 was neither inducted as

tenant over the land in dispute nor he was ever

given the land in dispute for cultivation in any

other capacity, as alleged?OPP

9 (c)Whether said Parkash Chand out of sheer, high-

handedness and force took over the possession of

the land in dispute in the year 1983-84 and

raised construction, as alleged, if so, its effect?OPP

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9. The plaintiff examined himself (PW1), and defendant

No.1 examined herself (DW3).

10. The learned Trial Court held that Moti Ram, the

predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, was recorded as a

non-occupancy tenant of the suit land. The name of Prakash

Chand was wrongly recorded to be in possession. Moti Ram

became the owner of the suit land after the commencement of the

H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. His estate was to be inherited

as per the Succession Act and not as per the provisions of the

Tenancy Act. The suit was within the limitation and was properly

valued for Court fees and jurisdiction. Hence, the learned Trial

Court answered issue No. 7(a) in the affirmative, issue No. 7(b) as

having become redundant, issue No. 9(a) partly in the affirmative,

the rest of the issues in the negative and dismissed the suit.

11. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by

the learned Trial Court, the plaintiff filed an appeal, which was

decided by the learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track

Court), Kangra at Dharmshala (learned Appellate Court). The

Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the

learned Trial Court that Moti Ram was in possession of the suit

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land as a non-occupancy tenant. He became the owner after the

commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. Entry

in favour of Prakash Chand was a stray entry. The plaintiff's plea

that Prakash Chand had forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff was

not proved. Hence, the appeal filed by the plaintiff was dismissed.

12. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by

the learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed the present

appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial

questions of law on 28.05.2009.

1.Whether the learned Courts below have erred in relying

upon documents Ext.DW1/A to Ext. DW1/C and Ext.DW2/A

and thereby erred in coming to the conclusion that the

appellants/plaintiffs have failed to prove their

dispossession in the year 1983-84?

2.Whether the learned Courts below erred in holding that

deceased Moti Ram had become the owner in the year 1975

by operation of the HP Tenancy and Land Reforms Act,

despite the defendants leading no evidence on issues No.

7(a)?

13. I have heard Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior counsel

assisted by Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants

and Mr Surinder K Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No.

2(a) to 2(c) and Mr Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for respondents

No. 4(a) and 4(d).

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14. Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior counsel for the

appellant, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in

dismissing the suit. The name of Moti Ram was deleted from the

revenue record, and the learned Courts below erred in holding

that Moti Ram was the tenant who had become the owner after

the commencement of the H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms Act.

The name of Prakash Chand was recorded by the revenue official

after conducting a proper enquiry. Therefore, he prayed that the

present appeal be allowed and the judgments and decrees passed

by the learned Courts below be set aside.

15. Mr. Sanjay Jaswal

3

, learned counsel for respondents

No. 4(a) to 4(d)

4

, submitted that the learned Courts below have

recorded concurrent findings of facts, and this Court should not

interfere with the concurrent findings of facts while deciding the

regular second appeal. The predecessor-in-interest of the

defendants, Moti Ram, was recorded to be the non-occupancy

tenant and his name was wrongly deleted. The entry in favour of

Prakash Chand is incorrect and was made in connivance with the

plaintiffs. There is no infirmity in the judgments and decrees

3

Correction carried in compliance to order dated 13.7.2026

4

Correction carried in compliance to order dated 13.7.2026

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passed by learned Courts below. Hence, he prayed that the present

appeal be dismissed.

16. Mr. Surender K. Sharma

5

, learned counsel for

respondents No. 2(a) and 2(c)

6

, adopted the submissions of Mr

Surinder K Sharma and prayed that the suit be dismissed.

17. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

Substantial Question of Law No.1:

18. Plaintiff Paras Ram (PW1) stated on oath that Prakash

Chand had taken forcible possession in the year 1984-85. He

stated, when he was recalled that Prakash Chand had taken

possession in Maagh, 1983.

19. The plaintiff’s version is not supported by the revenue

record. Copy of jamabandi for the year 1975-76 (Ext.PW1/A)

shows Moti Ram to be in possession of the payment of Galabatai

Chahram. An entry in the copy of the jambandi carries with it a

presumption of correctness. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram, (2020) 11 SCC 242:

2020 SCC OnLine SC 228 that an entry in the jamabandi carries

5

Correction carried in compliance to order dated 13.7.2026

6

Correction carried in compliance to order dated 13.7.2026

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with it a presumption of correctness under Section 45 of the H.P.

Land Revenue Act, and the burden is upon the person who alleges

to the contrary to disprove it. The burden can be discharged by

leading evidence of incapable integrity. Oral evidence is not

sufficient to hold that the presumption stands rebutted. It was

observed:

16. As per Section 32(2)(a) of the 1954 Act, record-of-

rights, i.e. jamabandi, shall include the name of persons

who are landowners, tenants or assignees of land revenue

and also the rent, land revenue, rates, cesses or other

payments due from and to each of those persons and the

Government. On the other hand, the periodical record, i.e.

khasra girdawari, as mentioned in Section 34 of the 1954

Act, is to be prepared every year as proof of the statements,

as mentioned in sub-section (2) clause (a) of Section 32,

which includes the name of the landowners, tenants and

the rent and land revenue payable. In terms of Section 45 of

the 1954 Act, the record of rights as prepared in terms of

Sections 32 and 34 of the 1954 Act carries a presumption of

truth. Still further, any person who is aggrieved by any

entry in the record of rights or a periodical record has a

right to invoke the jurisdiction of the civil court for

correction of the entries in terms of Section 46 of the 1954

Act.

17. The detailed procedure for recording periodical records

of rights, as well as the record-of-rights, in terms of

Sections 32 and 34 of the 1954 Act, has been prescribed. The

record of rights contains entries of the revenue record for

the four years. Such a record of rights carries the

presumption of correctness in terms of Section 45 of the

1954 Act and also Section 35 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for

short “the Evidence Act”). Section 109 of the Evidence Act

further contemplates whether there exists a relationship of

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landowner and tenant, and the burden of proving such a

relationship is on the person who affirms it.

18. The relevant provisions of the Evidence Act read as

under:

“35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic

record made in performance of duty.—An entry in any

public or other official book, register or record or an

electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact,

and made by a public servant in the discharge of his

official duty, or by any other person in performance of a

duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in

which such book, register, or record or an electronic

record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

***

109. Burden of proof as to relationship in the cases of

partners, landlord and tenant, principal and agent.—When

the question is whether persons are partners, landlord

and tenant, or principal and agent, and it has been

shown that they have been acting as such, the burden of

proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand,

to each other in those relationships respectively, is on

the person who affirms it.”

19. In the State of Himachal Pradesh, jamabandi, under

Section 32 of the 1954 Act, as well as Khasra Girdawari,

under Section 34 of the 1954 Act, both are record-of-rights

in terms of Section 32 of the 1954 Act and have a statutory

presumption of truth. How that presumption can be

inferred has come up for consideration before this Court

in Harish Chander v. Ghisa Ram, (1981) 1 SCC 431. This Court

held that the entries in the jamabandi carry a presumption

of truth, but such presumption is rebuttable. Once that

presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of

Respondent 1 [therein] [Ed.: The facts of Harish Chander,

(1981) 1 SCC 431, are that the name of Respondent 1 therein

was recorded as a tenant in the jamabandi for the year

1959-60 (Ext. P-1) and consistently thereafter till the year

1968 (Khasra-girdawaris Exts. P-2 to P-7). Thus, it was

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held that the statutory presumption of truth of these

entries was attracted to the benefit of Respondent 1 tenant,

and so also the reversal of the burden of proof under

Section 109 of the Evidence Act, 1872, was held to be to his

benefit. The facts of the present case are exactly the

opposite—see para 20 below—there is no entry at all in the

record of rights of the tenancy claimed by the respondent-

defendant herein. Thus, the presumption of the truth of the

record-of-rights has been held to enure to the benefit of

the appellants whose names were found to be recorded in

the record-of-rights.] by reason of the rule contained in

Section 109 of the Evidence Act, namely, that when two

persons have been shown to stand to each other in the

relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of proving

that such relationship has ceased, is on the party who so

asserts. It was held as under: (SCC pp. 431-433, paras 2 & 6)

“2. … Apart from the oral evidence, there is no

material on the record which may indicate the falsity of

any of the entries in the revenue records, and we are of

the opinion that the lower courts were fully justified in

relying on them.

***

6. No suspicion can attach to the entries in the

jamabandi for the year 1959-60, nor have the contents

of that document been assailed before us. A

presumption of truth attaches to those entries in view of

the provisions of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue

Act. That presumption is no doubt rebuttable, but no

attempt has been made to displace it. Further, once that

presumption is raised, still another comes to the aid of

Respondent 1 by reason of the rule contained in Section

109 of the Evidence Act, 1872, namely, that when two

persons have been shown to stand to each other in the

relationship of landlord and tenant, the burden of

proving that such relationship has ceased is on the party

who so asserts. It may therefore be legitimately

presumed that the plaintiff continued to possess the

land as a tenant till the institution of the suit.”

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20. The present is a case where no relationship of landlord

and tenant is mentioned in the revenue record, though

required in terms of Section 32(2)(a) of the 1954 Act. In the

absence of an entry in the revenue record, which is also

expected to contain the entry of rent and possession, the

tenancy cannot be treated as in existence only on the basis

of oral evidence of the witnesses examined by the

defendant. The burden of proving the relationship was on

the defendant. Such a burden cannot be said to be rebutted

only by oral evidence. The witnesses may lie, but the

documents do not, is a golden rule. The presumption of

truth attached to the revenue record can be rebutted only

on the basis of evidence of impeccable integrity and

reliability. The oral evidence can always be adduced

contrary to the revenue record, but such oral testimony will

not be sufficient to hold that the statutory presumption

stands rebutted.

21. This Court in Vishwa Vijay Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan,

(1976) 3 SCC 642, held that the entries in the revenue record

ought to be generally accepted at their face value and courts

should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into their

correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply

only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent entries. This

Court held as under: (Fakhrul Hassan case [Vishwa Vijay

Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642], SCC p. 645,

para 14)

“14. It is true that the entries in the revenue record

ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value, and

courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry into

their correctness. But the presumption of correctness

can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent,

entries. The distinction may be fine, but it is real. The

distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness

of what the entry in the revenue record states, but the

entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently

or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of

all its legal effect and cannot be found a claim to the

possessory title.”

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22. This Court in Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand, (1993)

4 SCC 349: AIR 1994 SC 227 was examining a dispute of the

relationship of landlord and tenant. A copy of a more than

thirty-year-old lease deed was produced to prove the

relationship between the landowner and tenant. However,

the revenue record did not show any payment of rent, but

only the existence of terms of the lease to pay rent. This

Court held that non-production of the receipts of payment

of rent clearly indicates that there was no relationship

between the landlord and tenants.

23. In Sodhi Transport Co. v. State of U.P., (1986) 2 SCC 486:

1986 SCC (Tax) 410], this Court was considering Section 28-

B of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948, which raises a

presumption of sale of goods in a manner prescribed

therein. This Court considered Section 4 of the Evidence Act

and also the previous judgments and held as under: (SCC p.

496, para 14)

“14. A presumption is not in itself evidence but only

makes a prima facie case for a party in whose favour it

exists. It is a rule concerning evidence. It indicates the

person on whom the burden of proof lies. When the

presumption is conclusive, it obviates the production of

any other evidence to dislodge the conclusion to be

drawn on proof of certain facts. But when it is

rebuttable, it only points out the party on whom lies the

duty of going forward with evidence on the fact

presumed, and when that party has produced evidence

fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact

is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is

over. Then the evidence will determine the true nature

of the fact to be established. The rules of presumption

are deduced from enlightened human knowledge and

experience and are drawn from the connection, relation

and coincidence of facts and circumstances.”

24. In another judgment in  Kumar Exports v. Sharma

Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 : (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629 : (2009) 1

SCC (Cri) 823, this Court examined the presumption of fact

in proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable

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Instruments Act, 1881. It was held that bare denial of the

passing of the consideration and existence of debt,

apparently, would not serve the purpose of the accused.

Something, which is probable, has to be brought on record

for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant.

It was held as under: (SCC p. 521, para 21)

“21. The accused also has an option to prove the non-

existence of consideration and debt or liability either by

letting in evidence or, in some clear and exceptional

cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is,

the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the

statutory notice and evidence adduced by the

complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal

evidence is adduced and accepted by the court, having

regard to all the circumstances of the case and the

preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden

shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter, the

presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will

not again come to the complainant's rescue.”

25. The presumption of truth attached to the revenue

record can be rebutted if such an entry was made

fraudulently or surreptitiously ( Vishwa Vijay

Bharati v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642) or where

such an entry has not been made by following the

prescribed procedure ( Bhimappa Channappa

Kapali v. Bhimappa Satyappa Kamagouda, (2012) 13 SCC 759:

(2014) 5 SCC (Civ) 419). Even in  Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan

Chand, (1993) 4 SCC 349: AIR 1994 SC 227, where thirty years

old lease deed was produced, this Court had not accepted

the proof of the relationship between landowner and tenant

in the absence of receipt of payment of rent.

26. Therefore, we find that the presumption of truth

attached to the record of rights can be rebutted only if there

is fraud in the entry or the entry was surreptitiously made,

or the prescribed procedure was not followed. It will not be

proper to rely on the oral evidence to rebut the statutory

presumption, as the credibility of oral evidence vis-à-vis

documentary evidence is at a much weaker level.”

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20. Similarly, the copy of the jamabandi for the year 1983-

84 mentions Prakash Chand S/o Rasila to be in possession. An

entry in the column of remarks shows that the entry in favour of

Prakash Chand was recorded as per the order passed in File No.

742 of 1986 by the Land Reforms Officer. Balak Ram s/o Parkash

Chand had applied for an electricity connection vide application

(Ext.DW1/A) on 07.08.1982. Rattan Chand, one of the co-sharers,

filed an application ‘Mark A’ in which he had claimed that Moti

Ram started cultivating the land of Paras Ram in the year 1972,

and he was wrongly recorded as a tenant under the owners, which

is incorrect. Tehsildar verified the spot position and found a

cowshed and trees on the land. These documents came into

existence long before any controversy had arisen between the

parties and have to be accepted as correct. These documents show

that the plaintiff's plea that he was in possession of the suit land

and he was dispossessed in the year 1984-85 is incorrect.

20. It was submitted that the application filed by Rattan

Chand was not proved and was merely marked. This submission

will not help the appellants. The document is a certified copy of

the application taken from the public record and is, per se,

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admissible. Hence, the mere fact that the application was marked

and not exhibited will not make any difference.

21. The statement made by the co-owner Rattan Chand in

the application that Moti Ram was a tenant under Paras Ram and

the copy of the jamabandi for the year 1975-76 (Ext.PW1/A)

corroborated the defendant's version that their predecessor Moti

Ram was in possession since 1972.

22. The plaintiff filed a copy of the order dated 28.08.1986

(Ext.A6) passed by the Land Reforms Officer, Nurupur, in the

proceedings between Rattan Chand and Paras Ram vide which the

entry in favour of Savitri Devi, Desh Raj, etc. were ordered to be

deleted. The memo of parties does not show that Savitri Devi,

Desh Raj, etc., were parties before the Land Reforms Officer, and

the order passed by the Land Reforms Officer in their absence will

not bind them, hence, no advantage can be derived from this

order.

23. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held

that the plaintiff had failed to prove his dispossession in the year

1983-84. This substantial question of law is answered

accordingly.

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Substantial Question of Law No.2:

24. The revenue record shows that Moti Ram was recorded

as the tenant on the payment of the Galabatai Chahram. All the

tenants became the owners after the commencement of the H.P.

Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. It was laid down by this Court in

Daulat Ram vs State of HP 1979 Shim. LC 215 = 1978 ILR (HP) 742

that the conferment of proprietary rights was automatic on the

appointed day. It was observed:

“23. I have already quoted sub-section (3) of section 104 of

the Act. Under the provision of this sub-section, the rights

of the landowner in the land held by a tenant shall stand

extinguished, and his rights, title and interest shall vest in

the tenant free from all encumbrances created by the

landowner with effect from 1-10-19/3 on payment of

compensation. Therefore, the provision of law does not

leave any room for doubt that a person who is entered as a

tenant is to become the owner of the land with effect from

1-10-97 3 on payment of compensation or from the date of

the publication of the rules, as already stated above. So,

there is no question of laying any condition or imposing a

fetter on the rights of ownership. The rights that are to vest

are without any fetters, and the law enjoins to confer

absolute ownership in the land. Therefore, if any fetter is

laid that would be in contravention of this statutory

provision, and any such condition which is against the

statutory provision would be void….”

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25. This judgment was followed in Asif Beg v. Estate

Officer/Station Commander, 2016 SCC OnLine HP 4318, wherein it

was observed:

31. It appears that the mandate of Section 104(3) of the HP

Tenancy Act is that the moment the Act has come into

force, all rights of the landowners are extinguished and a

person who is in possession of the land as a non-

occupancy tenant steps into the shoes of an owner and

becomes the owner. Thus, it is automatic, and there is no

question of following any mechanism. May be the Tenancy

Rules provide for following any mechanism, but that is

only for making entries in the revenue records. It does not

mean that in case an entry is not made or a mutation is not

effected/recorded, the said person is not the owner.

32. This Court in a case titled Daulat Ram v. State of

Himachal Pradesh, 1979 Shim. L.C. 215 held that a person

recorded as a non-occupancy tenant has to reap the fruits.

Further held that the State cannot take a plea that the writ

petitioners were not tenants and the revenue record is

wrong because once the tenants are so recorded, by

operation of law, they become the owners of the land. It is

apt to reproduce relevant portions of paras 15 and 23 of the

judgment herein:

“15. …………………Therefore, from that date, the

ownership rights vested free from all encumbrances on

the persons who were so recorded as tenants under the

landowners or, for the matter of that, the State

Government in that land. Therefore, the plea taken up

by the Respondents that they were not the tenants is

wholly incorrect because they cannot set up this case

when they are so recorded, and once they are so

recorded, they become the owner of the land by virtue

of the operation of law, and they actually became

owners with effect from the date of the publication of

the rules,

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xxx xxx xxx

23. I have already quoted Subsection (3) of Section 104

of the Act. Under the provision of this Subsection, the

rights of the landowner in the land held by a tenant

shall stand extinguished, and his such rights, title and

interest shall vest in the tenant free from all

encumbrances created by the landowner with effect

from 1101973 on payment of compensation. Therefore,

the provision of law does not leave any room for doubt

that a person who is entered as a tenant is to become

the owner of the land with effect from 1101973 on

payment of compensation or from the date of the

publication of the rules, as already stated above. So,

there is no question of laying any condition or imposing

a letter on the rights of ownership. The rights that are

vested are without any fetters, and the law enjoins to

confer absolute ownership in the land. Therefore, if any

fetter is laid that would be in contravention of this

statutory provision, and any such condition which is

against the statutory provision would be void. ………”

33. In the cases titled as Shri Bishambhar Nath v. Shri Hari

Chand, (1993) 3 SLJ 2906; Sant Ram v. Jash Ram, (1995) 3 SLJ

2510; and Jethu through K. Guddi v. Gobind Singh, (1995) 4

SLJ 3031, it has been held that the proprietary rights stand

conferred upon the tenants by operation of law. It is apt to

reproduce para 27 of the judgment in Jethu's case (supra)

herein:

“27. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid circumstances

examined during the trial, both the Courts below acted

illegally in ignoring the legally competent evidence

supporting the defendants' plea of tenancy as claimed

by them. The defendants having been held to be in

occupation of the suit land as tenants since 195455, till

date, accordingly, under Section 104 of the HP. Tenancy

and Land Reforms Act, the proprietary rights in respect

of the suit land stood conferred upon them, and they

have become owners of the same by operation of law.”

21

2026:HHC:24828

34. In the case titled as Mohar Singh v. Manju Devi, (1997) 1

SLJ 304, this Court has held that the conferment of

proprietary rights under the HP Tenancy Act is automatic

and by operation of law. It is apt to reproduce the relevant

portion of para 11 of the judgment herein:

“11. …………………Needless to point out here that after the

coming into force of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and

Land Reforms Act, 1972, the conferment of proprietory

right is automatic and by operation of law. The rest of

the matter is procedural as required under the Act, and

the rules framed thereunder.”

35. This issue stands clinched by the Apex Court in Civil

Appeal No. 5424 of 1998, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh

v. Chander Dev, wherein it has been held that conferment of

the proprietary rights is automatic. It is apt to reproduce

the relevant portion of the judgment herein:

“……………From the above provisions, it is clear that all

rights, title and interest of a landowner shall be

extinguished and all such rights, title and interest shall,

with effect from the date to be notified by the State

Government in the Official Gazette, vest in the tenant

free from all encumbrances.”

36. The Apex Court in the case titled as Tarsem Lal v. Ram

Sarup, 2014 AIR SCW 2886, held that a tenant becomes an

owner on the enforcement of the Act. It is apt to reproduce

para 13 of the judgment herein:

“13. As per the aforesaid provision, all right, title and

interest including a contingent interest of a land owner

other than the land owner entitled to resume land under

subsection(l) shall be extinguished and all such rights,

title and interest in respect of the land in question vest

in the tenant, i. e. original plaintiff, free from all

encumbrances from the date the Act came into force.

The Act was published in the Official Gazette on 21st

February, 1974 vide Act No. 8 of 1974. What is not in

dispute is that the original plaintiff became owner of

the suit land by operation of law and continued to enjoy

22

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all the rights, including the right of irrigation from the

common source, which was in possession of the original

landlord.”

37. Thus, it is accordingly held that the conferment of the

proprietary rights is automatic, by operation of law.

26. Therefore, the order passed by Land Reforms Officer

(Ext.P5) deleting the name of Desh Raj from the column of

possession was of no effect because Moti Ram had become the

owner, and his legal heirs would inherit the land as owners. The

Land Reforms Officer had no jurisdiction to delete the name of the

owner from the column of possession. Hence, this substantial

question of law is answered accordingly.

Final Order:

27. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the judgments and

decrees passed by learned Courts below; hence, the present appeal

fails, and it is dismissed.

28. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed

of.

29. Records of the learned Courts below be sent down

forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

25

th

June, 2026

(Nikita)